State v. Martinez-Castellanos , 428 P.3d 1038 ( 2018 )


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  •                  This opinion is subject to revision before final
    publication in the Pacific Reporter
    
    2018 UT 46
    IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
    STATE OF UTAH,
    Appellant,
    v.
    ABISAI MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS,
    Appellee.
    No. 20170323
    Filed August 29, 2018
    On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
    Fourth District, Nephi
    The Honorable James M. Brady
    No. 101600146
    Attorneys:
    Sean D. Reyes, Att’y Gen., Christopher D. Ballard, Asst. Solic. Gen.,
    Salt Lake City, for appellant
    Aaron P. Dodd, Provo, for appellee
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court,
    in which ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, JUSTICE HIMONAS,
    JUSTICE PEARCE, and JUSTICE PETERSEN joined.
    CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:
    Introduction
    ¶1 Abisai Martinez-Castellanos was charged with two counts
    of possession of or use of a controlled substance and one count of
    possession of drug paraphernalia after a highway trooper discovered
    drugs and drug paraphernalia in his vehicle during a traffic stop.
    Before his trial began, his counsel failed to involve him in the jury
    selection process. His counsel also filed a motion to suppress the
    traffic stop evidence but repeatedly failed to file any memorandum
    in support of the motion.
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶2 After the jury convicted Mr. Martinez-Castellanos, the trial
    court, on its own accord, issued notice that it was considering
    granting a new trial because of his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
    during the jury selection and motion to suppress stages. The court
    appointed       separate     conflict    counsel      to       represent
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos on the issues it raised. But conflict counsel
    chose to act as a “friend of the court” instead of representing
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. Conflict counsel argued against
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s interests, asserting that his trial counsel’s
    failure did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial
    court thereafter declined to grant a new trial.
    ¶3 Mr. Martinez-Castellanos appealed his conviction, arguing
    that his counsel was ineffective during the jury selection and the
    motion stages, and that the trial court erred in its dealings with
    conflict counsel. While the court of appeals agreed that
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s three claims constituted errors, it
    concluded that none of these errors warranted reversal on its own. It
    did so, in part, because it could not determine whether, absent trial
    counsel’s error, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress
    would have been meritorious. But the court did hold that the
    cumulative effect of these errors undermined its confidence that
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos received a fair trial. So it reversed his
    convictions and ordered a new trial with new counsel.
    ¶4 The State challenges the court of appeals’ determination,
    arguing that the errors cited by the court did not harm
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos in the slightest and so the cumulative error
    doctrine cannot apply. We agree. Without a determination that the
    motion to suppress is meritorious, at least two of the three errors at
    issue cannot conceivably cause harm to him, so they cannot
    cumulate into reversible error. So we reverse the court of appeals’
    decision. With such a determination, however, these errors would
    not only be harmful, they would constitute reversible error on their
    own. So we cannot uphold Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s conviction,
    because the court of appeals failed to determine whether his motion
    to suppress was meritorious. We therefore remand this case to the
    court of appeals to make this determination.
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                             Opinion of the Court
    Background
    The Traffic Stop
    ¶5 In June 2010, Abisai Martinez-Castellanos was driving his
    car on Interstate 15 through Juab County.1 A trooper, who had just
    finished up a traffic stop on the opposite side of the highway,
    observed Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s car traveling northbound. The
    trooper got in his patrol car and, with his emergency lights still
    engaged, crossed the median and accelerated in order to get closer to
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s car. Once the car was within view, the
    trooper noticed that the California license plate of the vehicle was
    missing a registration sticker—a requirement on vehicles registered
    in     California.     The     trooper     proceeded      to     pull
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos over.
    ¶6 Once his vehicle was pulled to the side of the road,
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos provided the trooper with an expired
    Colorado license and registration, but he assured the trooper that he
    had a valid          Utah Driver       license.  While discussing
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s information, the trooper testified that he
    noticed Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was “a little bit jittery” and was
    “bouncin’ around a little bit.” The trooper then proceeded to check
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s information in his patrol car and also ran
    a warrants and background check. The trooper verified that the car
    was indeed registered and that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos had a valid
    Utah     Driver    license.   But    he     also   discovered    that
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos had miscellaneous theft charges dating
    back to 1997, charges for drug offenses in 2001 and 2006, and that he
    had his probation revoked in 2007 for possessing a controlled
    substance. Based on this criminal history, along with
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s jittery movements, the trooper testified
    that he had a “heightened” suspicion that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos
    “might be [under] the influence of something.”
    ¶7 The trooper then returned to the car and asked
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos to step out of the vehicle. Before
    administering several field sobriety tests, the trooper asked
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos if he had any weapons, to which he
    _____________________________________________________________
    1“On review of a jury verdict, we recite the evidence, and all the
    reasonable inferences that flow from the evidence, in the light most
    favorable to the verdict.” State v. Wilder, 
    2018 UT 17
    , ¶ 4 n.1, 
    420 P.3d 1064
    .
    3
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    responded that he had two work knives in the center console. After
    conducting field sobriety tests, the trooper concluded that
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was under the influence of a controlled
    substance. The trooper also concluded, based on Mr. Martinez-
    Castellanos’s criminal history, that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was a
    restricted person who could not legally possess knives. The trooper
    then arrested Mr. Martinez-Castellanos and searched his car. His
    search revealed two pocket knives, a marijuana grinder, a lighter,
    two glass pipes, a wrapper containing three pills that later tested
    positive for methamphetamine, and a wrapper containing several
    prescription pills.
    ¶8 The trooper took Mr. Martinez-Castellanos to jail, where he
    admitted that he had smoked marijuana. The trooper obtained a
    warrant for a blood draw, which tested positive for THC metabolite
    at    a   level    consistent   with   recent     marijuana   use.
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s blood tested negative for a number of
    other drugs, including methamphetamine. He also admitted that the
    knives were his but claimed to know nothing about the other drugs
    and paraphernalia in his car.
    ¶9 The State charged Mr. Martinez-Castellanos with counts of
    drug possession, paraphernalia possession, and possession of a
    dangerous weapon by a restricted person.
    The Motion to Suppress
    ¶10 Before trial, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s appointed trial
