DCPP VS. K.M. AND R.A. IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF N.A. (FN-09-0304-16 AND FG-09-0137-17, HUDSON COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)(CONSOLIDATED) ( 2018 )


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  •                              RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
    Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
    parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-3133-16T2
    A-0635-17T2
    NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
    PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,
    Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    K.M.,
    Defendant-Appellant,
    and
    R.A.,
    Defendant.
    _________________________________
    IN THE MATTER OF N.A.,
    Minor.
    _________________________________
    Submitted June 4, 2018 – Decided June 8, 2018
    Before Judges Sabatino and Firko.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
    Docket Nos. FN-09-0304-16 and FG-09-0137-17.
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
    for appellant K.M. (Meghan K. Gulczynski,
    Designated Counsel, on the briefs).
    Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney
    for respondent (Jason W. Rockwell, Assistant
    Attorney General, of counsel; Kenneth M.
    Cabot, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief
    in A-3133-16; Ellen L. Buckwalter, Deputy
    Attorney General, on the briefs in A-0635-17).
    Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
    Guardian, attorney for minor (Olivia Belfatto
    Crisp, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on
    the briefs).
    PER CURIAM
    These related back-to-back appeals, which we consolidate for
    purposes of this opinion, involve a two-year-old girl, N.A.,1 who
    was born in February 2016.    The child's birth mother is appellant
    K.M.   The child's birth father, R.A., has not appealed the rulings
    of the trial court, including the termination of his own parental
    rights.
    I.
    N.A. was born prematurely at thirty weeks, when her mother's
    placenta erupted.     The child received no prenatal care.        She
    weighed only three pounds and six ounces at birth and was placed
    on a respirator at the hospital. She was diagnosed with abnormally
    high bilirubin in her blood, and did not open her eyes for a period
    1
    Pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(d)(12), we use initials to protect the
    privacy of the child and the other parties.
    2                          A-3133-16T2
    of time.    The mother tested positive for marijuana and cocaine at
    birth, and cocaine was also found in the baby's system. The mother
    admitted that she had used drugs through the last trimester of the
    pregnancy, including the day before the child was born.
    The mother had no stable housing or employment.         She has a
    long    history   of   drug   abuse   and   related   incarcerations   and
    homelessness.
    Notably, the mother did not visit the baby for the month when
    she was in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit, even though the
    Division of Child Protection and Permanency contends it provided
    her with bus tickets to enable such visitation. The mother claimed
    that she planned to take care of the baby at a friend's house.
    However, the Division's assigned caseworker did not find a bassinet
    there, and the person living at the address provided by the mother
    denied knowing the mother.
    Once the newborn, N.A., was released from the hospital, the
    Division soon conducted an emergency removal and placed her with
    a resource parent.        The resource parent has been the child's
    ongoing caretaker since that time.
    N.A. has special needs due to delays in her gross motor skills
    and communication skills.       N.A.'s resource parent is aware of her
    needs and has cooperated with the therapy prescribed by the
    Division to aid the child's development.
    3                           A-3133-16T2
    Appellant   and   R.A.   previously   had   their   parental    rights
    terminated in July 2016 with respect to their son, J.M.             The son
    had also tested positive for drugs at birth in April 2014.              J.M.
    has since been placed permanently with a paternal uncle.                 The
    termination of both parents' rights as to J.M. was affirmed by
    this court in a June 2017 unpublished opinion.       N.J. Div. of Child
    Prot. & Permanency v. K.M., No. A-5108-15 (App. Div. June 7, 2017)
    (slip op. at 6).
    The parents each have longstanding drug abuse issues.               The
    mother previously left the "Mommy and Me" caregiving program after
    only three weeks with J.M.        She has frequently moved and been
    unable to maintain employment or steady housing. Most importantly,
    she has never been able to overcome her drug dependency.
