Smith v. Coast Hotels & Casinos C/W 62589 ( 2014 )


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  •                 Asia Jeter, left the room and went to the casino floor. The parties dispute
    whether Jeter possessed a room key when she left the room.
    Upon arriving downstairs, Jeter met with Roderick Sawyer.
    Jeter and Sawyer then returned to Smith's guest room, again passing The
    Orleans' security staff at the key watch stand.' Sawyer entered Smith's
    room and shot him. The Orleans maintains that Sawyer was Jeter's pimp
    and that he orchestrated this "trick-roll," in which Jeter would gain access
    to Smith's room and then accompany Sawyer back to Smith's room so that
    Sawyer could rob him
    As a result of his injuries sustained in the alleged "trick-roll,"
    Smith filed a complaint against The Orleans, alleging (1) negligence; (2)
    negligent hiring, training and/or supervision; (3) respondeat superior; and
    (4) res ipsa loquitur. The Orleans filed a motion for summary judgment,
    arguing that Sawyer's and Jeter's acts were not foreseeable because (1)
    The Orleans took the basic minimum precautions to ensure the safety of
    its patrons under NRS 651.015(3)(a); and (2) there were no prior similar
    acts that would impart knowledge—and thus a duty—on The Orleans
    under NRS 651.015(3)(b).
    In his opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Smith
    argued that while The Orleans implemented a key watch stand, it failed to
    follow its own procedures because its security guard failed to prevent a
    non-guest from entering the guest room tower without showing a key card.
    1 Theparties dispute whether Jeter or Sawyer showed a key while
    passing security at the key watch stand. However, this fact goes to the
    issues of breach and causation in a negligence action, which are both
    beyond the scope of our inquiry here.
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    Smith's opposition cited deposition testimony from The Orleans' security
    officers who stated that the key watch stand was created to "protect from
    crimes," to "keep the riffraff out," and generally for the safety of the guests
    in their hotel rooms. Smith also cited a security expert regarding general
    industry practices. Smith argued that both the security videotape and his
    expert would demonstrate that there was a breakdown in security at the
    key watch stand based on general hotel security industry standards, and
    The Orleans' own policies, procedures, and practices.
    At oral argument, the district court deferred ruling on the
    motion for summary judgment in order to review the videotape of Sawyer
    and Jeter walking past the key watch stand. One week later, the court
    granted The Orleans' motion for summary judgment. 2 The district court
    concluded that (1) "no admissible evidence has been presented that
    establishes that The Orleans had knowledge of prior similar intentional
    criminal acts," (2) "The Orleans took basic minimum precautions to
    prevent criminal conduct," and (3) the actions of Sawyer and the woman
    did not "establish a breach of duty by the hotel." Smith now appeals. 3
    Standard of review
    "In a negligence action, summary judgment should be
    considered with caution." Doud v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 
    109 Nev. 1096
    ,
    1100, 
    864 P.2d 796
    , 798 (1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as
    stated in Estate of Smith v. Mahoney's Silver Nugget, Inc.,      127 Nev. ,
    2 Thedistrict court order does not include any findings of fact
    regarding what the videotape actually showed.
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    , 
    265 P.3d 688
    , 691 (2011). Summary judgment is appropriate when,
    after viewing the evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no
    genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law.      Wood v. Safeway, Inc.,   
    121 Nev. 724
    , 729,
    