    counsel filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the car and the
    blood draw, asserting that the evidence was unconstitutionally
    seized. But trial counsel did not file an accompanying memorandum
    with the motion. The trial court then held an evidentiary hearing on
    the motion where the trooper testified for the prosecution and was
    cross-examined by trial counsel. At the end of the hearing, trial
    counsel requested thirty days to “submit a brief on the matter,”
    which the trial court granted. But trial counsel again failed to file a
    timely brief. A week after it was due, trial counsel submitted a
    motion “request[ing] additional time in which to file his brief
    regarding the suppression of evidence.” The court again granted the
    motion, but trial counsel again failed to file a brief supporting the
    motion. Having received nothing from trial counsel, the State finally
    submitted its own memorandum in opposition to the motion to
    suppress. Again, trial counsel did not respond, and the court
    eventually denied the motion.
    ¶11 About two weeks after the motion was denied, trial counsel
    moved to set aside the court’s decision and requested additional
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    2018 UT 46
                            Opinion of the Court
    time to file a memorandum in support of the motion. The court
    granted the request, giving counsel an additional week to file his
    supporting memorandum. But instead of filing a memorandum in
    support, trial counsel eventually filed a motion captioned
    “Submission of Motion to Suppress,” which stated that counsel
    “submits the Motion to Suppress Evidence to the Court based upon
    the transcript of the suppression hearing.” The trial court thereafter
    reinstated its prior order denying the suppression motion, noting
    that trial counsel had yet again failed to file a supporting
    memorandum.
    ¶12 But trial counsel was not done yet. Two days before trial, he
    moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the dash-cam video
    demonstrated that there was “no basis” for the stop. No
    memorandum in support was filed with this motion. The trial court
    again denied the motion.
    Jury Selection and Trial
    ¶13 Before trial began, twenty-six members of the jury pool
    filled out juror questionnaires and were asked background questions
    in open court about matters that might influence their opinions of
    the case. After completing these background questions, thirteen
    potential jury members were called back to the trial court’s chambers
    for individual questioning by him and the attorneys.
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was not invited, however, into the
    chambers by the court or his counsel, and he remained in the
    courtroom while further questioning of the potential jury members
    took place.
    ¶14 Once in chambers, the court and attorneys asked the
    individual jury members follow-up questions to their answers in
    open court.2 Three of the potential jurors called into chambers were
    _____________________________________________________________
    2 Due to a technical issue, the audio recording of this in-chambers
    questioning is unintelligible. On appeal, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos
    moved the court of appeals to supplement the record with
    declarations from both counsel under rule 11(h) of the Utah Rules of
    Appellate Procedure. Both parties stipulated to the supplemental
    record, which was reconstructed roughly fifteen months after the
    fact from the memories of the participants. We rely on the
    reconstructed record here for what occurred during the in-chambers
    voir dire.
    5
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    of particular concern. The most concerning, the individual who
    eventually sat on the jury as Juror One, revealed in chambers that he
    was a retired Utah Highway Patrol trooper who had forty years’
    worth of experience in drug interdiction on Utah’s highways (a
    significant portion of which was spent on the stretch of highway
    where Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was arrested), and had participated
    in “many jury trials.” He also acknowledged that he knew the
    arresting trooper, but he stated he would not give the trooper’s
    testimony “more weight,” but “would make up his mind based on
    the facts presented in court.” He also “assured [both counsel] that he
    knew how to be fair, and that he could be fair if selected as a juror.”
    ¶15 As to the other two jurors of concern, the individual who
    eventually sat as Juror Two revealed in chambers that she had been a
    victim of a violent crime, that her son had been prosecuted in
    California for drugs, that she was against drugs, and that she
    believed “that if a person had drugs in the car, they were probably
    guilty.” And the individual who eventually sat as Juror Six was
    “reluctant to disclose what was going on in her own mind.” When
    the court asked if she could be fair and impartial, she expressed
    “reservations about her ability to function as a juror.” The court
    asked her the same question again and she responded that “she
    understood what the judge wanted and she believed she could serve
    as a juror.”
    ¶16 After these questions, each of the thirteen prospective jurors
    was dismissed from the judge’s chambers, and the court asked the
    attorneys whether they had any issues with a particular prospective
    juror and whether the attorneys passed the prospective jurors for
    cause. There is no evidence that any concern was raised about a
    particular prospective juror or that any were actually challenged for
    cause.
    ¶17 At the conclusion of the in-chambers questioning, the
    attorneys returned to the courtroom. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s trial
    counsel did not discuss with him what had occurred in chambers
    and did not mention the possible biases of the three potential jurors.
    Trial counsel simply exercised his four peremptory strikes without
    consulting Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. Counsel did not strike Jurors
    One, Two, or Six.
    ¶18 The court named the eight members of the jury, which
    included Jurors One, Two, and Six, and a one-day trial was held. The
    jury convicted Mr. Martinez-Castellanos of two felonies for
    possession or use of a controlled substance and two related
    misdemeanors.
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                             Opinion of the Court
    Post-Trial Proceedings
    ¶19 A week after the trial, the trial court issued a notice sua
    sponte, indicating that it was considering granting a new trial
    pursuant to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
    notice stated that “the court is concerned with a question of whether
    any error or impropriety occurred in this case which may have had a
    substantial adverse effect on the rights of the defendant.”
    Specifically, the court identified two events that, in its view,
    demonstrated Mr. Martinez-Castellanos possibly received ineffective
    assistance of counsel: “Defense counsel’s failure to file any
    memorandum          following     an    evidentiary     hearing    on
    [Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s] motion to suppress”; and “Defense
    counsel’s failure to challenge or remove a potentially biased juror
    [(Juror One)] from the jury on the day of trial.”
    ¶20 In the course of a subsequent hearing on the matter, the
    court concluded that it was no longer concerned with the
    “potentially biased juror” issue due to a recent Utah Court of
    Appeals’ decision. The court did decide, however, to appoint conflict
    counsel to represent Mr. Martinez-Castellanos in post-trial
    proceedings regarding the motion to suppress issue. The court
    expressed its concern with “[w]hether or not the evidence . . .
    supported the continued retention of [Mr. Martinez-Castellanos]
    after [the trooper] determined that the vehicle was registered,” and
    “whether there was . . . justification for having [Mr. Martinez-
    Castellanos] step out of the car and further perform . . . field sobriety
    tests” when the trooper discovered that the car was registered to
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos, that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was who he
    said he was, and that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos had a valid Driver
    license. The court was also concerned with “whether there was
    reasonable suspicion.” The court instructed conflict counsel to
