in Re the State of Texas Ex Rel. Abelino Reyna, Relator v. Court of Appeals for the Tenth District ( 2015 )

WR-83,719-01
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 9/14/2015 4:10:01 PM
Accepted 9/15/2015 8:45:28 AM
ABEL ACOSTA
TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS CLERK
________________________________
CASE NO.
September 16, 2015
WR-83, 719-01
________________________________
IN RE STATE OF TEXAS EX REL. ABELINO REYNA,
Relator
________________________________
Trial Cause No. 2015-1955-2
In the 54th District Court, McLennan County
Appellate Cause No. 10-14-00235-CR
10th Court of Appeals
Waco, Texas
_________________________________________________________
BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND 24 MEDIA ORGANIZATIONS* IN
OPPOSITION TO RELATOR’S APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS
__________________________________________________________
Hannah Bloch-Wehba
State Bar No. 24087175
hblochwehba@rcfp.org
Counsel of Record
Bruce D. Brown
Katie Townsend
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
1156 15th Street NW, Suite 1250
Washington, D.C. 20005
Tel.: (202) 795-9300
* A full list of amici is reproduced Fax: (202) 795-9310
on the next page
IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press
American Society of News Editors
The Associated Press
Association of Alternative Newsmedia
Courthouse News Service
Cox Media Group, Inc.
First Amendment Coalition
First Look Media, Inc.
Gannett Co., Inc.
Hearst Corporation
Investigative Reporting Workshop at American University
MPA – The Association of Magazine Media
National Association of Black Journalists
National Newspaper Association
The National Press Club
National Press Photographers Association
The New York Times Company
The News Guild – CWA
Newspaper Association of America
Online News Association
Radio Television Digital News Association
Society of Professional Journalists
The Star-Telegram
Texas Press Association
Tully Center for Free Speech
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................................... i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iv
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................... 1
FEE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......................................................................... 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ................................................................................ 2
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 4
I.
Gag orders like the one at issue here impinge on constitutionally protected
newsgathering activities and restrict the flow of accurate, newsworthy
information about matters of public interest. .................................................... 4
II.
The Texas Constitution and the First Amendment impose stringent standards
that must be satisfied for a gag order to issue in a criminal case. ..................... 5
A.
The Davenport standard is compelled by Article I, Section 8 of the Texas
Constitution and applies in both civil and criminal cases. ........................ 5
B.
The First Amendment requires a finding of “substantial likelihood” of
prejudice to the defendant’s fair trial rights. ............................................. 9
III.
Only in the most extreme cases will pretrial publicity threaten a criminal
defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial before an impartial jury................... 11
A.
This Court has consistently held that extensive news coverage is not
inherently prejudicial to a defendant’s fair trial rights. ........................... 11
B.
Federal courts agree that even widespread, adverse publicity does not
violate the fair trial rights of criminal defendants. .................................. 14
IV.
The gag order at issue is unsupported by findings sufficient to satisfy either the
Texas or the federal constitutional standards. ................................................. 19
A.
The record in this case is devoid of any specific findings to support a
substantial likelihood—let alone a serious and imminent threat—of
prejudice. ................................................................................................. 20
V.
The Court of Appeals’ grant of mandamus was correct on other constitutional
grounds. ........................................................................................................... 24
ii
A.
The gag order is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague....................... 25
B.
The trial court improperly rejected alternatives to its expansive prior
restraint on speech. .................................................................................. 27
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 28
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4(i)(3)................................. 30
APPENDIX A ........................................................................................................... 1
APPENDIX B ........................................................................................................... 9
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) ................................ 11, 12, 20
Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ................................. 24
Calley v. Calloway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied 425 U.S. 911 (1976) ...................................................... 15, 16, 17, 21
Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2004) ....................................................... 15
CBS Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) ................................................. 4, 9
Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia, 822 S.W.2d 675
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ) ............................................................. 4
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)............... passim
Ex parte McCormick, 88 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1935) ................................ 7
Ex parte Tucker, 220 S.W. 75 (Tex. 1920). .............................................................. 6
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) ............................................. 9
Gonzalez v. State, 222 S.W.3d 446 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) .................................. 13
Henley v. State, 576 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ....................................... 13
Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982)..................................................................................... 5, 8
In re Benton, 238 S.W.3d 587
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) ........................................ passim
In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850 (4th Cir. 1989)................................... 10, 27
In re Graves, 217 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.) .................. passim
In re Houston Chron. Publ’g Co., 64 S.W.3d 103
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) ........................................... 8, 23
Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986) ............................. 9
iv
Levine v. U.S. Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1985) ......................................... 5
Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975) ................................................................ 14
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) ............................................ 21
Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Texas, Inc.,
975 S.W.2d 546, 559 (Tex. 1998) ......................................................................... 6
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) ............................................................. 10, 17
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) ....................................................... 13
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).............................................................. 18
Rubenstein v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) ............................... 13
San Antonio Express-News v. Roman, 861 S.W.2d 265
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1993, no writ) ............................................................. 8
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) ........................................................ 4, 18
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) ..................................... 14, 15, 17, 21
Teague v. State, 864 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ............................. 11
United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000)........................................ 9, 10
United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596 (6th Cir. 1987) .................................. 10, 21, 25
United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2002)....................................... 14
United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976) .................................... 15
United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2001) ................................................. 9
United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194 (3d Cir. 2007) ............................................... 9
United States v. Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740 (5th Cir. 2011) ........................................... 15
Other Authorities
Dane Schiller, Waco Twin Peaks says it’s working with police after
biker brawl, Houston Chron. (May 20, 2015, 8:48 A.M.), archived at
http://perma.cc/J5Q4-ETNW .............................................................................. 16
v
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici file this brief in opposition to Relator’s Application for a Writ of
Mandamus. As representatives and members of the media, amici have a strong
interest in preserving their ability to gather news and report on ongoing criminal
proceedings, and in ensuring that any prior restraint on speech imposed by a court
meets constitutional requirements.
The impact of this Court’s resolution of Relator’s Application extends
beyond this case. Accordingly, amici submit this brief to emphasize the
constitutional interests at stake and the impact that gag orders like the one entered
by the trial court have on all members of the media. A supplemental statement of
identity and interest of amici curiae is included below as Appendix A.
FEE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 11(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, amici
state that no fee was paid or will be paid for the preparing of this brief.
1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The gag order imposed by the trial court in this case has placed
unconstitutional restrictions on speech and prevented members of the media from
gathering the news and reporting on matters of significant public interest. The trial
court failed to apply the correct legal standards for determining whether and to
what extent the constitutional rights of the press and the public under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the
Texas Constitution must yield to preserve a defendant’s ability to receive a fair
trial by an impartial jury. The Tenth Court of Appeals, below, was thus correct in
conditionally granting mandamus relief and ordering the trial court to vacate its
gag order. See In re Clendennen, No. 10-15-00235-CR (Tex. App.—Waco August
7, 2015) (not designated for publication). This Court should uphold that ruling.
