State v. Peyton , 2017 Ohio 243 ( 2017 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Peyton, 2017-Ohio-243.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    BUTLER COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :
    CASE NO     CA2015-06-112
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                       :
    OPINION
    :              1/23/2017
    - vs -
    :
    JAMES V. PEYTON,                                  :
    Defendant-Appellant.                      :
    CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    Case No. CR2013-07-1033
    Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael Greer, Government
    Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
    Fred Miller, Baden & Jones Building, 246 High Street, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for defendant-
    appellant
    M. POWELL, P.J.
    {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, James V. Peyton, appeals his conviction in the Butler
    County Court of Common Pleas for possession of marijuana.
    {¶ 2} Appellant owns Empire Motors, a car dealership in Middletown, Ohio. In the
    spring of 2013, Detective Greg Spanel of the Lebanon Police Department and Detective Dan
    Schweitzer of the Warren County Sheriff's Office were both working with the Warren County
    Butler CA2015-06-112
    Drug Task Force in an undercover capacity. After a confidential informant ("CI") provided
    Detective Spanel with information about appellant, the detective introduced the CI to
    Detective Schweitzer.
    {¶ 3} On April 11, 2013, Schweitzer and the CI went to Empire Motors where
    Schweitzer was introduced to appellant as "Matt." Schweitzer told appellant he was looking
    to buy a car. Drugs were not discussed during this introductory meeting.
    {¶ 4} After the CI arranged another meeting with appellant, Schweitzer and the CI
    returned to Empire Motors on April 25, 2013. At Schweitzer's request, appellant sold him ten
    Percocet pills. During the meeting, the CI asked appellant whether "there was any good
    smoke around," meaning marijuana. Appellant made a telephone call. A man soon arrived
    and sold seven grams of marijuana to Schweitzer. As Schweitzer was leaving Empire
    Motors, appellant told Schweitzer he could contact him.
    {¶ 5} On May 7, 2013, Schweitzer contacted appellant to purchase 20 Vicodin pills.
    The two met at Empire Motors where appellant sold 20 Vicodin pills to Schweitzer. The two
    men did not discuss marijuana during this meeting. Rather, they discussed the quantity of
    pills appellant could get and where he could get them. Before Schweitzer left, he asked
    appellant if he could contact appellant for future pill purchases. Appellant agreed. On May
    15, 2013, Schweitzer contacted appellant to purchase 31 Vicodin pills. The two met at
    Empire Motors. Schweitzer ended up buying 51 Vicodin pills.
    {¶ 6} On May 21, 2013, Schweitzer contacted appellant to purchase 50 Vicodin pills.
    The two met at Empire Motors where appellant sold 50 Vicodin pills to Schweitzer. While
    there, Schweitzer also bought some moonshine from appellant. As they were discussing
    moonshine, appellant asked Schweitzer at what price Schweitzer sold his marijuana.
    Schweitzer replied it depended on the quality of the marijuana: $1,200 to $1,300 a pound for
    commercial grade marijuana, $3,500 to $4,800 a pound for higher grade marijuana.
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    Appellant then asked, "Is that the hydro?" meaning hydroponic marijuana. Subsequently,
    appellant told Schweitzer that his stepson, James Smith, a "career guy," might be interested
    in Schweitzer's marijuana.
    {¶ 7} Later in the conversation, appellant shared with Schweitzer "how he used to
    fool with large quantities of marijuana" and how he once "broke down 480 pounds of
    marijuana right here" in the office where the two men were sitting: "We moved the desk back,
    and got a brook out, we swept the floor, and had the bricks, and we broke them down right
    here." Appellant told Schweitzer he had a partner in the business at the time, their marijuana
    supplier was from California, and the marijuana would come in on a truck, in a crate box.
    {¶ 8} At that point, Schweitzer asked appellant if he was interested in storing 50 to
    100 pounds of marijuana at Empire Motors. Appellant replied that his dealership was "hot,"
    meaning it was being watched by the police, but that his stepson might be interested in
    storing and moving some marijuana. Appellant shared with Schweitzer that he (appellant)
    had been dealing for 45 years. Subsequently, Schweitzer mentioned storing marijuana at the
    dealership if appellant was interested, told appellant to think about it, and told him he would
    pay him a storage fee. As Schweitzer was leaving Empire Motors, appellant approached
    Schweitzer's car and informed him he had an additional 120 Vicodin pills for sale.