    address whether trial counsel’s failure to file any memorandum on
    the motion to suppress issue constituted ineffective assistance of
    counsel.
    ¶21 About a month later, conflict counsel submitted a
    memorandum entitled “Amicus Brief.” Conflict counsel began his
    brief by stating that he was acting “as a friend of the Court.” He did
    not address the concerns the court expressed regarding the extended
    duration of the traffic stop in his brief, but instead addressed only
    whether trial counsel’s failure to file the memorandum rose to a level
    of ineffective assistance of counsel. He laid out the two-part
    Strickland analysis for ineffective assistance of counsel and applied it
    in this case. Then, surprisingly, conflict counsel argued that
    7
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos could not meet the prejudice prong of the
    Strickland test, noting that it “is difficult, if not impossible to find that
    [Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s counsel’s] failure to file a legal
    memorandum could satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test.”
    He concluded his brief by stating that the district court’s earlier
    denial of the motion to suppress was sufficient to include “an
    implicit determination that the facts elicited at the evidentiary
    hearing” supported a lawful search. He therefore advised the court
    that its decision denying the motion had addressed the concerns it
    had raised. He did not advocate for a different result on
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s behalf.
    ¶22 The State did not file a response to conflict counsel’s brief
    but rather concurred with the findings of conflict counsel. The trial
    court agreed with conflict counsel’s conclusion and withdrew its
    notice. The court dismissed conflict counsel and reinstated trial
    counsel to represent Mr. Martinez-Castellanos through the rest of the
    proceedings. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was subsequently sentenced
    to zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. The court suspended
    the sentences and placed him on probation.
    ¶23 Trial counsel then filed a timely motion for a new trial,
    asking the court to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop and
    blood draw, and noting that the trial court itself had expressed
    concern with this evidence. Once again, however, trial counsel failed
    to file a supporting memorandum. Instead, he simply attached the
    transcripts of the preliminary hearing, the suppression hearing, and
    the trooper’s trial testimony. In the motion, trial counsel did argue
    that there was “a substantial change in the [trooper’s] testimony
    regarding the reason for the stop and the time and delay in the stop”
    during these hearings. And, in light of the change in testimony, trial
    counsel argued that the order denying the motion to suppress
    “should be set aside and reconsidered.” But counsel did not further
    flesh out this issue. The State opposed the new motion as untimely
    and inadequate, and the trial court denied the motion without
    explanation. Mr. Martinez-Castellanos thereafter timely appealed his
    convictions.
    The Court of Appeals’ Decision
    ¶24 Before the court of appeals, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos
    argued that trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection and in
    his    efforts      to    litigate  the     motion     to    suppress.
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos also argued that the trial court committed
    plain error in failing to provide him with competent conflict counsel
    to address the court’s post-trial notice. A majority panel of the court
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                                Opinion of the Court
    of appeals concluded that each of these three assertions identified an
    error, but that none of these errors alone warranted reversal.3
    ¶25 The court of appeals first reviewed trial counsel’s actions
    during jury selection and concluded that counsel was deficient when
    he “fail[ed] to provide Martinez-Castellanos a meaningful
    opportunity to participate in the [jury selection] process—either
    through physical presence in chambers or at minimum through
    consultation afterward.”4 But it concluded that this error did not
    meet the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. The court reasoned
    that in order for Mr. Martinez-Castellanos to show prejudicial error
    under Strickland, he must show “that a biased juror actually sat.”5
    And because it believed “the limited record in this case permits no
    more than speculation that a juror with actual bias may have sat in
    judgment,” the court held that the second prong of Strickland could
    not be met.6
    ¶26 The court of appeals did note, however, that a finding of
    insufficient prejudice on this error was “a particularly unsatisfactory
    result” because it was built upon “one presumption layered on
    another.”7 And the court expressed further reservation in reaching
    this finding because “the trial judge himself had lingering concerns
    about at least one of the three jurors” and “the crucial events
    occurred       without      Martinez-Castellanos’       involvement.”8
    Nevertheless, the court “reluctantly conclude[d] that, on this record,
    Martinez-Castellanos cannot show that ‘there is a reasonable
    probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of
    the proceeding would have been different.’”9
    ¶27 The second error the court of appeals identified was trial
    counsel’s failure to file a memorandum in support of
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress. The court stated that
    _____________________________________________________________
    3   State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶¶ 78, 80, 
    389 P.3d 432
    .
    4   
    Id. ¶ 32.
       5   
    Id. ¶ 51
    (citing State v. King, 
    2008 UT 54
    , ¶ 28, 
    190 P.3d 1283
    ).
    6   
    Id. ¶ 58.
       7   
    Id. ¶ 60.
       8   
    Id. 9 Id.
    (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694 (1984)).
    9
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    counsel’s failure to file supporting memoranda effectively deprived
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos of “an effective adversarial process” and
    “amounted to deficient performance” under Strickland.10
    ¶28 The court also held that a third error occurred in
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s case—he was inadequately represented
    in his post-trial proceedings on the trial court’s sua sponte notice. The
    court believed that conflict counsel completely failed to represent
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos and, in fact, argued against him.11 It stated
    that conflict counsel essentially argued in his brief that, “because the
    court had decided the motion against . . . Martinez-Castellanos, it
    must have lacked merit in the first place and, as a consequence, trial
    counsel’s      failure   to     file   a     memorandum          arguing
    Martinez-Castellanos’ position was harmless.” The court of appeals
    12
    therefore concluded that the trial court had erred in accepting a brief
    that did not advocate for Mr. Martinez-Castellanos and “that the
    error was obvious.”13
    ¶29 But the court concluded that neither the trial counsel’s
    deficient performance with his motion to suppress, nor the trial
    court’s failure in the post-trial proceeding, constituted reversible
    error because Mr. Martinez-Castellanos “has [not] demonstrated the
    necessary prejudice.”14 It stated that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos was
    required under law to prove his motion to suppress was
    “meritorious” and that, had he prevailed on that motion, the
    “verdict      would       have      been     different.”15    While
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos argued on appeal that there was a
    “reasonable likelihood that a proper motion would have resulted in
    suppression of the evidence,” the court declined to determine
    whether Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion would have succeeded if
    a competent attorney would have filed a supporting memorandum.16
    The court chose not to engage in a merits analysis on the motion
    because of the “absence of representation” Mr. Martinez–Castellanos
    _____________________________________________________________
    10   
    Id. ¶¶ 63,
    67.
    11   
    Id. ¶ 72.
       12   
    Id. ¶ 71.
       13   
    Id. ¶ 73.
       14   
    Id. ¶ 78.
       15   