The standard set forth in Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1992)
(orig. proceeding) is the correct standard for evaluating the constitutionality of a
prior restraint like the one at issue here under Texas law. The gag order entered by
the trial court in this case not only fails to satisfy that heightened standard, it also
fails to satisfy the standard compelled by the U.S. Constitution. The record in this
case does not include any findings of inflammatory or prejudicial media coverage
supporting a determination that Matthew Allen Clendennen’s (“Clendennen”) fair
trial rights would be threatened in any way by public access to information about
2
his case—let alone findings of prejudice to the extent required to justify curtailing
the exercise of state and federal constitutional rights. For that reason alone, the
Court of Appeals’ ruling was correct.
In addition, the gag order is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Not
only does it purport to restrain the speech of too many individuals, including
witnesses and law enforcement officers who do not possess information that could
jeopardize Clendennen’s fair trial rights, but the order also restricts too much
speech and is of unlimited duration. The order prevents any gagged individual
from making any statement whatsoever to the media, without regard to whether it
is innocuous, purely factual, or already a matter of public record. The trial court
made no attempt to narrowly tailor the gag order to prevent dissemination only of
prejudicial material, or even to limit the order’s duration. It is unclear from the
language of the gag order what speech—if any—concerning Clendennen’s case or
the underlying incident falls safely outside its ambit.
Finally, the trial court failed to give proper consideration to alternatives
designed to safeguard the integrity and impartiality of a jury, including voir dire,
which is normally sufficient to root out prejudice, even in the most high-profile
and publicized of criminal trials.
For these reasons, amici urge this Court to deny Relator’s Application for a
Writ of Mandamus.
3
ARGUMENT
I.   Gag orders like the one at issue here impinge on constitutionally
protected newsgathering activities and restrict the flow of accurate,
newsworthy information about matters of public interest.
Media access to criminal proceedings, court records, and trial participants is
essential to the public’s understanding and oversight of the judicial system. For
centuries, the press has played a critical role in facilitating public oversight of the
courts. “A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field.” Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism. . . . And where there was no threat or menace to the
integrity of the trial, we have consistently required that the press have
a free hand, even though we sometimes deplored its sensationalism.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Both the Texas Constitution and U.S. Constitution protect newsgathering
activities, including the right of a reporter to receive information from a willing
speaker. See Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia, 822 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1991, no writ) (emphasizing that “news gathering” activities
are protected by both the state and federal constitutions); CBS Inc. v. Young, 522
F.2d 234, 237–38 (6th Cir. 1975) (gag order “directly impaired or curtailed” the
media’s “constitutionally guaranteed right” to gather the news); Levine v. U.S.
4
Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1985) (“By effectively denying the media
access to litigants, the district court’s order raises an issue under the first
amendment by impairing the media’s ability to gather news.”) (citation omitted).
Gag orders curtail the exercise of that right, and restrict the flow of accurate,
newsworthy information to the public about matters of public interest. They
prevent the media and, by extension, the public, from obtaining information about
a case from the most knowledgeable individuals, verifying information obtained
elsewhere, and clarifying or contextualizing arguments asserted in court documents
or proceedings. The effect of such orders is to reduce both the quantity and quality
of information flowing to the public about matters vital to self-governance, such as
the administration of justice, public safety, and law enforcement activities.
II.   The Texas Constitution and the First Amendment impose stringent
standards that must be satisfied for a gag order to issue in a criminal
case.
A.  The Davenport standard is compelled by Article I, Section 8 of the
Texas Constitution and applies in both civil and criminal cases.
Article I, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution states that “[e]very person shall
be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being
responsible for the abuse of that privilege….” See also Houston Chron. Publ’g
Co. v. Shaver, 630 S.W.2d 927, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (“The central idea
embodied in the Constitution is simple: Express what one will, understanding one
may be called to account for abusing the privilege.”). Courts in this state have long
5
recognized that “[p]unishment for the abuse of the right [to free speech], not
prevention of its exercise, is what [this] provision contemplates.” Ex parte Tucker,
220 S.W. 75, 76 (Tex. 1920) (emphasis added). Thus, as “the text, history, and
purpose of the provision” make clear, Article I, Section 8 provides heightened
protection against prior restraints on speech that exceed even the stringent
protections afforded by the First Amendment. Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned
Parenthood of Houston & Se. Texas, Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 559 (Tex. 1998).
Because the Texas Constitution provides “greater rights of free expression
than its federal equivalent,” Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 10, the Texas Supreme
Court has applied a particularly exacting standard to evaluate gag orders, holding
that such orders:
will withstand constitutional scrutiny only where there are specific
findings supported by evidence that (1) an imminent and irreparable
harm to the judicial process will deprive litigants of a just resolution
of their dispute, and (2) the judicial action represents the least
restrictive means to prevent that harm.
Id.; see also id. at 36 (stating that federal First Amendment standards are
insufficiently protective of “the rights of free expression that we believe that the
fundamental law of our state secures”).
The constitutional standard announced in Davenport is applicable in
criminal cases as well as civil disputes. By requiring the risk of prejudice to a
criminal defendant to be “imminent and irreparable” to justify a gag order, the
6
Davenport standard correctly reflects the Texas Constitution’s animosity toward
prior restraints, and its recognition that in all but the most extreme cases any risk of
prejudice from pretrial publicity may be cured by less drastic remedial measures.
See Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 10–11 (placing more faith in remedial measures
than federal case law); see also Benton, 238 S.W.3d at 600 (“[I]t is only the
occasional case that presents a danger of prejudice from pretrial publicity.”).
Application of the Davenport standard in the criminal context is also
consistent with this Court’s precedent, as well as the decisions of lower appellate
courts. Over a century ago, this Court recognized that prior restraints conflict with
“the genius and spirit of our free institutions, which is intended to guaranty
publicity to the proceedings of our courts, and the greatest freedom in the
discussion of the doings of such tribunals, consistent with truth and decency.” Ex
parte Foster, 71 S.W. 593, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 1903). Because prior restraints
are particularly disfavored as a matter of Texas constitutional law, this Court has
rejected attempts to prevent publication of testimony adduced in criminal trials.
See id. at 595 (holding a prior restraint on publication of testimony
unconstitutional); Ex parte McCormick, 88 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Tex. Crim. App.
1935) (holding a prior restraint on publication of testimony unconstitutional).
