State of Iowa v. Jodie Marie Hill ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0974
Filed January 25, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JODIE MARIE HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price,
District Associate Judge.
Jodie Hill appeals claiming her guilty plea was not voluntary and the court
abused its discretion in sentencing. AFFIRMED.
Francis P. Hurley of Phil Watson P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
Jodie Hill entered a written guilty plea to third-degree theft, an aggravated
misdemeanor. The district court sentenced her to a prison term not exceeding
two years. On appeal, Hill contends her attorney advised her “the charge of
Theft in the Third Degree required the District Court to impose a mandatory
prison sentence” and “if she pled guilty, she could go to prison where she would
receive medical care” for her recently-diagnosed terminal cancer. In her view,
her attorney was ineffective in providing this advice, which she characterizes as
coercive. As a result, she argues, her plea was unknowing and involuntary. See
State v. Utter, 803 N.W.2d 647, 651 (Iowa 2011) (“One way a defendant can
intrinsically challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of his or her guilty plea
is to prove ‘the advice he [or she] received from counsel in connection with the
plea was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.’” (citing State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Iowa 2009)).
Hill concedes “the appellate court cannot speculate as to what [she] did
and did not say, nor can it determine what motivated [her] to sign the [guilty plea]
petition.” She asserts she simply raised “these issues to preserve them for post-
conviction relief.”
She did not need to do so. See Iowa Code § 814.7(1) (stating an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim “need not be raised on direct appeal from
the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief
purposes”); State v. Johnson, 784 N.W.2d 192, 198 (Iowa 2010) (“[W]e hold
defendants are no longer required to raise ineffective-assistance claims on direct
appeal, and when they choose to do so, they are not required to make any
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particular record in order to preserve the claim for postconviction relief.”). But
because she did, our only two choices are to deem the record adequate to
decide the claim or preserve the claim for postconviction relief. Johnson, 784
N.W.2d at 198.
We agree with Hill that the record is inadequate to address her ineffective
assistance claims, which we view as a single claim implicating the voluntariness
of her plea. We preserve the claim for postconviction relief. See State v.
Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 405 (Iowa 2015) (“If the record is inadequate on
appeal, the issue must be addressed in an action for postconviction relief.”).
Hill next contends the district court abused its discretion in “imposing the
maximum time of incarceration.” She argues the district court failed to consider
her deteriorating “physical health and her employment.”
A sentencing court is not required to address every mitigating factor urged
by a defendant. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
Using a form order, the district court checked appropriate factors in support of the
prison term, including “[t]he nature and circumstances of the crime,” “[p]rotection
of the public from further offenses,” and “[Hill’s] criminal history.” We conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a prison term not
exceeding two years. See State v. Hopkins, 860 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Iowa 2015)
(setting forth the standard of review).
AFFIRMED.