Roberto Silva-Pereira v. Loretta E. Lynch , 827 F.3d 1176 ( 2016 )


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  •                      FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ROBERTO CARLOS SILVA-PEREIRA,                     No. 14-70276
    Petitioner,
    Agency No.
    v.                           A095-743-748
    LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney
    General,                                            OPINION
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Argued and Submitted January 4, 2016
    San Francisco, California
    Filed July 7, 2016
    Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,
    Circuit Judges and Marilyn L. Huff,* District Judge.
    Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain
    *
    The Honorable Marilyn L. Huff, District Judge for the U.S. District
    Court for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation.
    2                   SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    SUMMARY**
    Immigration
    The panel denied a petition for review brought by Roberto
    Carlos Silva-Pereira, a former Salvadoran professional soccer
    player and deputy to a Salvadoran congressman, holding that
    he was statutorily barred from asylum and withholding of
    removal relief under the serious nonpolitical crime bar, and
    did not qualify for protection under the Convention Against
    Torture.
    The panel held that the evidence did not compel the
    conclusion that Silva was credible. The panel further held
    that substantial evidence supported the Board of Immigration
    Appeals’ determination that Silva was ineligible for asylum
    and withholding of removal under the serious nonpolitical
    crime bar, because there was probable cause to believe that
    Silva was complicit in the murders in Guatemala of three
    Salvadoran representatives to the Central American
    Parliament.
    The panel held that it need not decide whether the law of
    the case doctrine applies to administrative proceedings in the
    immigration context, because even assuming it does, neither
    the immigration judge nor the Board explicitly decided the
    serious nonpolitical crime issue before the final round of
    decisions.
    **
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                      3
    The panel affirmed the Board’s denial of protection under
    the Convention Against Torture, because Silva never asserted
    any fear of torture in Nicaragua, the country he designated for
    removal, and to which the IJ ultimately ordered removal.
    The panel declined to consider the Board’s determination
    that Silva failed to demonstrate a likelihood of torture in El
    Salvador, the alternate country of removal, because such a
    challenge does not relate to “the proposed country of
    removal,” as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
    COUNSEL
    Guatam Jagannath (argued), and Emily Abraham, Social
    Justice Collaborative, Oakland, California, for Petitioner.
    Timothy G. Hayes (argued), Trial Attorney; Cindy S. Ferrier,
    Assistant Director; Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting Assistant
    Attorney General, Civil Division; Office of Immigration
    Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington,
    D.C., for Respondent.
    4                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    OPINION
    O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:
    We must decide whether substantial evidence supports the
    determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals that this
    petitioner is ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal
    to Nicaragua and whether he qualifies for deferral of removal
    under the Convention Against Torture.
    I
    A
    Roberto Carlos Silva-Pereira is a Salvadoran citizen and
    national, and was a professional soccer player in El Salvador
    until around 2000. Following his retirement, he entered the
    construction business in El Salvador with his wife. His
    companies bid for government construction contracts, which
    regularly yielded 30–40% profit. Earnings from these
    contracts placed Silva among El Salvador’s wealthiest
    individuals. Silva denied he ever bribed government officials
    to secure such contracts.
    Silva reports that he became involved in Salvadoran
    politics in 2000, when he became a member of the Frente
    Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional Party
    (“FMLN”). In 2006, however, Silva changed parties when he
    was elected a deputy to Congressman Gonzales Lovo, a
    member of the Partido de Conciliación Nacional (“PCN”).
    Silva testified that although some members of the FMLN
    resented his switch to the PCN, he thought both parties had a
    shared ideology opposing the then-ruling Alianza
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                      5
    Republicana Nacionalista party (“ARENA”), which Silva
    believed to be corrupt.
    Roughly six months after Silva assumed office as
    Congressman Lovo’s deputy, the Salvadoran legislature held
    hearings about allegations that Silva engaged in money
    laundering and bribery of government officials through his
    construction business. At those hearings, the Salvadoran
    Attorney General presented evidence that Silva acquired
    approximately $1.6 million in illicit assets between 2004 and
    2006 from contracts acquired through bribery. According to
    Silva, the charges were brought because the Attorney General
    believed him to be a “stumbling block” to the ARENA party.
    Ultimately, 82 out of El Salvador’s 84 legislators voted to
    suspend Silva’s legislative immunity. The voting majority
    included all three parties and 9 out of 10 members of Silva’s
    own PCN party, with the exception of Congressman Lovo
    who chose to abstain. The legislator who acted as a
    prosecutor in Silva’s case also abstained. Silva claims that
    the legislature’s landslide vote was orchestrated by ARENA
    and motivated by a desire to secure aid from the United States
    by demonstrating an active fight against corruption.
    After the legislature revoked Silva’s immunity, a
    Salvadoran court held hearings in January 2007 to determine
    whether the evidence against Silva supported the issuance of
    a warrant for his arrest. Silva was represented by counsel at
    these hearings, but submitted a note through his attorneys
    telling the court that he was too sick to attend. The court
    issued a warrant for Silva’s arrest on January 25, 2007. Silva
    left El Salvador sometime during this period.
    6                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    Around the time Silva’s legislative immunity was
    suspended, Silva’s wife and mother-in-law were also arrested
    on corruption charges connected to their role in Silva’s
    construction businesses. His mother-in-law was acquitted.
    After being convicted of some charges and acquitted of
    others, Silva’s wife was sentenced to seven years in prison.
    Additionally, authorities successfully prosecuted a former
    mayor, Mario Osorto, for forging documents that facilitated
    Silva’s government contracts. Osorto was an ARENA party
    member and also a member of the Central American
    Parliament (“PARLACEN”). As with Silva, the Salvadoran
    legislature voted to suspend Osorto’s legislative immunity in
    December 2006. Osorto was sentenced to four years in
    prison.
    B
    Subsequently, in the United States, Silva was
    apprehended by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
    (“FBI”) near his girlfriend’s home in California in October
    2007. When investigators knocked on the door, Silva fled on
    foot, jumping fences and hiding in bushes before being
    arrested. Following his arrest, Silva conceded removability
    but sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
    under the Convention Against Torture. He declined to
    designate a country of removal, so the immigration judge
    (“IJ”) designated El Salvador, Silva’s home country, as the
    country of removal.
    1
    At his initial immigration hearings before the IJ in
    Florence, Arizona, Silva described several incidents of
    violence allegedly perpetrated against him by Salvadoran
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                      7
    officials. First, he asserted that the leader of ARENA’s
    legislators threatened him at gunpoint for accusing ARENA
    of corruption. Second, Silva alleged he suffered violence at
    the hands of Salvadoran police after visiting his wife in prison
    in El Salvador. According to Silva, he visited his wife in
    October 2006 and took pictures with his cell phone of injuries
    she allegedly sustained while incarcerated. Silva testified that
    upon leaving the prison, police stopped the car in which he
    was riding with his ten-year-old son and his driver.
    According to Silva, the police hit him with a rifle, forcibly
    took the phone, and threatened his son at gunpoint.
    Third, Silva testified that roughly one week after this
    assault, police entered his house without a warrant and again
    assaulted him and frightened his children. Silva claimed he
    was unable to attend the arrest warrant hearings in El
    Salvador as a result of injuries from this incident. When
    government counsel pointed out that based on Silva’s
    testimony, the alleged encounter in his home took place more
    than three months before the arrest warrant hearings, Silva
    claimed he had actually been beaten an additional time by
    “four people dressed as police” in January 2007.
    Silva failed to report any of these incidents in his asylum
    application to the Department of Homeland Security. When
    asked why he failed to mention the incidents involving the
    police outside his wife’s prison and in his home, Silva said he
    forgot to report them to his attorney. He also claimed that
    “[his] problem is very complex” and he worried that other
    Salvadoran detainees would “steal [his] declaration” and beat
    him.
    On cross-examination, government counsel also
    questioned Silva about his alleged departure date from El
    8                 SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    Salvador. Silva testified that he crossed the Texas border in
    early January 2007 after spending only six hours or so in
    Guatemala and a handful of days in Mexico. When
    government counsel pointed out that this timeline was
    inconsistent with the entry date to the United States that Silva
    reported in his asylum application, Silva testified that he
    actually exited El Salvador several weeks later than he
    initially indicated. Silva subsequently admitted that he
    allowed his attorneys to tell a Salvadoran judge that he was
    too sick to attend the arrest warrant hearings when in fact he
    was fleeing the country.
    2
    Several experts hired by Silva testified that they believed
    the Salvadoran corruption charges were likely linked to
    Silva’s opposition to the ARENA party. One of these
    experts, a private investigator named Tom Parker, also
    presented a tape-recorded conversation in which Adolfo
    Torrez, a close confidant of the ARENA-affiliated president,
    told Silva he could make the charges against Silva and his
    wife disappear for a price of $500,000. When Torrez’s offer
    became public, the ARENA party withdrew its support for the
    Attorney General because he knew about Torrez’s actions but
    failed to investigate. Torrez subsequently died of a gunshot
    wound. Parker speculated that Torrez was murdered, though
