State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Ferrin , 311 Mont. 155 ( 2002 )


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  •                                           No. 01-887
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2002 MT 196
    STATE FARM MUTUAL
    AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    FARREL FERRIN, individually and as
    parent and guardian of ALAN FERRIN, a minor,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM:         District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and For the County of Lewis and Clark,
    Honorable Jeffrey M. Sherlock, Judge Presiding
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellant:
    Ward E. Taleff, Alexander, Baucus, Taleff, Paul & Young, PLLC,
    Great Falls, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Lyman H. Bennett III, Attorney at Law, Bozeman, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: April 4, 2002
    Decided: September 5, 2002
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice W. William Leaphart delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1    Farrel Ferrin, individually and as parent and guardian of his
    son, Alan Ferrin, appeals from the First Judicial District Court’s
    denial of his motion for summary judgment and its grant of summary
    judgment to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.                         We
    affirm.
    ¶2    The following issue is raised on appeal:
    ¶3    Did the District Court err in concluding that Alan Ferrin’s
    personal injuries were not caused by an accident resulting from the
    use of Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle?
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶4    The essential facts of this case are undisputed.                        In 1995,
    Farrel Ferrin (Ferrin)              discussed purchasing Carl Wajahuski’s
    (Wajahuski) .30/.30 caliber rifle for his son Alan Ferrin (Alan).
    At the time, Alan was 12 years old.                  As part of the purchasing
    process, the Ferrins and Wajahuski arranged a hunting trip so that
    Alan could hunt deer with the rifle.                  On October 22, 1995, the
    Ferrins     drove    from    their     residence      in   Helena,      Montana,    to
    Wajahuski’s mother’s residence in Townsend, Montana.                          Upon the
    Ferrins’ arrival, Wajahuski informed them that he had arranged a
    hunt on private land near Harlowton, Montana, and that they would
    travel together in Wajahuski’s vehicle from Harlowton to the
    hunting site.       Wajahuski owned a 1990 Ford Nissan pickup truck that
    was insured by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company (State Farm).
    ¶5    Wajahuski      drove    his    truck     to   Harlowton     and   the    Ferrins
    traveled in their own vehicle.                 When Wajahuski and the Ferrins
    2
    arrived in Harlowton, the Ferrins parked their vehicle and the
    parties rode together in Wajahuski’s truck.    Upon arriving at the
    property where they intended to hunt, they drove around in search
    of deer.   Wajahuski eventually spotted some deer below a ridge, and
    he instructed the Ferrins to exit the truck and walk downhill while
    he and his mother circled behind in his truck in order to help load
    any deer that were shot or to pick up the Ferrins if they were
    unsuccessful.   The deer were approximately 200 to 250 yards from
    the truck.
    ¶6   Alan carried Wajahuski’s .30/.30 rifle.    At the time, it was
    loaded with some ammunition that Wajahuski had personally reloaded
    and some factory-loaded ammunition.    After walking about 25 to 50
    yards, Alan raised the rifle and fired.   He missed his first shot,
    and he ejected the shell and loaded another cartridge.      As Alan
    fired a second shot, the rifle exploded and nearly severed one of
    his hands.   Ferrin shouted for help and Wajahuski returned.    The
    men loaded Alan into Wajahuski’s vehicle and drove him to a
    hospital in Harlowton.   Alan was subsequently flown by helicopter
    to Billings, Montana, for further treatment.
    ¶7   On December 14, 1999, Ferrin, individually and as parent and
    guardian of Alan, filed a complaint in the Eighth Judicial District
    Court, Cascade County, alleging that Wajahuski was liable for
    Alan’s injuries because he had negligently reloaded the round of
    ammunition which caused the rifle to explode in Alan’s hands.
    ¶8   On March 27, 2000, State Farm filed a declaratory judgment
    action in the First Judicial District Court.      It contended that
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    there was a controversy over whether its automobile insurance
    contract with Wajahuski provided liability coverage with respect to
    any claims for bodily injury asserted by Ferrin.     Both State Farm
    and Ferrin filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of
    whether Alan’s injuries were caused by an accident resulting from
    the use of Wajahuski’s truck.