    Id. ¶ 74.
    (citation omitted).
    16   
    Id. ¶¶ 74,
    76.
    10
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                               Opinion of the Court
    received during these motion stages, and because the merits of the
    motion were “so poorly developed in the trial court.”17
    ¶30 The court of appeals did conclude, however, that the
    cumulative effect of these three errors—trial counsel’s deficient
    performance during the jury selection and the motion to suppress
    stages, and the trial court’s failure to appoint competent conflict
    counsel—“seriously         undermined”          its      “confidence
    that Martinez-Castellanos received a fair trial.” Operating under
    18
    the cumulative error doctrine, the court detailed how its decisions
    regarding Strickland prejudice on each error rested on shaky ground.
    Particularly, the court explained that its finding of insufficient
    prejudice was predicated on “layered legal presumptions” and an
    incomplete record.19 Because of this weak foundation, the court held
    that its confidence in the fairness of the trial was “significantly
    shaken.”20 The court therefore reversed Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s
    convictions and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial
    with different counsel.
    ¶31 The State subsequently filed a writ of certiorari with this
    court challenging the court of appeals’ cumulative error conclusion,
    which we granted. We have jurisdiction pursuant to section
    78A-3-102(3)(a) of the Utah Code.
    Standard of Review
    ¶32 We granted certiorari to review one question: whether the
    majority of the panel of the court of appeals erred in concluding
    cumulative error warranted a reversal of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s
    convictions. On certiorari, “we review the court of appeals’ decision
    for correctness.”21
    Analysis
    ¶33 In its decision below, the court of appeals concluded that
    trial counsel erred in his representation of Mr. Martinez-Castellanos
    during the jury selection and the motion to suppress stages of trial. It
    _____________________________________________________________
    17   
    Id. ¶ 76.
       18   
    Id. ¶ 79.
       19   
    Id. ¶ 78.
       20   
    Id. ¶ 80.
       21   State v. Rushton, 
    2017 UT 21
    , ¶ 9, 
    395 P.3d 92
    (citation omitted).
    11
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    also concluded that the trial court erred in its dealing with conflict
    counsel. But the court of appeals held that none of these three errors
    warranted reversal on their own, because Mr. Martinez-Castellanos
    could not show the “necessary prejudice” required under Strickland
    or the plain error doctrine.22 Neither party contests these
    determinations.23
    ¶34 The court of appeals did hold, however, that reversal was
    warranted under the cumulative error doctrine, a holding the State
    now appeals. So the only issue before us is whether the errors at
    trial, in combination, amount to reversible error under the
    cumulative error doctrine. We hold that they do not.
    ¶35 The cumulative error doctrine applies only to errors that
    could conceivably harm a party in some way. Errors with no
    potential for harm do not accumulate. Here, the court of appeals
    failed to determine whether Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to
    suppress was meritorious. Because at least two of the three errors
    identified by the court of appeals could not conceivably cause harm
    absent such a determination, we hold that the court of appeals erred
    in its application of the cumulative error doctrine. We accordingly
    reverse the court of appeals’ cumulative error determination and set
    forth the correct cumulative error standard.
    ¶36 Although we reverse the court’s decision, we cannot affirm
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s convictions, because the court of appeals
    failed to make a determination on the merits of his motion to
    suppress. Instead of deciding the merits of this motion, the court
    skipped this step and simply relied on reversal under the cumulative
    error     doctrine.      Because      a      determination      that
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress is meritorious would
    _____________________________________________________________
    22   State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶ 78, 
    389 P.3d 432
    .
    23  On certiorari, the State concedes that the court of appeals
    correctly held that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos has met the first prong
    of the Strickland test (deficient performance) with regard to trial
    counsel’s performance during the jury selection and the motion to
    suppress stages of trial. It also appears to concede that the trial court
    committed an obvious error when it accepted the brief from conflict
    counsel as sufficient representation. Additionally, in his briefing,
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos has not asserted as an alternative ground
    for affirmance that any of these errors warrant reversal on their own.
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                               Opinion of the Court
    render some errors reversible in this case, we remand the case to the
    court of appeals to make such a determination.
    I. The Court of Appeals Erred in Applying the Cumulative
    Error Doctrine
    ¶37 The court of appeals reversed Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s
    convictions on cumulative error grounds. It specifically concluded
    that while “no single error met the prejudice standard of ineffective
    assistance [of counsel] or plain error,” when it “‘consider[ed] all the
    identified errors, as well as any errors [it] assume[d] may have
    occurred,’ [its] confidence in the fairness of the trial and its outcome
    [was] substantially undermined.”24 The State claims this was error.
    ¶38 On certiorari, the State argues that the court of appeals’
    reliance on the cumulative error doctrine in this case was misplaced
    because none of the errors identified by the court were the least bit
    prejudicial to Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. It asserts that when “an
    error is not prejudicial to at least some degree, then it cannot add any
    weight to the cumulative error scale” and so should not be
    considered in a court’s cumulative error analysis. It also contends
    that, “[g]iven the nature of [Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s] claims,
    prejudice either existed or it did not; it was all-or-nothing.” And,
    according to the State, the errors he has identified cannot accumulate
    to warrant reversal, because Mr. Martinez-Castellanos could not
    establish prejudice on his all-or-nothing claims. We agree in part and
    accordingly set forth the proper scope of the cumulative error
    doctrine.
    ¶39 “‘Cumulative error’ refers to a number of errors which
    prejudice [a] defendant’s right to a fair trial.”25 It is “used when a
    single error may not constitute grounds for reversal, but many
    errors, when taken collectively,” do.26 This means that, under the
    doctrine, “we will reverse [a jury verdict or sentence] only if the
    _____________________________________________________________
    24  State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶ 80, 
    389 P.3d 432
    (citation omitted).
    25 State v. Ellis, 
    748 P.2d 188
    , 191 (Utah 1987) (alteration in
    original) (citation omitted).
    26   State v. Perea, 
    2013 UT 68
    , ¶ 97, 
    322 P.3d 624
    .
    13
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    cumulative effect of the several errors                  undermines       our
    confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.”27
    ¶40 In applying this doctrine, we have stated that a court should
    “consider all the identified errors, as well as any errors we assume
    may have occurred.”28 But this does not mean that all errors
    accumulate for purposes of cumulative error. Rather, when
    conducting this analysis, we have repeatedly held that the “doctrine
    _____________________________________________________________
    27 State v. Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 363, 
    299 P.3d 892
    (alterations in
    original) (citation omitted); see also Perea, 
    2013 UT 68
    , ¶ 105
    (“Cumulative error is applicable in those instances where the district
    court’s collective errors rise to a level that undermine our confidence
    in the fairness of the proceedings.”); State v. Kohl, 
    2000 UT 35
    , ¶ 25,
    
