United States v. David Williams , 520 F. App'x 166 ( 2013 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4719
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DAVID EARL WILLIAMS, a/k/a Kristian Williams,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:04-cr-00045-TDS-2)
Submitted: April 9, 2013 Decided: April 12, 2013
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Joan Brodish Binkley, Douglas Cannon,
Frank Joseph Chut, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David Earl Williams appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to thirteen
months of imprisonment and a twenty-three month term of
supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether Williams’ sentence is plainly unreasonable. Although
notified of his right to do so, Williams has not filed a
supplemental brief. We affirm.
We ordinarily review a district court’s judgment
revoking supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d
279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). However, because Williams did not
object to the district court’s revocation of his supervised
release, we review for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993). To satisfy the plain error standard an
appellant must show: “(1) an error was made; (2) the error is
plain; and (3) the error affects substantial rights.” United
States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2009).
Even if Williams satisfies these requirements, correction of the
error is appropriate only if we conclude that the error
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 343 (internal quotation marks
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omitted). Here, Williams admitted to violating numerous
conditions of his supervised release. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in directing that Williams’ supervised release
status be revoked. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)-(g) (2006).
The district court also appropriately sentenced
Williams. A district court has broad discretion when imposing
sentence upon revoking a term of supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm such a sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and
is not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In making this determination,
we first consider whether the sentence imposed is procedurally
or substantively unreasonable. Id. at 438. Only if we so find,
will we “then decide whether the sentence is plainly
unreasonable . . . .” Id. at 439.
Here, the district court correctly calculated
Williams’ advisory policy statement range and considered the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors applicable to sentencing upon
revocation of supervised release. The court was also well
within its statutory authority to sentence Williams to an
additional term of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).
Because the district court also clearly explained the basis for
Williams’ sentence, we find no error in its imposition.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the revocation of Williams’ supervised release
and his sentence. This court requires that counsel inform
Williams, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Williams requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a
petition would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Williams. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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