Similarly, this Court has recognized that prior restraints that deny the press and the
public access to information about criminal proceedings are almost always
7
unnecessary because “in our adversary system of criminal justice the ultimate
safeguard against prejudicial publicity is the right of the accused to demonstrate
that the media’s coverage of his case—be it printed or broadcast—compromised
the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to adjudicate fairly.” Shaver,
630 S.W.2d at 933 (internal citation marks omitted).
Recognizing that the Davenport standard strikes the correct constitutional
balance, and is sufficiently protective of criminal defendants’ fair trial rights, the
Tenth and Fourth Courts of Appeals have expressly held that it applies in criminal
cases. See In re Graves, 217 S.W.3d 744, 749 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, no pet.);
see also San Antonio Express-News v. Roman, 861 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1993, no writ). As the Court of Appeals in San Antonio Express-
News explained, “[t]he application of Davenport to a criminal proceeding is
appropriate as a means of protecting the public’s right of access to criminal trials
and proceedings and free speech through the dissemination of public
information—especially when, as in this case, the criminal defendant has raised no
challenge that without the gag order he will be deprived of a fair trial.” 861
S.W.2d. at 268 (citations omitted).1
1
While other Courts of Appeals have failed to apply the Davenport standard in criminal cases,
they have either declined to reach the question of its application, or not articulated any rationale
for rejecting it. See In re Benton, 238 S.W.3d 587, 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007,
no pet.) (“We need not determine whether the higher Davenport standard applies in this criminal
8
B.  The First Amendment requires a finding of “substantial likelihood”
of prejudice to the defendant’s fair trial rights.
Gag orders are also presumptively invalid under the U.S. Constitution.
Young, 522 F.2d at 238; see also Journal Publ’g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233,
1236 (10th Cir. 1986) (stating that “any inhibitions against news coverage of a trial
carry a heavy presumption of an unconstitutional prior restraint”). A gag order that
restricts the speech of lawyers and parties may issue only when a court makes
specific findings showing that extrajudicial commentary by those individuals
presents a “substantial likelihood of material prejudice” to the court’s ability to
conduct a fair trial, and the order must be narrowly tailored and the least restrictive
means available to preserve the fairness of the trial. Gentile v. State Bar of
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1063 (1991); United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 427–
28 (5th Cir. 2000).2 Speech restrictions must be no greater than essential to
case, because the record and the findings do not support the imposition of a gag order even under
the lower standards articulated in Gentile [v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991)] and
Brown.”); In re Houston Chron. Publ’g Co., 64 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.) (upholding a gag order without explaining the legal basis for the decision).
2
Federal courts have applied “varying standards to review gag orders depending on whom or
what is being gagged.” United States v. Scarfo, 263 F.3d 80, 92 (3d Cir. 2001). For example,
reasoning that tighter restrictions on the speech of lawyers—as opposed to witnesses and
potential trial participants—may be permissible “[b]ecause lawyers have special access to
information through discovery and client communication” and, thus, their extrajudicial
statements may pose a greater threat of prejudice, Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1074, some federal courts
have concluded that restrictions on lawyers’ speech must present a “reasonable likelihood” of
material prejudice to the fairness of the proceedings to pass constitutional muster. The majority
of jurisdictions require a higher showing for such gag orders. See United States v. Wecht, 484
F.3d 194, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2007) (“every state, as well as a majority of federal district courts,
now apply rules that are more protective of speech than the reasonable likelihood standard”). In
9
prevent the specific harm identified. See Brown, 218 F.3d at 427–28; United
States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1987). Because large quantities of
speech about a given case carry no risk of prejudicial effect, gag orders that impose
a blanket “no comment” rule, without exceptions, are unlikely to satisfy
constitutional mandates. See id. (concluding that a “no comment” gag order was
not narrowly tailored).
For a gag order to be constitutional, it also must be the least restrictive
means of preserving the defendant’s rights. The power of voir dire and other
curative measures to negate the effect of any prejudicial publicity should not be
understated. See Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038 (1984) (“It is fair to assume
that the method we have relied on since the beginning [voir dire], usually identifies
bias.”) (citation omitted); In re Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d 850, 855–56 (4th Cir.
1989) (“Increasingly the courts are expressing confidence that voir dire can serve
in almost all cases as a reliable protection against juror bias however induced.”).
considering the validity of a prior restraint on attorney speech, the Texas Supreme Court has also
“assume[d] that the Gentile standard is a constitutional minimum.” Comm’n for Lawyer
Discipline v. Benton, 980 S.W.2d 425, 431 (Tex. 1998) (emphasis added).
10
III.   Only in the most extreme cases will pretrial publicity threaten a
criminal defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial before an impartial
jury.
A.  This Court has consistently held that extensive news coverage is not
inherently prejudicial to a defendant’s fair trial rights.
Under Texas law, publicity must be “pervasive, prejudicial, and
inflammatory” before it is found to pose a risk to a defendant’s right to an impartial
jury. Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 946 (1997) (“The mere fact of media attention and publicity do
not, however, automatically establish prejudice.”). This Court has repeatedly
rejected arguments that pretrial news coverage creates “outside influences affecting
the community’s climate of opinion as to a defendant are so inherently suspect that
the resulting probability of unfairness requires suitable procedural safeguards” to
guard against prejudice. Faulder v. State, 745 S.W.2d 327, 338 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
In Teague v. State, for example, a defendant convicted of capital murder
argued that the “the trial court should have granted his motion for a change of
venue because of the prejudicial pretrial publicity” surrounding his case. 864
S.W.2d 505, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993), abrogated by Robertson v. State, 871
S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Teague introduced evidence showing that
several area newspapers and television channels had covered his case. Id. at 510.
This Court found that Teague was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to
11
grant his motion for a change of venue despite the fact that several jurors were
aware of the case because Teague “did not show the outside influences affecting
the community as to him were so inherently suspect as to raise doubt about the
likelihood of obtaining a fair and impartial jury.” Id.
Similarly, in Bell v. State, a man who had been convicted multiple times of
capital murder charges sought to challenge one conviction on the grounds of
improper denial of a motion for change of venue. 938 S.W.2d at 41, 44. He
entered 150 newspaper articles and excerpts from nine television news broadcasts
into the record, including one broadcast that intimated his guilt, along with
testimony from attorneys who opined that he could not receive a fair trial in
Jefferson County. Id. at 45–46. Thirty-six of the sixty veniremembers, drawn
from a qualified jury pool of less than 130,000, had existing knowledge of his case,
including six jurors selected for service. Id. at 45–46. Nevertheless, this Court
held that the defendant’s right to an impartial jury was not violated. Id. at 46–47.
“The mere fact of media attention and publicity do not,” the Court reasoned,
“automatically establish prejudice or require a change of venue; jurors do not have
to be totally ignorant of the facts and issues of a particular case.” Id. at 46. This
Court agreed with the trial court that the news coverage was not sufficiently
“inflammatory, pervasive, or prejudicial” to violate defendant’s right to an
12
impartial jury, and that jury panel questionnaires sufficiently guarded against
prejudicial influence. Id.