    ¶9     The District Court held that they were not, and it denied
    Ferrin’s motion for summary judgment and granted State Farm’s
    motion.    Ferrin appeals.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶10    Our standard of review in appeals from summary judgment
    rulings is de novo, and we apply the same Rule 56, M.R.Civ.P.,
    criteria as the district court.   Wendell v. State Farm Mutual Auto.
    Ins. Co., 
    1999 MT 17
    , ¶ 9, 
    293 Mont. 140
    , ¶ 9, 
    974 P.2d 623
    , ¶ 9
    (citation omitted).    Pursuant to Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., summary
    judgement is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material
    fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.
    ¶11    The interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of
    law.    Pablo v. Moore, 
    2000 MT 48
    , ¶ 12, 
    298 Mont. 393
    , ¶ 12, 
    995 P.2d 460
    , ¶12 (citation omitted).     This Court reviews a conclusion
    of law to determine whether it is correct.     Pablo, ¶ 12 (citation
    omitted).
    DISCUSSION
    4
    ¶12   Did the District Court err in concluding that Alan Ferrin’s
    personal injuries were not caused by an accident resulting from the
    use of Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle?
    ¶13   The   insurance   policy   issued   to   Wajahuski   by   State   Farm
    included the following provision:
    5
    We will:
    1) Pay damages, including punitive or exemplary damages,
    which an insured becomes legally liable to pay because
    of:
    A. Bodily injury to others; and
    B. Damage to or destruction of property including loss of use
    Caused by accident resulting from the ownership,
    maintenance, or use of your car; . . .
    ¶14   In Wendell, an uninsured motorist case, we concluded that the
    phrase “arising out of the use” is ambiguous, and we adopted an
    expansive, fact-intensive test to determine whether injuries “arise
    out of the use” of an uninsured vehicle.                 We held that, for
    purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, an insured’s injuries
    “arise out of the use” of an uninsured vehicle if the injuries
    originate from, or grow out of, or flow from the use of the
    uninsured vehicle.   Wendell, ¶ 54.           The parties and the District
    Court applied the Wendell test in this case even though it is not
    an uninsured motorist case and even though a different insurance
    contract phrase is at issue:    whether injuries were caused by an
    accident “resulting from the use” of a vehicle.
    ¶15   We conclude that the Wendell test is applicable here.            First,
    from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence but not
    trained in the law or insurance business, the phrase “resulting
    from the use” is equally as ambiguous as the phrase “arising out of
    the use” which we considered in Wendell.            Like the phrase “arising
    out of the use,” the phrase “resulting from the use” is reasonably
    subject to more than one interpretation.            See Wendell, ¶ 53.
    ¶16   In interpreting an ambiguous phrase, we are guided by general
    principles   regarding   contract       law    as    applied   to   insurance
    contracts.   Pablo, ¶ 17.   If the terms of an insurance policy are
    6
    ambiguous, obscure, or open to different constructions, we construe
    the terms in a light most favorable to the insured or other
    beneficiary, particularly if an ambiguous provision attempts to
    preclude the insurer’s liability.              Pablo, ¶ 17.
    ¶17   While   we   considered      the   remedial       purposes     of    uninsured
    motorist coverage in formulating the Wendell test, we conclude that
    the test need not be confined to cases involving only uninsured
    motorist    coverage.     The    principles       of    construction       governing
    ambiguous insurance contract terms and phrases remain the same
    whether the case involves an insured motorist or an uninsured
    motorist.
