United States v. Anthony Calcagni , 441 F. App'x 916 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3880
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANTHONY CALCAGNI,
Appellant
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On appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(Criminal No. 5-08-cr-00743-002)
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 14, 2011
BEFORE: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 10, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
Anthony Calcagni (“Calcagni”) appeals from his sentence of 72 months‟
imprisonment on the grounds that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that
the District Court erroneously calculated his sentence. For the reasons discussed below,
we will affirm.
I.
We write solely for the parties and thus discuss only the facts necessary to reach
our decision.
A grand jury returned an indictment charging Calcagni with: (1) one count of
conspiracy to possess and sell stolen firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; (2) three
counts of possessing and selling stolen firearms and aiding and abetting, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(j) and 2; and (3) one count of dealing in firearms without a license in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and § 924(a)(1)(D). Calcagni entered into a plea
agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to all of the charges against him.
His plea agreement contained the following appellate waiver provision:
In exchange for the undertakings made by the government in entering his
plea agreement, the defendant voluntarily waives all rights to appeal or
collaterally attack the defendant‟s conviction, sentence, or any other matter
relating to this prosecution, whether such a right to appeal or collateral
attack arises 18 U.S.C. § 3742, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, or any
other provision of law. This waiver is not intended to bar the assertion of
constitutional claims that the relevant case law holds cannot be waived.
JA 386-87. The agreement further provided that Calcagni retained the right to file a
direct appeal if the Government appealed his sentence. If the Government did not, he
only preserved the right to raise three claims on direct appeal: (1) that he was sentenced
beyond the statutory maximum for any count of his conviction; (2) that the sentencing
judge imposed an erroneous upward departure; or (3) the sentence imposed was
unreasonably higher than the guideline range. JA 386-87.
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Calcagni‟s claims of error arise from information that came to light during his
change of plea hearing. During its recitation of the facts at Calcagni‟s change of plea
hearing, the Government stated that one of Calcagni‟s codefendants, Joshua Foster
(“Foster”), told a confidential informant that he and Calcagni had stolen the guns from
Calcagni‟s ex-girlfriend‟s house. Although there was reason to believe that the guns had
in fact been stolen from Calcagni‟s ex-girlfriend‟s house, the investigation into this
burglary was still ongoing and no charges had yet been filed against Calcagni. Calcagni
objected to the Government‟s recitation of the conversation between Foster and the
informant, and claimed that Foster never told the informant that they committed the
burglary together. This led the District Court to ask pointed questions as to Calcagni‟s
actual involvement in the burglary. Defense counsel not only instructed Calcagni to
answer the Court‟s questions, but also willingly elicited additional answers from him
regarding the underlying burglary. Counsel did not advise Calcagni of his Fifth
Amendment rights, and failed to request a recess to inform his client of the possible
consequences of his testimony—that he would either be admitting to an uncharged crime
or, if he denied his involvement, be committing perjury. Calcagni denied stealing the
guns.
After the guilty plea hearing, the Probation Office issued a revised Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”) withdrawing the three-level offense reduction for
acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The PSI also included a two-
level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and a four-
level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) for possessing firearms in
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connection with another felony offense—the burglary. These adjustments comprise a
nine-level offense increase, and consequently raised Calcagni‟s guideline sentencing
range from 33 to 41 months to 70 to 87 months.
In light of Calcagni‟s objections to the PSI, the District Court held a lengthy
hearing, during which it heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including Calcagni.
By this time, Calcagni had been charged with the burglary in state court. After the three-
day hearing, the District Court concluded, based on all the testimony, that Calcagni had
obstructed justice by committing perjury with regard to his involvement in the burglary,
and thereby had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. The Court thus assessed
the nine-level increase as recommended in the PSI and sentenced Calcagni to a term of
72-months‟ imprisonment.
Calcagni filed a timely notice of appeal.1
II.
Because an enforceable appellate waiver would necessarily preclude our exercise
of jurisdiction over the instant appeal, we first address the waiver provision in Calcagni‟s
plea agreement. We exercise plenary review over the enforceability of an appellate
waiver and whether a defendant‟s claims fall within its scope. United States v. Goodson,
544 F.3d 529, 537 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).
To determine if Calcagni‟s appellate waiver bars this appeal, we consider:
(1) whether the waiver „of the right to appeal [his] sentence was knowing
and voluntary;‟ (2) „whether one of the specific exceptions set forth in the
1
We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. §
3742.
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[plea] agreement prevents the enforcement of the waiver;‟ i.e., what is the
scope of the waiver and does it bar appellate review of the issue pressed by
the defendant; and (3) „whether enforcing the waiver would work a
miscarriage of justice.‟
Id. at 536 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Calcagni does not dispute that he entered into his plea agreement knowingly and
voluntarily; therefore, we will begin by considering whether his claims are exempt from
application of the appellate waiver.2
Calcagni first argues on appeal that his attorney‟s failure to advise him of his right
to remain silent or warn him about the potential consequences of his testimony deprived
him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. Because the waiver contains an
exception for asserting constitutional rights that cannot be waived, this claim is not
precluded. However, this Court does not generally hear ineffective assistance of counsel
claims on direct appeal; we have long held that they are better decided on collateral
review. United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 555-56 (3d Cir. 2004). We have
recognized a narrow exception to this rule only “where the record is sufficient to
determine ineffective assistance of counsel” and thus “an evidentiary hearing to develop
the facts is not needed.” United States v. Headley, 923 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1991).
That exception does not apply here.
Next, Calcagni argues that the District Court erroneously calculated his sentence.
He claims: (1) he should not have received the two-level enhancement for obstruction of
justice; and (2) he should not have been denied the three-level downward adjustment for
2
Even if Calcagni were to argue otherwise, our independent review reveals that his guilty
plea was in fact entered into knowingly and voluntarily.
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acceptance of responsibility. These claims do not fall within the exceptions specified in
his appellate waiver. His waiver only preserves the right to appeal an upward departure.
“An „enhancement‟ is an adjustment to the base offense level as specifically provided by
the Guidelines, whereas an „upward departure‟ is a discretionary adjustment to the
Guidelines range once calculated.” United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 298 n.5 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). Neither the
enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 nor the denial of a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to § 3E1.1 constitutes an upward
departure. Because the language of an appellate waiver must be strictly construed,
United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001), we find that Calcagni waived
his right to raise these claims on direct appeal.
Calcagni next argues that we should address the merits of his claims to prevent a
miscarriage of justice. He contends that affirming the District Court‟s sentence would
amount to a miscarriage of justice due to the Court‟s erroneous calculation. We disagree.
The District Court properly applied the guidelines and thus enforcing the imposed
sentence does not work a miscarriage of justice.3
III.
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Calcagni‟s false testimony regarding his involvement in the burglary was material to the
federal charges, and thus the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was appropriate. With respect to the court‟s denial of a three-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1, we give great deference to the
sentencing judge. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 n.5. We find no error in the sentencing judge‟s
assessment that Calcagni did not act in a manner consistent with acceptance of
responsibility and note that when a defendant‟s conduct results in an enhancement under
§ 3C1.1, a reduction under § 3E1.1 rarely applies. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 n.4.
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s sentence.
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