Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 2001 )


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  •     OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEPU’ERAL. STATE OF TEXAS
    JOHN     CORNYN
    December 20,200l
    The Honorable Charles D. Penick                        Opinion No. JC-0443
    Bastrop County Criminal District Attorney
    804 Pecan Street                                       Re: Whether a county that contracts with an
    Bastrop, Texas 78602                                   attorney for the collection of delinquent taxes may
    accept a gift from that attorney (RQ-0410-JC)
    Dear Mr. Penick:
    You ask whether an attorney that contracts with a county to collect delinquent taxes may
    donate personnel, equipment, or dollars back to the county to enhance the county’s collection of
    delinquent taxes. ’ When a county contracts with an attorney to collect delinquent taxes pursuant to
    section 6.30 of the Tax Code, section 33.07 authorizes the county to impose an additional penalty
    on the delinquent taxes to provide compensation for the contract attorney. An attorney who is
    compensated under section 33.07 of the Tax Code may not make a donation to the county if the
    donation in effect refunds part of the compensation to the county. Whether a particular donation is
    a refund of the attorney’s compensation under section 33.07 is a fact question that cannot be resolved
    in an attorney general opinion.
    A county may contract with a private attorney to represent it in collecting delinquent taxes.
    See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 8 6.30(c) (Vernon 1992) (authority for “taxing unit” to contract for
    collection of delinquent taxes); see also 
    id. 8 1.04(
    12) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (“taxing unit” defined
    to include “county”). The attorney’s compensation is set in the contract, but the total amount of
    compensation provided may not exceed twenty percent of the amount of delinquent tax, penalty, and
    interest collected. 
    Id. § 6.30(c)
    (Vernon 1992). Section 33.07 of the Tax Code authorizes the taxing
    unit to provide that the delinquent taxes incur an additional penalty “to defray costs of collection,
    if the unit . . . has contracted with an attorney pursuant to Section 6.30” of the code. 
    Id. fj 33.07(a)
    (Vernon Supp. 2001). “The amount of the penalty may not exceed the amount of the compensation
    specified in the contract with the attorney to be paid in connection with the collection of the
    delinquent taxes.” 
    Id., as amended
    by Act of May 17,2001,77th         Leg., R-S., ch. 1430, 5 14,200l
    Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4819,4823 (added language in italics). If a penalty is imposed pursuant to
    section 33.07, “a taxing unit may not recover attorney’s fees in a suit to collect delinquent taxes
    subject to the penalty.” 
    Id. 0 33.07(c).
    Section 33.48 of the Tax Code provides for recovery of
    “attorney’s fees in the amount of 15 percent of the total amount of taxes, penalties, and interest due
    ‘Letter from Charles D. Penick, Bastrop County Criminal District Attorney, to Opinions Division
    (July 3 1,200l) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Request Letter].
    The Honorable   Charles D. Penick   - Page 2     (JC-0443)
    the unit,” see 
    id. 8 33.48(a)(5),
    but a taxing unit may collect attorney’s compensation under only one
    of the two provisions. See City of Houston v. First City, 827 S. W.2d 462,474 (Tex. App.-Houston
    [ 1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
    Until it was amended by the Seventy-seventh Legislature, Tax Code section 33 -07 provided
    that the additional penalty “may not exceed 15 percent of the amount of taxes, penalty, and interest
    due.” See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 9 33.07 (Vernon Supp. 2001). A prior opinion of this office
    determined that the full amount of the penalty collected under section 33.07 must be used to
    compensate the attorney with whom the taxing unit had contracted. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
    JM-857 (1988) at 7. It concluded that the county had no authority to allocate only part of the section
    33.07 penalty to the attorney’s compensation and keep the rest to pay its own costs of collecting
    delinquent taxes. See 
    id. at 2-3,7.
    Section 33.07 of the Tax Code now expressly ties the penalty to
    the attorney’s compensation, stating that the “amount of the penalty may not exceed the amount of
    the compensation specijied in the contract with the attorney.” See Act of May 17,200 1,77th Leg.,
    R-S., ch. 1430, 9 14, 2001 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4819, 4823 (added language in italics). This
    language confirms the conclusion of Attorney General Opinion JM-857 that the entire penalty was
    to be paid as compensation to the contract attorney.
    You suggest, however, that an attorney who is compensated pursuant to section 33.07 of the
    Tax Code may give the county money to use for collecting delinquent taxes and that section 81.032
    of the Local Government       Code authorizes the county to accept the gift. This payment is             .
    characterized as a “gift” or “donation” in the request letter, but it could also be characterized as a
    rebate from the attorney’s compensation. See XIII OXFORDENGLISH         DICTIONARY   297 (2d ed. 1989)
    (“rebate” defined as “[a] deduction from a sum of money to be paid, a discount”).
    Section 81.032 provides that “[tlhe commissioners court may accept a gift, grant, donation,
    bequest, or devise of money or other property on behalf of the county for the purpose of performing
    a function conferred by law on the county or a county officer.” TEX. Lot. GOV’T CODE ANN.
    5 81.032 (Vernon Supp. 2001). Absent such express legislative authority, counties could not
    accept gifts of money or other personal property to use for county purposes. See Tex. Att’y Gen.
    LO’s 97-032 (county may not accept gifts of videotapes, books, or cash on behalf of alternative
    dispute center); 88-106 (county may not collect funds and disburse them to local law enforcement
    agencies to combat drug abuse in county). But see TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODEANN. 5 270.001 (Vernon
    1999); TEX. TFUNSP.CODEANN. 8 252.214 (Vernon 1999); Bell County v. Alexander, 
    22 Tex. 351