    ¶18   Indeed, our Wendell decision cited other jurisdictions which
    have recognized that the reasoning with respect to uninsured
    motorist claims applies as well to other clauses in an insurance
    policy.    In Wendell, we adopted the test set forth in Insurance Co.
    of N. America v. Dorris (Ga. App. 1982), 
    288 S.E.2d 856
    .                         See
    Wendell, ¶ 54.     In Dorris, the Georgia Court of Appeals adopted the
    “originate from, or grow out of, or flow from” test from a case
    involving     personal    injury     protection         coverage–not       uninsured
    motorist    coverage.      See   Dorris,       
    288 S.E.2d at 858
        (quoting
    Southeastern Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Stevens (Ga. App. 1977), 
    236 S.E.2d 550
    , 551).        The Dorris court reasoned that although the
    Stevens case involved personal injury protection coverage, its
    holding regarding the sufficiency of a causal connection between an
    injury and use of a vehicle was “nonetheless relevant for purposes
    of contractual interpretation.”              Dorris, 
    288 S.E.2d at 858
    .
    7
    ¶19   Additionally, in Wendell we discussed with approval General
    Accident Ins. Co. of America v. Olivier (R.I. 1990), 
    574 A.2d 1240
    .
    Wendell, ¶¶ 43-44.    In Olivier, an uninsured motorist case, the
    Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the reasoning behind
    affording a broader meaning to the phrase “arise out of the use”
    would   likewise   apply   to   the   medical-payments   portion   of   the
    insurance policy at issue.       Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1243.
    ¶20   Accordingly, we hold that the expansive, fact-intensive test
    that we adopted in Wendell to determine whether injuries “arise out
    of the use” of an uninsured vehicle is also applicable to determine
    whether bodily injury was caused by an accident “resulting from the
    use” of an insured vehicle.
    ¶21   Ferrin contends that Alan’s personal injuries were caused by
    an accident resulting from the use of Wajahuski’s vehicle as set
    forth in Wajahuski’s insurance policy and that State Farm is thus
    liable for the damages Alan suffered.          He argues that the word
    “use” as well as the phrase “resulting from the use,” are ambiguous
    and must be construed, under Montana law, against the insurer and
    in favor of the insured.        Citing Georgeson v. Fidelity & Guaranty
    Ins. Co. (D. Mont. 1998), 
    48 F.Supp.2d 1262
    , and Fire Ins. Exchange
    v. Tibi (D. Mont. 1995), 
    51 F.Supp.2d 1065
    , Ferrin claims that
    because the use of Wajahuski’s vehicle was integrally related to
    Alan’s activities and injuries at the time of the accident, Alan’s
    injuries originated in, grew out of, or flowed from the use of
    Wajahuski’s vehicle.
    8
    ¶22   In Tibi, a rifle discharged inside a vehicle used for a guided
    antelope hunt when Tibi moved his personal belongings from the
    front seat of the vehicle to the back seat.      Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at
    1068-69.   A hunt participant standing outside near the vehicle was
    shot and injured.    Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1069.     Tibi’s insurance
    company filed a declaratory action alleging that its policy did not
    provide coverage to Tibi for the incident because the injuries
    sustained did not arise out of the use, loading or unloading of an
    insured vehicle.    Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1070.     A Montana federal
    district court concluded that it was reasonable and foreseeable
    that weapons and other hunting gear would be placed in and moved
    during the course of a hunting trip.      Because the injury occurred
    while a firearm and/or hunting gear were relocated in the vehicle
    so that Tibi could sit in the vehicle for the trip home, the court
    held that the requisite causal connection existed between the
    accident and the use of the vehicle.      Tibi, 51 F.Supp.2d at 1073.
    ¶23   In Georgeson, a telecommunications employee was killed in a
    fall from a utility pole while stringing cable, one end of which
    was attached to a spool resting on a company truck’s trailer.
    Georgeson, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1263.       Again, a question existed as to
    whether the accident was caused by the use of the uninsured
    vehicle.   Georgeson, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1265.         A Montana federal
    district court held that because the company truck was used to
    transport cable to work sites and was used to raise and tension the
    cable as it was hung on utility poles, a causal connection existed
    9
    between the underlying accident and Georgeson’s use of the company
    truck and trailer.        Georgeson, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1267-68.
