State v. Shary , 2021 Ohio 3604 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Shary, 
    2021-Ohio-3604
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    STATE OF OHIO,                                    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
    No. 109487
    v.                               :
    ROBERT SHARY,                                     :
    Defendant-Appellant.             :
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 7, 2021
    Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-18-630128-A
    Appearances:
    Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
    Attorney, and David Elias, Assistant Prosecuting
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Brian R. McGraw, for appellant.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
    Defendant-appellant, Robert Shary (“Shary”), appeals from his
    convictions following a jury trial. He raises the following assignments of error for
    review:
    1. Information contained within the search warrant was inaccurate and
    embellished and the trial court erred in not suppressing the search
    warrant.
    2. Convictions lacked sufficient evidence and did not meet the manifest
    weight standard.
    After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm
    Shary’s convictions.
    I. Procedural and Factual History
    In May 2018, detectives received a citizen complaint regarding drug
    sales occurring in the upstairs unit of a two-family residence (referred to as “the
    residence”) located on West 78th Street in Cleveland, Ohio. The complainant
    provided the name “Robert Shary” as the person suspected of selling the drugs in
    the unit. The investigating detectives later learned from an anonymous caller that
    “Robert Shary” lives in the upstairs unit of the residence and has access to the attic.
    When the detectives investigated Shary’s criminal history, they discovered that he
    had prior convictions for drug possession in Cuyahoga County and Summit County.
    Based on this information, detectives began surveilling the residence.
    In the course of their investigation, detectives observed numerous individuals
    coming and going from the residence. According to Detective Larry Smith (“Det.
    Smith”) of the Cleveland Police Department, these individuals would knock on the
    door, enter the residence for several minutes, and leave immediately thereafter. This
    activity, based on the detectives’ joint experience and training, indicated possible
    drug trafficking.
    While surveilling the residence, the detectives initiated a traffic stop of
    a vehicle seen leaving the residence. Prior to the stop, the detectives observed the
    driver enter the residence for several minutes before returning to his vehicle and
    driving away. The driver indicated to the detectives that he had just purchased
    methamphetamine from an individual named “Bob.” Relevant to this appeal,
    however, the driver did not specify that the man he knew as “Bob” was, in fact,
    Robert Shary.
    Several days after the first traffic stop, the detectives initiated a second
    traffic stop of a driver seen leaving the residence. During the traffic stop, the driver,
    who was in possession of crack cocaine, informed the detectives that he was visiting
    an individual named “Bob” while inside the residence. The driver would not tell the
    detectives where he obtained the crack cocaine. However, the driver did confirm
    that “Bob” lived in the upstairs unit of the residence. Again, the driver did not
    specify that the man he knew as “Bob” was, in fact, Robert Shary.
    During further surveillance of the residence, detectives observed
    surveillance cameras on the exterior of the building. In the detectives’ joint training
    and experience, the location of the surveillance cameras was suspicious because (1)
    it allowed individuals inside the residence to detect if law enforcement was
    approaching the residence, and (2) prevented law enforcement from conducting a
    trash pull to determine whether there was possible drug activity occurring in the
    residence.
    Based on the information gathered during the investigation of the
    residence, Det. Smith completed an affidavit for a warrant to search the residence,
    including its “curtilage, common areas, storage areas, and persons therein.” In the
    affidavit, Det. Smith averred as follows:
    Affiant avers that he has probable cause to believe, and does believe,
    that with [the residence], further described as a double-family
    residence, * * * there is now being unlawfully kept, concealed and
    possessed the following evidence of a criminal offense:
    Methamphetamine, crack cocaine, and any other narcotic drugs,
    and/or controlled substances; instruments and paraphernalia used in
    taking or preparing drugs for sale, use, or shipment; records of illegal
    transactions, articles of personal property, and papers tending to
    establish the identity of the persons in control of the premises; other
    contraband, including, but not limited to, money, communications
    equipment including telephones, answering machines tapes, as well as
    computers, including, but not limited to, computer hard drives and
    monitors and other hardware and software, and weapons being
    illegally possessed therein; safes; and/or any and all evidence
    pertaining to the violations of laws of the state of Ohio, to wit: Chapters
    2923, 2925, and 2925.37 of the Revised Code.