    (1858) (authority of county to accept donation of land). The question to be addressed is whether the
    enactment of Local Government Code section 8 1.032 changes the analysis of Tax Code section
    33.07 stated in Attorney General Opinion JM-857.
    Section 81.032 of the Local Government Code must be construed in harmony with
    other statutes. See generally Acker v. Tex. Water Comm iz, 
    790 S.W.2d 299
    , 301 (Tex. 1990);
    Standard v. Sadler, 
    383 S.W.2d 391
    , 395 (Tex. 1964). Section 81.032 does not authorize the
    cornmissioners court to accept a donation for purposes inconsistent with the constitution or laws.
    See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC-0073 (1999) at 2-3 (commissioners court authorized by statute to
    The Honorable     Charles D. Penick      - Page 3        (JC-0443)
    accept donation of land for road-building subject to reasonable conditions, but court may not accept
    a condition that is contrary to the constitution or statutes); see also 10 EUGENEMCQUILLIN, THELAW
    OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: Corporate Property, Gifts and bequests 0 28.16, at 47 (3d ed. 1999)
    (illegal condition attached to gift to municipality may vitiate the gift). An attorney who contracts
    with a county to collect delinquent taxes for compensation derived from the section 33.07 penalty
    may not donate any of the section 33.07 compensation to the county, whether the donation is to
    enhance the collection of delinquent taxes or for another county purpose. The purpose of the penalty
    authorized by section 33.07 of the Tax Code is to compensate the attorney and not to pay other
    county expenses.
    A brief submitted in connection with this request states that a number of firms and taxing
    units “have negotiated contracts in which the firm either directly pays or reimburses a taxing unit
    for specific types of ‘costs of collections,“‘2 in reliance on language in Attorney General Opinion
    JM-857. This opinion, after pointing out that nothing required the taxing unit to impose the full
    fifteen percent penalty, stated that “[i]n drafting the contract, the taxing unit has the opportunity to
    include specific terms on the ‘costs of collection’ which the attorney will absorb.” Tex. Att’y Gen.
    Op. No. JM-857 (1988) at 7.
    The sentence from Attorney General Opinion JM-857 must be read in the context of the
    entire opinion, which emphasizes that the penalty imposed under section 33.07 may not be spent to
    defray the taxing unit’s costs of collection. 
    Id. This places
    a significant limit on the power of the
    county to contract regarding costs of collection. Moreover, the Tax Code expressly allocates certain
    costs, and these may not be reallocated by contract. Section 33.48 authorizes the taxing unit to
    recover usual court costs, including service of process, filing notice of lis pendens against property,
    foreclosure sale, and other reasonable expenses incurred by the taxing unit to determine the name,
    identity, and location of parties and to secure legal descriptions of the property, as well as reasonable
    court-approved attorney ad litem fees. See TEX. TAX CODEANN. 5 33.48 (Vernon Supp. 2001), as
    amended by Act of May 17,2001,77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430,§ 23,200l Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4819,
    4826; see also TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 6 33.07(c) (Vernon 2001) (if penalty is imposed pursuant to
    section 33.07, taxing unit may not recover attorney fees in suit to collect delinquent taxes subject
    to penalty). Subsection 33.49(a) of the Tax Code provides that a taxing unit is not “liable in a suit
    to collect taxes for court costs, including any fees for service of process, an attorney ad Zitem,
    arbitration, or mediation, and may not be required to post security for costs,” except that a “taxing
    unit shall pay the cost of publishing citations, notices of sale, or other notices from the unit’s general
    fund.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. 8 33.49(a), as amended by Act of May 17,2001,77th Leg., R-S., ch.
    1430, § 24,200l Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 4819,4826; 
    id. 8 33.49(b).
    Accordingly, the quoted language
    firom Attorney General Opinion JM-837 is limited by the holding of that opinion and by Tax Code
    provisions.
    2Brief fromR. Bruce Medley, Perdue, Brandon, Fielder, Collins & Mott, L.L.P., to Opinion Committee, Office
    of the Attorney General of Texas (Sept. 10,200l) (on file with Opinion Committee) [hereinafter Briefl.
    The Honorable   Charles D. Penick    - Page 4      (JC-0443)
    In conclusion, we point out that we cannot determine whether a particular donation to the
    county constitutes an allocation of the section 33 -07 penalty to the county. This determination raises
    questions of fact, which cannot be resolved in an attorney general opinion. See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen.
    Op. Nos. JC-0328 (2000) at 6; JC-0152 (1999) at 12; JC-0020 at 2; DM-98 (1992) at 3; H-56 (1973)
    at 3; M-l 87 (1968) at 3; O-291 1 (1940) at 2. If, however, a county tax-collection contract provides
    for a “donation” to the county by the attorney, we believe this provision would certainly raise the
    issue that the contract impermissibly allocates some of the article 33.07 penalty to the county.
    The Honorable   Charles D. Penick    - Page 5      (JC-0443)
    SUMMARY
    When a county contracts with an attorney to collect delinquent
    taxes pursuant to section 6.30 of the Tax Code, section 33.07
    authorizes the county to impose an additional penalty on the
    delinquent taxes to provide compensation for the contract attorney.
    The additional penalty authorized by section 33.07 of the Tax Code
    is solely for the purpose of providing compensation to the contract
    attorney, and the attorney may not make a donation to the county that
    in effect refunds part of his or her compensation to the county.
    Whether a particular donation is a refund of the attorney’s
    compensation under section 33.07 is a fact question.
    Attorney General of Texas
    HOWARD G. BALDWIN, JR.
    First Assistant Attorney General
    NANCY FULLER
    Deputy Attorney General - General Counsel
    SUSAN D. GUSKY
    Chair, Opinion Committee
    Susan L. Garrison
    Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JC-443

Judges: John Cornyn

Filed Date: 7/2/2001

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017