United States v. Lamarre , 712 F.3d 612 ( 2013 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 10-2340
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    PATRICK J. GELIN,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 10-2486
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    MICHELINE LAMARRE, a/k/a MICHELINE CHAMPAGNE,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. George A. O'Toole, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Boudin,* Circuit Judges.
    *
    Judge Boudin heard oral argument in this matter and participated
    in the semble, but he did not participate in the issuance of the
    panel's opinion in this case. The remaining two panelists therefore
    issued the opinion pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    (d).
    Rudolph F. Miller, for appellant Gelin.
    Nathalie R. Castor, for appellant Lamarre.
    Daniel Steven Goodman, Assistant United States Attorney,
    Criminal Division, Appellate Section, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz,
    United States Attorney, James E. Arnold, Assistant United States
    Attorney, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, and John D.
    Buretta, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, was on brief for
    appellee.
    April 1, 2013
    -2-
    TORRUELLA,   Circuit   Judge.        Following   a   jury   trial,
    Defendant-Appellants     Patrick   J.   Gelin    ("Gelin")   and Micheline
    Lamarre ("Lamarre") were each convicted under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 1347
     and
    1349 for making fraudulent claims to, and obtaining payment from,
    insurance    companies   participating      in    Massachusetts'    no-fault
    automobile insurance program.1          They appeal their convictions,
    arguing first that the district court erred in ruling that the
    defrauded insurance companies constituted "health care benefit
    programs" within the jurisdictional reach of § 1347.               Gelin and
    Lamarre also argue that the district court (1) erred in concluding
    that their scheme affected interstate commerce as is required for
    a constitutionally valid application of § 1347; and (2) abridged
    their Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in denying proposed voir
    dire questions concerning the ethnic minority group to which they
    belong.   Finding no error by the district court, we affirm.
    I.     Background
    Gelin was the owner of Premium Care Physical Therapy
    ("Premium"), a physical therapy clinic in Brockton, Massachusetts.
    Lamarre worked as an "on-call" physical therapist at Premium and
    was generally present at the clinic on Mondays and Wednesdays. The
    1
    Under Massachusetts law, everyone who registers a vehicle in the
    state is required to have insurance coverage that pays for the
    reasonable and necessary medical services that could arise in
    connection with insured vehicle accidents, regardless of fault.
    Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, § 34M.
    -3-
    sequence of events leading up to Gelin and Lamarre's convictions
    follows.
    In April 2002, Gelin hired Sharon Little ("Little") as
    the marketing director for Premium.          Little was responsible for
    bringing new patients to Premium and for getting the clinic into
    better functioning order.         Eventually she also became Premium's
    manager and Gelin's assistant, helping him with the billing of
    insurance companies for treatments provided to clinic patients.
    While discharging those duties, Little stumbled onto patient charts
    indicating that Lamarre treated patients on days when Little knew
    Lamarre was not at the clinic.        When Little asked what was going
    on, Gelin told her that Premium was submitting fraudulent charges
    to insurance companies with the help of Lamarre.              According to
    Little's testimony, Gelin and Lamarre would submit fraudulent
    claims to providers of Massachusetts' no-fault automobile insurance
    and request payment for physical therapy that they never rendered.
    If the fraudulent claims were paid, Lamarre would receive up to 15%
    of the proceeds as a commission for her participation in the
    scheme, and Gelin would keep the rest.
    Between   2003   and    2004,   Little   heard   Gelin   instruct
    Lamarre to "finish off" charts more than 20 times.            She also saw
    Lamarre forging patient charts that Gelin had given her, and saw
    Gelin forging injury claim application forms on behalf of patients.
    When Little protested to Gelin about their need to forge charts
    -4-
    given Premium's success, he responded that she was overreacting to
    "a little white-collar crime" and told her not to worry about it.
    Lamarre later told Little that the submission of fraudulent claims
    was Gelin's idea, and while she was not happy with it, she did need
    the extra money to pay off her student loans.
    Little testified that Gelin eventually concluded that she
    could   not    be   trusted   to   keep   quiet    about    Premium's     billing
    practices.       He therefore hired a "general chief manager" and
    instructed him to keep an eye on Little.             By August 2004, Little
    had had enough and told Gelin that she would not do "this illegal
    shit" anymore, walked out of the office, and "never went back."