    other reports on the forensic evidence indicate that Torrez
    committed suicide.
    The IJ also heard testimony from Silva’s brother, who
    stated that Silva was protected by two bodyguards during his
    time as a legislator. Following such testimony, the IJ recalled
    Silva and asked him whether his bodyguards were present
    during the incidents he recounted in which police assaulted
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                    9
    him outside the prison and at his home. Silva testified that
    only one bodyguard was present during each incident because
    they took turns every twenty-four hours. He also asserted
    that the bodyguard present during both incidents was
    unarmed and was also beaten by police.
    3
    In August 2008, the IJ rendered his first decision,
    concluding Silva was non-credible and denying his
    applications. In so finding, the IJ noted discrepancies
    between Silva’s testimony and his asylum application
    concerning his exit date from El Salvador. The Board of
    Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reversed, finding that the IJ’s
    limited discussion—and especially his focus on the date
    discrepancies—was inadequate to sustain the credibility
    determination.
    C
    Following remand, the IJ conducted additional hearings
    between May and September 2009. During this time, the
    government introduced evidence that in addition to his crimes
    in El Salvador, Silva had also been charged with conspiracy
    to commit murder in Guatemala.
    1
    Exhibits and testimony at the second round of hearings
    established that in February 2007, three Salvadoran
    representatives to the Central American Parliament were
    found murdered in a charred van outside Guatemala City.
    Among the murdered PARLACEN representatives was
    Eduardo D’Aubuisson, the son of ARENA’s founder and the
    10               SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    brother of Roberto D’Aubuisson, Jr., one of ARENA’s
    current leaders. Later inquiry by international investigators
    concluded that the representatives were likely carrying $5
    million and twenty kilograms of cocaine.
    Guatemalan authorities initially arrested four Guatemalan
    police officers whom they believed carried out the murders in
    cooperation with a drug gang. Two weeks after being taken
    into custody, however, these four officers were gunned down
    inside a Guatemalan prison, prompting the Guatemalan
    government to seek out assistance from the FBI and a task
    force sponsored by the United Nations called the International
    Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (“CICIG”).
    Guatemalan authorities subsequently charged and convicted
    a number of individuals for involvement in these killings,
    including a Guatemalan congressman named Manuel Castillo.
    Phone records showed Castillo placed calls to both the
    corrupt police and the drug gang involved in the hit on
    D’Aubuisson and his companions. Castillo was sentenced to
    203 years in prison.
    During Castillo’s trial, Guatemalan authorities offered
    evidence that Silva cooperated with Castillo and the drug
    gang in planning the killings. Correspondingly, the
    Guatemalan government filed a separate indictment against
    Silva, indicating that Silva acted as the “intellectual author”
    behind the Guatemalan murders. Specifically, the indictment
    accuses Silva of planning the murders with Castillo and
    various gang members at a series of meetings in El Salvador
    and Guatemala. Those allegations were corroborated during
    Castillo’s trial by an eyewitness witness known as “Judas,”
    currently under government protection in El Salvador.
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                     11
    Silva’s experts questioned the legitimacy of the
    Guatemalan charges, and offered varying theories as to why
    Guatemala would target Silva specifically. One expert, a
    journalist named Lafitte Martine Fernandez-Rojas who wrote
    a popular book about the PARLACEN murders, speculated
    that Guatemalan officials actually ordered the hit and
    conspired to prosecute Silva to help ARENA hide the party’s
    connection to drug dealing. Another expert stated his belief
    that Silva was a “fall guy” used by Guatemalan officials to
    distance themselves from allegations of drug trafficking.
    2
    Following this second round of hearings, the IJ issued an
    oral decision granting Silva asylum but denying Silva
    withholding of removal or protection under the Convention
    Against Torture (“CAT”). In so holding, the IJ concluded
    that the BIA’s previous decision left him no choice but to find
    Silva credible. Upon review, the BIA vacated the IJ’s
    decision and remanded the case again, noting that it had
    merely instructed the IJ to “provid[e] further explanation,”
    not accept Silva’s credibility without question. The BIA also
    directed the IJ to make a specific determination concerning
    Silva’s eligibility for protection under the CAT if necessary.
    D
    Following the second remand, the government argued to
    the IJ that Silva was statutorily barred from seeking asylum
    or withholding of removal because there were serious reasons
    to believe Silva committed money laundering in El Salvador
    and conspiracy to commit murder in Guatemala. The IJ
    agreed and declared Silva ineligible for asylum and
    withholding of removal, but sought additional evidence
    12                   SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    related to Silva’s CAT claim. During this time, the IJ trying
    Silva’s case retired and the case was reassigned to a new
    judge.1
    1
    In the next round of hearings, Silva’s experts testified in
    support of his CAT claim that he would be tortured or
    executed in El Salvador because Roberto D’Aubuisson, Jr., a
    high-powered leader of ARENA and son of the party’s
    founder, would seek retribution for his brother’s murder.
    Silva’s experts acknowledged that ARENA no longer
    controlled the presidency in El Salvador, but insisted that
    ARENA continues to exert control over many aspects of the
    government. Silva’s experts also argued that Silva would
    likely not survive being jailed in Guatemala.
    2
    In March 2013, the IJ issued a decision denying Silva’s
    application for deferral of removal under the CAT and
    reiterating that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding
    1
    During this period, Silva also changed counsel multiple times. The
    attorney representing Silva for the first two rounds of proceedings
    withdrew after he received anonymous threats subsequent to Silva being
    granted temporary asylum. Silva’s next attorney withdrew after
    participating in the initial hearings following the second remand, citing a
    “fail[ure] to cooperate” on Silva’s part. Silva claimed she misrepresented
    her abilities, lied to him, and refused to work because of a fee dispute. A
    third attorney withdrew after one appearance having learned about the
    threats to Silva’s first attorney, prompting Silva to file a seventeen-page
    attorney misconduct complaint. A fourth set of attorneys ultimately
    represented Silva through the remainder of proceedings, partly on a pro
    bono basis since many of Silva’s assets had been frozen by Salvadoran
    authorities.
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                     13
    of removal. Before issuing his decision, however, the IJ
    inquired whether Silva wished to reconsider his decision
    declining to specify a preferred country of removal. Silva
    indicated he wished to designate Nicaragua as his country of
    removal. The IJ granted Silva’s request, and designated El
    Salvador as the alternate country of removal.
    Considering Silva’s claims on the merits, the IJ concluded
    that Silva was ineligible for asylum and withholding of
    removal because there were serious reasons for believing he
    committed serious nonpolitical crimes in both El Salvador
    and Guatemala. The IJ also found Silva to be non-credible
    after concluding Silva’s explanation for failing to report his
    violent interactions with police in his asylum application was
    highly implausible. Additionally, the IJ pointed out that Silva
    admitted to having lied to the Salvadoran court, and found
    that Silva failed to produce relevant evidence corroborating
    his story about the attacks. Finally, the IJ held that Silva had
    not met his burden under CAT because he had not
    demonstrated he would likely be tortured in either El
    Salvador or Guatemala.
    3
    The BIA thereafter dismissed Silva’s appeal, largely
    adopting the reasoning of the IJ. The BIA agreed that there
    were serious reasons to believe that Silva was involved in the
    Guatemalan murders because the charging documents alleged
    specific facts and were likely the product of a genuine fight
    against corruption. The BIA also concluded that there were
    serious reasons to believe Silva committed a serious
    nonpolitical crime in El Salvador. In so holding, the BIA also
    upheld the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, pointing to
    Silva’s lie to the Salvadoran court, his failure to report
    14                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    incidents of police violence, and his lack of corroborating
    evidence. Finally, the BIA upheld the IJ’s determination
    denying Silva’s CAT claim.
    Silva timely petitioned for review.
    II
    “We review ‘denials of asylum, withholding of removal,
    and CAT relief for substantial evidence and will uphold a
    denial supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Huang v.
    Holder, 
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1152 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Garcia-
    Milian v. Holder, 
    755 F.3d 1026
    , 1031 (9th Cir. 2013)). The
    agency’s “findings of fact are conclusive unless any
    reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
    contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Thus, in order to
    reverse the BIA, “we must determine that the evidence not
    only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it—and also
    compels the further conclusion that the petitioner meets the
    requisite standard for obtaining relief.” 
    Huang, 744 F.3d at 1031
    (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    “Where, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision while
    adding its own reasons, this court reviews both decisions.”
    Vahora v. Holder, 
    641 F.3d 1038
    , 1042 (9th Cir. 2011); see
    also Shrestha v. Holder, 
    736 F.3d 871
    , 877 (9th Cir. 2013)
    (observing that “[w]hen the BIA conducts its own review of
    the evidence and law rather than adopting the IJ’s decision,”
    we review only the BIA’s decision “except to the extent that
    the IJ’s opinion is expressly adopted”).
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                      15
    III
    Silva first argues that the record does not support the
    BIA’s conclusion that there are serious reasons to believe that
    he participated in the murder of D’Aubuisson and his
    companions in Guatemala, or engaged in bribery and money
    laundering in El Salvador. In so arguing, Silva contends that
    the IJ erred in finding him non-credible.
    Because Silva’s application for relief was submitted after
    May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act governs his case. Pub. L.
    No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see Shrestha v. Holder,
    