    In June 2018, a reviewing judge issued a warrant to search the
    residence. During the execution of the search warrant, the detectives located
    quantities of various narcotics and criminal tools indicative of drug trafficking.
    In July 2018, Shary and his codefendants, Rachel Walker (“Walker”)
    and Edward Thornton (“Thornton”), were named in a criminal indictment in
    Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-18-630128-A. The indictment charged Shary with drug
    trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), with forfeiture specifications and a
    schoolyard specification1 (Count 1); drug possession, to wit: methamphetamine, in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specifications (Count 2); drug
    possession, to wit: fentanyl, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture
    specifications       (Count        6);      drug        possession,        to      wit:
    methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”), in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with
    forfeiture specifications (Count 7); drug possession, to wit: amphetamine, in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specifications (Count 8); drug
    possession, to wit: a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance containing
    cocaine, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specifications (Count 9);
    drug possession, to wit: heroin or a compound, mixture, preparation, or substance
    containing heroin, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specifications
    (Count 10); drug possession, to wit: lorazepam, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), with
    forfeiture specifications (Count 11); drug possession, to wit: dronabinol, in violation
    of R.C. 2925.11(A), with forfeiture specifications (Count 12); and possession of
    criminal tools in violation of R.C. 2923.24(A), with forfeiture specifications (Count
    15).
    In January 2020, Shary filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized,
    and statements made, during the execution of a search warrant at the residence. In
    the motion, Shary argued that “he can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
    that there are incorrect and unbelievable statement[s] included in the affidavit by
    1On January 6, 2020, the state dismissed the schoolyard specification attached to
    the drug trafficking offense charged in Count 1 of the indictment.
    the affiant knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and
    the incorrect statement[s] were necessary to the finding of probable cause, for the
    search warrant.” Shary further argued that the search warrant affidavit failed to
    make a sufficient connection “between the residence to be searched and the facts of
    criminal activity.”
    The state opposed Shary’s motion to suppress, arguing that the
    information set forth in the search warrant affidavit established that there was
    probable cause to believe criminal activity was occurring at the residence.
    A hearing was held to address the pending motion to suppress. At the
    hearing, the court heard testimony from Det. Smith and reviewed the four corners
    of the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant. At the conclusion of the
    hearing, the trial court denied Shary’s motion to suppress, stating, in relevant part:
    After reviewing State’s Exhibit 1, which is the search warrant that was
    signed by [a judge] on June 19, 2018, looking at the four corners of the
    search warrant itself, I am going to find that [the judge] was provided
    sufficient probable cause to sign that search warrant.
    (Tr. 42.) The matter then proceeded to a jury trial and the following facts were
    adduced.
    At trial, Athan Sarantopoulos (“Sarantopoulos”) testified that he is the
    owner of a duplex residence located on West 78th Street in Cleveland, Ohio.
    Relevant to this appeal, Sarantopoulos identified Shary in court and confirmed that
    Shary was renting the upstairs unit of the residence at the time the warrant was
    executed in June 2018.
    Detective William Salupo, Jr. (“Det. Salupo”) of the Cleveland Police
    Department’s vice unit, provided comprehensive testimony regarding his training
    and experience with narcotics and trafficking investigations. With respect to this
    case, Det. Salupo testified that in June 2018, detectives obtained a warrant to search
    Shary’s residence for narcotics following an extensive investigation that focused on
    Shary. Det. Salupo confirmed that he participated in the “systematic and thorough
    search of the residence.” (Tr. 258.) His body camera, which captured the search as
    it occurred, was played for the jury.
    Det. Salupo testified that the search warrant was executed at
    approximately 6:30 a.m. When Det. Salupo entered the residence, he encountered
    “numerous” individuals, including Shary, who were present inside the home at the
    time a SWAT unit entered the residence to secure the scene. (Tr. 257.) Ultimately,
    the detectives recovered a tan handbag under a couch cushion located in the living
    room that contained U.S. currency, a ledger, a scale, a “loaded syringe,” pills,
    marijuana, and a large amount of methamphetamine that was indicative of drug
    trafficking.   In other areas of the residence, the detectives found additional
    quantities of marijuana, pills, and a metal tin containing drug residue.          The
    detectives also seized other items indicative of drug activity, including packaging
    material, straws, spoons, baggies, scales, grinders, and an overdose kit. Finally, Det.