    Sometime thereafter Little informed the National Insurance Crime
    Bureau about the fraudulent scheme at Premium.
    Gelin and Lamarre were each indicted on nine counts of
    health care fraud, § 1347, and one count of conspiracy to commit
    health care fraud, § 1349.         During the voir dire,       Gelin's counsel
    requested that the court pose the following question to the venire:
    "Patrick Gelin is a black Haitian-American.                  Do you have any
    feelings about black Haitian-Americans or any other minority group
    that might affect your ability to sit as a fair and impartial juror
    in this case?"       Lamarre, also a Haitian-American, joined Gelin's
    request,   advancing     concerns    regarding     the     racial   overtone      of
    evidence      the   government     intended   to    introduce       at   trial.
    Specifically, Gelin and Lamarre pointed to Little's deposition
    -5-
    testimony, where she used derogatory terms to refer to Gelin's
    Haitian background and made reference to voodoo and witch doctors.
    She   also   referred   to    Gelin   as    the   godfather    of    the   Haitian
    community.
    The government did not object to the voir dire question
    but stated that it was unnecessary, even though it anticipated that
    Little would offer testimony concerning Gelin's statement that his
    fraudulent activity was a "white person's crime," and that he was
    "not doing what [African-Americans] do, selling drugs in the
    street."     The government also admitted that it would introduce
    testimony of former employees who would state that Gelin treated
    African-Americans       differently    than       people   from     the    Haitian
    community.
    The   district   court    refused     to   pose   the    voir    dire
    question, stating that it was not aware of "anything in the facts
    of the case that would suggest any potential for racial bias to be
    a prominent feature of the case."           The court also stated its view
    that defense counsel "vastly overstated the danger of racial bias
    in an average jury in 2010" and "presume[d] the existence of racial
    bias in jurors the way we might have 50 years ago, maybe 25 years
    ago."   But in present times, the court then added, "we have to
    acknowledge, I think, the reality of social progress.                So it is --
    just as a general matter against a social background that there's
    no need to inject the issue into the case."
    -6-
    Nevertheless, the court did emphasize to the venire the
    need for a jury "that is composed of people who are completely
    fair-minded and impartial as to the parties involved in the case
    and as to the issues presented."                It followed up with specific
    inquiries about whether any juror was employed by law enforcement
    or insurance companies, and whether any of them had been the victim
    of fraud or other crimes.            The court also asked potential jurors
    whether they had "any personal belief, attitudes, experiences,
    potential biases that would interfere with [their] ability to be a
    fair-minded and impartial juror in this case."
    At   trial,    the       government    introduced   16    witnesses,
    including Little, several patients whose treatment charts Little
    had identified as containing false entries, employees from the
    defrauded insurance companies, several of Premium's employees, and
    an FBI agent.       Some of the witnesses testified that Gelin and
    Lamarre had documented therapy sessions with car accident victims
    when the patients were not in Massachusetts or when Lamarre, who
    signed off on the treatments, was not in the clinic.                 For example,
    one of the government's witnesses testified that Premium had
    submitted a claim for 30 treatment days "provided" during a period
    of   time   in   which    he   was    away     attending   college   in   Iowa.2
    Furthermore, one of Premium's physical therapy assistants testified
    2
    The government's brief describes similar trial testimonies from
    at least four of Premium's "patients."
    -7-
    that the charts reflecting treatments supposedly administered by
    Lamarre were not consistent with the days that Lamarre actually
    worked at the clinic.        Another of Premium's employees testified
    that Gelin told her about his agreement with Lamarre concerning
    fraudulent charts and excessive billing.
    The    government   also      presented    evidence        regarding
    Premium's transactions with the insurance companies themselves,
    some of which were located outside Massachusetts and did business
    nationally.    This evidence included, for example, the testimony of
    insurance company representatives that their policies provided
    benefits for health care services rendered anywhere in the United
    States, not only within Massachusetts.          Additionally, it included
    the insurance policies themselves, which confirm that they covered
    both   in-    and   out-of-state    accidents.         The     government   also
    introduced several checks drawn on banks located in different
    states as evidence of payments made by insurance companies to
    Premium on account of fraudulent claims.          Further, the government
    introduced evidence showing Premium's use of the United States
    Postal   Service     to   mail   fraudulent    claims        to   the   insurance
    companies.
