United States v. Sepulveda ( 2022 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 20-2193
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    GEORGE SEPULVEDA,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Hon. Mary M. Lisi, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Barron, Chief Judge,
    Selya and Gelpí, Circuit Judges.
    William C. Dimitri for appellant.
    Lauren S. Zurier, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Rodney Santi, Acting United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    May 13, 2022
    GELPÍ,   Circuit      Judge.       Appellant    George     Sepulveda
    ("Sepulveda") appeals the district court's denial of his motion
    for compassionate release pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A),
    as amended by the First Step Act ("FSA").           Sepulveda argues before
    us, as he did below, that several factors — including his young
    age at the time of the offenses of conviction, the length of the
    sentence     imposed,      and     sentencing      disparities        with   his
    co-defendants and others similarly situated, as well as his post-
    conviction rehabilitation efforts — warrant a sentence reduction.
    We affirm the district court's ruling.
    I.        Background
    In   1997,    following    a    forty-four   day   trial,    a   jury
    convicted    Sepulveda     of    racketeering,     
    18 U.S.C. § 1962
    (c),
    conspiracy to commit racketeering, 
    id.
     § 1962(d), murder in aid of
    racketeering,      id.     §     1959(a),     witness      intimidation,      id.
    § 1512(b)(3), and possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, id.
    § 922(g)(1).     United States v. Sepulveda, No. 95–75 (D.R.I. Oct.
    2, 1997), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Lara, 
    181 F.3d 183
     (1st
    Cir. 1999).      Sepulveda's convictions relate to crimes involving
    the Almighty Latin Kings Nation ("Latin Kings"), one of the largest
    street gangs operating in the United States. Latin Kings is a
    hierarchical organization, in which Sepulveda, also known as "King
    Paradise," served        as the group's       president or "Inca" of          the
    Providence, Rhode Island chapter.             See Lara, 
    181 F.3d at 190-91
    .
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    The district court imposed three concurrent life sentences for the
    racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and murder in aid
    of racketeering charges, consecutive to the state sentence he was
    serving at the time, as well as concurrent twenty- and ten-year
    terms for the other federal offenses.
    Sepulveda has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged
    his convictions and sentence.      We upheld the convictions and
    sentence in Lara, 
    181 F.3d at 206
    , and affirmed the denial of
    Sepulveda's habeas corpus petition.       See, e.g., Sepulveda v.
    United States, 
    330 F.3d 55
    , 58 (1st Cir. 2003).
    Following the passage of the FSA, Sepulveda filed a pro
    se motion for compassionate release.      Therein, he argued that
    "extraordinary and compelling" reasons warranted the reduction of
    his sentence, to wit, his age at the time of his crimes, the length
    of his sentence, the disparity of his sentence compared with those
    of other convicted Latin Kings members, and his rehabilitation
    efforts.
    The district court denied Sepulveda's request, rejecting
    each of his arguments and finding that the reasons proposed were
    not "extraordinary and compelling."     United States v. Sepulveda
    (Sepulveda II), No. 95-75 (D.R.I. Oct. 8, 2020).      The district
    court considered also the applicable sentencing factors.        It
    concluded that Sepulveda remained a danger to the community and
    that the factors weighed against granting compassionate release.
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    As a result, the district court denied Sepulveda's motion for
    compassionate release.          The district court additionally denied his
    requests for an evidentiary hearing and for reconsideration.1
    Sepulveda timely appealed.
    II.          Discussion
    Section 3582(c)(1)(A) authorizes a court to reduce a
    term of imprisonment when extraordinary and compelling reasons so
    warrant.        See    
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A)(i).      Said   provision
    requires that "such a reduction is consistent with applicable
    policy   statements          issued   by    the    Sentencing   Commission."   
    Id.
    § 3582(c)(1)(A).            To grant compassionate release, "the district
    court    must    consider      any    applicable     [§] 3553(a)    factors,   and
    'determine whether,           in its discretion,         the reduction . . . is
    warranted in whole or in part under the particular circumstances
    of the case.'"         United States v. Texeira-Nieves, 
    23 F.4th 48
    , 52
    (1st Cir. 2022) (third alteration in original) (internal citation
    omitted) (quoting United States v. Saccoccia, 
    10 F.4th 1
    , 4 (1st
    Cir. 2021)).
    In 2018, Congress passed the FSA.                   See Pub. L. No.
    115-391, 
    132 Stat. 5194
     (2018).               Pertinently, the FSA amended the
    compassionate release statute to allow incarcerated individuals to
    1 The district judge who presided over Sepulveda's trial and
    sentencing, as well as ruled upon all post-conviction motions, is
    the same judge who denied Sepulveda's compassionate release
    motion.
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    file their own motions seeking compassionate release if they first
    apply to the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP").             See 
    id.
