Duanying Huang v. Holder , 447 F. App'x 253 ( 2011 )


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  •          10-3807-ag
    Huang v. Holder
    BIA
    Balasquide, IJ
    A098 975 216
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
    FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
    APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
    IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
    ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    1            At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
    2       for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    3       United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
    4       New York, on the 22nd day of November, two thousand eleven.
    5
    6       PRESENT:
    7                PIERRE N. LEVAL,
    8                JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
    9                RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
    10                     Circuit Judges.
    11       _______________________________________
    12
    13       DUANYING HUANG,
    14                Petitioner,
    15
    16                         v.                                   10-3807-ag
    17                                                              NAC
    18       ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
    19       ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    20                Respondent.
    21       ______________________________________
    22
    23       FOR PETITIONER:               WaiSim M. Cheung, Tsoi and
    24                                     Associates, New York, New York.
    25
    26       FOR RESPONDENT:               Tony West, Assistant Attorney
    27                                     General; Blair T. O’Connor,
    28                                     Assistant Director; Ari Nazarov,
    29                                     Trial Attorney, Office of
    30                                     Immigration Litigation, Civil
    31                                     Division, United States Department
    32                                     of Justice, Washington, D.C.
    1       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
    2   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
    3   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
    4   is DENIED.
    5       Petitioner Duanying Huang, a native and citizen of the
    6   People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 25,
    7   2010, order of the BIA affirming the October 23, 2008,
    8   decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his
    9   application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    10   under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).    In re
    11   Duanying Huang, No. A098 975 216 (B.I.A. Aug. 25, 2010),
    12   aff’g No. A098 975 216 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 23, 2008).
    13   We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
    14   and procedural history in this case.
    15       Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
    16   the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA.    See Yan Chen
    17   v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005).   The
    18   applicable standards of review are well-established.     See
    19   
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 
    562 F.3d 20
       510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).   Because Huang only challenges the
    21   agency’s conclusion that she did not establish past
    22   persecution we address only the agency’s adverse credibility
    2
    1   determination.   Under the REAL ID Act, which applies in this
    2   case, the agency may, considering the totality of the
    3   circumstances, base a credibility finding on inconsistencies
    4   in an applicant’s statements or between his or her
    5   statements and other evidence in the record, without regard
    6   to whether they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
    7   
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii).    We “defer to an IJ’s
    8   credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
    9   circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
    10   could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”    Xiu Xia Lin
    11   v. Mukasey, 
    534 F. 3d 162
    , 167 (2d Cir. 2008).
    12       We agree with Huang that some of the IJ’s inconsistency
    13   findings were flawed.   The IJ erred in finding that Huang
    14   testified inconsistently regarding whether her intrauterine
    15   device (“IUD”) was removed in her house or at the office of
    16   a private physician without presenting “specific, cogent
    17   reasons” for rejecting her translator’s explanation that
    18   there was no inconsistency because Huang had used the word
    19   “home” to mean “hometown.”   See Zhi Wei Pang v. Bureau of
    20   Citizenship & Immig. Servs., 
    448 F.3d 102
    , 108 (2d Cir.
    21   2006).   Moreover, contrary to the IJ’s finding, there were
    22   no inconsistencies between Huang’s testimony and her
    3
    1   supporting documents:    Her gynecological examination
    2   certificate, which indicated that the last exam she attended
    3   was on September 15, 2003, was consistent with her testimony
    4   that she did not go to any checkups after that date.      No
    5   evidence in the record indicated that her “floating
    6   population certificate” should mention her March 2004
    7   forcible abortion because the certificate was issued in 2002
    8   and had not been updated since being issued.    Huang’s March
    9   16, 2004, fine for a delayed gynecological checkup was not
    10   inconsistent with her testimony that her pregnancy was
    11   forcibly terminated on March 15, 2004; rather it
    12   corroborated Huang’s testimony that she had missed checkups
    13   before the abortion.    And Huang’s certificate for
    14   voluntarily agreeing to raise only one child, received in
    15   May 2003, was not inconsistent with her testimony that she
    16   later had a second pregnancy.
    17       However, despite these flaws the agency’s adverse
    18   credibility determination was supported by substantial
    19   evidence and remand is not necessary because “we can state
    20   with confidence that the [agency] would adhere to [its]
    21   decision were the petition remanded.”    Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
    22   Dep’t of Justice, 
    434 F.3d 144
    , 161 (2d Cir. 2006).      As
    4
    1   Huang concedes, she gave inconsistent testimony regarding
    2   whether she had a single IUD between 1998 and 2006 and the
    3   IJ was not required to accept her explanation that she was
    4   confused.    See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir.
    5   2005).   Further, as the BIA found, Huang’s credibility was
    6   undermined by “the discrepancy between [her] claim that she
    7   received an abortion certificate following her forced
    8   abortion and [a State Department Country Report stating]
    9   United States authorities are unaware of any so-called
    10   abortion certificates and that the only document that might
    11   resemble such a certificate . . . is a document issued by
    12   hospitals upon a patient’s request after a voluntary
    13   abortion.”    Xiao Xing Ni v. Gonzales, 
    494 F.3d 260
    , 263 (2d
    14   Cir. 2007) (finding no error in adverse credibility
    15   determination based in part on alien’s presentation of an
    16   abortion certificate).
    17       Huang argues that she was deprived of due process by
    18   the BIA’s reliance on that State Department report which was
    19   not in the record.   However, while it “would have been
    20   preferable for the BIA to have advised [Huang] of its intent
    21   to consider the [report] and to have afforded [her] an
    22   opportunity to respond thereto,” its failure to do so did
    5
    1   not result in a violation of due process requiring remand
    2   because the report was not the sole basis for the agency’s
    3   credibility determination, but confirmed the agency’s
    4   disposition of the case.   Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 5
       138, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2008).    Moreover, Huang has not
    6   indicated any basis for refuting the significance of the
    7   report if her case were remanded.
    8       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    9   DENIED.   As we have completed our review, any stay of
    10   removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
    11   is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
    12   this petition is DISMISSED as moot.    Any pending request for
    13   oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
    14   Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
    15   Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
    16                                 FOR THE COURT:
    17                                 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    18
    19
    6