Watts v. Entergy Operations ( 2001 )

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 00-60347
Summary Calendar
ELLEN WATTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC., DON HINTZ,
MIKE BAKARICH, JOSEPH HAGAN, AND MARY SEE,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:99-CV-63-BN
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January 5, 2001
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Ellen Watts is a black female who worked for Entergy
Operations for approximately ten years. While an employee at
Entergy, she applied for a promotion to the Site Administrative
Programs Coordinator. Ultimately, Entergy hired a white woman,
Karen Rucker, for the position. Rucker had twelve years
experience in England doing similar work, and spoke English,
German and French. Moreover, Rucker had developed an excellent
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
rapport with the people she would be supporting in this new
position. After being denied this promotion, Watts filed this
lawsuit. Watts alleges racial discrimination claiming Entergy
failed to promote her on the basis of her race, paid disparate
wages on the basis of race and established racially
discriminatory working conditions by creating “white jobs” and
“black jobs.”
In her complaint, Watts alleges Entergy acted in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In her appeal, she seemingly analyzes her
claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§2000e et seq. As the district court noted and we agree, Watts’
claims fail even under the less rigid standards in Title VII.
When a district court grants summary judgment, this court
reviews the determination de novo, employing the same standards
as the district court. Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138
F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate
when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, the record reflects that no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986).
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination
claim Watts must show that she suffered an adverse employment
action due to her race. Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility
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Management, 179 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1999). After
establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to Gustafson
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing
to hire Bunch. McDonnell-Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04
(1973). Entergy’s burden in this regard “is one of production,
not persuasion . . . [and] can involve no credibility
assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 2097, 2106 (2000). If Entergy satisfies this burden, the
burden shifts back to Watts, who must prove that “the legitimate
reasons offered by the defendant [for failing to promote Watts]
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination.” Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2104-05.
Assuming, arguendo, that Watts has established a prima facie
case of racial discrimination, she has not sustained her burden
that Entergy’s reason for failing to promote her was pretextual.
As held by the Supreme Court, “the ultimate question is whether
the employer intentionally discriminated, and proof that the
employer’s proffered reason is unpersuasive or even obviously
contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff’s
proffered reason . . . is correct.” Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2107.
“In other words, it is not enough . . . to disbelieve the
employer, the fact finder must believe the plaintiff’s
explanation of intentional discrimination.” Id. at 2108. “A
plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence
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to find that the employer’s asserted justification is false, may
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully
discriminated.” Id. “This is not to say that such a showing by
the plaintiff will always be adequate to sustain a jury’s finding
of liability. Certainly there will be instances where, although
the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth
sufficient evidence to reject the defendant’s explanation, no
rational fact finder could conclude that the action was
discriminatory.” Id.Entergy’s proffered reason for failing to promote Watts was
that Rucker was more qualified for the job and had an excellent
relationship with the group to which she would be promoted. Watts
argues that because she had ten years of experience with Entergy,
and Rucker had only seven, she was more qualified. Thus,
according to Watts there is a fact issue that should be sent to
the jury. We disagree. Watts fails to sustain her burden that
the proffered reason is merely pretext and offers no evidence
that Watts’ race at all influenced the decision.
In regard to Watts’ disparate treatment claims - both in
Entergy’s payment of wages and its creation of a black and white
working environment, Watts presents no evidence she or other black
workers are paid differently from white workers. She presents no
evidence that black employees are held to low skilled jobs, while
whites are hired for high skilled jobs. Watts merely asserts that
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there are fewer black employees than white employees in various
positions throughout the company. There is no evidence that black
employees are not hired or are not considered for promotions. As
stated by the district court, Watts’ subjective belief that she
was discriminated against is not enough to avoid summary judgment.
Grimes v. Texas Dept. of Mental Health, 102 F.3d 137, 140 (5th
Cir. 1996).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Entergy.
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