    999 P.2d 7
    (holding that the cumulative error doctrine will not be
    applied unless “the aggregation of these errors . . . result[s] in a
    fundamentally unfair trial”).
    While we have repeatedly stated that we look to the “fairness of
    the proceedings” or whether the defendant received a “fair trial” in
    our cumulative error analysis, see, e.g., Perea, 
    2013 UT 68
    , ¶¶ 97, 105,
    we have also stated that we look at whether “our confidence in the
    fairness of . . . [the] guilty verdict [is] . . . undermined,” State v. Jones,
    
    2015 UT 19
    , ¶ 74, 
    345 P.3d 1195
    ; see also State v. Houston, 
    2015 UT 40
    ,
    ¶ 111, 
    353 P.3d 55
    (“Because we find that each of Mr. Houston’s
    ineffective assistance of counsel claims fails, our confidence in the
    fairness of his sentence is not undermined. Therefore, we find no
    cumulative error.”); Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 364 (“Because
    Mr. Maestas was not harmed by any substantial errors over the
    course of the proceedings, our confidence in the fairness of his guilty
    verdict and his sentence of death is not undermined. Thus, the
    cumulative error doctrine does not apply . . . .”). These standards are
    synonymous. A defendant is deprived a “fair trial” when there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for the several errors, a different
    verdict or sentence would have resulted. We therefore hold that
    reversal is warranted under the cumulative error doctrine when
    multiple errors undermine our confidence in the verdict. See State v.
    Richardson, 
    2013 UT 50
    , ¶ 40, 
    308 P.3d 526
    (explaining that “[o]ur
    confidence in a verdict wanes when ‘there is a reasonable likelihood
    that the verdict would have been different’ but for an erroneous
    ruling” (citation omitted)).
    28   State v. Dunn, 
    850 P.2d 1201
    , 1229 (Utah 1993).
    14
    Cite as: 
    2018 UT 46
                             Opinion of the Court
    will not be applied” when “claims are found on appeal to not
    constitute error, or the errors are found to be so minor as to result in
    no harm.”29 In other words, the doctrine will only be applied to
    errors that are “substantial” enough to accumulate.30
    ¶41 When considering reversal under the cumulative error
    doctrine, therefore, not only must a court make a determination that
    an error exists, it must also make a separate determination that the
    error could conceivably cause some harm before it adds the error’s
    effect to the cumulative error scale. This is a critical intermediate step
    in which a court determines whether an error, standing alone, has
    any potential to cause harm before considering it in combination
    with other errors. This step ensures that errors with no potential for
    harm, such as technical or otherwise nullified errors,31 do not serve
    to inflate the overall number of errors we consider in favor of
    cumulative error. Although a trial riddled with technical errors may
    raise a reviewing court’s suspicions, only errors that could have
    adversely affected a party can accumulate into reversible error.
    _____________________________________________________________
    29See Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 363 (citation omitted); State v.
    Gonzales, 
    2005 UT 72
    , ¶ 74, 
    125 P.3d 878
    .
    30 Bundy v. Deland, 
    763 P.2d 803
    , 806 (Utah 1988) (holding that
    “[b]ecause . . . no substantial errors were committed, the concept of
    cumulative error does not apply” (emphasis added)); 
    Ellis, 748 P.2d at 191
    (same); Ivie v. Richardson, 
    336 P.2d 781
    , 787 (Utah 1959) (“We
    expressly do not mean to say that trivia which would be innocuous
    in themselves can be added together to make sufficient error to
    result in prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real and
    substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would affect the
    result.” (emphasis added)).
    31  A nullified error occurs when an error is rendered a nullity
    because there exists an alternative basis for upholding the same
    result the error produced. For example, a trial judge may
    erroneously exclude evidence as irrelevant under rule 402 of the
    Utah Rules of Evidence. But this error becomes nullified, or without
    effect, when it is clear on review that the evidence would have been
    excluded anyway under rule 403. Although technically an error, the
    trial court’s mistake poses no danger of harm because the evidence
    in question would have been excluded on alternative grounds. In
    other words, the result would have been the same whether the trial
    court erred or not.
    15
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶42 In sum, a court must make three determinations before
    reversing a verdict or sentence under the cumulative error doctrine:
    it must determine that (1) an error occurred, (2) the error, standing
    alone, has a conceivable potential for harm, and (3) the cumulative
    effect of all the potentially harmful errors undermines its confidence
    in the outcome.32 If the court determines that either a party’s claim
    did not amount to an error, or that the claim was an error but has no
    potential to cause harm on its own, the claim cannot weigh in favor
    of reversal under the cumulative effects test. The court of appeals
    failed to follow this test.
    ¶43 Here, the court of appeals weighed errors with no potential
    to cause harm on their own in favor of reversal. The court of appeals
    held that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s trial counsel rendered deficient
    _____________________________________________________________
    32  While similar in some respects, this analysis differs from the
    reversible error and ineffective assistance of counsel standards,
    which require a court to conclude (1) that an error occurred and (2)
    that the error undermines its confidence in the outcome. In order to
    establish reversible error, a court must determine that (1) an error
    exists, and (2) the error was harmful—i.e., “there is a reasonable
    likelihood that, absent the error, there would have been a result
    more favorable to the complaining party.” Tingey v. Christensen, 
    1999 UT 68
    , ¶ 16, 
    987 P.2d 588
    (citation omitted). Similarly, in order to
    establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must conclude that
    (1) “that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and (2) that “the
    deficient performance prejudiced the defense”—i.e., “there is a
    reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
    the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 694 (1984). The second prong in both
    standards ultimately focuses on whether the court’s confidence in
    the outcome of the proceeding is undermined. See Richardson, 
    2013 UT 50
    , ¶ 40 (holding that an error “will require reversal only if [our]
    confidence in the jury’s verdict is undermined” (alteration in
    original) (citation omitted)); 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    (holding that
    “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
    confidence in the outcome”). While an argument can be made that
    the same intermediate step set forth in the cumulative error standard
    is implicit in these standards, this step is particularly important in
    the cumulative error context because it prevents the court from
    giving weight to an error that has no conceivable effect on the
    outcome.
    16
    Cite as: 
    2018 UT 46
                              Opinion of the Court
    performance in failing to file a memorandum in support of his
    motion to suppress.33 It also held that the trial court plainly erred in
    accepting conflict counsel’s “Amicus Brief that did not advocate for
    [Mr. Martinez-Castellanos].”34 But it ultimately determined that
    these errors did not warrant reversal on their own, because
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos failed to “demonstrate[] the necessary
    prejudice to be entitled to relief on the grounds of ineffective
    assistance of counsel or plain error.”35
    ¶44 It       appears      the      court       determined        that