As this Court has made clear, “even extensive knowledge of the case or
defendant in the community as a result of pretrial publicity is not sufficient if there
is not also some showing of prejudicial or inflammatory coverage.” Gonzalez v.
State, 222 S.W.3d 446, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The extent and nature of
pretrial publicity will be found to have risen to that level only in the most extreme
circumstances. Indeed, amici are aware of only a single case in which this Court
has found that a trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a motion for a
change of venue for reasons of pretrial publicity: In 1966, this Court reversed the
conviction of Jack Rubenstein, or Jack Ruby, the killer of President John F.
Kennedy’s assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, because “the Dallas County climate was
one of such strong feeling that it was not humanly possible to give Ruby a fair and
impartial trial which is the hallmark of American due process of law.” Rubenstein
v. State, 407 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (McDonald, J., concurring).3
3
In Henley v. State, 576 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), this Court held that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to hold a hearing on the issue of pretrial publicity. That issue is
not presented here.
13
B.  Federal courts agree that even widespread, adverse publicity does
not violate the fair trial rights of criminal defendants.
The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise made clear that the criminal justice
system both anticipates and tolerates jurors who have been exposed to pretrial
publicity as an inevitable consequence of an informed citizenry. See Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1878) (“[E]very case of public interest is
almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people
in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors
who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion
in respect to its merits.”); Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 n.4 (1975) (“We
must distinguish between mere familiarity with petitioner or his past and an actual
predisposition against him, just as we have in the past distinguished largely factual
publicity from that which is invidious or inflammatory.”).
Thus, to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s requirement of an impartial jury,
“[i]t is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a
verdict based on the evidence in court.” Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under the federal constitution, for pretrial publicity to
reach the point of interfering with a defendant’s fair trial rights, the publicity must
be so inflammatory that any juror exposed to it could not be expected to render an
impartial verdict. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 382–83 (2010)
(discussing that publicity must be “the kind of vivid, unforgettable information”
14
that is “particularly likely to produce prejudice”); United States v. Lipscomb, 299
F.3d 303, 344 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the fair trial right “is violated only if . . .
the trial atmosphere [is] utterly corrupted by press coverage”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
To determine whether the nature of pretrial publicity has risen to this level,
district courts must consider the circumstances of each case, including, for
example: (1) the time elapsed between the coverage and the trial4; (2) whether the
coverage contains “confessions or other blatantly prejudicial information of the
type readers or viewers could not reasonably be expected to shut from sight”5; and
(3) whether the coverage invites prejudgment of, or expresses opinions about, a
particular defendant’s guilt.6
In many high-profile criminal cases—including those involving the
Watergate defendants, the platoon leader in the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, and
Enron executive Jeffrey Skilling—voir dire of prospective jurors sufficiently
guarded against prejudice.7
4
Skilling, 561 U.S. at 383.
5
Id. at 382.
6
Id. at 383 (considering whether the coverage contains reports of a “smoking gun”); id. at 384
n.17 (“[W]hen publicity is about the event, rather than directed at individual defendants, this may
lessen any prejudicial impact.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Wilcox, 631 F.3d 740, 747 (5th Cir. 2011) (considering whether publicity “probatively
incriminated” the defendant); Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004).
7
See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1262 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that 10 of the
12 jurors selected “claimed to have followed Watergate casually, if at all”), rev’d on other
15
Perhaps the best example of the principle that remedial measures normally
suffice to protect defendants’ rights is Calley v. Callaway, in which Lieutenant
Calley, leader of the platoon responsible for the My Lai massacre in Vietnam, was
convicted in a military court. 519 F.2d 184, 190–191 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
425 U.S. 911 (1976). The massacre, and Lt. Calley’s involvement in it, had
received “massive” amounts of “intense” publicity. Id. at 205. The record
contained “volumes of clippings, reports and extracts from written reports on the
case, as well as video tapes” of news coverage. Id. at 204. The federal district
court that reviewed Lt. Calley’s conviction found that he “had been persecuted and
pilloried by the news media so intent on making prejudicial revelations about the
incident” that it was “not humanly possible for the jurors not to be improperly
influenced by” the news coverage, which had “lasting emotional impact.” Id. at
205. The court concluded “it would be sheer fantasy to believe that the jurors did
not see, hear and read (the publicity) or that they were not influenced by it,” and
held that Lt. Calley’s Sixth Amendment right had been violated. Id.
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the publicity was not prejudicial, and
that Lt. Calley had not been deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
grounds sub nom., Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Calley, 519 F.2d at 206
(“the exhaustive voir dire conducted at trial indicates that there is no likelihood that pretrial
publicity prejudiced Lieutenant Calley”); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 384 (“the extensive screening
questionnaire and follow-up voir dire were well suited to that task”).
16
Stating that it could not “accept the position that ‘prominence brings prejudice,’”
the Fifth Circuit closely examined the publicity in the record before it and
determined that while some of the coverage contained “virulent and oppressive
attacks on Calley,” “a good deal of the extensive publicity” contained “objective
statements of the facts known and discovered about the My Lai incident.” Id. at
206. The federal court of appeals distinguished “‘straight news stories’” from
“‘invidious articles which would tend to arouse ill will and vindictiveness,’” and
concluded that “there appears to have been no single sentiment regarding the case
held by a vast segment of the American public.” Id. (quoting Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541, 556 (1962)).
The Fifth Circuit also found that a “searching and sensitively conducted voir
dire” eliminated the likelihood that the jurors selected “were other than fair and
impartial individuals who would determine Calley’s guilt or innocence based
solely on the evidence developed before the court.” Id. at 208–09. As the court
explained, “[t]he law does not prohibit the informed citizen from participating in
the affairs of justice. In prominent cases of national concern, we cannot allow
widespread publicity concerning these matters to paralyze our system of justice.”
Id. at 210.
The Fifth Circuit’s approach comports with U.S. Supreme Court precedent.
See Patton, 467 U.S. at 1025, 1029–30 (holding that pretrial publicity did not
17
violate the right to an impartial jury, despite the fact that 77 percent of prospective
jurors “admitted they would carry an opinion into the jury box” and eight of the
fourteen jurors and alternates actually seated “admitted that at some time they had
formed an opinion as to Yount’s guilt”); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 375, 377, 385
(holding that the district court properly denied a motion to change venue, despite
“community passion aroused by Enron’s collapse and the vitriolic media
treatment” of the defendant, which “wrote of Skilling’s guilt as a foregone
conclusion”).
In the small number of cases in which the United States Supreme Court has
found such overwhelming prejudice that the defendant was denied his right to
receive a fair trial, the inflammatory nature of the media coverage was extreme.
See Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 72, 723–27 (1963) (finding multiple television
broadcasts of footage of the defendant “in jail, flanked by the sheriff and two state
troopers, admitting in detail the commission of the robbery, kidnapping, and
murder, in response to leading questions by the sheriff” prejudicial); Sheppard, 384
U.S. at 334–36, 358, 363 (declining to hold that months of “virulent” pretrial
publicity alone deprived the defendant of a fair trial, even though the media
televised a three-day inquest, during which the defendant “was examined for more
than five hours without counsel”; vacating the defendant’s conviction only after
considering factors unrelated to the content of pretrial publicity).
18
As the foregoing cases illustrate, pretrial publicity must be extraordinary to
prejudice a defendant’s rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury. And, even in
sensational cases, voir dire and other remedial measures are sufficient safeguards.
IV.   The gag order at issue is unsupported by findings sufficient to satisfy
either the Texas or the federal constitutional standards.
This case arises out of a gang-related shootout that resulted in nine deaths,
eighteen injuries and more than 170 arrests. See Dane Schiller, Waco Twin Peaks
says it’s working with police after biker brawl, Houston Chron. (May 20, 2015,
8:48 A.M.), archived at http://perma.cc/J5Q4-ETNW. The incident received both
local and national media coverage when it occurred because the shooting raised
issues of public safety, law enforcement, and gang violence. The nature of the
media coverage was immediately praised by law enforcement. See App. 5, Video
File B at 11:15 8 ( “the media assistance that we had here yesterday was very good
in getting information out quickly to our public”); App. 5, Video File C at 24:30
(“the media is doing a phenomenal job as well providing information and getting
that out”). Indeed, law enforcement described news coverage of the incident as
“responsible,” and encouraged members of the media to continue to verify facts
with police. See App. 5, Video File C at 2:44 (“I would ask you to continue
8
All subsequent references to “App.” refer to Clendennen’s Appendix for Writ of Mandamus,
filed with the Tenth Court of Appeals on July 8, 2015.
19
responsible reporting. If you don’t know that it’s a fact, please come to me and I
will give you that information if I can.”).
The only specific reference to Clendennen in the news coverage in the
record is an online report by KCEN-TV, which describes Clendennen’s efforts to
subpoena surveillance footage in connection with this prosecution. App. 3 at Ex.
B. That story refers to Clendennen as “a man charged in the May 17th Twin Peaks
shootings,” and quotes Clendennen’s counsel as saying that the police “have
repeatedly given the public contradictory information about the events,” and that
Clendennen wanted the video footage “to show there was no probable cause to
arrest” him and to loosen his bond conditions at a hearing on August 10, 2015. Id.
On June 30, 2015, the McLennan County District Attorney’s Office filed a
motion for a gag order approximately ten minutes before the trial court was to hear
its motion to quash Clendennen’s subpoena for the surveillance footage of the
shootout. Pet. at 2. As a result, neither Clendennen nor members of the news
media had any meaningful opportunity to oppose the gag order prior to its entry
A. The record in this case is devoid of any specific findings to
support a substantial likelihood—let alone a serious and imminent
threat—of prejudice.
The Court of Appeals was correct that the trial court abused its discretion by
issuing the gag order. The trial court’s conclusion that prejudice was reasonably
likely to result from future news coverage was speculative, conclusory, and
20
unsupported by any specific findings. See Graves, 217 S.W.3d at 752 (requiring
the court to make “specific findings supported by evidence”); Davenport, 834
S.W.2d. at 10.
The trial court did not identify a single news report that contained any
“prejudicial, or inflammatory” coverage—let alone such coverage concerning
Clendennen specifically. Bell, 938 S.W.2d at 46. Indeed, the gag order did not
discuss the concept of “prejudice,” focusing instead on the quantity of coverage.
See App’x 4 at 1–2. For example, the court commented on “extensive local and
national media coverage,” and expressed concern about the “volume of pre-trial
publicity,” the “willingness” of counsel to speak with the media, and the inability
of a delay to “lessen the publicity generated by this case.” Id. at 2. It offered only
conclusory statements that “publicity will interfere with the defendant’s right to a
fair trial” and that the publicity posed a “specific threat to the judicial process.” Id.
These findings are facially insufficient to support a gag order. The mere fact
that news coverage about a particular event has been prevalent does not support a
conclusion that such coverage is substantially likely to be prejudicial or poses an
imminent threat to a defendant’s rights. See Calley, 519 F.2d at 206. The proper
inquiry is not whether counsel, the parties, or trial participants exhibit a
“willingness to give interviews to the media,” or whether the resulting news
coverage has been “extensive,” App’x 4 at 1, but whether the nature and content of
21
the publicity is sufficiently threatening to the ability to seat an impartial jury.
Nothing in the record suggests that news coverage of such an inflammatory nature
has occurred or will occur in the absence of a gag order. And there is nothing to
indicate that the effect of anticipated news coverage would be so irreparably
damaging that no alternative remedial measures could “blunt the impact of pretrial
publicity.” Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 565 (1976).9
Moreover, the trial court failed to take into account that any prejudicial
effect of media coverage diminishes with time. See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 383;
Benton, 238 S.W.3d at 599 (finding “no substantial likelihood of material prejudice
when such a substantial period of time elapses [six months] between the statements
and the seating of a jury”). When the trial court entered the gag order, Clendennen
had not yet been indicted, and any criminal trial—if one is to occur—is likely
many months away. Even if the trial court had jurisdiction to enter the gag order
before indictment, which Clendennen contests, the order contains no findings
based on any evidence that the impact of future news coverage is substantially
likely to prejudice potential jurors at the time of trial, or that jurors would be
unable to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in court.
9
The fact that Clendennen is himself challenging the gag order issued by the trial court should
alone counsel against any finding of prejudice. Under the federal constitution, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees a fair trial to the individual defendant, and thus it is the defendant who is
best positioned to advocate for his own rights. See Ford, 830 F.2d at 600.
22
The gag order at issue here resembles those which were found lacking in
Graves and Benton. In Graves, the trial court’s order noted that pretrial publicity
included “local and national newspaper coverage” and stated that “it is necessary
to enter this Restrictive Order to protect and provide for a fair and impartial trial in
this cause of action.” Graves, 217 S.W.3d at 743. And, in Benton, the trial court
determined that the case had “generated extensive media coverage and publicity,”
and noted that it had previously “admonished trial counsel to try the case in court
and not in the media.” Benton, 238 S.W.3d at 590–91. The trial court also took
note of the fact that the defendant and his counsel exhibited an “extraordinary
willingness to grant interviews to the media,” and that the parties had discussed the
terms of plea-bargain negotiations in detail with the media. Id. at 591.
