USCA11 Case: 22-11706 Document: 14-1 Date Filed: 03/09/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11706
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CHRISTOPHER NICHOLAS KOONCE-HOPE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUZANNE BASS,
in her official capacity as Circuit Court
Judge at the Fourth Judicial Circuit
Courts of Florida,
Defendant-Appellee.
MARY SUZANNE BASS,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11706
Defendant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-00078-TJC-JBT
____________________
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Nicholas Koonce-Hope appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his federal civil rights complaint, in which he
alleged that Florida Circuit Judge Suzanne Bass violated his due
process and equal protection rights while presiding over his di-
vorce.
In the underlying state court action, Judge Bass awarded Mr.
Koonce-Hope’s ex-wife full custody of their children, restrained
Mr. Koonce-Hope from contacting his ex-wife, and required him
to enroll in various domestic violence and mental health programs.
Following the final judgment, Mr. Koonce-Hope filed a supple-
mental petition to modify parental responsibility, but Judge Bass
subsequently granted the ex-wife’s motion to dismiss the petition.
Mr. Koonce-Hope then filed a complaint in federal district
court, alleging that Judge Bass violated his constitutional rights be-
cause (1) she failed to recuse herself from the case, (2) he did not
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22-11706 Opinion of the Court 3
receive notice of the June 25, 2020, hearing, (3) he “never had an
opportunity to present reasons why the proposed action on June
24, 2020, should not be taken[,]” (4) he did not have an opportunity
to “present evidence” and call witnesses at the June 24, 2020, hear-
ing, (5) he was denied his “right to know opposing evidence[,]” and
(6) Judge Bass deprived him of his right to “examine adverse wit-
nesses[.]” He also seemingly asserted that the substance of the state
court’s rulings violated his due process and equal protection rights,
claiming that the “signing of this order is the material and irrepara-
ble harm that constitutes a denial of [his] [r]ights[.]”
The nature of the remedy sought in the amended complaint is
unclear. Mr. Koonce-Hope requested a “Fourteenth Amendment
remedy” due to “adverse rulings and denials” and “numerous dep-
rivations without due process of law.”
The magistrate judge interpreted Mr. Koonce-Hope’s amended
complaint to be a collateral attack on a state court judgment and
recommended that the case be dismissed on that basis. Mr.
Koonce-Hope’s objections, however, clarified that he did not seek
relief from the state court’s final judgment. His objections insist
that his amended complaint is not an improper attempt to collater-
ally attack a state court judgment, but is instead a § 1983 claim
brought for violations of his due process rights. The district court
adopted the report and recommendation and dismissed the case,
citing to Sibley v. Lando,
437 F.3d 1067, 1071 (11th Cir. 2005),
which discusses both judicial immunity and the Rooker Feldman
doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413 (1923);
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11706
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462
(1983).
The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes between claims seeking re-
lief from a state court judgment and claims seeking damages even
if those claims are related to a state court case—the former are
barred by Rooker Felman and the latter are not. See Sibley,
437
F.3d at 1070 n.3 (“Sibley does not ask us to fix an erroneous state
court judgment, which we could not do, but rather to award $10
million against each state court judge who participated in his
cases.”). See also Behr v. Campbell,
8 F.4th 1206, 1214 (11th Cir.
2021) (“Because Rooker-Feldman bars only claims that invite a dis-
trict court’s ‘review and rejection’ of a state court judgment, claims
that seek only damages for constitutional violations of third par-
ties—not relief from the judgment of the state court—are permit-
ted.”). Because the amended complaint did not clearly state the
relief it sought, and because pro se pleadings are liberally con-
strued, see Tannenbaum v. United States,
148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998), it is not clear that a complete dismissal on Rooker Feld-
man grounds would be appropriate.
Based on our review, it is unclear on which grounds the district
court dismissed the case—i.e. whether the case was dismissed be-
cause Judge Bass was protected by judicial immunity or because of
the Rooker Feldman doctrine. Part of the reason that we are un-
sure of the rationale for dismissing the case is that the district court
dismissed the case with prejudice. When a district court dismisses
a case for lack of jurisdiction, including under the Rooker Feldman
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22-11706 Opinion of the Court 5
doctrine, the dismissal must be entered without prejudice. See
Frederiksen v. City of Lockport,
384 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2004)
(“when the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, there is only one
proper disposition: dismissal for lack of federal jurisdiction”);
Stalley v. Orlando Reg’l Healthcare Sys.,
524 F.3d 1229, 1232 (11th
Cir. 2008) (“A dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not
a judgment on the merits and is entered without prejudice.”).
The district court’s dismissal of the case with prejudice indicates
that perhaps the ground for the dismissal was judicial immunity.
On the other hand, the district court’s adoption of the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation, which solely discusses a liti-
gant’s inability to collaterally attack a state court judgment, indi-
cates that the ground for the dismissal was Rooker Feldman. Be-
cause we believe that the basis for the dismissal is unclear, we va-
cate the order and remand for the district court to clarify the basis
for dismissal. Should the district court again dismiss the amended
complaint in its entirety, Mr. Koonce-Hope can, if he wishes, take
an appeal from that order.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