    121 P.3d 1026
    , 1029 (2005). An issue of material fact is genuine when the
    evidence is such that a rational jury could return a verdict in favor of the
    nonmoving party. 
    Id. at 731,
    121 P.3d at 1031. "This court reviews a
    district court's grant of summary judgment and its statutory construction
    determinations de novo." Mahoney's Silver Nugget, 127 Nev. at , 265
    P.3d at 690.
    The district court erred in ruling that an alleged "trick-roll" was
    unforeseeable as a matter of law
    In an innkeeper negligence action, a plaintiff must establish
    the four basic elements of negligence: "(1) duty, (2) breach, (3) proximate
    causation, and (4) damages." Mahoney's Silver Nugget, 127 Nev. at ,
    265 P.3d at 690. The duty element is at issue here. Under NRS
    651.015(2), an innkeeper has a duty to protect patrons from foreseeable
    wrongful acts. "The determination of foreseeability as it relates to an
    innkeeper's duty of care to a patron must be made by the district court as
    a matter of law." Mahoney's Silver Nugget, 127 Nev. at , 265 P.3d at
    691. This determination is governed by NRS 651.015(3). 
    Id. NRS 651.015(3)
    provides that a wrongful act is not foreseeable
    unless: (a) the owner failed to exercise due care; or (b) similar prior
    incidents occurred on the premises and the owner had notice or knowledge
    of those incidents. In analyzing the "due care" language in the first option,
    this court has concluded that "due care" allows a judge to "look beyond the
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    existence of similar wrongful acts in determining the existence of a duty,"
    and evaluate "any other circumstances related to the exercise of due care."
    Mahoney's Silver Nugget,     127 Nev. at , 265 P.3d at 692 (internal
    quotations omitted). Thus, in order to survive summary judgment, Smith
    was required to establish that the wrongful act was foreseeable under
    either NRS 651.015(3)(a) or NRS 651.015(3)(b).
    Here, the record supports the conclusion that The Orleans was
    on notice that "trick-rolls" or other violent crimes could occur if non-guests
    were allowed access to casino hotel room towers. While Mahoney's Silver
    Nugget provides the appropriate legal structure for this court's analysis,
    this case is factually distinguishable from Mahoney's Silver Nugget.        In
    Mahoney's Silver Nugget, a group of patrons arrived at a public lounge,
    were spotted by security, and were asked to leave within five minutes of
    their arrival. 127 Nev. at , 265 P.3d at 690. As the group was being
    escorted out of the casino by security, one member of the group began
    arguing with a patron who was sitting at a bar adjacent to the lounge.      
    Id. Over a
    period of approximately ten seconds, the two engaged in a physical
    altercation, during which one man was fatally shot.      
    Id. Based on
    those
    facts, this court concluded that Mahoney's Silver Nugget did not owe a
    duty to the victim as a matter of law.      
    Id. at 693.
    However, unlike in
    Mahoney's Silver Nugget, where the event occurred in a public area on the
    casino-lounge floor, this event occurred in the guest room tower beyond
    the security key checkpoint. The location of this alleged "trick-roll"—the
    guest room tower—is an area of heightened security in which guests are
    more vulnerable to certain crimes, such as robberies or sexual assaults,
    making such an occurrence foreseeable.
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    Here, the record demonstrates that the district court failed to
    view the competing evidence in the light most favorable to Smith. First,
    the very fact that The Orleans itself refers to this crime as a "trick-roll"
    indicates that it was aware that such crimes may occur if non-guests are
    allowed access to guest room towers. Additionally, The Orleans' security
    staff acknowledged that it has a duty to keep non-guests from reaching the
    hotel tower to "protect from crimes" and for the general safety of its
    guests. As a result, we conclude that the district court erred in granting
    summary judgment on the issue of duty.
    We note that under NRS 651.015, the district court was only
    tasked with determining whether such a crime was foreseeable, thereby
    imposing a duty on The Orleans. In light of this limitation, the district
    court's conclusions of law finding (1) that Jeter showed a room key card to
    security, solely based on the deposition testimony of Donald Moore; and (2)
    that "[am n alleged prostitute or the perpetrator . . . gaining entrance with
    the use of a room card key does not establish a breach of duty by the hotel"
    were error because the issues of breach, causation, and damages are
    factual issues that should be left to the trier of fact. Additionally, there is
    conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether Jeter possessed a
    room key card when she initially left Smith's room and whether Jeter and
    Sawyer showed a key card when returning to Smith's room. These are
    disputed material issues that must be resolved by a trier of fact. As a
    result, we conclude that the district court erred in making findings of fact
    and conclusions of law that (1) are reserved for the trier of fact, and (2)
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    that did not view the conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to
    Smith. Accordingly, we 4
    ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED AND
    REMAND this matter to the district court for further proceedings
    consistent with this order.
    J.
    Hardesty
    Douglas
    cc:   Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge
    Hon. J. Charles Thompson, District Judge
    Carolyn Worrell, Settlement Judge
    Hawkins Melendrez, P.C.
    Thorndal Armstrong Delk Balkenbush & Eisinger/Las Vegas
    Eighth District Court Clerk
    4 Inlight of this disposition, we vacate the district court order
    granting in part The Orleans' motion for attorney fees and costs. See
    Miller v. Jones, 
    114 Nev. 1291
    , 1300, 
    970 P.2d 571
    , 577-78 (1998)
    (vacating a district court award of attorney fees upon reversing the district
    court order granting summary judgment). Additionally, we need not
    address the parties' remaining arguments.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 62153

Filed Date: 7/29/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021