    Schweitzer agreed to buy 20 additional Vicodin pills.
    {¶ 9} On May 30, 2013, Schweitzer contacted appellant to purchase 50 Vicodin pills.
    During the call, Schweitzer asked appellant if Smith could come to the meeting "so that we
    could all discuss future marijuana transactions." Schweitzer later went to Empire Motors
    where he purchased 50 Vicodin pills from appellant.          During the meeting, appellant
    introduced Smith to Schweitzer. In appellant's presence, Schweitzer and Smith discussed
    storing marijuana at Smith's residence in exchange for $500-$1,000.              During their
    conversation, Smith advised Schweitzer that Smith and appellant had talked about
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    Schweitzer "in the storage of marijuana."
    {¶ 10} On June 10, 2013, Schweitzer went to Empire Motors where he purchased 100
    Vicodin pills from appellant. While there, and in appellant's presence, Schweitzer and Smith
    discussed marijuana. Schweitzer advised Smith that he was expecting a shipment of
    marijuana and asked Smith whether he was interested in buying 20 pounds from the
    shipment. The issue of appellant storing marijuana at his dealership was not discussed
    during this meeting.
    {¶ 11} On June 18, 2013, Schweitzer went to Empire Motors where he bought 50
    Vicodin pills from appellant. Schweitzer told appellant that he (Schweitzer) would be
    receiving a shipment of marijuana by week's end. Appellant stated he would be willing to
    break down the marijuana and agreed to store it at his dealership. Schweitzer told appellant
    he intended to "keep two to 300 pounds here at the car lot and two to 300 pounds at
    [Smith's]," and that he would pay appellant $2,000 in storage fee. Appellant then took
    Schweitzer around the parking lot of the dealership and showed him vehicles where the
    marijuana could be stored.
    {¶ 12} On June 21, 2013, Schweitzer conducted a "reverse buy" operation.
    Schweitzer had previously arranged to meet appellant at Empire Motors that day to break
    down 500 pounds of marijuana reportedly shipped from California. Appellant, Schweitzer,
    and Smith were to take the marijuana out of its shipping crate, put it into duffle bags, and
    then store it. The marijuana was packed in a crate so that it appeared to have been shipped
    from California. As was the case in his prior meetings with appellant, Schweitzer was
    wearing a wireless transmitter that was being monitored by fellow officers. Schweitzer had
    also arranged for about 20 law enforcement officers from six different agencies to surround
    Empire Motors and conduct surveillance during the operation. Schweitzer also had search
    warrants for Empire Motors and appellant's home.
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    {¶ 13} Prior to driving to Empire Motors, Schweitzer sent a text message to appellant
    informing him that the shipment of marijuana had arrived, asking appellant if he was ready,
    and informing appellant he would be at Empire Motors around 10:00 a.m. Appellant "replied
    back okay." Schweitzer transported the marijuana crate in his pick-up truck. The crate
    contained several bricks of marijuana as well as four 50-pound black blocks of marijuana.
    {¶ 14} Once Schweitzer arrived at Empire Motors, he and appellant unloaded the
    marijuana from the truck. Schweitzer unloaded the marijuana bricks from the crate and
    handed them to appellant. In turn, appellant put the marijuana bricks into hockey bags
    provided by Schweitzer, and then carried the loaded bags into his office. When the two ran
    out of hockey bags, appellant provided black trash bags. Appellant also removed three of
    the black blocks of marijuana from the pickup truck and stored them in a hatchback parked
    on the lot. Schweitzer kept the fourth block, ostensibly to later deliver it in Franklin, Ohio.
    {¶ 15} Once in appellant's office, the two men tallied the quantity of marijuana in each
    bag. The total tally was written on a notepad which was subsequently recovered from the
    front left fender of a vehicle parked in the garage of Empire Motors. Schweitzer asked
    appellant where he intended to store the marijuana. Appellant replied he was going to store
    it in the attic of the dealership, because "it's the safest place." Subsequently, appellant
    hoisted the bags of marijuana, one at a time, into the attic. After Smith arrived at Empire
    Motors, appellant assisted in loading the marijuana intended for Smith into Smith's vehicle.
