In the Interest of: R.N.R., a Minor ( 2017 )


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  • J. S20016/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: R.N.R.,             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    A MINOR                                 :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: A.R., FATHER                 :         No. 3305 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Decree, September 29, 2016,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court Division at Nos. CP-51-AP-0000835-2016,
    CP-51-DP-0001108-2015
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., OTT, J. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                    FILED APRIL 19, 2017
    A.R. (“Father”) appeals from the decree entered September 29, 2016,
    in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of
    the Philadelphia County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) and
    involuntarily terminating his parental rights to his minor, dependent son,
    R.N.R. (“Child”), born in November of 2012, pursuant to the Adoption Act,
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). 1    Father further appeals
    the order entered September 29, 2016, changing Child’s permanency goal to
    1
    By separate decree entered the same date, the trial court also involuntarily
    terminated the parental rights of Child’s mother, B.N. (“Mother”), also
    pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother did not
    appeal, nor is she a party to the instant appeal.
    J. S20016/17
    adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351.2 After review,
    we affirm.
    The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history,
    in part, as follows:
    The family in this case has been known to DHS
    since March 17, 2015, when DHS received a report
    that Child had been taken to a hospital by Father.
    Father alleged that B.N. (“Mother”) abused and
    neglected Child.    Father threatened to physically
    harm hospital staff if they did not treat Child. On
    March 19, DHS visited Father in the home of J.F.,
    Child’s paternal grandmother (“Grandmother”). The
    home was appropriate, and Grandmother told DHS
    that she supported Father and Child. On April 14,
    2015, Grandmother informed DHS that she had
    evicted Father and Child after Father had threatened
    her. DHS met with Father in a temporary residence,
    but he was unable to obtain stable housing through
    other services because he had been banned for
    threatening employees there. On May 14, 2015, the
    trial court adjudicated Child dependent, fully
    committed him to DHS custody and placed him in
    foster care. The case was then transferred to a
    Community      Umbrella    Agency    (“CUA”)   which
    developed a Single Case Plan (“SCP”) with objectives
    2
    Father failed include any claim relating to the change of Child’s
    permanency goal in the statement of questions involved section of his brief,
    and failed to develop any argument related to this issue in his brief. Any
    challenge to this issue is therefore waived. See Krebs v. United Refining
    Co. of Pennsylvania, 
    893 A.2d 776
    , 797 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that, a
    failure to preserve issues by raising them both in the concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved portion
    of the brief on appeal results in a waiver of those issues); In re W.H.,
    
    25 A.3d 330
    , 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011), appeal denied, 
    24 A.3d 364
    (Pa.
    2011), quoting In re A.C., 
    991 A.2d 884
    , 897 (Pa. Super. 2010) (“‘[W]here
    an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to
    relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful
    fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”’).
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    for Father. Over the course of 2015 and 2016,
    Father did not complete his objectives. . . .[3]
    Trial court opinion, 11/10/16 at 1.
    The trial court held regular permanency review hearings in this matter.
    Throughout these reviews, the trial court maintained Child’s commitment
    and placement and permanency goal.
    DHS filed petitions to terminate parental rights and for a goal change
    on September 13, 2016. The trial court held a combined termination/goal
    change hearing on September 29, 2016. In support thereof, DHS and the
    Child Advocate presented the testimony of the following: Andrea Freeman,
    CUA, NET, aftercare worker, former case manager; Nashanta Robinson,
    CUA, NET, case manager; Calea Moore, CUA, NET, case aid.         In addition,
    there was an agreement to stipulate that CUA would testify as to the facts in
    the petition. (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 8.) DHS also offered Exhibits
    DHS 1-5, and the Child Advocate offered Exhibits CA 1-5, which were all
    admitted without objection.      (Id. at 6-7, 12-13.)    Father additionally
    testified on his own behalf. By decree entered September 29, 2016, the trial
    3
    Father’s objectives included compliance with Northeast Treatment Centers
    (“NET”) services; enrollment in Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for
    employment and drug and alcohol therapy; attendance at the Clinical
    Evaluation Unit (“CEU”); attendance at Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”);
    housing; visitation; completion of a parenting capacity evaluation; signature
    of consent forms; participation in a dual-diagnosis program; and provision of
    proof of employment and income. (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 26.)
    Testimony was also presented as to referrals for parenting, anger
    management, and domestic violence. 
    Id. at 29.
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    court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Father pursuant to
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).      On August 25, 2016,
    Father, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal, along with
    a concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    On appeal, Father raises the following issue for our review:
    Whether the trial court terminated the Father’s
    parental rights in the absence of clear and convincing
    evidence that termination served the needs and
    welfare of the child?