    Salupo testified that the detectives discovered an envelope and personal papers that
    listed Shary’s address as the West 78th Street residence.
    Officer Kevin Berigan (“Officer Berigan”) of the Cleveland Police
    Department testified that he was dispatched to assist the vice unit in executing the
    search warrant at Shary’s residence. Officer Berigan stated that when he arrived on
    the scene, there was a line of people out the door. Once these individuals were
    secured, Officer Berigan stayed with them while members of the vice unit completed
    the search. Thereafter, Officer Berigan was tasked with transporting Shary and
    codefendant Thornton to the county jail for processing. Officer Berigan explained
    that before he placed Shary and Thornton in his zone car, he had completed a vehicle
    inspection to ensure that no contraband was contained therein. Upon removing
    Shary and Thornton from his zone car, however, Officer Berigan discovered “a
    baggie of drugs in the back seat of [the] vehicle.” (Tr. 348.)
    Det. Smith reiterated much of his prior testimony from the
    suppression hearing, confirming that he participated in the investigation and search
    of Shary’s residence. Det. Smith testified that when he arrived at the scene to
    conduct the search of Shary’s residence, he observed people “coming and going.”
    Det. Smith stated that before the search was executed, approximately five
    individuals standing outside the residence were detained, and approximately seven
    or eight individuals inside the upstairs unit of the residence were detained. Once
    the residence was secured, the detectives entered the home, provided Shary a copy
    of the search warrant, and read him his Miranda rights. Consistent with Det.
    Salupo’s testimony, Det. Smith testified that based on his training and experience,
    the ledger, scales, packaging materials, and quantity of drugs recovered from the
    residence were indicative of drug trafficking. Det. Smith also testified that the
    residence had surveillance cameras that were positioned in a manner that would
    allow
    the person that resides at the house to have a tactical advantage on
    somebody coming up to the house or for a seller it can show somebody
    who is at the door waiting to come up and purchase narcotics.
    (Tr. 395.)
    After the search was completed, Det. Smith spoke with Shary. During
    this conversation, Shary informed Det. Smith that codefendant Walker was willing
    to take responsibility for the narcotics found inside the tan handbag. Walker, who
    was previously observed speaking with Shary while detained on the couch, was
    crying during this interaction.
    Forensic drug chemist, Megan Peders (“Peders”), of the Cuyahoga
    County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that she analyzed evidence seized in this
    case for the presence or absence of controlled substances. The results of the forensic
    testing were set forth in physical evidence examination report marked state’s exhibit
    No. 34. Peders determined that the methamphetamine recovered from the tan
    handbag weighed 45.08 grams. In addition, other items submitted for testing
    contained 15-unit doses of Lorazepam; 27-unit doses of Dronabinol; .30 grams of
    methamphetamine;       .21   grams     of   methamphetamine;       .30    grams    of
    methamphetamine; .12 grams of methamphetamine; .04 grams of marijuana; .7
    grams of marijuana; .52 grams of marijuana; .1o grams of marijuana; 1-unit dose of
    amphetamine; and trace amounts of MDMA, Delta-9-THC, heroin, fentanyl, and
    methamphetamine residue.
    At the conclusion of trial, Shary was found guilty of all counts and
    accompanying specifications. He was later sentenced to an aggregate six-year
    prison term.
    Shary now appeals from his convictions.
    II. Law and Analysis
    A. Motion to Suppress
    In his first assignment of error, Shary argues the trial court erred by
    denying his pretrial motion to suppress because the information contained within
    the search warrant affidavit was “shaky and vague.”
    Appellate review of a motion to suppress generally presents a mixed
    question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 
    100 Ohio St.3d 152
    , 
    2003-Ohio-5372
    ,
    
    797 N.E.2d 71
    , ¶ 8. At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier
    of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility
    of witnesses. 
    Id.
     With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our
    standard of review is de novo. 
    Id.
    “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police
    — which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment is basic to a free society.” Wolf v.
