Robert Langermann v. Samuel J. Dubbin , 613 F. App'x 850 ( 2015 )


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  •            Case: 14-15136   Date Filed: 06/03/2015   Page: 1 of 12
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-15136
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cv-22531-KMM
    ROBERT LANGERMANN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    SAMUEL J. DUBBIN,
    JONATHAN W. CUNEO,
    STEVE W. BERMAN,
    ILYA RUBINSTEIN,
    “Elie”,
    DAVID C. WROBEL, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 3, 2015)
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    Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Robert Langermann brought this action alleging that the Defendants
    improperly denied him benefits he is due under a class action settlement. The
    district court dismissed his suit as barred by res judicata and denied his pending
    summary judgment motion as moot. The district court also imposed a filing
    injunction against Langermann as a Rule 11 sanction because this is his third
    attempt to litigate these same claims. He appeals, and we affirm.
    I
    In the waning months of World War II, United States Army forces in Austria
    seized a train laden with gold, jewelry, works of art and other valuable personal
    property—riches that had been confiscated from some 800,000 Jews by Hungary’s
    Nazi-allied government. In the spring of 1945, the Hungarian government secreted
    the loot westward into Austria, away from the advancing Soviet Army, where it
    was intercepted. The United States government, which kept and housed the seized
    property, declared the treasure’s rightful owners “unidentifiable.” Despite pleas
    from organizations representing Hungarian Jewry, the United States refused to
    return or repatriate the property, which it deemed ownerless. Some was auctioned
    off, some was transferred to the Austrian postwar government, some was pilfered
    from U.S. storage, and some was requisitioned by high-ranking U.S. officers for
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    their own personal use. The train, owing to its origin and its surfeit of gold,
    became known as the “Hungarian Gold Train.”
    More than fifty-five years later, a group of Hungarian Jews brought a
    putative class action against the United States in the District Court for the Southern
    District of Florida, alleging that the United States government’s conduct related to
    the Gold Train violated, among other things, the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
    Clause.
    In 2005, a district court certified a class of nearly 50,000 people with
    ownership claims to property on the Gold Train and approved a $25.5 million
    settlement. The settlement did not call for direct distribution of funds to class
    members. Instead, it created a cy pres distribution system: the funds would “be
    used for the direct provision of social services and humanitarian relief to eligible
    Victims of Nazi Persecution who are in need.” To effect this goal, social service
    agencies would field requests for settlement funds from needy Holocaust survivors.
    The agencies would be responsible for verifying the requesters’ eligibility and need
    for funds based on documentation or home visits.
    II
    That brings us to our plaintiff, Robert Langermann. He is a member of the
    certified plaintiff class: a Jew who was born in Hungary in 1935, survived the
    Holocaust, immigrated to the United States in 1958, became a citizen in 2002, and
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    lives in Nevada. This action is Langermann’s third attempt to convince a court that
    the social service agencies responsible for disbursing the funds violated the terms
    of the settlement.
    Two agencies named as Defendants in this action—Jewish Family Service
    Agency of Las Vegas (JFSA) and The Blue Card, Inc. (TBCI)—were responsible
    for determining Langermann’s eligibility for settlement funds. Langermann
    received over $7,000 from 2006 through 2009. But after a dispute over whether he
    was married, he refused to provide documentation to TBCI, to sign a release
    allowing TBCI to obtain information about him, or to permit a home visit to verify
    his continuing eligibility and need for settlement funds. Because he refused, TBCI
    denied Langermann’s requests for funds. In response, he filed a motion for
    contempt in the class action. He alleged that TBCI and JFSA should be held in
    contempt because by demanding he sign a release or permit a home visit, they
    violated both the terms of the class settlement and his constitutional rights. The
    district court, which continued to oversee the class action, denied Langermann’s
    motion.