    Father’s brief at 2.
    In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
    standard of review is as follows:
    The standard of review in termination of parental
    rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
    findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
    trial court if they are supported by the record.”
    In re Adoption of S.P., 
    47 A.3d 817
    , 826 (Pa.
    2012).     “If the factual findings are supported,
    appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
    made an error of law or abused its discretion.” 
    Id. “[A] decision
    may be reversed for an abuse of
    discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
    ill-will.” 
    Id. The trial
    court’s decision, however,
    should not be reversed merely because the record
    would support a different result. 
    Id. at 827.
    We
    have previously emphasized our deference to trial
    courts that often have first-hand observations of the
    parties spanning multiple hearings.       See In re
    R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
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    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013).          “The trial court is free to
    believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
    make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
    In re M.G., 
    855 A.2d 68
    , 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
    competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
    the record could also support the opposite result.”       In re Adoption of
    T.B.B., 
    835 A.2d 387
    , 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
    Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, controls
    the termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis, as
    follows:
    Our case law has made clear that under
    Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
    process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
    the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
    satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
    delineated in Section 2511(a).     Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
    termination of his or her parental rights does the
    court engage in the second part of the analysis
    pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
    best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
    needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
    status of the emotional bond between parent and
    child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
    child of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted).        We
    have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
    weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
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    conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
    In re C.S., 
    761 A.2d 1197
    , 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
    Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 
    708 A.2d 88
    , 91 (Pa. 1998).
    In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights
    pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We
    have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
    need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
    Section 2511(a), well as Section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    ,
    384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, Father does not challenge the trial
    court’s finding of grounds for termination under Section 2511(a).       We,
    therefore, analyze the court’s termination pursuant to Section 2511(b) only,
    which provides as follows:
    (b)   Other      considerations.--The         court     in
    terminating the rights of a parent shall give
    primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of
    the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
    terminated     solely     on     the    basis     of
    environmental factors such as inadequate
    housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
    medical care if found to be beyond the control
    of the parent. With respect to any petition
    filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
    the court shall not consider any efforts by the
    parent to remedy the conditions described
    therein which are first initiated subsequent to
    the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
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    With regard to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as
    follows:
    [I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
    are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
    the developmental, physical and emotional needs
    and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The
    emotional needs and welfare of the child have been
    properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
    love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M.,
    
    53 A.3d 781
    , 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M.,
    620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that
    the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare”
    requires consideration of the emotional bonds
    between the parent and child.           The “utmost
    attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on
    the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
    In re 
    K.M., 53 A.3d at 791
    . However, as discussed
    below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an
    easy task.
    In re 
    T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267
    . “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a
    bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
    exists.     Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily
    depends on the circumstances of the particular case.”         In re Adoption
    of J.M., 
    991 A.2d 321
    , 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
    When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use
    expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
    well.     Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
    evaluation.”    In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing
    In re K.K.R.-S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
    omitted).
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    Moreover,
    While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
    is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
    best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
    many factors to be considered by the court when
    determining what is in the best interest of the child.
    [I]n addition to a bond examination, the
    trial court can equally emphasize the
    safety needs of the child, and should also
    consider the intangibles, such as the
    love, comfort, security, and stability the
    child might have with the foster parent.
    ...
    In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015), quoting
    In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    , 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    Instantly, in examining Section 2511(b) and determining whether
    termination of Father’s parental rights serves Child’s needs and welfare, the
    trial court reasoned as follows:
    Father misses half his scheduled visits with Child.
    He claims he oversleeps. Father does not use the
    visits to build a relationship with Child. He does not
    interact with Child, but argues with and threatens
    CUA employees. Father is hostile and threatening to
    everyone he interacts with. His visits had to be
    moved to DHS because he fought with CUA. He
    fought with parents during visits.              Father
    demonstrated no interest in reunification with Child.
    His main concern was ensuring Child was placed with
    one of his family members. Child is not bonded with
    Father, and calls Father by his first name only.
    When Father testified about his relationship with
    Child, the only positive example he could provide of
    their relationship was that Father had once bought
    Child expensive sneakers. Child would not suffer
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    irreparable harm if Father’s rights were terminated.
    Child is placed in a pre-adoptive foster home, and
    calls his foster mother “Mom.” He is very happy
    there and responds well to the foster mother. The
    foster mother takes Child to events with her family,
    and meets all of Child’s daily needs. The foster
    mother has made extraordinary efforts to provide
    Child a safe and stable home, choosing to give up
    other foster children in order to keep him. It is in
    Child’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental
    rights. Consequently, the court did not abuse its
    discretion when it found that it was clearly and
    convincingly established that there was no positive,
    beneficial parent-child bond with Father, and that
    termination of Father’s parental rights would not
    destroy an existing beneficial relationship.
