United States v. Jaamal Cotman , 458 F. App'x 319 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-4100
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    JAAMAL ANTONIO COTMAN, a/k/a Jamaal A. Cotman,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.  Henry E. Hudson, District
    Judge. (3:10-cr-00185-HEH-1)
    Submitted:   November 29, 2011            Decided:   December 20, 2011
    Before SHEDD, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Matthew W. Greene, GREENE LAW GROUP, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia,
    for Appellant.     Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
    Michael A. Jagels, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
    Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Jaamal     Antonio    Cotman      was   convicted         of    interference
    with commerce by threats and violence, and aiding and abetting
    in    violation   of    
    18 U.S.C. § 1951
          (2006)     (attempted         robbery)
    (Count 1); discharge of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of
    violence in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c), (d) (2006) (Count
    2);    and   possession       of   a   firearm       by   a    convicted       felon    in
    violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g) (2006) (Count 3).                             Cotman was
    sentenced to a total of 240 months of imprisonment.                           On appeal,
    he raises one issue: whether the district court erred by denying
    his motion for acquittal for his § 1951 Hobbs Act conviction.
    For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
    Cotman’s issue turns on whether the Government proved
    he    attempted    to   rob    a   drug    dealer     —   which    was       the    conduct
    underlying his § 1951 conviction.               We review de novo a denial of
    a motion for acquittal.            United States v. Alerre, 
    430 F.3d 681
    ,
    693 (4th Cir. 2005).           Where, as here, the motion was based on a
    claim of insufficient evidence, the verdict of a jury must be
    sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
    favorable to the Government, to support it.                       Glasser v. United
    States, 
    315 U.S. 60
    , 80 (1942).                   We have defined substantial
    evidence     as   evidence     that    a   reasonable         finder    of    fact   could
    accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.                       Alerre, 
    430 F.3d
                                      2
    at 693; see United States v. Burgos, 
    94 F.3d 849
    , 862 (4th Cir.
    1996).
    Here, the jury heard evidence that Cotman and Carl
    Phillips exchanged gun fire during what Phillips described as an
    attempted robbery.          Phillips was an illegal marijuana dealer.
    Moreover, a fellow inmate testified that Cotman told him of the
    attempted robbery of “Weed Man,” as Phillips was known.                        Based
    on this testimony, and the supporting forensic evidence, we find
    that     the    jury   could   have      properly   determined        that    Cotman
    attempted to rob Phillips.                Alerre, 
    430 F.3d at 693
    ; United
    States v. Murphy, 
    35 F.3d 143
    , 148 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that
    this court does not review credibility).                    We have previously
    held that a robbery of a drug dealer is sufficient to establish
    the interstate commerce element of a § 1951 conviction.                          See
    United States v. Williams, 
    342 F.3d 350
    , 354 (4th Cir. 2003).
    Thus,    we    find    no   error   in   the    district    court’s     denial    of
    Cotman’s motion for acquittal.
    Accordingly,    we     affirm.       We     dispense    with     oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
    presented in the materials before the court and argument would
    not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3