Diaz v. Lynch , 669 F. App'x 949 ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    October 21, 2016
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    CARLOS L. DIAZ,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                      No. 16-2174
    (D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00484-DLR)
    THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY                               (D.N.M.)
    GENERAL U.S. ATTORNEY GEN:
    MS. LORETTA LYNCH; CHIEF
    JUDGE: MS. M. CHRISTINA
    ARMIJO: JUDGE KENNETH JOHN
    GONZALES: INDIVIDUAL
    CAPACITY JUDGE: STEPHEN C.
    YARBROUGH: INDIVIDUAL
    CAPACITY MS. LORETTA LYNCH:
    INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AS THE
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL: M.
    CHRISTINA ARMIJO; INDIVIDUAL
    CAPACITY AS CHIEF JUDGE FOR
    THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
    DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges. **
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
    Cir. R. 32.1.
    **
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
    panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    Plaintiff-Appellant Carlos L. Diaz, appearing pro se, appeals from the
    district court’s dismissal of his complaint against the United States Attorney
    General, two federal district court judges, and a federal magistrate judge. Mr.
    Diaz brought claims against these officials for “deliberately [v]ictimiz[ing]” him
    by not applying the laws of the United States to his complaints in a separate case
    and for violating his rights to due process of law and equal protection. R. 5.
    Acting sua sponte, the district court dismissed Mr. Diaz’s complaint for failure to
    state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). It then denied Mr. Diaz’s motion to
    reconsider and his motion for the court’s recusal; construed Mr. Diaz’s request for
    a final order as a notice of appeal; and denied Mr. Diaz’s second demand for a
    final order and his motion for an extension of time to amend his complaint. Our
    jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.
    We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).
    Smith v. United States, 
    561 F.3d 1090
    , 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). A sua sponte
    dismissal is allowed when it is “patently obvious” that the plaintiff could not
    prevail on the facts alleged and that allowing him an opportunity to amend his
    complaint would be futile. McKinney v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    925 F.2d 363
    , 365 (10th Cir. 1991).
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    -2-
    To survive dismissal, a complaint must allege sufficient facts which, taken
    as true, state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678
    (2009). A complaint is plausible if there are sufficient facts to allow “the court to
    draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
    alleged.” Id. That is, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
    relief “above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    555 (2007).
    Mr. Diaz brought claims against three judges: Chief Judge Armijo, Judge
    Gonzales, and Magistrate Judge Yarbrough. Specifically, Mr. Diaz complains of
    unfavorable rulings by Judges Gonzales and Yarbrough in another of Mr. Diaz’s
    cases, and of Chief Judge Armijo’s refusal to correct those decisions. R. 5–17.
    Because the claims against all three judges are for actions taken as part of their
    official judicial duties, the claims were properly dismissed under the doctrine of
    absolute judicial immunity. See Mireles v. Waco, 
    502 U.S. 9
    , 9–10 (1991).
    Mr. Diaz’s claim against Attorney General Loretta Lynch is likewise
    unavailing. That claim is generally a request for assistance by the Attorney
    General in her official capacity to aid Mr. Diaz in his claim against the judges. In
    any event, he has not identified any basis for the United States to waive its
    sovereign immunity. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 
    510 U.S. 471
    , 475 (1994); Atkinson
    v. O’Neill, 
    867 F.2d 589
    , 590 (10th Cir. 1989).
    -3-
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -4-