Com. v. Miranda, E. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S64030-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    EFRAIN MIRANDA III,                        :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 263 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0004165-2011
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2018
    Appellant, Efrain Miranda III, appeals pro se from the December 20,
    2017 order dismissing his second petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction
    Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    During the summer of 2011, police witnessed Appellant sell narcotics to
    numerous individuals. On July 18, 2012, Appellant pled guilty to ten counts
    of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance,1 ten counts of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver a controlled substance,2 and ten
    counts of corrupt organizations.3          On September 6, 2012, the trial court
    ____________________________________________
    1   35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
    2   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
    3   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 911(b)(1).
    J-S64030-18
    sentenced him to an aggregate term of 12 to 29 years’ imprisonment.
    Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
    On July 8, 2013, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition.       After an
    evidentiary hearing, the PCRA court denied the petition on December 10,
    2013.     This Court affirmed.      Commonwealth v. Miranda, 
    116 A.3d 697
    ,
    
    2014 WL 10753724
     (Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum).
    On December 8, 2017, Appellant filed a document he titled a petition for
    a writ of habeas corpus. On December 20, 2017, the PCRA court denied the
    petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This timely appeal followed.4
    Appellant presents two issues for our review:
    1. Whether [the PCRA court] erred as a matter of law, in not
    treating [Appellant’s filing] as a [PCRA petition]?
    2. Whether [the PCRA court] erred as a matter of law[ by]
    concluding that, [it] lacked [s]ubject [m]atter [j]urisdiction
    over [Appellant’s p]etition . . . ?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.5
    In his first issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by not
    treating his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as a PCRA petition. Whether
    a pleading is properly construed as a PCRA petition is a question of law;
    therefore, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
    ____________________________________________
    4Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 1925.
    5   We have re-numbered the issues for ease of disposition.
    -2-
    J-S64030-18
    plenary. See Commonwealth v. Descardes, 
    136 A.3d 493
    , 497 (Pa. 2016)
    (citation omitted).
    “The [PCRA is] the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
    encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same
    purpose. . . including habeas corpus and coram nobis.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542.
    A petition for writ of habeas corpus is only appropriate where a petitioner’s
    claim is not cognizable under the PCRA. See Descardes, 136 A.3d at 499.
    In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Appellant argued that the trial court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his criminal case and that he received
    an illegal sentence. These claims are cognizable under the PCRA. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(vii), (a)(1)(viii). Accordingly, the PCRA court erred by
    not treating Appellant’s filing as a PCRA petition.
    In his second issue, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred by
    dismissing his PCRA petition for want of jurisdiction. The PCRA court correctly
    concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Cf. Commonwealth v.
    Katona, 
    191 A.3d 8
    , 16 (Pa. Super. 2018) (we may affirm on any basis).
    “The timeliness requirement for PCRA petitions is mandatory and
    jurisdictional in nature.” Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 
    181 A.3d 359
    ,
    365 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (cleaned up). “The question of whether a
    petition is timely raises a question of law.       Where the petitioner raises
    questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review
    -3-
    J-S64030-18
    plenary.”   Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
    156 A.3d 1194
    , 1197 (Pa. Super.
    2017), appeal denied, 
    170 A.3d 1007
     (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted).
    A PCRA petition is timely if it is “filed within one year of the date the
    judgment [of sentence] becomes final.”       42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).        “[A]
    judgment [of sentence] becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
    including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
    the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
    the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). Appellant’s judgment of sentence
    became final on October 12, 2012 at the expiration of the time for seeking
    review by this Court. Appellant’s petition was filed over five years later. Thus,
    the petition was patently untimely.
    An untimely PCRA petition may be considered if one of the following
    three exceptions applies:
    (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
    interference by government officials with the presentation of the
    claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
    or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
    (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
    the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
    of due diligence; or
    (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
    by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
    of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
    has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
    -4-
    J-S64030-18
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). If an exception applies, a PCRA petition may be
    considered if it is filed “within 60 days of the date the claim could have been
    presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
    In this case, Appellant failed to plead that he satisfied any exception to
    the PCRA’s one-year time bar. See PCRA Petition, 12/8/17, at 1. Failure to
    plead the applicability of a timeliness exception in the PCRA petition renders
    the PCRA court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the petition. See
    Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 
    923 A.2d 466
    , 468-469 (Pa. Super. 2007),
    appeal denied, 
    934 A.2d 72
     (Pa. 2007).           As Appellant did not plead the
    applicability of a timeliness exception in his petition, the PCRA court lacked
    jurisdiction to reach the merits of the petition and we affirm on that basis.6
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 11/20/18
    ____________________________________________
    6 “The PCRA court failed to issue [notice pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 907] before denying relief. Nevertheless, Appellant has
    not raised this issue on appeal, so he waived any defect in notice.”
    Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 
    148 A.3d 849
    , 852 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2016)
    (citation omitted).
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 263 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 11/20/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/20/2018