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos could not show the requisite prejudice on
    these errors, because it was uncertain whether his motion to
    suppress was “meritorious”—a requirement a defendant must prove
    before he can establish “actual prejudice” on an ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim concerning the Fourth Amendment. 36 Instead of
    determining whether Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion was
    meritorious, the court stated that his trial counsel’s error during the
    motion stage, as well as the trial court’s error during the post-trial
    review of the motion stage, potentially left “unexplored
    developments” before the trial court and so left a “poorly
    developed” record on this issue.37 These “serious concerns” led the
    court to determine that the motion was “plausible” and to weigh the
    cumulative effect of these errors in favor of cumulative error.38 This
    was a mistake.
    ¶45 Trial counsel’s error during the motion stage—his failure to
    file a memorandum in support of the motion to suppress—was
    improperly considered by the court in its cumulative error
    _____________________________________________________________
    33   Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶ 67.
    34   
    Id. ¶ 73.
       35   
    Id. ¶ 78.
       36See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
    477 U.S. 365
    , 375 (1986) (“Where
    defense counsel’s failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim
    competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the
    defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
    meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict
    would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to
    demonstrate actual prejudice.”).
    37   Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶ 76.
    38   
    Id. ¶¶ 76,
    78.
    17
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    determination because this error, without a determination that the
    motion is meritorious, cannot conceivably cause harm. A trial
    counsel’s failure to file a memorandum in support of motion to
    suppress can only cause harm to a defendant when the motion
    would have been successful had the memorandum been filed.
    Otherwise, the failure to file a memorandum would have no effect
    on the defendant, as the failure would lead to the same result—an
    unsuccessful motion and the admission of the evidence at issue.
    Here, the court of appeals declined to determine whether, absent his
    trial counsel’s error, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress
    would have been meritorious. Because the court did not make this
    finding, we cannot say that this error had any conceivable effect on
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. So the court of appeals erred in
    considering this error as part of its cumulative error determination.
    ¶46 Similarly, in making its cumulative error determination, the
    court of appeals incorrectly accumulated the trial court’s error in
    accepting conflict counsel’s briefing. The trial court’s error here turns
    on whether trial counsel’s deficient performance during the motion
    stage prejudiced Mr. Martinez-Castellanos. In fact, that was exactly
    what conflict counsel was instructed to evaluate by the trial court.
    But the lack of representation by conflict counsel in the post-trial
    hearings could have no effect on Mr. Martinez-Castellanos if his
    motion to suppress was meritless. If his motion could not have
    succeeded below, regardless of whether a memorandum in support
    was filed, then his trial counsel’s deficient performance at the motion
    stage caused no harm. So the trial court’s decision to accept conflict
    counsel’s argument also could not cause harm, because the motion
    would not have succeeded either way. In other words, without a
    determination that the motion to suppress was successful, the trial
    court’s     error    could     not     conceivably      have     affected
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos, because nothing would have changed had
    the error not occurred—the traffic stop and blood draw evidence still
    would have been admitted.
    ¶47 Because, without a meritorious determination, we cannot
    say that his trial counsel’s error during the motion stage, or the trial
    court’s error during the post-trial stage, had any conceivable effect
    on Mr. Martinez-Castellanos, we also cannot say these errors are
    18
    Cite as: 
    2018 UT 46
                             Opinion of the Court
    “substantial” enough to accumulate.39 So the court of appeals
    incorrectly weighed these errors in favor of cumulative error.
    ¶48 That leaves us with the last error the court weighed in favor
    of cumulative error—trial counsel’s deficient performance during
    jury selection. The State contends that this error, like the two
    mentioned above, should not be included in the court’s cumulative
    error determination, because trial counsel’s performance during jury
    selection had zero prejudicial effect on Mr. Martinez-Castellanos.
    Specifically, it contends that because Mr. Martinez-Castellanos failed
    to show that an actually biased juror sat on the jury as a result of his
    counsel’s error—a requirement to meet Strickland prejudice40—he
    cannot show that any conceivable harm came from this error. We do
    not need to reach the question of whether this error is accumulable,
    however, because we have concluded that, without a determination
    that the motion is meritorious, the other errors identified by the
    court of appeals had no potential to cause harm and so could not
    accumulate under the cumulative error doctrine. This means that
    even if trial counsel’s deficient performance during jury selection
    potentially caused some harm to Mr. Martinez-Castellanos, and so
    was accumulable under the doctrine, we would be left with only one
    accumulable error for review. And a single accumulable error cannot
    warrant reversal under the cumulative error doctrine.41
    _____________________________________________________________
    39   See Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 364; see also Gonzales, 
    2005 UT 72
    ,
    ¶ 74.
    40 See State v. Sessions, 
    2014 UT 44
    , ¶ 31, 
    342 P.3d 738
    (holding that
    when considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims involving
    jury selection, “prejudice is defined in terms of proof of ‘actual juror
    bias’” (citation omitted)); State v. King, 
    2008 UT 54
    , ¶ 47, 
    190 P.3d 1283
    (“In order to prevail on [a] claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel, [a defendant] must show that his counsel’s actions
    prejudiced him because those actions allowed the seating of an
    actually biased juror.”).
    41  
    Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229
    (The cumulative error doctrine is
    applicable only where “the cumulative effect of . . . several errors
    undermines our confidence . . . that a fair trial was had.” (alteration
    in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Conocophillips Co. v.
    Utah Dep’t of Transp., 
    2017 UT App 68
    , ¶ 32, 
    397 P.3d 772
    (“[T]he
    cumulative-error doctrine has no application when only a single
    error has been determined or assumed on appeal.”).
    19
    STATE v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶49 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals’ cumulative
    error       determination.     But      we      cannot      uphold
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s convictions because the court of appeals
    failed to determine whether his motion to suppress would have been
    meritorious.42
    _____________________________________________________________
    42 In the alternative, Mr. Martinez-Castellanos argues that we
    may presume prejudice for each of these errors under United States v.
    Cronic, 
    466 U.S. 648
    (1984), and so we should affirm on this basis. The
    State argues, however, that we should not address these alternative
    arguments because he failed to present these arguments before the