     § 603(b),
    132 Stat. at 5239; 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A) (2018).
    We   recently      held    that     "district     courts —     when
    adjudicating     prisoner-initiated          motions    for    compassionate
    release — have discretion, unconstrained by any policy statement
    currently in effect, to consider whether a prisoner's particular
    reasons are sufficiently extraordinary and compelling to warrant
    compassionate release."        See United States v. Ruvalcaba, 
    26 F.4th 14
    , 23 (1st Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. McCoy, 
    981 F.3d 271
    , 284 (4th Cir. 2020)).2       Nonetheless, we have emphasized that
    the absence of an applicable policy statement "does not mean that
    a     district      court's     discretion       when       adjudicating     a
    prisoner-initiated motion for compassionate release is unbounded,"
    nor does it "creat[e] a sort of Wild West in court, with every
    district    judge     having    an    idiosyncratic      release    policy."
    
    Id.
       (alteration in original) (citations omitted).              "After all,
    the district court's discretion remains circumscribed by statutory
    2As we noted in Ruvalcaba, "[s]uch motions are variously
    referred     to     as      sentence-reduction     motions     and
    compassionate-release motions." 26 F.4th at 17 n.1 (quoting
    Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4 n.2).             "We use those terms
    interchangeably."   Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4 n.2.     "In adopting
    this approach, we in no way suggest that release from imprisonment
    is the only form of relief contemplated under section
    3582(c)(1)(A).    After all, section 3582(c)(1)(A) refers to
    sentence reductions generally." Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 17 n.1.
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    standards, which obligate the district court to find a reason that
    is both extraordinary and compelling."             Id.
    a. Standard of Review
    The   compassionate       release      statute   provides     that    "a
    district court's decision to grant or deny [such type of] motion
    is discretionary."       Saccoccia, 10 F.4th at 4 (citing 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A)).     Thus, "we review a district court's denial of
    a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion."                        
    Id.
    "This standard is not monolithic and, under it, we review embedded
    questions of law de novo and embedded findings of fact for clear
    error."   Ruvalcaba, 26 F.4th at 19.
    b. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons Analysis
    The district court found that Sepulveda's proffered
    reasons related to his age, length of sentence, and sentencing
    disparities, did not amount to an extraordinary and compelling
    reason for compassionate release.              On appeal, Sepulveda relies
    heavily   on   two   recent       cases   where    district     courts   granted
    compassionate release to street gang members based on their age at
    the time of their offenses and other factors.               But these cases do
    not establish that the district court abused its discretion in
    denying compassionate release.            Like the courts in those cases,
    the   district   court     here    considered      the   full    slate   of     the
    defendant's    proffered    reasons.       The     district     court,   however,
    reasonably arrived at a different conclusion: that Sepulveda’s
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    particular circumstances did not rise to the requisite level of
    both extraordinary and compelling.            We review the district court's
    treatment of the defendant's reasons sequentially.
    i.    Age
    Sepulveda      argues    that       the   district    court   "did   not
    seriously consider" his argument that imposing a life sentence is
    especially    harsh   punishment        for   an    adolescent    who   is   still
    developing and capable of change and that his age at the time of
    offense thus warranted compassionate release.                   But contrary to
    Sepulveda's    assertions,        the     district      court     did   consider
    Sepulveda's age at the time of his offense and concluded it was
    not an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. Addressing
    Sepulveda's   specific     age-based      arguments,     the     district    court
    apparently reasoned that his actions did not appear to be motivated
    by, or resulted from, immaturity.               It noted that Sepulveda was
    twenty years old and, at that time, was the Inca of the Latin Kings
    in Providence.    See Sepulveda II, slip op. at 3 ("Defendant was
    the leader, not a follower; he was the one giving the orders.").
    These are factual findings that Sepulveda does not argue were
    clearly erroneous.      The district court’s conclusion, hence, was
    not an abuse of discretion.
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    ii.    Length   of         Sentence       and      Sentencing
    Disparities
    Next, Sepulveda argues that                   his then-mandatory life
    sentence is in and of itself an extraordinary and compelling reason
    warranting compassionate release.                  He goes further and, quite
    confidently, asserts that, had he been sentenced today, he would
    not receive a life sentence. This too, is inaccurate and misguided
    as   under    the       current,    discretionary          sentencing     regime,    the
    applicable       sentencing      guideline      sentence      as    to    him   is   life
    imprisonment.
    Crucially, the district court reasoned that the passage
    of   time    did    not    render        that   lengthy      sentence      unreasonable
    considering the scope and gravity of Sepulveda's offenses.                        To lay
    this    matter     to    rest,     the    district    court       expressly     rejected
    Sepulveda's contention that at present it would have imposed upon
    him a lower sentence.           Highlighting the seriousness of Sepulveda's
    offenses, the district court reaffirmed the sentence imposed by
    stating that "[w]hile this may seem harsh to him, given the nature
    of     his   crimes . . . his        sentence        was    and    is     appropriate."
