State v. Carlos Parker ( 1998 )

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE FILED
NOVEMBER 1998 SESSION
December 21, 1998
Cecil W. Crowson
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9712-CC-00574
Appellee, )
) Cheatham County
V. )
) Honorable Robert E. Burch, Judge
)
CARLOS DEWAYNE PARKER, ) (Aggravated Sexual Battery)
)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
Shipp R. Weems John Knox Walkup
District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
Steve Stack Kim R. Helper
Assistant Public Defender Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 160 425 Fifth Avenue North
Charlotte, TN 37036 Nashville, TN 37243-0493
Dan M. Alsobrooks
District Attorney General
James Kirby
Assistant District Attorney General
P.O. Box 580
Ashland City, TN 37015
OPINION FILED: ___________________
AFFIRMED
PAUL G. SUMMERS,
Judge
OPINION
The appellant, Carlos Dewayne Parker, was indicted by the Cheatham
County Grand Jury for various sexual offenses including rape, rape of a child,
sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, and incest. He entered negotiated
pleas of nolo contendere to one count each of rape, see T.C.A. § 39-13-503, and
aggravated sexual battery, see T.C.A. § 39-13-504. Pursuant to his plea
agreement, he received concurrent eight-year sentences for each offense. At a
hearing to determine the manner of service of these sentences, the trial court
concluded that the appellant was eligible for community corrections under the
“special needs” provision of T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c). However, after reviewing the
statutory sentencing considerations, see T.C.A. § 40-35-103, and arguments of
counsel, the trial court ordered confinement with the Tennessee Department of
Correction.
The appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a
sentence to community corrections. We find that the appellant is ineligible for
community corrections and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
To be eligible for consideration of a sentence to community corrections,
an offender must meet the requirements of T.C.A § 40-36-106. Subsection (a)
of that statute lists the general eligibility criteria and disqualifies persons who, like
the appellant, are convicted of “crimes against the person as provided in title 39,
chapter 13, parts 1-5.” T.C.A. § 40-36-106(a)(2).
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Neither is the appellant eligible under the “special needs” provision of
subsection (c). See T.C.A. § 40-36-106(c). “Before an offender may be
sentenced pursuant to subsection (c), the offender must be found eligible for
probation.” State v. Grigsby, 957 S.W.2d 541, 546 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)
(citing State v. Staten, 787 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)); see
State v. Boston, 938 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). The appellant is
not eligible for probation. See T.C.A. § 40-35-303 (“a defendant shall not be
eligible for probation under the provisions of this chapter if the defendant is
convicted of a violation of . . . § 39-13-504”). Therefore, he is not eligible for
community corrections.
Because we find that the appellant is ineligible for consideration of a
sentence to community corrections, we need not directly address the appellant’s
argument that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering confinement.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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__________________________
PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge
CONCUR:
__________________________
JOE G. RILEY, Judge
__________________________
L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge
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