    590 F.3d 1034
    , 1039 (9th Cir. 2010). The REAL ID Act
    states in relevant part:
    Considering the totality of the circumstances,
    and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may
    base a credibility determination on . . . the
    inherent plausibility of the applicant’s or
    witness’s account, the consistency between
    the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral
    statements. . . , the internal consistency of
    each such statement . . . and any inaccuracies
    or falsehoods in such statements, without
    regard to whether an inconsistency,
    inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
    the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant
    factor.
    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also 
    id. §§ 1231(b)(3)(C)
    (adopting this standard for withholding of removal),
    1229a(c)(4)(C) (all other relief). “Under the REAL ID Act,
    there is no presumption that an applicant for relief is credible,
    and the IJ is authorized to base an adverse credibility
    16                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    determination on ‘the totality of the circumstances’ and ‘all
    relevant factors.’” Huang v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 1149
    , 1152–53
    (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). The
    Act explicitly names factors such as “the inherent
    plausibility” of the applicant’s account, “consistency between
    [his] written and oral statements,” and the “consistency of
    such statements with other evidence of record.” 8 U.S.C.
    § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). However, “these statutory factors are
    not exhaustive,” and “the agency can look to relevant pre-
    REAL ID Act factors, such as the ‘level of detail of the
    claimant’s testimony.’” Bingxu Jin v. Holder, 
    748 F.3d 959
    ,
    964 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040
    ).
    “[O]nly the most extraordinary circumstances will justify
    overturning an adverse credibility determination.” Id.
    (quoting 
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1040
    ). Nonetheless, “an
    adverse credibility determination cannot be based on
    complete speculation and conjecture.” Singh v. Lynch,
    