    Langermann then filed a new civil action in the United States District Court
    for the District of Nevada, making the same substantive allegations against TBCI,
    JFSA, and a host of other Defendants, including one of the class’s lawyers and the
    District Judge presiding over the class action. In response, class counsel filed a
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    motion in the class action (in the Southern District of Florida) seeking an
    injunction to prevent Langermann from collaterally attacking the class settlement
    in Nevada. The motion was granted, and a Southern District of Florida District
    Judge enjoined Langermann from prosecuting the ancillary action in Nevada. The
    District Judge observed that each of Langermann’s Nevada claims were premised
    on the class action, its settlement, its allocation plan, and its final order, and that
    pursuing the Nevada action would lead to relitigation of rulings made in the class
    action, including the earlier order denying Langermann’s motion for contempt. We
    affirmed the injunction on appeal. Rosner v. United States, 517 F. App’x 762
    (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The District Court for the District of Nevada
    dismissed Langermann’s action with prejudice. Langermann’s appeal of that
    dismissal remains pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
    III
    This appeal arises out of Langermann’s third attempt to show that JFSA and
    TBCI violated the terms of the settlement. He filed this action in the Southern
    District of Florida, again naming JFSA and TBCI as well as, this time, three of the
    class’s lawyers (Samuel Dubbin, Jonathan Cuneo and Steve Berman), the
    executive director of TBCI (Ilya Rubinstein), and TBCI’s attorney (David
    Wrobel). The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that it was barred by
    res judicata, and denied as moot a pending motion for summary judgment filed by
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    Langermann. The district court also found that the complaint was frivolous, so it
    imposed a Rule 11 sanction enjoining Langermann from filing any further
    pleadings or motions against the Defendants without leave of Court. Langermann
    appeals each of those rulings.
    IV
    A. Res Judicata
    Res judicata makes an earlier judgment “an absolute bar to [a] subsequent
    action or suit between the same parties.” In re Atlanta Retail, Inc., 
    456 F.3d 1277
    ,
    1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). It not only bars matters actually
    litigated in the earlier action; when it applies, res judicata also bars “every claim
    which might have been presented” in the earlier action. 
    Id. (quotation omitted)
    (alteration adopted). Res judicata applies if four elements are met: (1) a final
    judgment on the merits; (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
    (3) between the same parties, or their privies; and (4) the causes of action involved
    in both cases are the same. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 
    193 F.3d 1235
    , 1238
    (11th Cir. 1999). We review de novo whether a claim is barred by res judicata. 
    Id. The district
    court held that all four elements of res judicata were present, and that
    the order denying contempt in the class action barred this suit. We agree.
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    1. Finality
    Res judicata finality is closely related to finality for appealability under the
    final-order rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291. First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, N.A. v.
    Parsons Steel, Inc., 
    825 F.2d 1475
    , 1480 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987). An order is final
    under § 1291 if it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court
    to do but execute its judgment. Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 
    594 F.3d 823
    , 829 (11th Cir. 2010). A postjudgment order is final for § 1291 if it
    disposes of all issues raised in the motion. 
    Id. The order
    denying Langermann’s
    contempt motion in the class action was a postjudgment order. The order, which
    held that the agencies had not violated the terms of the class settlement, disposed
    of all issues Langermann raised in his motion. The order was a final judgment for
    purposes of § 1291 and, by extension, res judicata.
    2. Competent Jurisdiction
    The District Court for the Southern District of Florida, which oversaw the
    class action, undoubtedly had jurisdiction to decide Langermann’s earlier contempt
    motion. In its final order approving the class settlement, the district court
    expressly retained jurisdiction over the action to monitor the progress of the
    settlement and the allocation of settlement funds.
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    3. Privity
    Privity describes a relationship between a party and a nonparty that is
    sufficiently close so that a judgment binds both. Hart v. Yamaha-Parts Distribs.,
    Inc., 
    787 F.2d 1468
    , 1472 (11th Cir 1986). 1 Langermann’s contempt motion
    specifically sought a contempt order against JFSA and TBCI. Langermann argues
    that the parties named in this appeal were not all named in his contempt motion.
    That is true. But his contempt motion specifically accused Mr. Rubinstein, the
    director of TBCI, and Mr. Wrobel, an attorney for TBCI, of misconduct. Their
    relationship with TBCI is sufficiently close for them to be considered TBCI’s
    privies. And Langermann certified in his contempt motion that he had
    unsuccessfully attempted to resolve his dispute with the three class attorneys
    named as Defendants here. For that reason, they would have been bound by any
    judgment arising from the contempt motion. This action and the earlier contempt
    motion thus involved the same parties or their privies.
    4. Same Causes of Action
    Cases involve the same causes of action if they arise out of the same nucleus
    of operative facts. 
    Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239
    . Res judicata bars not only those
    claims that were actually litigated in the prior suit, but any and all claims that could
    1
    In the same vein, the Supreme Court has said that a judgment may bind a nonparty
    representative of a party, despite the general rule that judgments exert no binding force against
    nonparties. Taylor v. Sturgell, 
    553 U.S. 880
    , 892–95, 
    128 S. Ct. 2161
    , 2172–73 (2008).