    Sepulveda II, slip op. at 3–4 (emphasis added); see also Sepulveda,
    
    330 F.3d at 58
     ("[T]he length of the petitioner's sentence was not
    plucked out of thin air, but, rather, was determined by a federal
    judge based upon discrete findings of fact established by a fair
    preponderance of the evidence.").
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    We see no basis for concluding that the district court's
    determination that Sepulveda's sentence remained appropriate (made
    by the same judge who originally sentenced him) was marked by any
    legal or factual error.               The district court             also reasonably
    rejected Sepulveda's claims that his sentence was disproportionate
    compared to his own co-defendants based on material differences
    that justified the diverging sentences.                      Cf. United States v.
    Romero, 
    906 F.3d 196
    , 211-12 (1st Cir. 2018).                       Those reasonable
    findings    support     the    district      court's       determination        that   his
    existing    sentence     length      could     not    be    an     extraordinary       and
    compelling reason for compassionate release.
    iii.     Rehabilitation
    Sepulveda further urged the district court to consider
    the twenty-five years he has spent rehabilitating himself.                              On
    appeal,    Sepulveda     argues      that    the     district      court   abused      its
    discretion by disregarding the strides that the defendant made
    over the years.       The district court recognized that Sepulveda has
    dedicated    himself     to    his   rehabilitation          and    that   of    others.
    Sepulveda II, slip op. at 4-6.              The district court also noted that
    Sepulveda    included     as    exhibits       to     his    motion    a   number       of
    certificates for educational, vocational, and self-improvement
    programs he has completed during his incarceration, as well as
    letters of support from BOP staff and family members, among
    others.     
    Id. at 5
    .     The district court, however, having rejected
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    each of the defendant's other proffered reasons for compassionate
    release, correctly determined that rehabilitation alone could not
    be   an   extraordinary       and   compelling    reason     for     compassionate
    release.    See Sepulveda II, slip op. at 6.
    In    sum,    the    district    court   acted    well     within   its
    discretion       when    it     rejected    Sepulveda's      array    of   alleged
    extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.
    Because we may affirm on the ground that Sepulveda failed to
    establish an extraordinary and compelling reason, we need not
    address his argument that the statutory sentencing factors weighed
    in favor of a sentence reduction.
    c. Denial of Request for a Hearing
    Lastly, we address Sepulveda's claim that the district
    court abused its discretion by not granting him a hearing, which
    he weaves into his youthful status claim, arguing that without a
    hearing he was impeded from further expanding his arguments.                     We
    disagree.
    It is well-settled that criminal defendants are "not
    automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a pretrial or
    posttrial motion."        United States v. McAndrews, 
    12 F.3d 273
    , 279
    (1st Cir. 1993).        "Courts are busy places. Not surprisingly, then,
    evidentiary hearings on motions are the exception, not the rule.
    We have repeatedly stated that, even in the criminal context, a
    defendant is not entitled as of right to an evidentiary hearing on
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    a pretrial or posttrial motion."        United States v. McGill, 
    11 F.3d 223
    , 225 (1st Cir. 1993).      We review a denial of a request for an
    evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.              See McAndrews, 
    12 F.3d at 279-80
    .    "Because the trial judge is steeped in the facts
    and has a superior vantage point for assessing motions of this
    sort, we will not overrule the refusal to convene an evidentiary
    hearing absent a clear showing that the court's discretion has
    been misused."     
    Id.
    Sepulveda failed to carry this burden.           Below, he does
    not appear to have identified any basis for a hearing on the
    motion, such as a disputed material issue of fact.            On appeal, he
    suggests that an evidentiary hearing was warranted to fully address
    his claim that his offenses were motivated or a result of his age
    at the time of the offense.      But the defendant proffered case law
    on this point along with testimony from another case regarding
    updated information on the mental development of youths.              Here,
    the district court fairly believed the record developed enough to
    fully address the defendant's arguments, including those regarding
    his age.    Such a determination was amply within its discretion
    particularly because in this instance Sepulveda's age-related
    arguments   were   tied   to   his    motivations   and   reasons   for   his
    offenses.    Here, the district court had an existing reservoir of
    knowledge of Sepulveda's offenses and history, dating back to his
    trial and sentence.       Cf. Texeira-Nieves, 23 F.4th at 57 ("When
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    imposing a sentence, a judge necessarily acquires an intimate
    knowledge   of   the   offense   of   conviction   and   the   history   and
    characteristics of the offender.").        We thus affirm the district
    court's decision to deny the request for a hearing and to decide
    Sepulveda's motion on the papers.
    III. Conclusion
    We find no error in the district court's finding that no
    extraordinary and compelling reasons exist so as to warrant a
    reduction of Sepulveda's life sentence. Likewise, we find no error
    in the district court's decision to deny Sepulveda's request for
    an evidentiary hearing.     Accordingly, the judgment of the district
    court is
    Affirmed.
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