    Throughout N.A.'s life, the mother has been recalcitrant and
    difficult to locate.    She continued to test positive for drugs on
    multiple occasions after N.A.'s birth.      Additionally, the mother's
    visits with N.A. were infrequent and highly sporadic, except for
    times when she was incarcerated.        The mother failed to submit to
    psychological and bonding evaluations until she was incarcerated.
    She repeatedly failed to comply with substance abuse evaluations
    during the litigation.        In sum, the mother has failed to take
    advantage of nearly all of the services offered to her by the
    Division.
    4                               A-3133-16T2
    II.
    Given these failures, the Division charged the mother with
    child abuse and neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).    A fact
    finding hearing was held on September 22, 2016.
    Judge Lois Lipton conducted the fact-finding hearing.       She
    found the sole testifying witness, Division caseworker Vivian
    Acosta, to be credible.   The judge expressly declined to rely on
    a finding that the baby had suffered from drug withdrawal symptoms.
    Nevertheless, she found that, although drug use can no longer be
    a per se basis to find abuse and neglect, see N.J. Div. of Youth
    & Family Servs. v. A.L., 
    213 N.J. 1
    , 23 (2013), the mother's
    behavior and indifference to the child's needs were sufficient
    additional factors, beyond the baby's positive drug screen, to
    support a finding of abuse and neglect.
    On appeal in the abuse or neglect case (A-3133-16), the mother
    contends that the trial court unfairly penalized her for her
    poverty and homelessness.    She asserts there is no sufficient
    corroborating evidence of the child suffering harm or withdrawal,
    emphasizing that A.L. holds that drugs in a newborn's system cannot
    be the sole basis for finding abuse or neglect.   She argues there
    was no proof of actual or likely harm to the child here, and that,
    in essence, the court improperly shifted the burden of persuasion
    5                          A-3133-16T2
    from the Division to her.    She also complains that the Division
    did not do enough to try to reunify the family.
    Our review of Judge Lipton's findings is guided by well-
    established standards.   As the Supreme Court has underscored, the
    purpose of Title 9 is "to protect children 'who have had serious
    injury inflicted upon them' and make sure they are 'immediately
    safeguarded from further injury and possible death.'"     A.L., 213
    N.J. at 18 (quoting N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a)).     "The law's 'paramount
    concern' is the 'safety of the children,' and 'not the culpability
    of parental conduct[.]'" Ibid. (internal citations omitted). "The
    focus in abuse and neglect matters . . . is on promptly protecting
    a child who has suffered harm or faces imminent danger."       Ibid.
    (citing N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)).
    A court's finding of abuse or neglect must be based on a
    preponderance of the evidence when the proof is considered in its
    totality.   N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b)(1).   "[I]n child abuse and neglect
    cases the elements of proof are synergistically related.         Each
    proven act of neglect has some effect on the child.     One act may
    be 'substantial' or the sum of many acts may be 'substantial.'"
    N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.H., 
    414 N.J. Super. 472
    ,
    481 (App. Div. 2010) (internal citations omitted).      The Title 9
    proof standard is less stringent than in guardianship cases for
    the termination of parental rights, which must instead be proven
    6                           A-3133-16T2
    by clear and convincing evidence.    See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a);
    N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 
    217 N.J. 527
    , 554
    (2014) (citation omitted) (recognizing the "clear and convincing"
    evidence standard required for a termination case).
    Abuse and neglect, as defined by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c), occurs
    when:
    a child whose physical, mental, or emotional
    condition has been impaired or is in imminent
    danger of becoming impaired as the result of
    the failure of his parent or guardian . . .
    to exercise a minimum degree of care . . . in
    providing the child with proper supervision
    or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or
    allowing to be inflicted harm, or substantial
    risk thereof, including the infliction of
    excessive corporal punishment; or by any other
    acts of a similarly serious nature requiring
    the aid of the court . . . .
    [N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b).]