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    have been raised arising out of the nucleus of operative facts. Maldonado v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    664 F.3d 1369
    , 1375–76 (11th Cir. 2011); see also In re Piper Aircraft
    Corp., 
    244 F.3d 1289
    , 1296 (11th Cir. 2001). Langermann’s claims in this action
    arise out of the same nucleus of operative facts as his claims in the contempt
    motion. Each of his claims stems from his contention that the agencies violated the
    terms of the class settlement by demanding that he sign a release or permit a home
    visit.
    Langermann insists that the causes of action in this case are different
    because he complains of a second demand for a release or a home visit in 2012,
    which came after his contempt motion was denied. But that alone does not make
    the causes of action distinct. The terms of the settlement caused TBCI to make the
    2012 demand, just as they caused any earlier demand. Both demands were part of
    the same nucleus of operative facts, so the causes of action in both cases were the
    same. See Restatement (Second) of Judgment § 24, cmt. d (1982) (“When a
    defendant is accused of successive but nearly simultaneous acts, or acts which
    though occurring over a period of time were substantially of the same sort and
    similarly motivated, fairness to the defendant as well as the public convenience
    may require that they be dealt with in the same action.”); see also Trustmark Ins.
    Co. v. ESLU, Inc., 
    299 F.3d 1265
    , 1270 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding identity of
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    causes of action where “[b]oth [cases] involve breaches of the same contract,
    committed by the same party and involving the same general type of conduct”).
    *      *      *
    The order denying Langermann’s contempt motion was (1) a final judgment
    on the merits; (2) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) between the
    same parties or their privies as in this suit; and (4) involved the same causes of
    action as this suit. The district court did not err in giving res judicata effect to the
    order denying contempt and barring this action.
    B. Rule 11 Sanctions
    As a Rule 11 sanction, the district court imposed an injunction that barred
    Langermann from filing further pleadings against the Defendants unless he
    (1) notified the court of the order imposing the injunction; (2) gave the court an
    opportunity to pre-screen his proffered filing; and (3) obtained the court’s leave to
    file the pleading based on a determination that the claims are neither frivolous nor
    barred by res judicata.
    Rule 11 sanctions are warranted when a party files a pleading that (1) “has
    no reasonable factual basis”; (2) “is based on a legal theory that has no reasonable
    chance of success and cannot be advanced as a reasonable argument to change
    existing law”; or (3) “is filed in bad faith or for an improper purpose.” Worldwide
    Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 
    87 F.3d 1252
    , 1254 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation
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    omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), (c). Federal courts have the inherent
    power and a constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct that
    interferes with their functions. Procup v. Strickland, 
    792 F.2d 1069
    , 1073 (11th
    Cir. 1986) (en banc). Rule 11 sanctions should not go beyond what is necessary to
    deter the sanctioned conduct. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). “The only restriction this
    Circuit has placed upon injunctions designed to protect against abusive and
    vexatious litigation is that a litigant cannot be completely foreclosed from any
    access to the court.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 
    986 F.2d 1384
    , 1387 (11th Cir.
    1993) (quotation omitted). We review Rule 11 sanctions only for abuse of
    discretion. 
    McGreal, 87 F.3d at 1254
    .
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the complaint
    violated Rule 11(b) and imposing sanctions. The specific sanction imposed was
    neither an abuse of discretion nor inconsistent with our precedent limiting a district
    court’s ability to prevent abusive litigation.
    C. Denial of Pending Summary Judgment Motion as Moot
    After dismissing Langermann’s complaint, the district court denied all
    pending motions “as moot.” An issue is moot “when it no longer presents a live
    controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Friends of
    Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 
    570 F.3d 1210
    , 1216 (11th Cir. 2009).
    Federal courts cannot decide issues that have become moot; doing so is tantamount
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    to issuing an advisory opinion that is beyond our Article III authority. 
    Id. (quotation omitted)
    . To decide moot issues “that do not matter to the disposition of
    a case is to separate Lady Justice’s scales from her sword. That we will not do.”
    
    Id. (citing George
    E. Allen, The Law as a Way of Life 27 (1969) (“The scales of
    justice without the sword is the impotence of law.”)). We review questions of
    mootness de novo. CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 
    451 F.3d 1257
    , 1268 (11th Cir. 2006). Any issue in Langermann’s summary judgment
    motion no longer presented a controversy because the case had been decided
    against him. The district court did not err in denying the motion as moot.
    V
    Upon careful review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
    we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Langermann’s complaint as barred by res
    judicata, its imposition of a filing injunction as a permissible Rule 11 sanction, and
    its dismissal of his summary judgment motion as moot.
    AFFIRMED.
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