United States v. Langley , 363 F. App'x 252 ( 2010 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-5140
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHONA RENEA LANGLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Chief
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00057-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2009 Decided: January 28, 2010
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Brian J. Beck,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, United States Attorney, Jennifer R.
Bockhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shona Renea Langley appeals the district court's
judgment revoking her original sentence of probation and
imposing a thirty-six month prison sentence. We affirm.
In 2005, Langley pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to one count of misprision of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). A conviction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4 carries a maximum term of imprisonment of three years.
Langley’s guideline range for the offense was zero to six
months’ imprisonment. She was sentenced to a five-year term of
probation.
In July 2008, Langley’s probation officer filed a
probation violation report with the district court. The report
detailed five violations of the terms of Langley’s probation –
that Langley left the judicial district without permission,
failed to submit her mandatory monthly reports to her probation
officer for the months of April, May and June of 2008, failed to
notify her probation officer of a change in address, was
associating with a known felon, and was neglecting her parental
responsibilities. These violations occurred when Langley, after
leaving her children in the care of others, began living with
Charlie Smith, a known felon, in the Eastern District of
Virginia. After a revocation hearing, the district court opted
2
to continue Langley’s probation and ordered her to serve a four-
month term at a community corrections center.
At the time of the hearing, Langley was subject to
detention by state authorities for also violating the terms of
her state probation. Accordingly, instead of beginning to serve
her four-month term at the community corrections center, Langley
was released to state authorities and placed under state
custody. Langley, through her attorney, advised the court that
she intended to remain in state custody pending her state
revocation hearing, and Langley’s federal probation officer
directed that Langley was to contact her if she secured a bond
on the state charges. Langley did secure a bond, but failed to
notify her federal probation officer when she was released from
state custody. Instead, Langley again left the judicial
district in the company of Smith. Consequently, Langley’s
probation officer filed a second probation violation report with
the district court.
Langley’s new probation violation report detailed
violations similar to the earlier report – that Langley traveled
outside of the district without permission, was neglecting her
responsibilities as a parent, failed to notify her probation
officer of a change in address, and was associating with a known
felon. The report also referenced two additional violations.
It noted Langley’s failure to follow the instructions of her
3
probation officer – in that she failed to contact the probation
officer upon her release from state custody – and that Langley
had recently been arrested and convicted in state court on
multiple charges relating to bad checks. At her new probation
revocation hearing, Langley admitted to these latest violations,
and the district court, noting that Langley had committed these
latest probation violations in a matter of days after she had
previously appeared before the court, sentenced her to thirty-
six months' imprisonment – the statutory maximum. Langley now
appeals that sentence.
We review probation revocation sentences “to determine
if they are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden,
478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). Review of a probation
revocation sentence under this standard proceeds in two parts.
First, we must determine whether the sentence is unreasonable.
Id. If the sentence is not unreasonable, it is affirmed.
United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006). If
we deem the sentence unreasonable, however, then we must ask
whether it is “plainly” unreasonable – “relying on the
definition of ‘plain’ [used] in . . . ‘plain’ error analysis.”
Id. Thus, we would assess whether the unreasonableness of the
sentence is “clear” or “obvious.” Id. Importantly, when we
review a probation revocation sentence for reasonableness we
“take[] a more ‘deferential appellate posture concerning issues
4
of fact and the exercise of discretion’ than reasonableness
review for guidelines sentences.” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 656.
On appeal, Langley attacks both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of her sentence, contending that the
district court failed to include an adequate statement of
reasons justifying its imposition of a thirty-six month sentence
and arguing that a thirty-six month sentence is too extreme a
punishment given that the Chapter 7 policy statements suggested
only a five to eleven month sentencing range in her case. We
disagree on both points.
First, the record in this case evinces no significant
procedural error. The record shows that the district court
adopted Langley’s probation violation report, which included the
five to eleven month imprisonment range suggested by the Chapter
7 policy statements, but chose to sentence Langley to thirty-six
months of imprisonment based on her continued and persistent
criminal conduct, her repeated violations of the conditions of
her parole, and to afford her the opportunity to take advantage
of opportunities for self-improvement provided by the Bureau of
Prisons. It is well established that a district court’s
statement of reasons in the probation revocation context “need
not be as specific as has been required for departing from a
traditional guidelines range,” Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657, and we
5
conclude the district court’s reasoning in this case was
sufficient.
Second, Langley’s sentence is not substantively
unreasonable, much less plainly so. Langley’s violations of her
probation, while minor, were numerous and persistent. While the
Chapter 7 policy statements only suggested a five to eleven
month sentencing range, this range was based only upon the
severity of the single most severe violation. This circuit has
recognized that it is appropriate for a district court, when
facing a repeat probation violator, “to take account not only of
the severity of probation violations, but also their number, in
fashioning a revocation sentence.” Id. at 658. Keeping in mind
that “the sentencing court retains broad discretion to revoke a
defendant’s probation and impose a term of imprisonment up to
the statutory maximum,” id. at 657, we believe that the number
and frequency of Langley’s violations sufficiently justifies the
district court’s sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
6