    Trial court opinion, 11/10/16 at 10-11 (citations to record omitted).
    Father, however, argues that expert testimony was not offered
    regarding the bond between him and Child or the effect of the termination of
    his parental rights. (Father’s brief at 11.) Rather, only the testimony of one
    social worker, who had not recently observed visits between Father and
    Child, was presented. (Id.) Highlighting his own testimony, Father asserts
    that he, in fact, had a “close and caring” relationship with Child. (Id.) In
    further support of this, Father notes that the court took judicial notice that
    Child called Father “Dad” at recent visits.     (Id. at 12.)   Hence, Father
    maintains that “the trial court’s conclusion that that [sic] no positive
    beneficial bond existed between Father and Child, and that terminating
    Father’s parental rights would not be detrimental to Child is not supported
    by the evidence.” (Id. at 13.) We disagree.
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    Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Child’s
    needs and welfare favor termination of Father’s parental rights. Initially, we
    observe that Father’s compliance with his established objectives was
    reported as “minimal” or “none.” (Notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 41, 83.)
    Further, former CUA case manager, Andrea Freeman, indicated that Father
    did not appear interested in reunification.   (Id. at 41.)   Rather, “his main
    concern was his son being taken in by a family member.”           (Id. at 42.)
    Likewise, the current CUA case manager at the time of the hearing,
    Nashanta Robinson, confirmed that Father indicated that, if Child were
    reunified with him, Child would be with his mother. (Id. at 82-82.)
    Additionally, Father’s visitation with Child remained supervised and
    was changed from occurring at CUA to DHS with male supervision due to an
    altercation between Father and the case aid and another parent. (Id. at 34,
    101-102.) The CUA case aid who supervised Father’s visits with Child while
    still at CUA, Calea Moore, noted two instances where Father exhibited
    threatening behavior at visitation.    (Id. at 101-02.)       Ms. Moore also
    observed that Father was “aggressive” and “disrespectful” toward female
    caseworkers. (Id. at 102.) Ms. Freeman recounted that Father’s visits were
    not consistent, at one point 50 percent, noting he would oversleep or
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    forget.4 (Id. at 34-35.) Similarly, Ms. Robinson stated that Father missed
    4 of 14 visits since the last hearing.5   (Id. at 80.)   As to the interaction
    between Father and Child during the visits, Ms. Moore observed that there
    was not a lot of interaction between Father and Child.          (Id. at 103.)
    Ms. Moore stated that Father was instead distracted, contacting case
    managers or talking to other parents. (Id. at 102-103.) Father did not offer
    redirection or even acknowledge redirection was required. (Id. at 104.) In
    describing the visits, Father offered, “[W]e basically play, and I buy him
    stuff.” (Id. at 110.) All of the CUA workers testified that Child called Father
    by his first name. (Id. at 54-55, 86-87, 103.)
    Moreover, and significantly, Child is in a pre-adoptive home. (Id. at
    43.) Child “responds well” to his foster mother, whom he calls “Mom.” (Id.
    at 43, 53.)    Ms. Freeman characterized the relationship as consisting of a
    mother-child bond. (Id. at 44.) In addition, as reported by Ms. Freeman,
    Child’s foster mother is “fully able to meet all of [Child’s] needs.” (Id. at
    54.)      Ms. Robinson further corroborated the positive nature of the
    relationship, noting how Child’s foster mother provides redirection as well as
    educational stimulation. (Id. at 84.)
    4
    Ms. Freeman confirmed confrontational behavior, including inappropriate
    text messages, on the part of Father toward herself as well as other CUA
    caseworkers. (Id. at 52. See also Exhibit CA-4.) Father claimed these
    were not his text messages and suggested that a text-free application was
    used to insert his information. (Id. at 109-110.)
    5
    Father blamed missing these visits on Ms. Robinson. (Id. at 114-115.)
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    As such, Ms. Freeman changed the Child’s goal to adoption and,
    referencing the lack of a father-son bond, opined there would be no
    irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights were terminated.   (Id. at 42,
    44-45.) Likewise, Ms. Robinson confirmed Child’s goal was still adoption and
    suggested adoption would be in Child’s best interest. (Id. at 84.) Thus, we
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding
    termination of Father’s parental rights serves Child’s needs and welfare
    pursuant to Section 2511(b).
    Accordingly, we affirm the decree of the trial court involuntarily
    terminating Father’s parental rights and order changing Child’s permanency
    goal to adoption.
    Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/19/2017
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