Charles K. Lockwood and Frankie L. Lockwood v. William M. Ables ( 1996 )


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  • CHARLES K. LOCKWOOD and                )
    FRANKIE L. LOCKWOOD,                   )
    )
    Plaintiffs/Appellants,           )
    )    Appeal No.
    )    01-A-01-9509-CV-00422
    VS.                                    )
    )    Marion Circuit
    )    No. 7663
    WILLIAM M. ABLES,                      )
    Defendant/Appellee.
    )
    )                      FILED
    April 4, 1996
    COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE            Cecil W. Crowson
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE           Appellate Court Clerk
    APPEALED FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MARION COUNTY
    AT JASPER, TENNESSEE
    THE HONORABLE WILLIAM INMAN, JUDGE
    STEVEN M. JACOWAY
    PATRICK, BEARD & RICHARDSON, P.C.
    Suite 202, Market Court
    537 Market Street
    Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402
    Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
    GEORGE LANE FOSTER
    FOSTER, FOSTER, ALLEN & DURRENCE
    515 Pioneer Bank Building
    801 Broad Street
    Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402
    Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    LEWIS, J.
    KOCH, J.
    OPINION
    In this legal malpractice case, the trial judge directed a verdict for the
    defendant because he found that the plaintiffs failed to prove that but for the
    defendant’s negligence they would have won their lawsuit. We reverse and remand
    for a new trial.
    I.
    On March 12, 1982, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Lockwood, agreed to
    purchase a tract of land in Marion County from Robert Baugh. The agreement
    described the property in general terms as running with the lines of surrounding
    landowners and called for “200 acres, more or less.”
    On July 13, 1982, Mr. Baugh sued Charles Floyd Cleveland for trespass
    to the northern portion of the property and asked that the court establish the boundary
    line between the two owners. Since the property in dispute was part of the property
    sold to the Lockwoods, Mr. Baugh told the Lockwoods about the action but assumed
    the burden of the litigation himself.
    After a hearing on May 12, 1983, the chancellor signed an order
    awarding the fifty-five acres in dispute to Mr. Baugh. On July 9, 1984, however, the
    chancellor granted Mr. Cleveland’s motion to alter or amend and ordered further
    proof. After the second hearing the chancellor took the case under advisement.
    At this point the Lockwoods sought legal help from the defendant. They
    testified that their only purpose in consulting the defendant was to get him to talk to
    the chancellor privately to urge him to render a decision. Instead, against their
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    wishes, the defendant filed a motion to intervene in the boundary dispute and moved
    to reopen the proof. The chancellor granted the motion and heard more evidence on
    May 9, 1985. One of the witnesses offered by the defendant on behalf of the
    appellants owned property in the area and, despite having given favorable pre-trial
    statements to the defendant and Mr. Lockwood, his trial testimony hurt the
    Lockwoods. The chancellor’s final decree awarded the property in dispute to Mr.
    Cleveland. The decision was affirmed on appeal.
    At the hearing below, the Lockwoods called Mr. Baugh’s attorney as a
    witness. He testified that he advised the defendant not to call the unfaithful witness
    because the witness was unreliable and had interests in the area that were
    antagonistic to the Lockwoods. The attorney also testified that in his opinion (1) the
    defendant was negligent because he did not get a written statement from the witness,
    and that (2) the case had been won for Mr. Baugh and the Lockwoods until the
    defendant put on the additional proof. At the end of the plaintiffs’ proof the trial judge
    directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, holding that there was no proof on which
    the jury could find that the alleged negligence of the defendant was the proximate
    cause of the Lockwoods’ loss of the fifty-five acres.
    II.
    We have stated the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, as
    we are required to do in reviewing a directed verdict. Cecil v. Hardin, 
    575 S.W.2d 268
    (Tenn. 1978). To establish a cause of action for legal malpractice the plaintiff must
    show that the attorney’s negligent acts were the proximate cause of some loss to the
    plaintiff. Blocker v. Dearborn and Ewing, 
    851 S.W.2d 825
     (Tenn. App. 1992). The
    loss claimed in this case is the value of the fifty-five acres that was the subject of the
    original lawsuit. At oral argument the Lockwoods’ attorney confirmed that fact. Thus,
    the issue on appeal is whether the jury could have decided that the defendant’s
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    negligence caused the adverse result in that controversy. In Gay & Taylor, Inc. V.
    American Cas. Co., 
    381 S.W.2d 304
     (Tenn. App. 1963), the court said:
    “The burden of proving that damages resulted from the
    negligence of an attorney, or from his failure to follow
    instructions, in connection with the prosecution or defense
    of a suit rests upon the client and usually requires the
    client to demonstrate that, but for the negligence
    complained of, the client would have been successful in
    the prosecution or defense of the action in question.”
    381 S.W.2d at 306.
    In legal malpractice cases we have adopted a rule analogous to the
    medical malpractice rule that requires expert proof to establish a cause of action. See
    Cleckner v. Dale, 
    719 S.W.2d 535
     (Tenn. App. 1986). In medical malpractice cases
    the rule requires expert proof to establish both the standard of care and causation.
    See Tucker v. Metropolitan Government, 
    686 S.W.2d 87
     (Tenn. App. 1984); Stokes
    v. Leung, 651 S.W.2d. 704 (Tenn. App. 1982). It is arguable that in legal malpractice
    cases it is not necessary to prove causation by expert proof, because the only cases
    requiring expert proof have dealt with the standard of care. But we do not have to
    decide that question here because the Lockwoods offered proof from Mr. Baugh’s
    attorney that in his opinion the defendant was negligent and that the case was lost
    because of the testimony of the witnesses called by the defendant. While that is not
    conclusive we think it is enough to take the case to the jury.
    The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause is remanded
    to the Circuit Court of Marion County for further proceedings in accordance with this
    opinion. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellee.
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    ____________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    CONCUR:
    _______________________________
    SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE
    _______________________________
    WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE
    )
    )
    Plaintiff/Appellant,           )
    )     Appeal No.
    )     01-A-01
    VS.                                  )
    )     County
    )     No.
    )
    )
    Defendant/Appellee.            )
    ORDER
    ENTER this _____ day of March, 1996.
    -5-
    _____________________________
    BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01A01-9509-CV-00422

Judges: Judge Ben H. Cantrell

Filed Date: 4/4/1996

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014