    802 F.3d 972
    , 977 (9th Cir. 2015). Instead, an IJ must
    provide “specific and cogent reasons” supporting such a
    determination with reference to “specific instances in the
    record.” 
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1044
    .
    A
    In upholding the IJ’s decision, the BIA first agreed with
    the IJ that Silva’s failure to mention in his asylum application
    incidents of police violence that occurred outside the prison
    and at his home in his asylum application was a significant
    omission that justified an adverse credibility finding. Silva
    has pointed us to no evidence that compels a contrary
    conclusion.
    Although it is true that “mere omission of details is
    insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding,” Lai v.
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                     17
    Holder, 
    773 F.3d 966
    , 971 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Singh v.
    Gonzales, 
    403 F.3d 1081
    , 1085 (9th Cir. 2005)), an adverse
    credibility determination may be supported by omissions that
    are not “details,” but new allegations that tell a “much
    different—and more compelling—story of persecution than
    [the] initial application,” Zamanov v. Holder, 
    649 F.3d 969
    ,
    974 (9th Cir. 2011). For instance, in Zamanov, we concluded
    that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s adverse
    credibility determination where a petitioner’s asylum
    application failed to mention three incidents in which police
    interrupted his participation in various political activities,
    arrested him, and beat him. 
    Id. at 972.
    We noted that these
    omissions “materially altered” his account of persecution by
    connecting government persecution to his political activity,
    and thus “went to the core of his alleged fear of political
    persecution” as our pre-REAL ID act case law required. 
    Id. at 973–74.
    We have since reiterated the rule explained in Zamanov
    several times. For instance, in Alvarez-Santos v. INS, we
    upheld the BIA’s adverse credibility determination where an
    applicant failed to mention a violent incident supporting his
    two previous asylum applications. 
    332 F.3d 1245
    , 1248–49
    (9th Cir. 2003). At the conclusion of his direct testimony, the
    applicant mentioned for the first time that masked men
    associated with a guerrilla group who had sent him
    threatening letters came to his house, caught him, and stabbed
    him in the shoulder. 
    Id. at 1249.
    We held that it was “simply
    not believable that an applicant for asylum would fail to
    remember” the experience of being attacked and stabbed
    which precipitated his flight from his home country. 
    Id. at 1254.
    Likewise, in Kin v. Holder, we held that a petitioner’s
    failure to mention that he had been beaten by police after
    participating in a political rally constituted substantial
    18                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    evidence to support an adverse credibility finding, because
    these allegations were not “trivial details” but allegations
    “crucial to establishing they were persecuted for their
    political opinion.” 
    595 F.3d 1050
    , 1057 (9th Cir. 2010).
    Here the BIA reasonably concluded that Silva’s failure to
    mention his altercations with police were not details, but
    instead “significant events of alleged police misconduct that
    would have supported his applications for relief.” In his
    asylum application, Silva stated only that the prosecution for
    corruption in El Salvador aimed at himself and his family was
    actually a form of persecution for Silva’s outspoken criticism
    of ARENA. At his immigration hearing, however, Silva
    reported for the first time that police brutally beat him outside
    his wife’s prison and again in his home—incidents which he
    claims left him with permanent injuries and provoked
    extreme psychological trauma in his children. Moreover,
    Silva testified that when he asked the police why they were
    pointing a gun at his son, they told him it was “because of
    your political opinion [and] because you’re always talking.”
    These are not trivialities, but “pivotal event[s]” that were
    “crucial to establishing” that Silva actually suffered
    persecution as a result of his political opinion. See Alvarez-
    
    Santos, 332 F.3d at 1254
    ; 
    Kin, 595 F.3d at 1057
    .
    Likewise, Silva’s explanation for omitting these events
    from his application for asylum “is not persuasive enough to
    compel the conclusion that the omissions were immaterial.”
    