    {¶ 16} Schweitzer told appellant that the marijuana would be stored at the dealership
    for a couple of days and that he would call appellant when he was ready to pick it up.
    Appellant told Schweitzer that if Schweitzer needed to access the marijuana after hours, he
    could call Smith who had a key to the premises. Appellant also suggested Schweitzer could
    pull in his vehicle, pretend to check the oil or jack the vehicle, and then load the marijuana
    from the attic into Schweitzer's car.
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    {¶ 17} Schweitzer paid appellant $2,000 in cash for storing the marijuana and left the
    dealership. About 15 to 20 seconds later, several law enforcement officers arrived at the
    dealership.    Appellant and Smith were arrested; the marijuana and the $2,000 were
    recovered.
    {¶ 18} Appellant was indicted in July 2013 on one count of aggravated drug trafficking
    for the Percocet sale, six counts of drug trafficking for the Vicodin sales, and one count of
    marijuana possession for the marijuana appellant received and stored on June 21, 2013.
    The marijuana possession charge also included several forfeiture specifications. At a jury
    trial in January 2015, Detectives Spanel and Schweitzer testified on behalf of the state.
    Appellant did not testify or present witnesses on his behalf. At the close of the evidence,
    appellant moved the trial court to provide an entrapment instruction to the jury with regard to
    the marijuana possession charge. The trial court overruled the motion. On January 9, 2015,
    the jury found appellant guilty as charged and he was subsequently sentenced to an
    aggregate eight-year prison term.
    {¶ 19} Appellant now appeals, raising two assignments of error.
    {¶ 20} Assignment of Error No. 1:
    {¶ 21} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT-
    APPELLANT WHEN IT REFUSED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE DEFENSE
    OF ENTRAPMENT.
    {¶ 22} Appellant argues the trial court erred when it refused to provide an entrapment
    instruction to the jury.
    {¶ 23} We note at the outset that appellant did not comply with Crim.R. 30 when he
    moved the trial court to instruct the jury regarding entrapment in an oral request prior to
    closing arguments. Crim.R. 30(A) provides in pertinent part that "[a]t the close of the
    evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may
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    file written requests that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in the requests."
    (Emphasis added.) This court has stated that when a defendant fails to request a jury
    instruction in writing as required by Crim.R. 30(A), a trial court does not err in denying his oral
    request for such an instruction. State v. Davis, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2015-05-015,
    2016-Ohio-1166, ¶ 36. See State v. Fanning, 
    1 Ohio St. 3d 19
    (1982), paragraph two of the
    syllabus. At trial, the state did not oppose appellant's requested entrapment instruction on
    the ground it did not comply with Crim.R. 30(A), nor does it do so on appeal. However, as
    discussed below, even if appellant had requested an entrapment instruction in compliance
    with Crim.R. 30(A), we would still find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
    request because the evidence did not support an entrapment instruction.
    {¶ 24} Jury instructions "must be given when they are correct, pertinent, and timely
    presented." State v. Joy, 
    74 Ohio St. 3d 178
    , 181 (1995). Jury instructions are matters left to
    the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Gomez, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-07-129,
    2013-Ohio-2856, ¶ 7. This court reviews a trial court's decision refusing to provide the jury
    with a requested instruction for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. {¶ 25}
    Entrapment is an affirmative defense which a defendant has the burden of
    proving by a preponderance of the evidence. R.C. 2901.05(A); Davis, 2016-Ohio-1166 at ¶
    36.   Entrapment exists "where the criminal design originates with the officials of the
    government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the
    alleged offense and induce its commission in order to prosecute." State v. Doran, 5 Ohio
    St.3d 187 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. However, there is no entrapment when
    government officials "merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the
    offense" to a criminal defendant who was predisposed to commit the offense. 
