United States v. Kamaga Roberts , 357 F. App'x 226 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________          DECEMBER 16, 2009
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    No. 09-10293                     CLERK
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 08-60175-CR-WPD
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    KAMAGA ROBERTS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (December 16, 2009)
    Before EDMONDSON, MARCUS and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Kamaga Roberts -- who pleaded guilty to cocaine importation and
    possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 841(a)(1) -- appeals the
    denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an x-ray
    examination that was conducted following a customs search. No reversible error
    has been shown; we affirm.
    On appeal, Roberts argues that customs agents lacked the requisite
    reasonable suspicion to conduct the x-ray examination. In considering the district
    court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review fact determinations for clear error
    and application of law to the facts de novo. United States v. Boyce, 
    351 F.3d 1102
    , 1105 (11th Cir. 2003). And we construe all facts in the light most favorable
    to the prevailing party -- here, the government. 
    Id. For border
    searches, a customs agent may conduct a more intrusive search --
    such as an x-ray examination -- if the agent has reasonable suspicion to believe that
    a traveler is carrying contraband. United States v. De Montoya, 
    729 F.2d 1369
    ,
    1371 (11th Cir. 1984). When assessing reasonable suspicion, courts must “look at
    the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining [agent]
    has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United
    States v. Arvizu, 
    122 S. Ct. 744
    , 750 (2002) (internal quotations omitted). “Though
    2
    there must be an objective basis for suspected wrongdoing, officers subjectively
    may assess the facts in light of their unique training, expertise, and experience in
    the field.” United States v. Tinoco, 
    304 F.3d 1088
    , 1116 (11th Cir. 2002).
    Here, customs agents earlier had received information about two women
    who had been arrested at a London airport for smuggling cocaine in a body suit
    and in condoms that were used as vaginal inserts. These women identified
    Roberts’s sister, Kadsashad, as their recruiter. One of the women frequently had
    traveled from Miami to London and from Fort Lauderdale to Jamaica. In checking
    Roberts’s flight from Fort Lauderdale to Jamaica, customs agents noticed that
    Roberts and another person, Taneisha Samms, were on the same flight and spoke
    to each other as they waited for their luggage. Samms and Roberts originally were
    seated next to each other on the flight but Roberts moved to a different row.
    Samms also purchased her ticket from the same travel agency as one of the women
    arrested in London.
    Agents detained Roberts and Samms for questioning.1 Samms provided
    agents with a false story about the reason for her trip; and she eventually admitted
    that she was in Jamaica with her cousin, Kadsashad Roberts. But she denied
    1
    “Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants [into the United States] are not
    subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant[.]” United States
    v. Montoya de Hernandez, 
    105 S. Ct. 3304
    , 3309 (1985).
    3
    knowing Kamaga Roberts. And Roberts also denied knowing Samms. Roberts told
    agents that she had been unemployed during 2008 and no longer spoke to her
    sister. But customs agents had information that, in 2008, Roberts made six trips
    from Fort Lauderdale to Jamaica and four trips from Miami to London, all of short
    duration. And on two of the trips, Roberts traveled with her sister. A search of
    Roberts’s luggage revealed no drugs. Agents suspected that Roberts was carrying
    drugs internally. A later x-ray examination of Roberts revealed an obstruction in
    her pelvic area; Roberts then admitted that she had inserted cocaine into her
    vaginal area.
    We conclude that the district court committed no error in denying Roberts’s
    motion to suppress: objective reasonable suspicion existed that Roberts was
    transporting drugs internally. Detaining agents identified particularized objective
    bases for requiring Roberts to submit to an x-ray, including that (1) her travel
    patterns were similar to other internal drug couriers recruited by her sister; (2)
    Roberts had traveled with her sister; and based on the agents’ training and
    experience, it was typical for new drug couriers to travel with their recruiters at
    first; (3) Roberts’s explanations for her many trips were implausible and vague,
    especially given that she was unemployed in 20082 ; (4) she denied knowing
    2
    For example, Roberts stated that one of her trips to London was to attend a baby shower
    for a friend of a friend.
    4
    Samms, even though they were cousins and had been seen talking to one another
    after the flight; and (5) Roberts had a nervous and angry demeanor when
    questioned by agents. Although each basis alone may have had an innocent
    explanation and may not be strongly probative of criminal activity, under the
    totality of the circumstances and based on the detaining agents’ knowledge of drug
    importation, the circumstances rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. See
    
    Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1116
    (reasonable suspicion exists if the cumulative
    information of which the detaining agent is aware suggests criminal activity, “even
    if each fact, viewed in isolation, can be given an innocent explanation”).3
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    On appeal, Roberts also argues that her suppression motion should have been granted
    because of the two-day delay in bringing her before a magistrate judge. Roberts failed to raise
    this claim below; and we discern no plain error. Here, reasonable suspicion existed for the x-
    ray; and authorities promptly obtained the necessary court order for the x-ray. See United States
    v. Mosquera-Ramirez, 
    729 F.2d 1352
    , 1356 (11th Cir. 1984) (once the reasonable suspicion
    standard has been met to justify a detention at the border, the government may detain a suspected
    internal smuggler for the time needed to conduct an x-ray examination).
    5