    The statute does not require that the child experience actual
    harm.   N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b); see also N.J. Div. of Youth &
    Family Servs. v. F.M., 
    211 N.J. 420
    , 449 (2012) (explaining that
    the Division need not wait until a child experiences an actual
    injury) (citing In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 
    161 N.J. 365
    , 383
    (1999) (stating that the court does not need to "wait to act until
    a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention
    or neglect")).   Instead, a child can be abused and neglected if
    his or her physical, mental, or emotional condition has been
    7                          A-3133-16T2
    "impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired . . . ."
    N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4).          The Title 9 analysis is fact-sensitive,
    and the court must consider the totality of the circumstances.
    See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.W.R., 
    205 N.J. 17
    , 33
    (2011). The primary focus of the statute is to preserve the safety
    of the child.         N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.8(a).
    The Supreme Court has instructed that the abuse and neglect
    standard under Title 9 is satisfied when the Division demonstrates
    that a parent has failed to exercise a minimum degree of care.
    See G.S. v. Dep't of Human Servs., 
    157 N.J. 161
    , 181 (1999)
    (citations omitted).            A "minimum degree of care" encompasses
    conduct    that       was   "grossly     or    wantonly   negligent,    but    not
    necessarily intentional."          
    Id. at 178
    .       Wanton negligence equates
    to conduct that was done with the knowledge that injury is likely
    to result.       
    Ibid.
          A parent's action or inaction can rise to the
    level of wanton negligence even if he or she did not intend to
    cause injury.         See 
    id. at 179
    .         The Court has recognized in this
    regard    that    a    parent    should   be     liable   for   the   foreseeable
    consequences of his or her choices.               See 
    ibid.
    A parent's long-term drug abuse can satisfy the statutory
    test for abuse or neglect.             To be sure, "'[N]ot all instances of
    drug ingestion by a parent will substantiate a finding of abuse
    or neglect.'"         A.L., 213 N.J. at 24 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth &
    8                               A-3133-16T2
    Family Servs. v. V.T., 
    423 N.J. Super. 320
    , 332 (App. Div. 2011)).
    However, ongoing irresponsible behavior by a drug-addicted parent,
    and his or her failure to take advantage of services offered by
    the Division that might help him or her overcome his or her
    deficits, can suffice to meet the Division's burden of proof.            See
    N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.M., 
    430 N.J. Super. 428
    ,
    444 (App. Div. 2013) (affirming finding of harm under first prong
    of best interest standard based on the mother's "continued drug
    use,    lack    of   appropriate   housing,    and   failure   to    attend
    treatment").
    Our review of the trial court's findings is limited.         We must
    defer to the factual findings of the Family Part if they are
    sustained by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence" in the
    record.     N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.B., 
    452 N.J. Super. 513
    , 521 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted).                In this
    regard, we afford great deference to the trial judge's credibility
    findings, as the judge had the first-hand opportunity to observe
    the testimony when it was presented.          Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v.
    Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 
    65 N.J. 474
    , 484 (1974) (citations
    omitted).      Thus, we specifically defer to Judge Lipton's finding
    that caseworker Acosta, the sole testifying witness at the hearing,
    was credible.
    9                              A-3133-16T2
    By contrast, "'where the focus of the dispute is . . . alleged
    error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and
    the implications to be drawn therefrom,' the traditional scope of
    review is expanded."   N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M.,
    
    189 N.J. 261
    , 279 (2007) (citations omitted).     "A trial court's
    interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow
    from established facts are not entitled to any special deference."
    Manalapan Realty, LP v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 
    140 N.J. 366
    , 378
    (1995) (citations omitted).