    Id. at 192;
    Davis at ¶ 36. Where a person is ready and willing to break the law, the fact that government
    officials provide a means to do so is not entrapment. Davis at ¶ 36. The defendant asserting
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    the entrapment defense must adduce evidence supporting his lack of predisposition to
    commit the offense. 
    Id. {¶ 26}
    A trial court does not err in failing to instruct the jury on an affirmative defense
    where the evidence is insufficient to support the instruction. State v. Palmer, 
    80 Ohio St. 3d 543
    , 564 (1997); Davis, 2016-Ohio-1166 at ¶ 35. In reviewing the record to ascertain the
    presence of sufficient evidence to support the giving of a proposed jury instruction, an
    appellate court should determine whether the record contains evidence from which
    reasonable minds might reach the conclusion sought by the instruction. 
    Id. {¶ 27}
    In Doran, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether Ohio should define
    entrapment pursuant to the "subjective" or "objective" test.         Explaining the distinction
    between the two tests, the court observed that "the subjective test of entrapment focuses
    upon the predisposition of the accused to commit an offense whereas the objective or
    'hypothetical-person' test focuses upon the degree of inducement utilized by law enforcement
    officials and whether an ordinary law-abiding citizen would have been induced to commit an
    offense." 
    Doran, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 190
    . In other words, the "subjective" test focus is upon the
    subjective aspects of an accused’s predilection to commit an offense and the "objective" test
    focus is upon the objective aspects of police conduct to induce an accused to commit an
    offense. The supreme court adopted the "subjective" test, finding it more reliable because it
    "properly emphasizes the accused's criminal culpability and not the culpability of the police
    officer." 
    Id. at 192.
    {¶ 28} Appellant argues that an entrapment jury instruction was warranted because it
    was Schweitzer who asked appellant to store marijuana, induced appellant to commit the
    offense by grooming him over time with increasingly larger pill purchases, and controlled the
    time, place, and manner of the transaction as well as the amount of marijuana provided to
    appellant. Obviously, the factual basis supporting appellant's claim of error is entirely focused
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    upon "the culpability of the police officer." In rejecting the "objective" test of entrapment, the
    Ohio Supreme Court necessarily rejected the approach taken by appellant in this assignment
    of error.
    {¶ 29} Pursuant to the "subjective" test, there was abundant evidence that appellant
    was predisposed to commit the offense. The evidence was unequivocal that appellant was
    engaged in the illegal drug trade, including marijuana, prior to the June 21, 2013 reverse buy
    operation. During their second meeting on April 25, 2013, appellant demonstrated his ready
    access to marijuana when, with little notice, he arranged for Schweitzer to purchase
    marijuana from a third party. Appellant sold Schweitzer ten Percocet pills at this meeting and
    invited Schweitzer to contact him in the future. Appellant sold pills to Schweitzer on six more
    occasions prior to June 21, 2013, each time readily accepting payment for the drugs. On one
    of those occasions, after selling Schweitzer the pre-arranged quantity of 50 Vicodin pills,
    appellant offered to sell Schweitzer 120 more.
    {¶ 30} During their meeting on May 21, 2013, Schweitzer and appellant discussed
    marijuana. Appellant inquired about the price of Schweitzer's marijuana. Appellant told
    Schweitzer that his stepson, Smith, was a "career [marijuana] guy" who may have an interest
    in Schweitzer's marijuana. During their conversation, appellant admitted that he "used to fool
    with large quantities of marijuana," and, much like the reverse buy that is the subject of this
    appeal, once "broke down 480 pounds of marijuana" in his office at Empire Motors.
    Appellant boasted that he had been dealing drugs for 45 years. These comments served as
    a segue to Schweitzer’s inquiry about storing marijuana at Empire Motors. Appellant
    indicated a reluctance to do so, not because he was disinclined, but because the dealership
    was "hot." Then, rather than merely demurring and terminating the discussion of storing
    marijuana, appellant suggested that his stepson, Smith, might be interested in storing
    marijuana for Schweitzer. Appellant subsequently introduced Smith to Schweitzer to facilitate
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    the discussion of "future marijuana transactions." Thereafter, appellant was present each
    time Schweitzer and Smith discussed storing marijuana.