    court of appeals. For support, the State relies on several cases
    including DeBry v. Noble, where we held that “[i]ssues not raised in
    the court of appeals may not be raised on certiorari unless the issue
    arose for the first time out of the court of appeals’ decision.” 
    889 P.2d 428
    , 444 (Utah 1995). But Mr. Martinez-Castellanos disagrees. He
    asserts that we “may affirm on any basis apparent on the record,”
    and he relies on Bailey v. Bayles, where we held that “an appellate
    court may affirm the judgment appealed from ‘if it is sustainable on
    any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
    ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the
    basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground
    or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not
    raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by
    the lower court.’” 
    2002 UT 58
    , ¶ 10, 
    52 P.3d 1158
    (citation omitted).
    The parties (and the cases they rely upon) present us with an
    important question that has not been squarely answered by this
    court—whether this court may affirm a decision of the court of
    appeals (which, reverses—as opposed to affirms as in Bailey v.
    Bayles—a district court’s decision) on a ground that was not argued
    below when such ground is apparent on the record. We also
    acknowledge that there is a question of whether we would even
    have jurisdiction to review Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s alternative
    arguments in the first instance since this case involves second degree
    felonies, with respect to which the court of appeals has original
    appellate jurisdiction. See UTAH CODE § 78A-4-103(2)(e). But we
    decline to answer these questions now, because even if we could
    affirm the court of appeals’ decision here on any ground apparent on
    the record, we cannot say the alternative grounds Mr. Martinez-
    Castellano raises are apparent on the record. This is so because
    neither the Supreme Court, nor this court, has decided whether jury
    (Continued)
    20
    Cite as: 
    2018 UT 46
                              Opinion of the Court
    II. The Court of Appeals Erred in Failing to Determine Whether the
    Motion to Suppress Was Meritorious
    ¶50 As stated above, the court of appeals failed to determine
    whether Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress the traffic
    stop and blood draw evidence was meritorious.43 Instead of
    addressing this issue, the court avoided making the determination
    by relying on the cumulative error doctrine for reversal. This was
    error.
    ¶51 It is well established that “[w]here defense counsel’s failure
    to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal
    allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his
    Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious . . . in order to demonstrate
    actual prejudice.”44 So in order for a defendant to bring a successful
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this context, he must show
    that his counsel rendered deficient performance, that his Fourth
    Amendment claim is meritorious, and that, but for trial counsel’s
    deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the
    verdict would have been different.45
    ¶52 In its opinion below, the court of appeals acknowledged that
    “[o]rdinarily, Martinez-Castellanos would also need to ‘prove that
    selection, a pre-trial motion to suppress evidence, or a district court’s
    sua sponte notice considering a new trial during post-trial
    procedures constitutes a critical stage of the proceedings. See 
    Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659
    n.25 (“The [United States Supreme] Court has
    uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of
    prejudice when counsel was . . . prevented from assisting the
    accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.”); Maestas, 
    2012 UT 46
    , ¶ 57, 
    299 P.3d 892
    (holding that prejudice will be presumed
    “where assistance of counsel has been denied . . . during a critical
    stage of the proceeding” and that “[a] critical stage is ‘a step of a
    criminal proceeding . . . that h[olds] significant consequences for the
    accused’” (third and fourth alterations in original) (emphasis
    omitted) (citations omitted)). Without such a determination, the
    arguments Mr. Martinez-Castellanos asserts cannot be “apparent on
    the record.” So we do not address his alternative arguments.
    43 State v. Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶¶ 74–76, 
    389 P.3d 432
    .
    44   Kimmelman v. Morrison, 
    477 U.S. 365
    , 375 (1986).
    45   
    Id. 21 STATE
    v. MARTINEZ-CASTELLANOS
    Opinion of the Court
    his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious’” to succeed on his
    ineffective assistance of counsel claim.46 But the court chose to not to
    make this determination, because the court was concerned that “the
    representation [he] received during the motion to suppress” caused
    his motion to be “poorly developed in the trial court” and left
    “potentially . . . unexplored developments during the trial itself.”47
    Because of these “serious concerns,” the court avoided the
    meritorious determination and relied instead on the cumulative
    error doctrine.48 It concluded that the Mr. Martinez-Castellanos had
    presented a “plausible motion to suppress” and that his trial
    counsel’s deficient performance in arguing the motion, along with
    the other errors, warranted reversal.49 This was error.
    ¶53 The court of appeals should have determined whether
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress was meritorious.
    Both parties adequately briefed this matter before the court, and
    such a determination was critical to the overall outcome of the case.50
    It is clear that if his motion to suppress would have been successful
    had it been properly argued before the trial court, then
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos would have succeeded on his ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim. His motion sought to exclude all
    evidence from the traffic stop and blood test—including any
    evidence of weapons, drugs, drug paraphilia, or use of drugs. So,
    had his motion been successful, this evidence would not have been
    admitted and the State would have been left with no physical
    evidence to support its charges. This would not only have created a
    reasonable probability that the verdict in this case would have been
    different—it would have created a certainty of a different result.
    ¶54 Accordingly, we remand this case to the court of appeals to
    determine whether Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress
    was meritorious.
    _____________________________________________________________
    46   Martinez-Castellanos, 
    2017 UT App 13
    , ¶ 74 (citation omitted).
    47   
    Id. ¶ 76.
       48   
    Id. ¶ 78.
       49   
    Id. ¶¶ 76,
    80.
    50 In contrast, neither party has briefed the merits of the
    Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s motion to suppress before our court, nor
    was this issue fairly presented in our grant of certiorari.
    22
    Cite as: 
    2018 UT 46
                           Opinion of the Court
    Conclusion
    ¶55 The court of appeals erred in accumulating errors that,
    standing alone, had no potential to cause harm. Without a
    determination that the motion to suppress is meritorious, trial
    counsel’s deficient performance during the motion stage, and the
    trial court’s error in its dealing with conflict counsel, cannot
    conceivably affect Mr. Martinez-Castellanos and so are not
    accumulable under the cumulative error doctrine. Thus, we reverse
    the court of appeals’ determination of cumulative error. But because
    the court of appeals did not make a meritorious determination on the
    motion to suppress, we cannot uphold Mr. Martinez-Castellanos’s
    convictions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the court of
    appeals to make this determination.
    23
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Case No. 20170323