    The jury returned guilty verdicts on all but two counts.
    Gelin and Lamarre then moved for acquittal, arguing that the
    government had failed to establish that the defrauded insurance
    companies were "health care benefit programs" as required for a
    -8-
    conviction under § 1347. The district court initially denied Gelin
    and Lamarre's motion without explanation, but following post-trial
    briefing, rejected their claims by agreeing with the government's
    arguments that the court should adopt the reasoning of a Second
    Circuit decision, United States v. Lucien, 
    347 F.3d 45
    , 50-52 (2d
    Cir. 2003), which held that an automobile insurance contract that
    provides for the reimbursement of medical services plainly meets
    the statutory definition of a "health care benefit program" under
    § 1347.    Gelin and Lamarre also raised a sufficiency of the
    evidence claim, arguing that the government failed to show that
    their fraud had affected interstate commerce as required under the
    statute. The district court also rejected that claim, entering the
    final judgments on appeal now.
    II.   Discussion
    A.    The Statutory Interpretation Challenge
    We begin with Gelin and Lamarre's contention that the
    district court incorrectly determined that the defrauded insurance
    companies were "health care benefit programs" under § 1347.
    Because   the   analysis   of    such    a   claim   involves   statutory
    construction, we   apply de novo review. United States v. Troy, 
    618 F.3d 27
    , 35 (1st Cir. 2010).     The starting point of our inquiry is
    the text of the statute itself, "and 'if the meaning of the text is
    unambiguous our task ends there as well.'"              Mass. Museum of
    Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Buchel, 
    593 F.3d 38
    , 50 (1st Cir.
    -9-
    2010) (quoting United States v. Godin, 
    534 F.3d 51
    , 56 (1st Cir.
    2008)).    When interpreting an unambiguous statute, however, we may
    also   resort   to   legislative   history   to   corroborate   "that   the
    statute's plain meaning does not lead to absurd results."           In re
    Rudler, 
    576 F.3d 37
    , 44-45 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Lamie v. United
    States, 
    540 U.S. 526
    , 534 (2004)).
    The relevant statutory provision in this case is 
    18 U.S.C. § 24
    (b),   which   defines   the   term "health   care   benefit
    program" for purposes of § 1347 as "any public or private plan or
    contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit,
    item, or service is provided to any individual, and includes any
    individual or entity who is providing a medical benefit, item, or
    service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract."3
    3
    As stated previously, § 1347 sets forth one of the offenses for
    which Gelin and Lamarre were convicted:
    Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to
    execute, a scheme or artifice -- (1) to defraud any
    health care benefit program; or (2) to obtain, by means
    of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
    promises, any of the money or property owned by, or under
    the custody or control of, any health care benefit
    program, in connection with the delivery of or payment
    for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be
    fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10
    years, or both.
    (emphasis supplied).    Section 1349 sets forth the other: "Any
    person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this
    chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed
    for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the
    attempt or conspiracy."
    -10-
    The crux of Gelin and Lamarre's challenge is that the
    defrauded insurance companies do not fall within the statutory
    definition of the term "health care benefit program" because they
    (1) "did not serve as health insurance companies"; (2) did not
    "identif[y] themselves as health insurance companies"; and (3)
    covered medical expenses up to a maximum of $8,000 "if the victim
    [did] not have health insurance." Gelin and Lamarre, however, fail
    to direct us to any statutory language indicating that Congress
    intended to limit the scope of the statute to health insurance
    companies.   Nor is there any requirement that an insurance company
    identify itself as a health insurance company to fall within the
    ambit of the statute.   And the statute does not contain a threshold
    premium amount.
    In any event, the statutory definition at issue is simple
    and broad: a "health care benefit program" is "any public or
    private plan or contract . . . under which any medical benefit,
    item, or service is provided . . . ."     
    18 U.S.C. § 24
    (b) (emphasis
    supplied).   The common meaning of the adjective "any" as used in
    this context   is   "regardless   of   sort,   quantity,   or   number."
    Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary, 115 (1984); see
    also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
    320 U.S. 344
    , 350-51 (1943)
    (noting the long-standing rule of statutory construction that
    "courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its
    dominating general purpose, will read text in the light of context
    -11-
    and will interpret the text so far as the meaning of the word
    fairly permits so as to carry out in particular cases the generally
    expressed legislative policy"). In light of this language, we find
    no room for the limited scope Gelin and Lamarre urge us to read
    into the statute.4
    The Second Circuit opinion in Lucien, 
    347 F.3d 45
    ,
    provides an on-point example of how other courts have addressed
    contentions similar to those Gelin and Lamarre present.                    There,
    defendants were convicted under § 1347 for defrauding private
    insurance companies providing coverage under New York's no-fault
    automobile insurance program.             The fraudulent scheme involved an
    elaborate     ruse    through     which    recruited    "victims"   of    staged
    automobile accidents would assign their no-fault insurance benefits
    to participating health clinics.           Id. at 49.    The clinics, in turn,
    would generate fictitious treatment records and make reimbursement
    claims   to    the    insurance    companies    for     the   medical    services
    "provided."     Id.
    4
    Moreover, the statute's legislative history contains language
    showing that in enacting § 1347, Congress considered fraudulent
    schemes perpetrated on insurance companies of the type involved
    here. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 104-747, at 9 (mentioning, as an
    example of health care fraud in need of addressing, a scheme
    involving "staged automobile accidents and related casualty and
    health insurance fraud"); see also Gaming the Health Care System:
    Trends in Health Care Fraud, at 12 (stating that fraudulent medical
    treatment claims arising from phony car accidents "have resulted in
    literally tens of billions of dollars in losses to insurers and
    increased premiums to all policyholders," negatively impacting the
    health care system).
    -12-
    On     appeal,     one      of     the    defendants        challenged    his
    conviction, arguing that New York's no-fault automobile insurance
    program was not a "health care benefit program" under § 24(b)
    because it did "not operate nationwide and it did not cover all
    injuries    and    illnesses--only            those   resulting     from     automobile
    accidents."       Id. at 52.      The Second Circuit disagreed, discarding
    the distinctions advanced as irrelevant and noting, as we do above,
    that the statutory definition unambiguously and broadly provides
    that any private contract under which a medical service is provided
    qualifies as a "health care benefit program."                    Id.     The court also
    noted as a dispositive fact that private insurers, participating in
    New   York's     no-fault    program,         had    "reimbursed    various       medical
    providers for fraudulently billed medical expenses incurred on
    behalf of defendants." Id.                   Other than the scope limitations
    described      above,     Gelin   and    Lamarre       advance     no    reason    why   a
    different result is in order here, where the facts underlying their
    convictions mirror so closely those at play in Lucien.
    Gelin and Lamarre argue in the alternative that the verb
    "provided" as used in § 24(b) means that medical benefits or
    services must actually be rendered for the statutory definition to
    apply.      In    other    words,    Gelin      and    Lamarre     contend    that    the
    defrauded insurance companies cannnot be deemed                           "health care
    benefit program[s]" because they did not pay Premium for any actual
    -13-
    medical benefits or services rendered, only for fictitious services
    that were never "provided."         We disagree.
    Gelin   and   Lamarre    construe   the   verb     "provide"   too
    narrowly,    fixing   its   meaning    on   only    one   of   its   possible
    connotations -- that is, "to furnish." See Webster's New Riverside
    University Dictionary, 948.           But the verb "provide" is quite
    versatile, and, among at least four different definitions, can mean
    "make available."     Id.   In the context in which the verb "provide"
    is used here -- that is, § 1347 which proscribes "fraudulent
    pretenses, representations, or promises" in pursuing payment for
    health care services -- we must favor the broader construction,
    including the meaning "make available."            See C.M. Joiner Leasing
    Corp., 
    320 U.S. at 350-51
    .