    {¶ 31} On June 18, 2013, after Schweitzer told appellant he was expecting a shipment
    of marijuana by week's end, appellant offered to break down and store the marijuana at his
    dealership. Demonstrating his competence and ability to store the marijuana, appellant then
    took Schweitzer around the parking lot of the dealership and showed him vehicles where the
    marijuana could be stored. Two days later, on the day of the reverse buy operation,
    Schweitzer sent a text message to appellant informing him he was bringing the marijuana to
    the dealership that morning. Appellant did not refuse the delivery, but acknowledged he was
    ready. Appellant readily accepted the $2,000 payment for storing the marijuana.
    {¶ 32} Appellant does not claim that he was entrapped into selling pills to Schweitzer.
    Appellant relies upon the pill transactions only as evidence that Schweitzer was "grooming"
    him for the later reverse buy. This assignment of error is restricted to appellant's possession
    of the marijuana he stored.     In effect, appellant's argument is that, although he was
    predisposed to dealing in prescription drugs, he was not predisposed to dealing with
    marijuana. However, his admissions concerning his past dealings in large quantities of
    marijuana, his involvement in prior conduct much like that involved with the instant
    possession of marijuana charge, and his ability to immediately arrange for Schweitzer to
    purchase marijuana on April 25, 2013, with just a telephone call, belie his argument.
    {¶ 33} In applying the subjective test, the Ohio Supreme Court identified some of the
    relevant factors courts should consider:
    (1) the accused's previous involvement in criminal activity of the
    nature charged, (2) the accused's ready acquiescence to the
    inducements offered by the police, (3) the accused's expert
    knowledge in the area of the criminal activity charged, (4) the
    accused's ready access to contraband, and (5) the accused's
    willingness to involve himself in criminal activity.
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    Doran, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 192
    .
    {¶ 34} Applying those factors to this case, the evidence is uncontroverted that
    appellant was actively engaged in illegal drug trafficking, had previously dealt in large
    quantities of marijuana, encouraged and readily accepted Schweitzer's business, professed
    to have experience and knowledge in preparing for the distribution of large quantities of
    marijuana, encouraged Schweitzer to engage in marijuana trafficking with his stepson, Smith,
    a "career [marijuana] guy," had ready access to marijuana and prescription drugs, and
    displayed a willingness to involve himself in the criminal activity by offering to store the
    marijuana for Schweitzer.
    {¶ 35} Appellant ignores the foregoing as it applies to the affirmative defense of
    entrapment, other than to say, "there are facts the State could argue to the jury in opposition
    to the entrapment defense. But that is not sufficient reason to deny the charge altogether."
    The evidence of Schweitzer's conduct relied upon by appellant as supporting an entrapment
    instruction has little relevance in applying the "subjective" test. Appellant had an affirmative
    duty to "adduce evidence supporting his lack of predisposition to commit the offense." Davis,
    2016-Ohio-1166 at ¶ 36.         Appellant presented no evidence supporting his lack of
    predisposition to commit the offense.
    {¶ 36} Application of the "subjective" test of entrapment shows that appellant was
    ready and willing to break the law and thus, had a predisposition to commit the crime, and
    that the state, through Schweitzer, merely afforded opportunities for appellant to do so. The
    record contains no evidence from which reasonable minds might reach the conclusion that
    appellant was entrapped. Considering the foregoing, appellant was not entitled to a jury
    instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The trial court, therefore, did not abuse
    its discretion in declining to provide the instruction to the jury.
    {¶ 37} Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
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    {¶ 38} Assignment of Error No. 2:
    {¶ 39} APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WAS
    AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THERE WAS
    INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT HE HAD POSSESSION OF THE
    MARIJUANA.
    {¶ 40} Appellant argues his conviction for possession of marijuana is not supported by
    sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Appellant asserts that
    he never exerted control over the marijuana and never had the opportunity to do so because
    Schweitzer controlled every aspect of the reverse buy operation and appellant was arrested
    immediately after the marijuana was delivered.
    {¶ 41} When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence underlying a criminal conviction,
    an appellate court examines the evidence in order to determine whether such evidence, if
    believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
    doubt. State v. Bradbury, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2015-06-111, 2016-Ohio-5091, ¶ 16. The
    "relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St. 3d 259
    (1991), paragraph
    two of the syllabus.
