Jaramillo v. Milyard , 337 F. App'x 764 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 20, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LARRY JARAMILLO,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 09-1075
v. District of Colorado
WARDEN KEVIN MILYARD and (D.C. No. 1:08-CV-02166-ZLW)
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, MURPHY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Larry Jaramillo, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district court’s order
denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). Because we conclude that Mr. Jaramillo has failed to make “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny his request
for a COA, and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
In March 2004, Mr. Jaramillo pled guilty to one count of sexual
exploitation of a child. The court later sentenced him to twenty years in prison,
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
citing his “significant” criminal history. R. 34. His habeas petition before us
contends, inter alia, that his sentence violated his Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, that his sentence was illegal, and that his plea was not
voluntarily, knowingly, or intelligently made. Aplt. Br. 6, 11, 15.
Federal law imposes a one-year limitation on the right of state prisoners to
file habeas actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244. See § 2244(d)(1). The district court
ruled that Mr. Jaramillo’s petition was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) and
noted that Mr. Jaramillo did not dispute that “there was more than one year after
his conviction became final and before this action was filed during which no state
court postconviction motion was pending.” Dist. Ct. Ord. 4. The court also
concluded that Mr. Jaramillo was not eligible for equitable tolling.
On appeal, Mr. Jaramillo does not dispute the substance of the district
court’s timeliness ruling, but instead argues that the statute of limitations for
asserting a claim for collateral review is unconstitutional. The precise grounds
for this contention are not clear, but Mr. Jaramillo asserts that “[i]t is impossible
for us to believe that the framers of the Constitution would have ever allowed for
a constitution [sic] violation to go unchallenged because of a time limitation.”
Aplt. Br. 4.
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
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showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order
to make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Jaramillo’s argument does not satisfy this standard. He cites no
historical evidence, and we are aware of none, that the framers of the Constitution
believed there could be no time limitations for raising constitutional claims or
defenses. Moreover, he cites no precedent, and we are aware of none, in support
of his position.
Federal law requires that a prisoner seeking collateral federal review of a
state court conviction diligently pursue any claims he brings. Marsh v. Soares,
223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). This requirement serves the values both of
finality and of comity. The fact that Mr. Jaramillo believes that his sentence is
unconstitutional does not remove this requirement. See Smith v. Workman, No.
05-CV-721-HDC-SAJ, 2006 WL 2251699, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 4, 2006)
(rejecting the claim that there is “no time limitation” for alleging a Constitutional
violation as “erroneous”). Mr. Jaramillo does not claim he is innocent, only that
his sentence is, for various reasons, unjust. And Mr. Jaramillo does not bring to
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bear any facts which show that his failure to timely file his claim was due to
anything more than excusable neglect.
No reasonable jurist, therefore, could disagree with the district court’s
conclusion that Mr. Jaramillo “fails to allege any facts that might justify equitable
tolling of the one-year limitation period.” Dist. Ct. Ord. 5.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Jaramillo’s request for a COA and DISMISS
this appeal. Petitioner’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also DENIED.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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