Citation Numbers: 2018 UT 46, 428 P.3d 1038

Filed Date: 8/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (18)

Kimmelman v. Morrison , 106 S. Ct. 2574 ( 1986 )

Strickland v. Washington , 104 S. Ct. 2052 ( 1984 )

State v. King , 190 P.3d 1283 ( 2008 )

State v. Gonzales , 125 P.3d 878 ( 2005 )

State v. Perea , 322 P.3d 624 ( 2013 )

United States v. Cronic , 104 S. Ct. 2039 ( 1984 )

State v. Kohl , 999 P.2d 7 ( 2000 )

Bundy v. Deland , 763 P.2d 803 ( 1988 )

DeBry v. Noble , 889 P.2d 428 ( 1995 )

State v. Richardson , 308 P.3d 526 ( 2013 )

Tingey v. Christensen , 987 P.2d 588 ( 1999 )

State v. Houston , 353 P.3d 55 ( 2015 )

State v. Rushton , 2017 UT 21 ( 2017 )

State v. Wilder , 420 P.3d 1064 ( 2018 )

State v. Ellis , 748 P.2d 188 ( 1987 )

State v. Sessions , 342 P.3d 738 ( 2014 )

Ivie v. Richardson , 9 Utah 2d 5 ( 1959 )

State v. Jones , 345 P.3d 1195 ( 2015 )

View All Authorities »

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State v. Norton , 2020 UT 46 ( 2020 )

State v. Green , 2023 UT 10 ( 2023 )

State v. Tippets , 2021 UT App 137 ( 2021 )

State v. Torres-Orellana , 2021 UT App 74 ( 2021 )

State v. Darnstaedt , 2021 UT App 19 ( 2021 )

State v. Alarid , 2022 UT App 84 ( 2022 )

State v. Beames , 2022 UT App 61 ( 2022 )

State v. Lopez-Gonzalez , 2020 UT App 15 ( 2020 )

State v. Beames , 2022 UT App 61 ( 2022 )

State v. Aguilar , 2022 UT App 97 ( 2022 )

State v. Ellis , 2020 UT App 119 ( 2020 )

State v. Whytock , 2020 UT App 107 ( 2020 )

State v. Percival , 2020 UT App 75 ( 2020 )

State v. Hart , 2020 UT App 25 ( 2020 )

State v. Suhail , 2023 UT App 15 ( 2023 )

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