Singh v. Lynch , 641 F. App'x 91 ( 2016 )


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  •     14-756
    Singh v. Lynch
    BIA
    Rohan, IJ
    A087 996 322
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
    ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
    32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED
    WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
    (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
    OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
    the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
    Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
    11th day of March, two thousand sixteen.
    PRESENT:
    JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
    REENA RAGGI,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    BHUPINDER SINGH, AKA KAMBOJ SINGH,
    Petitioner,
    v.                                                   14-756
    NAC
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER:               Bhupinder Singh, pro se, Floral
    Park, New York.
    FOR RESPONDENT:               Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General; Terri J. Scadron,
    Assistant Director; Siu P. Wong, Trial
    Attorney, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, United States Department of
    Justice, Washington, D.C.
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
    of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
    ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.
    Petitioner Bhupinder Singh, a native and citizen of India,
    seeks review of a February 7, 2014 decision of the BIA affirming
    a June 12, 2012 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying
    Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re
    Bhupinder Singh, No. A087 996 322 (B.I.A. Feb. 7, 2014), aff’g
    No. A087 996 322 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June 12, 2012). Under the
    circumstances of this case, we review the decision of the IJ
    as supplemented by the BIA, see Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 
    417 F.3d 268
    , 271 (2d Cir. 2005), applying well established standards
    of review, see Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 
    534 F.3d 162
    , 165-66 (2d
    Cir. 2008). In doing so, we assume the parties’ familiarity with
    the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
    For asylum applications like Singh’s, the agency may,
    “[c]onsidering the totality of the circumstances,” base a
    credibility finding on inconsistencies in an asylum applicant’s
    statements and other record evidence “without regard to whether”
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    they go “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”                      8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64
    . We
    “defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
    the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
    fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
    Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 167
    .
    Here, the agency reasonably relied on several discrepancies
    in the record in finding Singh not credible. Singh testified
    that members of the Shiromani Akali Dal Badal political party
    beat him while he attended a Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar
    political    rally.    When    confronted      with       his   inconsistent
    statements regarding whether this attack occurred during or
    after the rally, Singh stated for the first time that he was
    attacked twice that day, a fact not included in his written
    statement.      See Xiu Xia 
    Lin, 534 F.3d at 166
    n.3 (“An
    inconsistency    and    an    omission   are    .     .    .    functionally
    equivalent.”).    The IJ was not compelled to credit Singh’s
    explanation that he did not remember the second attack when
    questioned by his attorney. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 
    430 F.3d 77
    , 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Singh’s testimony regarding the extent
    of his medical treatment after this attack was similarly
    inconsistent:    he    testified   alternately        that      the    doctor
    3
    administered medication for pain and released him, and that the
    doctor hospitalized him for two days.
    With respect to an alleged attack in May 2009, Singh
    repeatedly testified that he suffered pain as a result, but that
    he was not seriously injured.       He later testified that he
    dislocated two discs in his spine as a result of the attack.
    Singh also repeatedly testified that the doctor sent him home
    after giving him medication and that he did not stay at the
    hospital. His doctor’s affidavit, however, stated that Singh
    was in critical condition and spent five days in the hospital.
    Singh failed to provide any explanation for these discrepancies.
    Having   questioned   Singh’s    credibility,   the   agency
    reasonably faulted his failure to provide corroborating evidence
    to rehabilitate his testimony, including affidavits from his
    mother and sister who witnessed two of the alleged attacks. See
    Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 
    496 F.3d 268
    , 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Given
    the inconsistency and corroboration findings, we identify no
    basis to disturb the agency’s adverse credibility determination,
    which is dispositive of Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding
    of removal, and CAT relief. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);
    Paul v. Gonzales, 
    444 F.3d 148
    , 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
    4
    Insofar as Singh argues in his reply brief that he also seeks
    to challenge the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand to the
    IJ for consideration of new evidence, he failed adequately to
    raise such a challenge in either his opening or reply brief.
    Thus, Singh has waived any challenge to the BIA’s denial of his
    motion to remand. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    426 F.3d 540
    ,
    541 n.1, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Issues not sufficiently argued
    in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be
    addressed on appeal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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