    Indeed, it would be nothing short of absurd to adopt
    Gelin and Lamarre's limitation on the construction of the statutory
    definition.   One of the most egregious and frequent expressions of
    prohibited conduct is obtaining payment for health care services
    never rendered.       Accordingly, if the statute were construed to
    exclude such conduct, it would defeat one of its most important
    purposes.   Convictions under § 1347 for fraud involving fictitious
    medical services abound. See, e.g., United States v. McGovern, 
    329 F.3d 247
    , 249 (1st Cir. 2003) (conviction for Medicare and Medicaid
    fraud involving the billing of medical services never rendered);
    Lucien, 
    347 F.3d at 49
     (same); United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d
    -14-
    706, 709 (6th Cir. 2011) (same); United States v. Franklin-El, 
    554 F.3d 903
    , 909 (10th Cir. 2009)(same).           And we have been provided
    with no valid reason to strike such a dissonant chord in this
    appeal.5
    B.   The As-applied Constitutional Challenge
    Next    we   turn   to     Gelin    and    Lamarre's   as-applied
    constitutional challenge.          On this front, they argue that their
    convictions     under   §   1347    resulted   from    an   unconstitutional
    application of the Commerce Clause because the underlying fraud
    5
    Our conclusion is not contradicted by the legislative history.
    During the congressional hearings leading up to the enactment of
    § 1347, the Senate's Special Committee on Aging heard testimony
    from several witnesses -- ranging from high-ranking government
    officials to physicians and other private health care professionals
    -- describing serious concerns with what appeared to be a growing
    trend in the health care industry:
    Throughout the United States we are seeing organized
    criminal groups, compromising doctors, chiropractors,
    attorneys, hospitals, and these groups establish store
    front clinics, diagnostic testing companies, as well as
    bogus law offices. They stage phony car accidents. Fake
    patients visit the clinics where expensive medical
    procedures like MRIs and x-rays are billed to insurers,
    even though not provided to the persons posing as
    patients. In addition, unfilled prescriptions are billed,
    kickbacks are paid, and lawyers collect false personal
    injury claims.
    Gaming the Health Care System: Trends in Health Care Fraud, Hearing
    Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 104th Cong. 12 (1995)
    (emphasis supplied).    The Committee on Governmental Reform and
    Oversight documented similar fraudulent practices arising from
    fictitious medical services and estimated the overall annual loses
    to the health care system in the $100 billion range. See Comm. on
    Gov't Reform and Oversight, Health Care Fraud: All Public and
    Private Payers Need Federal Criminal Anti-Fraud Protections, H.R.
    Rep. No. 104-747 (1996).
    -15-
    arose from intrastate transactions and was perpetrated against
    intrastate   parties.      This   is   a   constitutional   twist   to   the
    sufficiency of the evidence argument raised below.6         The applicable
    standard of review is plain error.          See United States v. Capozzi,
    
    347 F.3d 327
    , 334 (1st Cir. 2003).         This standard calls for a four-
    pronged analysis where the first inquiry is limited to whether an
    error occurred.    
    Id.
       If an error is found, then the inquiry shifts
    to whether such error (1) was clear and obvious; (2) affected
    substantial rights; and (3) "seriously impaired the fairness,
    integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings."           United
    States v. Duarte, 
    246 F.3d 56
    , 60 (1st Cir. 2001).            This multi-
    factor analysis makes the road to success under the plain error
    standard rather steep; hence, reversal constitutes a remedy that is
    granted sparingly.       United States v. Whitney, 
    524 F.3d 134
    , 140
    (1st Cir. 2008).
    Gelin and Lamarre fail to clear the first hurdle of the
    foregoing requirements, as the facts of record show that the
    underlying fraud sufficiently affected interstate commerce.              As
    just stated, Gelin and Lamarre argue that their fraudulent scheme
    affected Massachusetts parties only. The record, however, contains
    6
    As stated above, Gelin and Lamarre moved for acquittal, arguing
    that "[t]he trial presentation was completely and utterly void of
    any evidence that the health care fraud, as charged, had an
    [e]ffect on interstate commerce.    Accordingly, the [g]overnment
    failed to offer sufficient evidence to prove each and every element
    of the offenses with which the defendant[s] w[ere] convicted."
    -16-
    ample evidence that some of the defrauded insurance companies were
    located outside Massachusetts and did business throughout the
    United States.   Similarly, while Gelin and Lamarre argue that the
    transactions surrounding their fraudulent scheme occurred within
    Massachusetts' borders, the record shows that many of the checks
    Premium received as reimbursements for fraudulent claims were drawn
    on banks outside of Massachusetts.       See, e.g., Pereira v. United
    States, 
    347 U.S. 1
    , 9 (1954) (finding that negotiation of check
    drawn on an out-of-state bank evinced an interstate transaction);
    Ramsey v. United States, 
    332 F.2d 875
    , 879 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding
    that a forged check drawn on an out-of-state bank was tantamount to
    placing the check in interstate commerce).       The record also shows
    that Gelin and Lamarre used the United States Postal Service to
    mail their fraudulent claims for reimbursements.          Cf. R.A.G.S.
    Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 
    774 F.2d 1350
    , 1353 (5th Cir. 1985)
    (finding a sufficient nexus with interstate commerce where the
    United States Postal Service had been used in fraudulent scheme
    underlying violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
    Organizations Act).   Last but not least, the    record shows that the
    insurance policies under which fraudulent claims were paid extended
    nationwide   health   care    benefits   and   covered   both   in-   and
    out-of-state accidents.      See United States v. Lucien, 78 F. App'x.
    141, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that insurance policies covering
    both in- and out-of-state accidents removed a disincentive for
    -17-
    insureds to drive out of state and therefore affected interstate
    commerce).
    Together, the foregoing facts, which Gelin and Lamarre
    omit from their analysis, comfortably exceed the showing of the de
    minimis interstate effect required to reject their contentions on
    this front.    See, e.g., United States v. Guerrier, 
    669 F.3d 1
    , 7
    (1st Cir. 2011) ("Proving an effect on interstate commerce is not
    too difficult . . . . [T]he government need not show a substantial
    interference--a de minimis one will due. Certainty of a de minimis
    effect is not required either. A 'realistic probability' suffices.
    And 'even potential future effects' may be enough.") (quoting
    United States v. Capozzi, 
    486 F.3d 711
    , 726 (1st Cir. 2007).
    C.   The Voir Dire Challenge
    Gelin and Lamarre's last line of attack fares no better.
    According to them, the district court committed reversible error
    when it declined to ask a proposed question to the venire that
    "would have displayed jurors' predispositions towards race . . . ."
    An appellate challenge asserting an improper exclusion of voir dire
    questions is reviewed for abuse of discretion.    United States v.
    Gordon, 
    634 F.2d 639
    , 641 (1st Cir. 1980).         The dispositive
    question under this standard of review is not whether "we, if
    sitting as a court of first instance, would have weighed the
    relevant considerations differently," Negrón-Almeda v. Santiago,
    
    528 F.3d 15
    , 21 (1st Cir. 2008), but rather whether our review of
    -18-
    the record leaves us "with a definite and firm conviction that the
    court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion
    it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors."            Schubert v.
    Nissan Motor Corp., 
    148 F.3d 25
    , 30 (1st Cir. 1998).               "As the
    Supreme Court has noted, 'deference . . . is the hallmark of abuse-
    of-discretion review.'"      Guay v. Burack, 
    677 F.3d 10
    , 16 (1st Cir.
    2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
    
    522 U.S. 134
    , 143 (1997)).      This is certainly so when reviewing a
    trial judge's decisions during the venire, where she enjoys broad
    latitude and "need not pursue any specific line of questioning
    . . . provided it is probative on the issue of impartiality."
    United States v. Brown, 
    938 F.2d 1482
    , 1485 (1st Cir. 1991); see
    also Fed. R. Crim. P. 24.
    We   have   more   than    once   stated   that   a   "voir   dire
    ordinarily need not include questions regarding racial prejudice,"
    United States v. Escobar-de Jesús, 
    187 F.3d 148
    , 165-66 (1st Cir.
    1999); see also United States v. Brown, 
    938 F.2d 1482
    , 1485 (1st
    Cir. 1991); United States v. Webb, 70 F. App'x. 2, 2-3 (1st Cir.
    2003), and that "the mere fact that a defendant is black does not
    alone trigger [a] special questioning requirement . . . ."          Brown,
    938 F.3d at 1485; see also Escobar-de Jesús, 
    187 F.3d at 165-66
    .7
    7
    Although there are certain cases in which special voir dire
    questions regarding race are constitutionally required, this is not
    one of them. See Escobar-de Jesús, 
    187 F.3d at 165-66
    , for some
    examples of the types of cases where special questions are
    required.
    -19-
    In fact, in the past, we have unequivocally and consistently abided
    by the Supreme Court's plurality holding in United States v.
    Rosales-López, 
    451 U.S. 182
    , 191 (1981), that a trial judge's
    decision not      to   explore   the   possibility of         racial    or    ethnic
    prejudice during the voir dire constitutes "reversible error only
    where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a
    reasonable possibility that . . . prejudice might have influenced
    the jury."    See, e.g., Escobar-de Jesús, 
    187 F.3d at 165-66
    .
    Gelin and Lamarre's submissions fail to address the
    preceding case law altogether. Rather, they posit that race became
    a   highly   relevant    issue    through      the    trial   because   extensive
    portions of the testimony pointed to their Haitian heritage "in [a]
    very inflammatory manner."         They further claim that "the core of
    the government's case . . . was found in Little's testimony," which
    cemented "the general idea that [Gelin] was bigoted against other
    ethnicities and nationalities, particularly African-Americans."
    Because Little's credibility was "completely destroyed throughout
    the trial," Gelin and Lamarre continue, "it is likely that the
    government's introduction of negative racial stereotypes was given
    more weight than the actual evidence at trial."
    An exhaustive review of the record proves Gelin and
    Lamarre's fears to be misplaced.              Among other things, the record
    shows that Little was one of at least 16 witnesses the government
    presented    at   trial.    The    other      15     witnesses   --   among    them,
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    employees from the defrauded insurance companies, at least four
    automobile     accident       victims    "treated"      at    Premium,    several     of
    Premium's employees, and an FBI agent -- provided testimony of
    their own which explicated Gelin and Lamarre's fraudulent scheme.
    The government        also    introduced    extensive         documentary       evidence
    supporting the charges brought, including copies of (1) fraudulent
    claims filed; (2) fraudulent treatment charts; (3) the insurance
    policies     under    which    the     defrauded      companies   paid     fraudulent
    claims; and (4) Premium's financial records. In other words, aside
    from Little's testimony suggesting that Gelin was racist towards
    African-Americans and limited evidence that Little herself was
    derogatory towards Gelin on account of his national origin, the
    other   15   witnesses       who     testified   at    length,    as     well    as   the
    documentary evidence introduced at trial, concentrated exclusively
    on the details of the underlying fraudulent scheme.                        This could
    suffice to     rule    out     the    possibility      that    prejudice    may have
    influenced the jury in this case. Rosales-López, 
    451 U.S. at 191
    .
    But there is more.
    First, the jury acquitted Gelin and Lamarre of some of
    the charges brought against them, which suggests that the evidence
    adduced at trial was impartially considered.                    Second, other than
    the racial overtones in Little's testimony, Gelin and Lamarre
    advance nothing whatsoever to show a likelihood of racial or ethnic
    prejudice that would have advised voir dire questions on the issue
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    of race.    See, e.g.,    Rosales-López, 
    451 U.S. at 192
     ("[F]ederal
    trial   courts   must   make   such    an    inquiry    when     requested   by   a
    defendant accused of a violent crime and where the defendant and
    the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups.");
    Brown, 
    938 F.2d at 1485
     (finding that, where defendant was a black
    male, and all of the government's witnesses and jurors were white,
    voir dire inquiry about racial bias may be advisable, but not
    required, absent special circumstances surrounding the case which
    indicate the possibility of racial prejudice by the jury).
    Third, as stated above, during the voir dire, the court
    underscored the need for a jury "that is composed of people who are
    completely fair-minded and impartial as to the parties involved in
    the case and as to the issues presented."                Though not with the
    level of specificity Gelin and Lamarre sought, the court asked
    prospective jurors questions to test their ability to render an
    impartial verdict in light of the charges at play in the case.
    Among other things, the court asked jurors whether they were
    employed by law enforcement or insurance companies, and whether
    they had been the victims of fraud or other crimes.               The court also
    asked   potential   jurors     general      questions    about    "any   personal
    belief,    attitudes,    experiences,        potential    biases     that    would
    interfere with your ability to be a fair-minded and impartial juror
    in this case."    Under the circumstances at play here, this line of
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    questioning in itself thwarts the type of challenge launched by
    Gelin and Lamarre.    See Brown, 
    938 F.2d at 1485-86
    .
    III.     Conclusion
    For   the    foregoing     reasons,   Gelin   and   Lamarre's
    convictions are affirmed.
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