In both cases, these findings were insufficient. In Graves, the court of
appeals rejected the trial court’s conclusory findings, pointed to a lack of
evidentiary support for the determination that a gag order was necessary to protect
a fair trial, and criticized the trial court for not “detailing the nature or extent of the
pretrial publicity . . . or how the pretrial publicity . . . will impact the right to a fair
and impartial jury.” Graves, 217 S.W.3d at 752–73. Similarly, in Benton, the
court of appeals identified only one finding that “potentially . . . may have caused
or could cause prejudice”—the disclosure of details of the plea-bargain
negotiations—and determined that it, alone, was insufficient. Benton, 238 S.W.3d
23
at 597–98. The appellate court faulted the trial court for focusing on the “quantity”
of coverage over its “content or even its effects,” id. at 598, and found no issues
with news coverage that contained “defense counsels’ assertions of innocence
based on self-defense, reports of trial proceedings, and reasonable inferences from
witness testimony,” id. at 600. Both gag orders, accordingly, were set aside.10
The same result is required here. Under either the First Amendment or the
Texas Constitution, the Court of Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the trial
court’s unsupported findings are patently insufficient to sustain the gag order.
V.   The Court of Appeals’ grant of mandamus was correct on other
constitutional grounds.
Under Texas law, mandamus will lie when a relator can show that “he has
no adequate remedy at law to redress his alleged harm” and when “what he seeks
to compel is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision.”
Bowen v. Carnes, 343 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting State ex
rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207,
10
The gag order in this case is similar to one upheld in In re Houston Chronicle Publishing Co.,
64 S.W.3d at 108. In that case, however, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not discuss—or
even identify—the legal standard it applied, and thus its decision lacks persuasive value. In any
event, that case is distinguishable in at least two key respects. First, in Houston Chronicle, no
individual subject to the gag order challenged its validity. Second, the defendant in that case,
Andrea Yates, had already been indicted and the parties warned about prejudicial publicity
before the court entered a gag order, after circulating a proposed order and seeking requests for
modifications. Id. at 105. Here, Clendennen had not yet been indicted when the order was
entered, the trial court gave no notice that a gag order might be imposed, and neither Clendennen
nor the media had an opportunity to challenge the gag order prior to its entry.
24
210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). Not only was the Court of Appeals’ grant of
mandamus warranted because the trial court’s lack of findings, under any standard,
violated “unequivocal, well-settled . . . and clearly controlling legal principles,” id.,
it was also warranted because the gag order is unconstitutionally overbroad, vague,
and not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.
A.  The gag order is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.
The gag order is overbroad, and therefore not narrowly tailored, for at least
three reasons. First, the order restricts innocuous speech that poses no risk of
prejudice to Clendennen. The gag order creates a sweeping “no comment” rule,
ordering that “[a]ll attorneys, their staffs, and law enforcement officers involved in
the case shall not discuss this case with the media.” App. 4 at 2 (emphasis added).
The order similarly directs witnesses “not [to] discuss this case with the media.”
Id. These provisions make no exception for willing speakers to discuss factual
matters already in the public domain or to correct misunderstandings, rumors or
inaccuracies being disseminated about the case. The gag order does not even
permit Clendennen or his counsel to inform the media about logistical matters,
such as the date, time and location of upcoming hearings. Because the gag order
restricts speech that does not carry a sufficient risk of prejudice, the gag order is
unconstitutional. See Graves, 217 S.W.3d at 748 (requiring the gag order to be
“the least restrictive means to prevent” an imminent and irreparable harm); Ford,
25
830 F.2d at 599 (discussing “no comment” gag orders and stating that “such
broadly based restrictions on speech in connection with litigation are seldom, if
ever, justified,” particularly in criminal cases).
Second, the gag order is overbroad because it extends to all law
enforcement, witnesses, or counsel’s staff without adequate justification. The trial
court’s conclusory findings about the necessity of the gag order relate only to
counsel. See, e.g., App. 4 at 1 (“counsels’ willingness to give interviews . . . would
only serve to increase the volume of pre-trial publicity”) (emphasis added); id. at 2
(“if counsel for the parties continue to grant interviews to the media, the pre-trial
publicity will interfere with the defendant’s right[s]”) (emphasis added); id. (“an
order restricting extra-judicial commentary by counsel for the parties is necessary
to preserve all venue options”) (emphasis added). The trial court made no
findings, whatsoever, and offered no explanation for the restrictions it placed on
statements by law enforcement, witnesses, or counsel’s staff.
Third, the gag order is overbroad because its duration is unlimited.
Notwithstanding its stated purpose to preserve the ability to seat an impartial jury,
App. 4 at 2, the gag order is not addressed to that concern. The order’s restrictions
on speech will remain in place long after a jury is seated and long after the jury
returns its verdict—assuming this matter ever reaches trial. For all of these
reasons, the gag order is unconstitutionally overbroad.
26
The order also is unconstitutionally vague. The order does not make clear
whether the speech restrictions apply to any discussion of the underlying incident
generally, including the other pending criminal cases, or to Clendennen’s civil
lawsuit. And to the extent the order permits some nonprejudicial speech about the
case or the underlying incident, it is unclear what speech is permissible. The gag
order should be vacated on vagueness grounds as well.
B.  The trial court improperly rejected alternatives to its expansive prior
restraint on speech.
In rejecting remedial alternatives, the trial court improperly focused on the
volume of publicity, asserting that less restrictive measures, such as delaying trial,
“would not lessen the publicity generated by this case.” App’x 4 at 2. Instead, the
trial court should have inquired whether remedial measures are incapable of curing
any unfair prejudice from pretrial publicity. See Benton, 238 S.W.3d at 598.
Moreover, the trial court failed to explain why voir dire would be incapable
of rooting out any incurable prejudice, as it has done in so many high-profile cases.
Indeed, in “almost all cases,” voir dire will provide adequate protection “against
juror bias however induced.” Charlotte Observer, 882 F.2d at 856. The Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure specifically anticipates juror challenges based on
conclusions “formed from reading newspaper accounts, communications,
statements or reports or mere rumor or hearsay.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. § art.
35.16(a)(10) (2006). The trial court’s discussion of alternatives to the gag order is
27
insufficient to sustain a prior restraint under the First Amendment or the Texas
Constitution. 11 See id.; Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 11 (requiring trial courts to
explain “why such harm could not be sufficiently cured by remedial action”).
Simply because a criminal case generates media coverage, even extensive
media coverage, does not mean that every potential juror will have been exposed to
it. Nor does it mean that every potential juror will have formed inalterable
opinions as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence and be incapable of making a
decision based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Here, the record contains
no basis for concluding that voir dire or other corrective measures are incapable of
protecting Clendennen’s fair trial rights, and the gag order should be set aside.
CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, amici curiae respectfully urge this Court to
deny Relator’s Application for a Writ of Mandamus and uphold the ruling of the
Tenth Court of Appeals.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Hannah Bloch-Wehba
11
Prior restraints on speech, like sealed court documents and closed courtrooms, will almost
always be effective at restricting the free flow of information about a trial. However, the district
court must consider whether alternatives to these extraordinary measures are insufficient to
preserve the defendant’s rights, not whether drastic measures are effective. See Graves, 217
S.W.3d at 748 (requiring judicial action to be “the least restrictive means to prevent that harm”);
see also Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 11 (“‘the argument of convenience can have no weight as
against those safeguards of the constitution which were intended by our fathers for the
preservation of the rights and liberties of the citizen.’”)
28
Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Esq.
Counsel of Record
Bruce D. Brown, Esq.
Katie Townsend, Esq.
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
* Additional counsel for amici are listed
below in Appendix B
Dated: September 14, 2015
Washington, D.C.
29
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 9.4(i)(3)
This brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3) because this brief contains 7,178 words, excluding
the parts of the brief exempted by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/s/ Hannah Bloch-Wehba
Hannah Bloch-Wehba
Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS
Dated: September 14, 2015
Washington, D.C.
30
APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST
OF AMICI CURIAE
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is a voluntary,
unincorporated association of reporters and editors working to defend and preserve
First Amendment rights and freedom of information interests of the news media.
The Reporters Committee has provided representation, guidance, and research in
First Amendment and Freedom of Information Act litigation since 1970, and it
frequently files friend-of-the-court briefs in significant media law cases.
With some 500 members, American Society of News Editors (“ASNE”) is
an organization that includes directing editors of daily newspapers throughout the
Americas. ASNE changed its name in April 2009 to American Society of News
Editors and approved broadening its membership to editors of online news
providers and academic leaders. Founded in 1922 as American Society of
Newspaper Editors, ASNE is active in a number of areas of interest to top editors
with priorities on improving freedom of information, diversity, readership and the
credibility of newspapers.
The Associated Press (“AP”) is a news cooperative organized under the
Not-for-Profit Corporation Law of New York, and owned by its 1,500 U.S.
newspaper members. The AP’s members and subscribers include the nation’s
A-1
newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, cable news services and Internet content
providers. The AP operates from 300 locations in more than 100 countries. On
any given day, AP’s content can reach more than half of the world’s population.
Association of Alternative Newsmedia (“AAN”) is a not-for-profit trade
association for 130 alternative newspapers in North America, including weekly
papers like The Village Voice and Washington City Paper. AAN newspapers and
their websites provide an editorial alternative to the mainstream press. AAN
members have a total weekly circulation of seven million and a reach of over 25
million readers.
Courthouse News Service is a California-based legal news service for
lawyers and the news media that focuses on court coverage throughout the nation,
reporting on matters raised in trial courts and courts of appeal up to and including
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Cox Media Group, Inc. is an integrated broadcasting, publishing, direct
marketing and digital media company. Its operations include 15 broadcast
television stations, a local cable channel, a leading direct marketing company, 85
radio stations, eight daily newspapers and more than a dozen non-daily print
publications and more than 100 digital services.
First Amendment Coalition is a nonprofit public interest organization
dedicated to defending free speech, free press and open government rights in order
A-2
to make government, at all levels, more accountable to the people. The Coalition’s
mission assumes that government transparency and an informed electorate are
essential to a self-governing democracy. To that end, we resist excessive
government secrecy (while recognizing the need to protect legitimate state secrets)
and censorship of all kinds.
First Look Media, Inc. is a new non-profit digital media venture that
produces The Intercept, a digital magazine focused on national security reporting.
Gannett Co., Inc. is an international news and information company that
publishes 93 daily newspapers in the United States, including The El Paso Times
and USA TODAY. Each weekday, Gannett’s newspapers are distributed to an
audience of 9 million readers and the websites associated with the company’s
publications serve online content to 95 million unique visitors each month.
Hearst Corporation is one of the nation’s largest diversified media and
information companies. Its major interests include ownership of 15 daily and more
than 30 weekly newspapers, including the Houston Chronicle, San Antonio
Express-News, San Francisco Chronicle and Albany Times Union; hundreds of
magazines around the world, including Good Housekeeping, Cosmopolitan, ELLE
and O, The Oprah Magazine; 31 television stations, which reach a combined 18
percent of U.S. viewers; ownership in leading cable networks, including Lifetime,
A&E, HISTORY and ESPN; significant holdings in automotive, electronic and
A-3
medical/pharmaceutical business information companies; a majority stake in global
ratings agency Fitch Group; Internet and marketing services businesses; television
production; newspaper features distribution; and real estate.
The Investigative Reporting Workshop, a project of the School of
Communication (SOC) at American University, is a nonprofit, professional
newsroom. The Workshop publishes in-depth stories at
investigativereportingworkshop.org about government and corporate
accountability, ranging widely from the environment and health to national
security and the economy.
MPA – The Association of Magazine Media, (“MPA”) is the largest
industry association for magazine publishers. The MPA, established in 1919,
represents over 175 domestic magazine media companies with more than 900
magazine titles. The MPA represents the interests of weekly, monthly and
quarterly publications that produce titles on topics that cover politics, religion,
sports, industry, and virtually every other interest, avocation or pastime enjoyed by
Americans. The MPA has a long history of advocating on First Amendment issues.
The National Association of Black Journalists (NABJ) is an organization
of journalists, students and media-related professionals that provides quality
programs and services to and advocates on behalf of black journalists worldwide.
A-4
Founded by 44 men and women on December 12, 1975 in Washington, D.C.,
NABJ is the largest organization of journalists of color in the nation.
National Newspaper Association is a 2,400 member organization of
community newspapers founded in 1885. Its members include weekly and small
daily newspapers across the United States. It is based in Columbia, Missouri.
The National Press Club is the world’s leading professional organization
for journalists. Founded in 1908, the Club has 3,100 members representing most
major news organizations. The Club defends a free press worldwide. Each year,
the Club holds over 2,000 events, including news conferences, luncheons and
panels, and more than 250,000 guests come through its doors.
The National Press Photographers Association (“NPPA”) is a 501(c)(6)
non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of visual journalism in its
creation, editing and distribution. NPPA’s approximately 7,000 members include
television and still photographers, editors, students and representatives of
businesses that serve the visual journalism industry. Since its founding in 1946,
the NPPA has vigorously promoted the constitutional rights of journalists as well
as freedom of the press in all its forms, especially as it relates to visual journalism.
The submission of this brief was duly authorized by Mickey H. Osterreicher, its
General Counsel.
A-5
The New York Times Company is the publisher of The New York Times
and The International Times, and operates the news website nytimes.com.