    Kin, 595 F.3d at 1057
    . Before testifying about the altercation
    with police outside his wife’s prison, Silva explained that
    such incident was not included in his asylum application
    because he “forgot” to mention it to his attorney. Silva later
    stated that he did not previously report his altercations with
    police because “[his] problem is very complex” and because
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                     19
    he worried other Salvadoran detainees might beat him and
    “steal [his] declaration.” Yet as the IJ and the BIA both
    concluded, it is “simply not believable” that Silva would fail
    to remember such “dramatic incident[s]” so closely related to
    his asylum claim. See Alvarez-
    Santos, 332 F.3d at 1254
    . We
    also agree with the agency that it strains belief to conclude
    that Silva would fear accusing unnamed police officers of
    misconduct when his initial asylum application accused
    ARENA’s highest ranking officials of wrongdoing and
    corruption. Such circumstances clearly distinguish Silva’s
    case from instances in which we have found the BIA’s
    credibility determination based on an omission to be
    unsupported. See 
    Lai, 733 F.3d at 974
    (holding an adverse
    credibility determination was not supported where a claimant
    “gave a plausible and compelling explanation for the
    omission”).
    Silva argues that various documents submitted several
    years after his testimony compel the conclusion that the
    agency’s credibility determination is mistaken. But as the
    BIA noted, many of these documents were based only on
    Silva’s own assertions or otherwise insufficient to corroborate
    his version of events. For instance, Silva submitted an
    evaluation from a psychologist who examined him more than
    four years after his alleged encounters with police, and whose
    findings were based entirely on Silva’s own account of past
    events. Likewise, the reports Silva submitted from two
    physicians indicate only that Silva was seen for chest pain
    and various other conditions roughly two years after the
    violent incidents with police are said to have occurred. Silva
    also points to a statement attributed to his driver which
    supports his claims that he was beaten outside his wife’s
    prison. Yet the BIA found this report inconsistent with
    statements by Silva’s brother that Silva was always
    20                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    accompanied by bodyguards, and also pointed to Silva’s
    failure to provide any corroborating evidence from his son
    whom police allegedly threatened—now aged 16 or
    17—despite the fact that several other family members
    testified on Silva’s behalf. Because the record does not
    compel the conclusion that the agency’s assessment of this
    evidence was mistaken or that “such corroborating evidence
    [was] unavailable,” we decline to reverse the IJ’s credibility
    determination on this basis. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4); see also
    
    Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1047
    –48.
    B
    In addition to Silva’s failure to report incidents of alleged
    persecution by the police, the IJ and the BIA also noted
    discrepancies in Silva’s testimony regarding his entry date
    into the United States. In his asylum application, Silva said
    he left El Salvador on January 7, 2007, and that he arrived in
    the United States on February 1, 2007. However, after the
    government’s attorney pointed out that this exit date was
    irreconcilable with Silva’s reported timeline in traveling to
    the United States, Silva then stated he actually left El
    Salvador on January 22, 2007.
    Silva argues that this date discrepancy is insufficient on
    its own to support an adverse credibility determination, as the
    BIA concluded on its first remand. We are inclined to agree.
    However, “when inconsistencies that weaken a claim for
    asylum are accompanied by other indications of dishonesty
    . . . an adverse credibility determination may be supported by
    substantial evidence.” Kaur v. Gonzales, 
    418 F.3d 1061
    ,
    1067 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, the IJ and the BIA clarified that
    Silva’s varying testimony on this point was significant not for
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                       21
    its own sake, but instead because it related directly to Silva’s
    efforts to avoid criminal charges.
    The record demonstrates that following the legislature’s
    revocation of Silva’s immunity, a Salvadoran court held
    hearings beginning on January 18, 2007, to determine
    whether a warrant for Silva’s arrest ought to be issued. Silva
    testified that he instructed his attorneys to submit a note to the
    judge stating that he was too ill to attend the proceedings
    because of the beating he sustained by police when they
    searched his home. When DHS pointed out that Silva had
    previously testified that this incident took place roughly three
    months before the court hearings, Silva claimed that he had
    been beaten an additional time by individuals dressed as
    police in January 2007. The government then asked Silva to
    explain how he was both too injured to attend the arrest-
    warrant hearings but well enough to flee El Salvador on
    January 22 as he had just indicated. Silva first responded by
    saying he was “just hurt” and “not totally in a grave state.”
    After the government lawyer repeated the question multiple
    times, however, Silva admitted that he planned to and did flee
    El Salvador on January 22, and that his statement to the court
    that he was too ill to attend was fraudulent. We have held on
    numerous occasions that the “[a]dmission of prior dishonesty
    can support an adverse credibility determination.” Don v.
    Gonzales, 
    476 F.3d 738
    , 741 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
    
    Kaur, 418 F.3d at 1065
    (“It strains credulity to hold that the
    evidence presented at the asylum hearing compels us to find
    Kaur believable for the sole reason that she admitted to being
    a liar.”). The IJ did not err in finding Silva non-credible on
    a such basis here.
    In his opening brief, Silva’s attorney admits that Silva
    intentionally lied to the Salvadoran court, but contends that
    22                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    the lie was justified “to escape a sham trial at a puppet court.”
    But the record does not compel that conclusion. Although
    some of Silva’s experts asserted that it is “virtually
    impossible to get a fair trial in El Salvador,” they also
    recognized that justice can be had—an assertion further
    supported by the fact that Silva’s mother-in-law was acquitted
    of all charges against her, and his wife acquitted of several.
    Moreover, Silva’s appeal to possible corruption in the
    Salvadoran justice system does nothing to explain why Silva
    testified to the IJ that he was too sick to attend the hearings
    until inconsistencies in his own testimony forced him to
    admit he was lying. See 
    Don, 476 F.3d at 742
    (observing that
    a petitioner’s argument that he lied to Sri Lankan police out
    of fear for his safety “d[id] not explain why Don provided
    different dates to the asylum officer and to the IJ”). The
    agency’s credibility determination was valid.
    IV
    Silva next argues that the BIA erred in concluding that
    there are serious reasons to believe that he committed two
    serious nonpolitical crimes—conspiracy to murder
    D’Aubuisson and his companions in Guatemala and money
    laundering and bribery in El Salvador. Once again, we
    review the BIA’s conclusion for substantial evidence. See Go
    v. Holder, 
    640 F.3d 1047
    , 1052 (9th Cir. 2011).
    A
    An individual is ineligible for asylum and withholding of
    removal where “there are serious reasons for believing that
    the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside
    the United States.” 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (asylum),
    1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (withholding of removal); see also 8 C.F.R.
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                      23
    § 1208.16(d)(2). We have interpreted “serious reasons for
    believing” as “tantamount to probable cause.” 
    Go, 640 F.3d at 1052
    ; see also Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1, 3 (BIA
    2012).
    In finding Silva ineligible for asylum and withholding of
    removal, the BIA determined that there are serious reasons
    for believing that Silva conspired with others to murder
    D’Aubuisson and the other PARLACEN delegates in
    Guatemala. Silva does not contest that the Guatemalan
    murders were serious nonpolitical crimes, nor did he make
    any such argument to the BIA. Thus, the only question
    before us in relation to this issue is whether there are “serious
    reasons for believing” Silva was complicit in these killings.
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Abebe v. Mukasey, 
    554 F.3d 1203
    ,
    1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (noting that a “ [p]etitioner
    will . . . be deemed to have exhausted only those issues he
    raised and argued in his brief before the BIA.”).
    As both the IJ and the BIA noted, the Guatemalan
    indictment provides strong reason to believe that Silva was
    involved in the PARLACEN murders, not least because it
    alleges specific facts connecting Silva to the crime. The
    indictment accuses Silva of planning the murders with
    Castillo’s gang contacts at a series of meetings—one inside
    a restaurant allegedly owned by Osorto, the mayor who was
    convicted of corruption for assisting Silva in obtaining
    government contracts, and a second meeting at a car wash in
    Guatemala. Moreover, the indictment’s allegations were
    corroborated by “Judas,” an eyewitness whom the
    Guatemalan court deemed credible. Judas testified in no
    uncertain terms that he witnessed Silva meet with various
    gang members, and that Silva planned the murder of
    D’Aubuisson and his companions at those meetings. What is
    24                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    more, Judas asserted that the murders were occasioned by
    Silva’s desire for political and financial revenge against
    ARENA—the same theory that supported the Guatemalan
    government’s conviction of Castillo for ordering the killings.
    Such evidence is certainly sufficient to constitute probable
    cause—a “fair probability” that Silva was involved in the
    murders. See United States v. Gourde, 
    440 F.3d 1065
    , 1069
    (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 246 (1983)).
    Silva argues that the probable cause standard we
    articulated in Go is inapposite because unlike the petitioner
    in that case, Silva did not affirmatively admit to participating
    in the murders. See 
    Go, 640 F.3d at 1053
    . But there is no
    question that Go’s standard can be met without an explicit
    admission of guilt, as other courts have rightly recognized.
    For instance, in Khouzam v. Holder, 
    361 F.3d 161
    , 166
    (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit relied on an Egyptian
    arrest warrant and police reports to conclude that there were
    “serious reasons for believing” that a petitioner had
    committed a murder in that country. In so concluding, the
    court reasoned that, just as in Silva’s case, the documents
    submitted were sufficient to establish probable cause because
    they suggested a possible motive for the killing and offered
    specific allegations supporting the charge—that the
    petitioner’s fingerprints were found at the scene, that he was
    seen wearing a bloody shirt that was later recovered, and that
    eyewitnesses said he had an injured hand. 
    Id. Silva contends
    that Khouzam is distinguishable because the charges in that
    case were supported by circumstantial evidence rather than
    eyewitness testimony. But that difference is beside the point.
    Even assuming that the quantum of evidence in Silva’s case
    differs from the evidence at issue in Kouzam, Silva has
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                    25
    pointed to no evidence that “compel[s] the conclusion that
    probable cause was lacking.” 
    Go, 640 F.3d at 1053
    . Absent
    such a showing, the BIA’s determination must be upheld.
    Silva also argues that the IJ improperly ignored the
    testimony of Fernandez-Rojas and Silva’s other experts that
    the charges against Silva were pretextual and that the
    PARLACEN murders were in fact perpetrated by the
    Guatemalan government to cover up drug dealing. But the
    agency was within its discretion to reject these alternate
    theories. See Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 
    594 F.3d 701
    , 705
    n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (observing that an IJ is “not required to
    adopt as true all of the facts” upon which an expert witness
    based his opinion where the IJ states “specific reasons in the
    record why the testimony was insufficient to establish” facts
    necessary to grant relief).
    Here, both the BIA and the IJ found that evidence in the
    record suggests that although there is corruption in
    Guatemala, there have been improvements especially related
    to that government’s investigation of the PARLACEN
    murders, making it unlikely that the charges against Silva
    were pretextual. For instance, the BIA noted that in response
    to the murder of the police officers who carried out the
    PARLACEN killings, the Guatemalan government sought the
    assistance of the FBI to help bring those responsible to
    justice. Moreover, the record demonstrates that Guatemala
    has convicted not only numerous gang members implicated
    in the murders, but also Manuel Castillo, himself a
    Guatemalan official. Likewise, the BIA observed that the
    reliability of the CICIG report upon which Silva’s experts
    based their conclusions was at least questionable since the
    report’s principal author has herself since been implicated in
    corruption and stripped of immunity by CICIG. One may
    26               SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    certainly disagree with the agency’s assessment of the
    evidence or believe such evidence “cast[s] a reasonable doubt
    on [Silva’s] guilt.” 
    Khouzam, 361 F.3d at 166
    . But that is a
    far cry from “compel[ling] a finding that [Silva] was framed”
    or that probable cause is lacking. 
    Id. Because the
    Guatemalan charges provide a sufficient
    basis upon which to conclude that Silva is ineligible for
    asylum and withholding of removal, we need not reach
    Silva’s challenges to the BIA’s alternate conclusion that there
    are serious reasons for believing that Silva committed a
    second serious nonpolitical crime by engaging in bribery and
    money laundering in El Salvador. Silva is ineligible for
    asylum and withholding of removal.
    B
    Silva next argues that even assuming his possible
    involvement in the Guatemalan murders renders him
    ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, the agency
    should have been forbidden from reaching this conclusion
    under the law of the case doctrine.
    The law of the case doctrine “generally preclude[s]
    [courts] from reconsidering an issue previously decided by
    the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.”
    Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 
    902 F.2d 703
    ,
    715 (9th Cir. 1990). However, we have previously observed
    that “it is doubtful that federal courts have the authority to
    extend the law of the case doctrine” to administrative
    proceedings. Lockert v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 
    867 F.2d 513
    ,
    518 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Biltmore Forest Broadcasting
    FM, Inc. v. FCC, 
    321 F.3d 155
    , 163 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting
    that “the law of the case doctrine is of uncertain force in the
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                     27
    context of administrative litigation”); but see Stacy v. Colvin,
    No. 13-36025, 
    2016 WL 3165597
    , at *1 (9th Cir. June 7,
    2016) — F.3d — (holding that the law of the case doctrine
    applies to social security administrative remands from federal
    court). That reticence makes sense in the context of
    immigration proceedings, because both the BIA and the IJ
    have explicit legal authority to reconsider their own decisions
    sua sponte. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“The Board may at any
    time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in
    which it has rendered a decision.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)
    (“An Immigration Judge may upon his or her own motion at
    any time . . . reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she
    has made a decision, unless jurisdiction is vested with the
    Board.”). Indeed, we are aware of only one circuit that has
    held that the law of the case doctrine applies to immigration
    proceedings. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 
    434 F.3d 993
    , 998 (7th
    Cir. 2006) (interpreting the law of the case doctrine as
    forbidding a new IJ from reconsidering a petitioner’s
    credibility where that issue exceeded the scope of the BIA’s
    instructions on remand). For the purposes of this appeal,
    however, we need not decide whether the law of the case
    doctrine applies in the immigration context, because even
    assuming it does, the doctrine provides no help to Silva.
    For the law of the case doctrine to bar reconsideration of
    an issue, “the issue in question must have been decided
    explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous
    disposition.” United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 
    763 F.3d 1180
    , 1187 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Lummi
    Indian Tribe, 
    235 F.3d 443
    , 452 (9th Cir. 2000)). Silva
    admits that neither the IJ nor the BIA explicitly decided
    whether he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of
    removal on the basis of the serious nonpolitical crimes bar
    before the final round of decisions. Nonetheless, he argues
    28                SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    that the IJ and the BIA “found by necessary implication” in
    their earlier decisions that the bar did not apply. We disagree.
    In its first decision, the IJ denied Silva asylum and
    withholding of removal on the basis of its adverse credibility
    determination. The BIA reversed and remanded, stating that
    the IJ’s focus on the discrepancies in dates relating to Silva’s
    departure from El Salvador was inadequate to sustain the
    credibility determination. Subsequently, the IJ issued a
    second decision granting Silva asylum, based in large part on
    his erroneous view that the BIA’s previous ruling required
    that he find Silva credible. We doubt that this decision held
    by “necessary implication” that the serious nonpolitical
    crimes bar did not apply, since we find no evidence that the
    IJ was ever presented with or actually considered that issue.
    See Lummi Nation, 763 F.3d at (noting that “law of the case
    acts as a bar only when the issue in question was actually
    considered and decided by the first court” (quoting United
    Steelworkers of Am. v. Ret. Income Plan for Hourly-Rated
    Employees of ASARCO, Inc., 
    512 F.3d 555
    , 564 (9th Cir.
    2008))); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 
    697 F.3d 1059
    , 1067
    (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that an issue was not decided by
    necessary implication where it “had never been considered or
    decided by any court”); see also Black’s Law Dictionary (9th
    ed. 2009) (defining “necessary implication” as “[a]n
    implication so strong in its probability that anything to the
    contrary would be unreasonable”). Yet even assuming the
    IJ’s second decision addressed the serious nonpolitical crimes
    bar by “necessary implication” insofar as it granted Silva
    asylum, the BIA reversed the IJ’s decision and once more
    remanded the case. Moreover, nowhere in BIA’s second
    decision do we find any indication that it considered and
    rejected the applicability of the bar, or that it granted any
    form of relief suggesting the bar did not apply. To the
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                     29
    contrary, the BIA’s decision returned the matter to the IJ with
    explicit instructions to conduct further inquiry to determine
    whether Silva was actually entitled to asylum or any other
    form of relief. Silva’s law of the case argument is meritless.
    V
    Although Silva is ineligible for asylum and withholding
    of removal under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) and
    1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), he may still seek deferral of removal under
    the CAT. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a); see also 
    Go, 640 F.3d at 1053
    . To succeed in obtaining such relief, a petitioner
    must establish that “it is more likely than not that he or she
    would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of
    removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (emphasis added); see
    also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17(a) (applying this standard to deferral
    of removal). Such language plainly requires that a petitioner
    must demonstrate he will likely suffer torture in the country
    to which he is actually ordered removed “as opposed to an
    alternative country of removal.” She v. Holder, 
    629 F.3d 958
    ,
    965 (9th Cir. 2010) (examining identical language as
    contained in 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)); see also 8 C.F.R.
    § 1240.10(f) (contrasting the IJ’s power to designate “the
    country of removal” with the IJ’s ability to identify multiple
    “alternative countries of removal”) (emphasis added).
    At his initial immigration hearing, Silva decided not to
    designate a country of removal, prompting the IJ initially
    assigned to Silva’s case to designate El Salvador as the
    country of removal in accordance with the relevant statute.
    See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) (establishing the process for
    determining the country to which an alien who has been
    residing in the United States shall be removed).
    Subsequently, that IJ retired, and a new IJ took over Silva’s
    30                   SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH
    case and conducted hearings on Silva’s CAT claim. At the
    conclusion of these hearings, this IJ inquired on his own
    initiative whether Silva wished to reconsider his decision to
    forego designating a country of removal. After consulting
    with counsel, Silva requested that Nicaragua be designated as
    his country of removal. The IJ obliged, and ultimately
    ordered that Silva be removed to Nicaragua as the primary
    country of removal, or alternatively to El Salvador.
    Silva appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA and contested
    the IJ’s determination that he failed to meet his burden under
    CAT. However, Silva’s arguments focused exclusively on
    the likelihood that he will suffer torture in either El Salvador
    or Guatemala. At no point did Silva argue to the BIA, nor
    has he argued to us, that he would likely suffer torture if
    removed to Nicaragua—“the proposed country of removal.”
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Because this issue is unexhausted,
    we have no power to review it. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1);
    Abebe v. Mukasey, 
    554 F.3d 1203
    , 1208 (9th Cir. 2009) (en
    banc) (holding that an alien is “deemed to have exhausted
    only those issues he raised and argued in his brief before the
    BIA”); see also Pagayon v. Holder, 
    675 F.3d 1182
    , 1188 (9th
    Cir. 2011) (“A petitioner must specify the issues he intends
    to raise on appeal; a ‘general challenge to the IJ’s decision’
    will not suffice.’” (quoting Zara v. Ashcroft, 
    383 F.3d 927
    ,
    930 (9th Cir. 2004))). The BIA’s order commanding Silva’s
    removal to Nicaragua stands.2
    2
    We note that Silva also challenges the BIA’s determination that he has
    not demonstrated a likelihood that he would be tortured in El Salvador, the
    alternate country of removal. Because this challenge does not relate to
    “the proposed country of removal,” which is properly the focus of Silva’s
    CAT claim, we do not review it at this time. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2);
    
    She, 629 F.3d at 965
    n.7. However, should El Salvador ultimately become
    the proposed country of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2)(C), we fully
    SILVA-PEREIRA V. LYNCH                           31
    VI
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
    DENIED.
    expect that the BIA will grant a motion to reopen Silva’s application such
    that we may consider his challenge to this aspect of the BIA’s
    determination. Cf. 
    She, 629 F.3d at 965
    .
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-70276

Citation Numbers: 827 F.3d 1176

Filed Date: 7/7/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (23)

Sameh Sami S. Khouzam, A/K/A Sameh Sami Khouzam, A/K/A ... , 361 F.3d 161 ( 2004 )

Junshao Zhang v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General of ... , 434 F.3d 993 ( 2006 )

Zamanov v. Holder , 649 F.3d 969 ( 2011 )

Kin v. Holder , 595 F.3d 1050 ( 2010 )

Preet Kaur v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 418 F.3d 1061 ( 2005 )

Abebe v. Mukasey , 554 F.3d 1203 ( 2009 )

Su Hwa She v. Holder , 629 F.3d 958 ( 2010 )

Sahajeewa Rathnakumara Loku Kankanamge Don, Shiyamalie ... , 476 F.3d 738 ( 2007 )

Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder , 594 F.3d 701 ( 2010 )

Vahora v. Holder , 641 F.3d 1038 ( 2011 )

Shrestha v. Holder , 590 F.3d 1034 ( 2010 )

United Steelworkers of America v. Retirement Income Plan ... , 512 F.3d 555 ( 2008 )

Erlinda Gerardo Zara v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General , 383 F.3d 927 ( 2004 )

United States v. Micah J. Gourde , 440 F.3d 1065 ( 2006 )

Jarnail Singh v. Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General , 403 F.3d 1081 ( 2005 )

Lucio Ricardo Alvarez-Santos, AKA Luciano Ricardo Alvarez ... , 332 F.3d 1245 ( 2003 )

united-states-of-america-and-lower-elwha-band-of-sklallams-jamestown-band , 235 F.3d 443 ( 2000 )

Go v. Holder , 640 F.3d 1047 ( 2011 )

Steven Lockert v. United States Department of Labor, Ann ... , 867 F.2d 513 ( 1989 )

Pagayon v. Holder , 675 F.3d 1182 ( 2011 )

View All Authorities »