    Applying these standards, we agree with the Division and the
    Law Guardian there is ample evidence in the record to support
    Judge Lipton's findings of abuse or neglect by the preponderance
    standard, and that the findings comport with the applicable law
    under Title 9.    The facts here are stronger than those involved
    in A.L., in light of this mother's behavior in not endeavoring
    diligently to develop a relationship with the child, her failure
    to have a realistic plan in place for the baby's care after her
    birth and release from the hospital, and her uncooperative and
    irresponsible behavior.   The child was placed in imminent danger
    of harm due to the mother's wanton failure to provide a "minimum
    degree of care . . . ."    See N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4); G.S., 
    157 N.J. at 181
    .   We reject defendant's arguments that the trial court
    misapplied the law, or that it ruled against defendant merely
    10                          A-3133-16T2
    because of her poverty or homelessness.                  The record provides a
    solid basis for the court's determination under Title 9, and we
    decline to set it aside.
    III.
    The subsequent guardianship trial was presided over by Judge
    Lourdes I. Santiago.         The judge, who issued a twenty-six-page
    written opinion on September 19, 2017, found that the four prongs
    necessary for termination of a parent's rights were met by clear
    and convincing evidence as to both the mother and the father.
    Judge    Santiago    began   by    noting    the    history   of   domestic
    violence in the family, including incidents between the mother's
    own   mother   and   the   mother's      older    daughter    and   between    the
    grandmother and the grandmother's husband.               The judge cited to the
    parents' long history of substance abuse and incarceration.                    The
    judge stated that custody of an older child of the mother had been
    granted to a paternal aunt in Alabama.            She also found significant
    the termination of the parents' rights as to J.M., which preceded
    this case as to his sibling N.A.
    Both parents failed to attend substance abuse evaluations.
    When they did, they usually had positive urine screens.                     There
    were also intermittent periods of incarceration of both parents
    for various offenses.         The parents missed numerous scheduled
    visitations with N.A.
    11                                A-3133-16T2
    Neither the mother nor the father attended the guardianship
    trial.    Neither the mother nor the father presented any testimony
    in his or her behalf.   Apparently, the mother's plan for the child
    was to attempt to reconcile with the father and reunify the family.
    Dr. Frank Dyer, the Division's expert, found that her plan was
    unrealistic.    He opined that the best interests of the child were
    in remaining with her resource parent, who is the only parental
    figure N.A. has known consistently. The resource parent reportedly
    wishes to adopt N.A.
    Dr. Dyer also conducted bonding evaluations.   His evaluation
    with the mother, conducted at a jail, showed the child recognized
    her.     The mother interacted with N.A. in an appropriate manner.
    Even so, Dr. Dyer observed the child exhibited stronger ties in
    the bonding session with the resource parent.   Dr. Dyer opined the
    mother posed a "high risk of relapse" due to her drug usage.        He
    further opined that N.A. would be "at extreme risk of harm" if she
    were turned over to the mother's care.
    The Division ruled out any other relatives suggested by the
    mother, including the paternal uncle caring for N.A.'s brother,
    who does not have the space to take on another child.      Likewise,
    the mother's sister, who is a foster parent, does not have suitable
    space.
    12                          A-3133-16T2
    On appeal in the guardianship matter (A-0635-17), the mother
    raises the following issues:   (1) the trial was unfairly moved up
    eight weeks; (2) her trial attorney was ineffective in failing to
    file a motion to have the court order the Division to provide her
    with services; (3) the judge improperly relied on a complex hearsay
    opinion within the Division's records that the baby was exhibiting
    symptoms of drug withdrawal; (4) the Division did not provide
    adequate services; and (5) the Division improperly denied the
    mother's request to place N.A. with the mother's sister and did
    not explore the possibility of Kinship Legal Guardianship ("KLG").
    When seeking the termination of a parent's rights under
    N.J.S.A.   30:4C-15.1(a),   the    Division   has   the   burden    of
    establishing, by clear and convincing proof, N.J. Div. of Child
    Prot. & Permanency v. T.U.B., 
    450 N.J. Super. 210
    , 240 (App. Div.
    2017) (citation omitted), the following criteria:
    (1) The child's safety, health or development
    has been or will continue to be endangered by
    the parental relationship;
    (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to
    eliminate the harm facing the child or is
    unable or unwilling to provide a safe and
    stable home for the child and the delay of
    permanent placement will add to the harm.
    Such harm may include evidence that separating
    the child from his resource family parents
    would cause serious and enduring emotional or
    psychological harm to the child;
    13                         A-3133-16T2
    (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts
    to provide services to help the parent correct
    the circumstances which led to the child's
    placement outside the home and the court has
    considered alternatives to termination of
    parental rights; and
    (4) Termination of parental rights will not
    do more harm than good.
    [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also N.J. Div.
    of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 
    103 N.J. 591
    ,   604-11  (1986)   (reciting  the   four
    controlling standards later codified in Title
    30).]
    As with appeals from Title 9 abuse or neglect decisions, our
    scope of review of appeals from orders terminating parental rights
    under Title 30 is similarly constrained.       In such termination
    appeals, the trial court's findings generally should be upheld so
    long as they are supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible
    evidence."   R.G., 217 N.J. at 552 (citation omitted).   A decision
    in this context should only be reversed or altered on appeal if
    the trial court's findings were "so wholly unsupportable as to
    result in a denial of justice."   N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
    v. P.P., 
    180 N.J. 494
    , 511 (2004) (citation omitted).
    We must give substantial deference to the trial judge's
    opportunity to have observed the witnesses first hand and to
    evaluate their credibility.   R.G., 217 N.J. at 552.   We also must
    recognize the considerable expertise of the Family Part, which
    adjudicates many cases brought by the Division under Title 9 and
    14                         A-3133-16T2
    Title 30 involving the alleged abuse or neglect of children.         See
    N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 
    211 N.J. 420
    , 448
    (2012) (citation omitted).
    Having considered the record from the guardianship trial in
    light of these standards, we reject the mother's arguments and
    affirm the final judgment of termination.      We do so substantially
    for the reasons expressed by Judge Santiago in her comprehensive
    written decision.   We only add a few comments.
    The procedural decision to move up the guardianship trial to
    an earlier date than was initially contemplated was well within
    the trial court's wide discretion over trial scheduling. See,
    e.g., State v. Miller, 
    216 N.J. 40
    , 47 (2013).           Moreover, the
    scheduling change had no discernible effect on the outcome of the
    guardianship trial, because the mother persisted in being non-
    compliant with services throughout the entire litigation.         It is
    sheer speculation to believe that the outcome of the trial would
    have produced a different result had it been conducted a few months
    later.    The mother fails to show she was prejudiced by the
    adjournment.   In addition, the expeditious disposition of the case
    is   consistent   with   N.A.'s   important   interest   in   attaining
    permanency.    See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 
    161 N.J. 337
    , 357
    (1999) (recognizing New Jersey's strong public policy favoring
    permanency).
    15                            A-3133-16T2
    Appellant's claim under N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs.
    v. B.R., 
    192 N.J. 301
    , 308-09 (2007), alleging that her trial
    attorney was ineffective and thus the judgment must be set aside,
    is patently without merit.        The thrust of this claim is that trial
    counsel    should    have     advocated       that    the    mother    receive      more
    services.     But the mother was already granted and offered an
    abundance of services approved by the court and the Division.
    Among     other     things,     those     services          included     drug     abuse
    evaluations, drug testing, visitation, an exploration of housing
    assistance and a re-integration program, and bus passes or other
    needed transportation.          Unfortunately, as Judge Santiago aptly
    noted, the mother did little to take advantage of the services
    that were provided or offered to her.
    Appellant     next    argues      that    the    trial     court    improperly
    admitted hearsay evidence presented by the Division. This argument
    provides no basis for reversal.           To be sure, the Division's proofs
    did     include     certain     hearsay        opinions,       embedded     in       the
    investigation records, concerning N.A.'s medical condition and a
    perceived    manifestation        of     post-birth         withdrawal     symptoms.
    Arguably, those portions of the record, to the extent they involved
    complex and disputed expert opinions by a nurse or a physician,
    should not have been admitted over defense counsel's objection.
    See N.J.R.E. 808; N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 526 (citations omitted);
    16                                     A-3133-16T2
    N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.T., 
    445 N.J. Super. 478
    , 501-02 (App. Div. 2016).
    Even   so,    we    conclude   this   evidential   point   is    of    no
    consequence to the ultimate outcome of this appeal.             Regardless
    of whether there was or was not competent proof that N.A. was
    harmed by her mother's prenatal drug abuse and whether                   N.A.
    actually manifested withdrawal symptoms, a "mother's inability to
    provide any nurturing or care for her daughter for [a] prolonged
    period is a harm to [the child] that is cognizable under the best
    interests standard."        K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 356 (citing A.W., 
    103 N.J. at 604-11
    ); see In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. at
    380-81 (noting that a parent's withholding of parental solicitude,
    nurture, and care for an extended time is cognizable harm).              This
    potential for harm resulting from the mother's inability to nurture
    for prolonged periods of time, was aptly recognized by Judge
    Santiago in her written opinion.
    The proofs of the risks of harm to the child in this case,
    independent   of        N.A.'s   alleged   withdrawal    symptoms,       were
    formidable.   Hence, the claimed violation of the hearsay rules is
    of no moment in this case.       See R. 2:10-2 (instructing that trial
    court decisions shall not be reversed on appeal unless appellant
    demonstrates error that is "clearly capable of producing an unjust
    result"); see also State v. Macon, 
    57 N.J. 325
    , 333 (1971).
    17                              A-3133-16T2
    We reject appellant's next contention that the Division did
    not make "reasonable efforts" to provide her with services before
    terminating her parental rights.              N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3).             As
    we    have   already     noted,   and   as    is   well   delineated     in     Judge
    Santiago's opinion, the Division repeatedly provided or offered
    services to the mother in this case. The failure of those services
    to result in the reunification of N.A. lies with appellant herself,
    whose record of missed appointments and overall lack of cooperation
    was abysmal.
    Nor is there any merit to appellant's claim that the Division
    and the court failed to explore viable options to termination.
    The   Division     did   not   act   precipitously        in   ruling   out     other
    relatives     as   potential      caretakers.       The    Division     reasonably
    determined that the mother's sister R.M., and C.B., the paternal
    uncle who assumed custody of N.A.'s brother, were not feasible
    options.      In addition, the Division reasonably ruled out the
    mother's adult daughter, M.H., after discovering that M.H. was in
    a boarding home, and did not have her own place to live, and was
    unemployed.
    Appellant's contention that the court should have explored
    and approved KLG also fails.            The law is clear that KLG is not an
    option unless there is no one willing to adopt the child.                          See
    N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.L., 
    201 N.J. 210
    , 222-24
    18                                   A-3133-16T2
    (2010) (discussing KLG at length); In re Adoption of Child by
    Nathan S., 
    396 N.J. Super. 378
    , 387 (Ch. Div. 2006) (discussing
    how KLG is not an option unless adoption is not feasible).           Here,
    the record reflects the resource parent, who has raised N.A. nearly
    from birth, is interested in adopting her.
    In sum, we agree with the trial court, the Division, and the
    Law Guardian that the evidence clearly and convincingly supports
    all four prongs of the termination criteria.          N.J.S.A. 30:4C-
    15.1(a).    As   the   unrebutted    expert   testimony   of   Dr.   Dyer
    establishes, it is in the best interests of this child, despite
    her tender years, to be on the road to adoption by her resource
    parent, who was found capable of managing her special needs.           The
    court's termination of the parental rights of this drug-addicted
    mother, who showed no realistic signs of becoming a fit caretaker,
    and who spurned most of the services offered to her, was consistent
    with the evidence and with the governing law.
    All other points raised by appellant in these consolidated
    appeals, to the extent we have not already addressed them, lack
    sufficient merit to warrant discussion.       R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
    Affirmed.
    19                           A-3133-16T2