The News Guild – CWA is a labor organization representing more than
30,000 employees of newspapers, newsmagazines, news services and related
media enterprises. Guild representation comprises, in the main, the advertising,
business, circulation, editorial, maintenance and related departments of these
media outlets. The News Guild is a sector of the Communications Workers of
America. CWA is America’s largest communications and m
Newspaper Association of America (“NAA”) is a nonprofit organization
representing the interests of more than 2,000 newspapers in the United States and
Canada. NAA members account for nearly 90% of the daily newspaper circulation
in the United States and a wide range of non-daily newspapers. The Association
focuses on the major issues that affect today’s newspaper industry, including
protecting the ability of the media to provide the public with news and information
on matters of public concern.
Online News Association (“ONA”) is the world’s largest association of
online journalists. ONA’s mission is to inspire innovation and excellence among
journalists to better serve the public. ONA’s more than 2,000 members include
news writers, producers, designers, editors, bloggers, technologists, photographers,
academics, students and others who produce news for the Internet or other digital
A-6
delivery systems. ONA hosts the annual Online News Association conference and
administers the Online Journalism Awards. ONA is dedicated to advancing the
interests of digital journalists and the public generally by encouraging editorial
integrity and independence, journalistic excellence and freedom of expression and
access.
Radio Television Digital News Association (“RTDNA”) is the world’s
largest and only professional organization devoted exclusively to electronic
journalism. RTDNA is made up of news directors, news associates, educators and
students in radio, television, cable and electronic media in more than 30 countries.
RTDNA is committed to encouraging excellence in the electronic journalism
industry and upholding First Amendment freedoms.
Society of Professional Journalists (“SPJ”) is dedicated to improving and
protecting journalism. It is the nation’s largest and most broad-based journalism
organization, dedicated to encouraging the free practice of journalism and
stimulating high standards of ethical behavior. Founded in 1909 as Sigma Delta
Chi, SPJ promotes the free flow of information vital to a well-informed citizenry,
works to inspire and educate the next generation of journalists and protects First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press.
The Star-Telegram is a daily newspaper in Forth Worth, Texas that
delivers national and local news through its print edition and online at
A-7
http://www.star-telegram.com. The Star-Telegram is owned by Star-Telegram,
Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of The McClatchy Company. The McClatchy
Company, publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker
symbol MNI, operates media companies in 28 U.S. markets in 14 states. Contrarius
Investment Management Limited owns 10% or more of the common stock of The
McClatchy Company.
The Texas Press Association is an industry association representing nearly
450 daily and weekly newspapers across the state of Texas, each of which upholds
a strong tradition of journalistic integrity and community service. Texas Press,
founded in 1880, performs numerous services on behalf of its members, including
sponsoring and promoting legislation and taking legal action to protect the First
Amendment and open government.
The Tully Center for Free Speech began in Fall, 2006, at Syracuse
University’s S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications, one of the nation’s
premier schools of mass communications.
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APPENDIX B
ADDITIONAL COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
Kevin M. Goldberg Lynn Oberlander
Fletcher, Heald & Hildreth, PLC General Counsel, Media Operations
1300 N. 17th St., 11th Floor First Look Media, Inc.
Arlington, VA 22209 162 Fifth Avenue
Counsel for American Society of News 8th Floor
Editors and Association of Alternative New York, New York 10010
Newsmedia (347) 453-8111
Karen Kaiser Barbara W. Wall
General Counsel Senior Vice President & Chief Legal
The Associated Press Officer
450 W. 33rd Street Gannett Co., Inc.
New York, NY 10001 7950 Jones Branch Drive
McLean, VA 22107
Rachel Matteo-Boehm (703) 854-6951
Bryan Cave LLP
560 Mission Street, Suite 2500 Jonathan Donnellan
San Francisco, CA 94105 Kristina Findikyan
Counsel for Courthouse News Service Hearst Corporation
Office of General Counsel
Lance Lovell 300 W. 57th St., 40th Floor
Managing Attorney, Disputes New York, NY 10019
Cox Media Group, Inc.
6205 Peachtree Dunwoody Road James Cregan
Atlanta, GA 30328 Executive Vice President
MPA – The Association of Magazine Media
Peter Scheer 1211 Connecticut Ave. NW Suite 610
First Amendment Coalition Washington, DC 20036
534 Fourth St., Suite B
San Rafael, CA 94901 Kurt Wimmer
Covington & Burling LLP
1201 Pennsylvania Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20004
Counsel for the Newspaper Association
of America
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Tonda F. Rush Laura R. Handman
CNLC, LLC Alison Schary
200 Little Falls Street, Suite 405 Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Falls Church, VA 22046 1919 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
(703) 237-9801 (p) Suite 800
(703) 237-9808 (fax) Washington, DC 20006
tonda@nna.org
Counsel to National Newspaper Thomas R. Burke
Association Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Suite 800
Charles D. Tobin 500 Montgomery Street
Holland & Knight LLP San Francisco, CA 94111
800 17th Street, NW Counsel for Online News Association
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20006 Kathleen A. Kirby
Counsel for The National Press Club Wiley Rein LLP
1776 K St., NW
Mickey H. Osterreicher Washington, DC 20006
1100 M&T Center, 3 Fountain Plaza, Counsel for Radio Television Digital
Buffalo, NY 14203 News Association
Counsel for National Press
Photographers Association Bruce W. Sanford
James Romoser
David McCraw Baker & Hostetler LLP
V.P./Assistant General Counsel 1050 Connecticut Ave., NW
The New York Times Company Suite 1100
620 Eighth Avenue Washington, DC 20036
New York, NY 10018 Counsel for Society of Professional
Journalists
Barbara L. Camens
Barr & Camens Juan Cornejo
1025 Connecticut Ave., NW The McClatchy Company
Suite 712 2100 Q Street
Washington, DC 20036 Sacramento, CA 95816
Counsel for The Newspaper Guild – Counsel for The Star-Telegram
CWA
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Hannah Bloch-Wehba, certify that, on this 14th day of September, 2015, I
caused copies of the foregoing Brief of Amici Curiae to be served electronically,
via eFile Texas or email, on:
McLennan County District Attorney
219 N. 6th Street
Waco, Texas 76701
Counsel for State of Texas, Relator
F. Clinton Broden
Broden, Mickelsen, Helms & Snipes, LLP
2600 State Street
Dallas, Texas 75204
Counsel for Matthew Alan Clendennen, Real Party in Interest
Honorable Matt Johnson
54th District Court
501 Washington Ave., Suite 305
Waco, Texas 76701
Real Party in Interest
Tenth Court of Appeals
501 Washington Ave.
Waco, Texas 76701
Respondent
/s/ Hannah Bloch-Wehba
Hannah Bloch-Wehba
Counsel of Record for Amici Curiae
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS