Run v. Barr ( 2019 )

18-776
Run v. Barr
BIA
Christensen, IJ
A206 466 061
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 19th day of September, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT:
PETER W. HALL,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
MICHAEL H. PARK,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
ZHUO DA RUN, AKA, RUN DA ZHUO
Petitioner,
v. 18-776
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, Karikari &
Associates, P.C., New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
Attorney General; Paul Fiorino,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Erik R.
Quick, Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Zhuo Da Run (“Zhuo”), a native and citizen of
the People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a February
27, 2018, decision of the BIA affirming a May 18, 2017,
decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Zhuo’s
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhuo Da
Run, No. A 206 466 061 (B.I.A. Feb. 27, 2018), aff’g No. A 206
466 061 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 18, 2017). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
history in this case.
We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See
Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005).
We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial
evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.
Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). “Considering the
totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a
trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant or
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witness, . . . the consistency between the applicant’s or
witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence of record . . . , and any
inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements . . . .” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin
v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. The multiple inconsistencies in Zhuo’s
statements and between his and his witness’s testimony
provide substantial evidence for the agency’s decision.
As an initial matter, it was reasonable for the agency
to rely on the record of Zhuo’s credible fear interview. The
interview record bears sufficient indicia of reliability
because it “was memorialized in a typewritten document
setting forth the questions put to [Zhuo] as well as [his]
responses;” questioning was delayed so that Zhuo had an
opportunity to consult counsel; questioning was conducted
through a Mandarin interpreter; and the asylum officer asked
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questions to elicit details of Zhuo’s claim. See Ming Zhang
v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 721, 724-25 (2d Cir. 2009)
Zhuo alleged that he was persecuted in China for his
practice of Christianity and feared persecution because he
continued to practice Christianity. Inconsistencies between
his interview and later statements provide substantial
evidence for the adverse credibility determination on both
points. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xian Tuan Ye v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006).
Zhuo’s application, interview, and testimony were
inconsistent as to (1) whether Chinese police officers
routinely threatened Zhuo after they released him from
detention or beat Zhuo four additional times when he reported
to them after his release, (2) whether Zhuo was baptized, and
(3) why Zhuo did not attend church from 2014 to 2016 and where
he was living during that period. These inconsistencies
alone, which call into question both his past harm and his
practice of Christianity in the United States, are adequate
support for the adverse credibility determination. See Xian
Tuan Ye, 446 F.3d at 295. Zhuo did not provide a compelling
explanation for any of these discrepancies and did not specify
or document his allegation that the translation or
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interpretation was erroneous. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than
offer a plausible explanation for . . . inconsistent
statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
testimony.” (internal quotations omitted)).
Moreover, the agency did not err in relying on Zhuo’s
lack of knowledge of Christmas, given his testimony that he
came from a Christian family, was actively practicing
Christianity, and had attended a Christmas dinner where the
participants studied the Bible. See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442
F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that when “an individual
applicant’s account would render his lack of a certain degree
of doctrinal knowledge suspect” that lack of knowledge “could
. . . provide substantial evidence in support of an adverse
credibility finding”). It was reasonable for the agency to
take into account Zhuo’s failure to rehabilitate his
questionable testimony with reliable corroboration. See Biao
Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
applicant’s failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
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that has already been called into question.”). Zhuo’s
witness contradicted Zhuo’s representations and lacked
knowledge of his practice of Christianity. The IJ did not
err in declining to give weight to a letter from Zhuo’s pastor
who was not available for cross-examination. Zhuo did not
call witnesses from his U.S. church or provide any
corroboration from his family in China who were also
practicing Christians. Id.; see also Y.C. v. Holder, 741
F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that “[w]e
generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to
be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence” and
deferring to decision to afford little weight to letter from
applicant’s spouse in China).
The inconsistencies among Zhuo’s application, interview,
and hearing testimony as well as his lack of reliable
corroborating evidence provide substantial evidence for the
agency’s adverse credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That determination was dispositive of
the application for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
relief because all three claims were based on the same factual
predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d
Cir. 2006).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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