    {¶ 42} A manifest weight of the evidence challenge, on the other hand, examines the
    "inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered at a trial, to support one side
    of the issue rather than the other." Bradbury at ¶ 17. To determine whether a conviction is
    against the manifest weight of the evidence, the reviewing court must look at the entire
    record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the
    witnesses, and determine whether in resolving the conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact
    clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
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    must be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
    Id. An appellate
    court will overturn a conviction
    due to the manifest weight of the evidence only in extraordinary circumstances when the
    evidence presented at trial weighs heavily in favor of acquittal. 
    Id. at ¶
    18. A "determination
    that a conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence will also be dispositive
    of the issue of sufficiency." State v. Jones, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2012-03-049, 2013-Ohio-
    150, ¶ 19.
    {¶ 43} Appellant was convicted of possession of marijuana in violation of R.C.
    2925.11(A), which provides that "[n]o person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a
    controlled substance[.]" Possession means "having control over a thing or substance, but
    may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through ownership or
    occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found." R.C. 2925.01(K).
    {¶ 44} Possession may be constructive or actual. State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Butler
    No. CA2014-09-180, 2015-Ohio-2010, ¶ 14. "An accused has 'constructive possession' of an
    item when the accused is conscious of the item's presence and is able to exercise dominion
    and control over it, even if the item is not within the accused's immediate physical
    possession." State v. Jester, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-10-264, 2012-Ohio-544, ¶ 25. A
    person may knowingly possess or control property belonging to another; the state need not
    establish ownership to prove constructive possession. Williams at ¶ 14. In addition, two or
    more persons may have possession of an object together if they have the ability to control it,
    exclusive of others. State v. Weckner, 12th Dist. Brown No. CA2001-06-009, 
    2002 WL 371948
    , *2 (Mar. 11, 2002).
    {¶ 45} Constructive possession may be proven by circumstantial evidence alone.
    Williams at ¶ 15. Absent a defendant's admission, the surrounding facts and circumstances,
    including the defendant's actions, are evidence that the trier of fact can consider in
    determining whether the defendant had constructive possession. 
    Id. The discovery
    of
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    readily accessible drugs in close proximity to the accused constitutes circumstantial evidence
    that the accused was in constructive possession of the drugs. 
    Id. {¶ 46}
    Upon a thorough review of the record, we find the jury did not lose its way in
    concluding appellant had possession of the marijuana during the reverse buy operation. The
    record shows that appellant had dominion and control over the dealership where the
    marijuana was stored and concealed, and that he was conscious of the marijuana. Appellant
    removed the marijuana from Schweitzer's truck by loading the marijuana bricks into individual
    hockey bags and trash bags, by concealing the bags into the attic of his dealership, as it was
    "the safest place," and by unloading three blocks of marijuana from the truck and concealing
    them into a hatchback parked on his lot. Appellant accepted the $2,000 payment in
    consideration for storing the marijuana, thus establishing his possession. Thereafter,
    Schweitzer left the dealership; 15 to 20 seconds later, law enforcement officers converged on
    the scene.
    {¶ 47} These facts, taken together, show that appellant took delivery of the marijuana
    and knowingly exercised dominion and control over it, if only for a short time. See State v.
    Reyes, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-02-069, 2004-Ohio-2217; Williams, 2015-Ohio-2010. The
    crucial issue is not whether the accused had actual physical contact with the article
    concerned, but whether the accused was capable of exercising dominion and control over it.
    State v. Bowerman, 9th Dist. Medina No. 13CA0059-M, 2014-Ohio-4264, ¶ 7.
    {¶ 48} In light of the foregoing, we find that appellant's conviction for marijuana
    possession is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Our determination that
    appellant's conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence is also dispositive of the
    issue of sufficiency. Jones, 2013-Ohio-150 at ¶ 19.
    {¶ 49} Appellant's second assignment of error is overruled.
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    {¶ 50} Judgment affirmed.
    HENDRICKSON and PIPER, JJ., concur.
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