L.C. Hall v. State of AL Dept. of Public Safety , 249 F. App'x 749 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
------------------------------------------- ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 1, 2007
No. 06-15743
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
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D.C. Docket No. 06-00146-CV-UWC
L. C. HALL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STATE OF ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendant,
TROOPER JEREMY LETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(October 1, 2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Officer Jeremy Lett (“Defendant”), an Alabama State Trooper, appeals the
district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds
the section 1983 claims brought by L.C. Hall (“Plaintiff”). No reversible error has
been shown; we affirm.
This case arises out of a traffic stop conducted by Defendant. Plaintiff
claims that Defendant violated his constitutional rights by using excessive force
and by making an unreasonable arrest. After Plaintiff filed his initial complaint,
all defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district court dismissed with
prejudice all claims against the State of Alabama and the Alabama Department of
Public Safety based on sovereign immunity. The district court also dismissed
without prejudice all claims against Defendant, but allowed Plaintiff to amend his
complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleged the following facts.
In 2004, Defendant stopped Plaintiff for speeding. After Defendant took
Plaintiff’s license and walked back to his patrol car, Plaintiff exited his car and
approached Defendant. Defendant then pulled out his nightstick and mace and
told Plaintiff to get back in his car. When Plaintiff asked Defendant if he was
going to beat him, Defendant ordered Plaintiff up against the car, grabbed
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Plaintiff’s arms, and told Plaintiff to get down. Because of a recent knee surgery,
Plaintiff was slow to comply with these orders. Defendant then began to beat
Plaintiff with the nightstick. Plaintiff then ran into oncoming traffic to escape the
beating, but several civilians and Defendant charged Plaintiff and knocked him to
the ground. After handcuffing the Plaintiff, Defendant sprayed Plaintiff with mace
and then pushed him into another officer’s patrol car.
The district court summarily denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s amended complaint on qualified immunity grounds. A denial of
qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss is an immediately appealable
interlocutory order, which we review de novo. Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d
1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2002). We accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true and construe the facts in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Id.Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss on qualified immunity grounds. He contends that a reasonable officer in
his position could have reasonably believed that each of his acts were necessary to
subdue Plaintiff, who had resisted arrest and had attempted to flee. Accepting
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, however, we conclude that the district court
correctly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because Defendant has failed to
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show that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts to establish a violation of his clearly
established rights.
“The use of excessive force in carrying out an arrest constitutes a violation
of the Fourth Amendment.” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.
2002). “Use of force must be judged on a case-by-case basis from the perspective
of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1347 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether the force applied was excessive depends on
“(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need
and amount of force used; and (3) the extent of the injury inflicted.” Draper v.
Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1277-78 (11th Cir. 2004) (footnote and citation
omitted). The need for the application of force is measured by (1) the severity of
the crime; (2) the danger to the officer or others; and (3) the risk of flight by the
suspect. See Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347.
Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant sprayed him with mace after Plaintiff
had already been subdued and handcuffed is sufficient to survive Defendant’s
motion to dismiss. In Vineyard, we said that “using pepper spray is excessive
force in cases where the crime is a minor infraction, the arrestee surrenders, is
secured, and is not acting violently, and there is no threat to the officers or anyone
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else.” 311 F.3d at 1348. We also explained that “using pepper spray is
reasonable, however, where the plaintiff was either resisting arrest or refusing
police requests, such as requests to enter a patrol car or go to the hospital.” Id.Although Plaintiff’s amended complaint concedes that he did not comply
with Defendant’s orders and even tried to escape, Plaintiff also alleges that after
he was already subdued in handcuffs, Defendant sprayed him with mace. Having
no facts before us that Plaintiff, at that point, continued to resist arrest, to refuse
police requests, to act violently, or to pose a threat to others -- facts that Defendant
might be able to prove at a later stage -- we conclude that Plaintiff’s allegations
are sufficient to show a violation of Plaintiff’s clearly established rights under
Vinyard.1 Therefore, the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint on qualified immunity grounds is affirmed.2
AFFIRMED.
1
We do not decide whether Defendant’s other acts (grabbing Plaintiff’s arms, striking Plaintiff
with a nightstick after he failed to comply with orders, taking Plaintiff down after he attempted to
flee, and pushing Plaintiff into a patrol car) are necessarily -- by themselves -- constitutionally
unreasonable or, if unreasonable, would be sufficient to defeat qualified immunity. We note,
however, that “[t]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right
to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Vinyard, 311 F.3d at 1347(quoting Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1865 (1989)). Also, “[n]ot every push or shove, even
if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, . . . violates the Fourth
Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
2
Defendant does not argue and we do not address the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity
for claims brought against Defendant in his official capacity. We affirm only the district court’s
denial of qualified immunity for claims brought against Defendant in his individual capacity.
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