    ¶24    State Farm contends that Alan’s personal injuries were not
    caused by an accident resulting from the use of Carl Wajahuski’s
    insured motor vehicle.       State Farm argues that although the Wendell
    test   is     expansive   and   fact-intensive,    it    requires    that   the
    connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury sustained
    be more than “remote or tenuous.”             State Farm maintains that to
    conclude that Alan’s injuries resulted from the use of Wajahuski’s
    vehicle “would be to determine that liability coverage exists in
    any accident situation with the slightest connection to a vehicle.”
    ¶25    The District Court agreed and concluded that Alan’s personal
    injuries were not caused by an accident resulting from the use of
    Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle.            The court reasoned that
    while it might have been reasonable and foreseeable that the rifle
    Alan was using would be placed in and moved about the vehicle as in
    Tibi, it was neither reasonable nor foreseeable that the firearm
    would contain allegedly negligently reloaded ammunition which would
    cause the gun to explode and injure Alan after he exited the
    vehicle and was 25-50 yards away from the vehicle when he fired the
    gun.     We    hold   that   the   District    Court    reached   the   correct
    conclusion when it determined that this was not the type of
    accident which could reasonably be expected to occur as the result
    of using a vehicle for purposes of a hunting trip.                Likewise, we
    hold that the District Court properly concluded that although the
    hunting party used Wajahuski’s vehicle as part of their hunting
    10
    trip, the use of the truck was not integrally related to the
    incidents surrounding the accident as was the vehicle in Georgeson.
    ¶26     The other cases Ferrin cites are also inapposite.          In each of
    them, the accidents in question would not have occurred without the
    use of the vehicle.          Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. McMichael
    (Colo. 1995), 
    906 P.2d 92
     (underinsured motorist coverage applied
    when employee’s injuries arose out of his use of the company truck
    as a barricade and warning device); Union Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v.
    Commercial Union Ins. Co. (Me. 1987), 
    521 A.2d 308
     (insurer liable
    for injuries incurred when removing loaded shotgun from automobile
    on hunting trip); Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Transit
    Co. of Louisiana (Miss. 1941), 
    1 So.2d 221
     (insurer required to
    defend suit for death of bus passenger resulting from pneumonia
    allegedly contracted when bus broke down and passenger forced to
    walk in inclement weather); State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v.
    District Court (1940), 
    110 Mont. 250
    , 
    100 P.2d 932
     (insurance
    policy covering the loading and unloading of an automobile covered
    injuries incurred during unloading of beer truck).
    ¶27     Here, on the other hand, the accident with the rifle could
    have occurred without the use of Wajahuski’s vehicle.                As such,
    this is more akin to the circumstances of Farmers Union Mutual Ins.
    Co. v. Blair (1991), 
    250 Mont. 52
    , 
    817 P.2d 1156
    .                 In Blair, a
    passenger removed a loaded revolver from a friend’s car, went into
    the   house   and,   while    removing    the   revolver   from   his   pants,
    accidentally shot another man.       Blair, 250 Mont. at 53, 817 P.2d at
    1157.    The district court held that since the shooting accident
    11
    occurred inside a house during a party after the passenger had left
    the car, the accident did not arise from the use of the vehicle.
    Blair, 250 Mont. at 56-57, 817 P.2d at 1159.
    ¶28   Here, as in Blair, the accident could have occurred in any
    location, regardless of where the rifle was stored or how the
    hunters reached their destination.     The fact that the   truck was
    used to transport the hunters and assist in the hunt simply
    provides no connection between the use of the truck and the
    explosion of the rifle.     Had Alan walked to the hunt carrying the
    rifle or engaged in target practice in his backyard, the rifle
    still would have exploded.
    ¶29   We hold that the District Court did not err in concluding that
    Alan Ferrin’s personal injuries were not caused by an accident
    resulting from the use of Carl Wajahuski’s insured motor vehicle.
    Accordingly, State Farm was entitled to summary judgment as a
    matter of law.
    ¶30   Affirmed.
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    We concur:
    /S/   KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/   PATRICIA COTTER
    /S/   JIM REGNIER
    /S/   TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    12