    Colorado, 
    338 U.S. 25
    , 27, 
    69 S.Ct. 1359
    , 
    93 L.Ed. 1782
     (1949), overruled on other
    grounds, Mapp v. Ohio, 
    367 U.S. 643
    , 
    81 S.Ct. 1684
    , 
    6 L.Ed.2d 1081
     (1961).
    The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article
    I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and
    seizures and provide that a warrant can be issued only if probable cause for the
    warrant is supported by an oath or affirmation and particularly describes the place
    to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. See also Crim.R. 41(C); R.C.
    2933.23.
    In deciding whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search
    warrant, the issuing judge must make “‘a practical, common-sense decision
    whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including
    the “veracity” and “basis of knowledge” of persons supplying hearsay information,
    there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
    particular place.’” State v. George, 
    45 Ohio St.3d 325
    , 
    544 N.E.2d 640
     (1989),
    paragraph one of the syllabus, following Illinois v. Gates, 
    462 U.S. 213
    , 238-239, 
    103 S.Ct. 2317
    , 
    76 L.Ed.2d 527
     (1983). “[C]onsiderations to be taken into account when
    determining whether to issue a search warrant include how stale the information
    relied upon is, when the facts relied upon occurred, and whether there is a nexus
    between the alleged crime, the objects to be seized, and the place to be searched.”
    State v. Castagnola, 
    145 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2015-Ohio-1565
    , 
    46 N.E.3d 638
    , ¶ 34, citing
    2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, Section 3.7(a), (b), (d) (5th Ed.2012). “‘To establish
    probable cause to search a home, the facts must be sufficient to justify a conclusion
    that the property that is the subject of the search is probably on the premises to
    search.’” State v. Marler, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2007 CA 8, 
    2009-Ohio-2423
    , ¶ 26,
    quoting State v. Freeman, 4th Dist. Highland No. 06CA3, 
    2006-Ohio-5020
    , ¶ 13.
    “The nexus between the items sought and the place to be searched depends upon all
    of the circumstances of each individual case, including the type of crime and the
    nature of the evidence.” State v. Carter, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011 CA 11, 2011-Ohio-
    6700, ¶ 10, citing Freeman at ¶ 13.
    The duty of the reviewing court is to ensure that the issuing judge had
    a “substantial basis” for concluding that probable cause existed. Castagnola at ¶ 35;
    George at paragraph two of the syllabus. When conducting any after-the-fact
    scrutiny of an affidavit submitted in support of a search warrant, reviewing courts
    should accord “great deference” to the issuing judge’s determination of probable
    cause; “doubtful or marginal cases should be resolved in favor of upholding the
    warrant.” 
    Id.
     Neither a trial court nor an appellate court may substitute its
    judgment for that of the issuing judge by determining de novo whether the affidavit
    provided sufficient probable cause. 
    Id.
    On appeal, Shary suggests that Det. Smith’s affidavit in support of the
    search warrant contained false or embellished statements of fact that “had the effect
    of convincing the judge reviewing the affidavit that the supportive information was
    far more precise than in reality.” Specifically, Shary maintains that Det. Smith
    recklessly disregarded the truth when he identified Shary by name as the person
    connected to the two individuals stopped by the detectives after they were observed
    leaving the residence. Contrary to the information set forth in the affidavit, Shary
    maintains that “the only information provided to law enforcement from people
    coming out of the house is that someone in there was named ‘Bob.’”
    Search warrant affidavits are presumed valid. State v. Sheron, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98837, 
    2013-Ohio-1989
    , ¶ 29. However, where a search warrant
    is based on false statements in the affidavit submitted to establish probable cause,
    the fruits of the search warrant must be suppressed. Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    , 155, 
    98 S.Ct. 2674
    , 
    57 L.Ed.2d 667
     (1978). A “Franks challenge,” which
    challenges the factual veracity of a warrant affidavit, requires allegations of
    deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. State v. Roberts, 
    62 Ohio St.2d 170
    , 178, 
    405 N.E.2d 247
     (1980), citing Franks at 171.
    Relevant to this appeal, the United States Supreme Court explained
    in Franks that:
    where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a
    false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard
    for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if
    the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable
    cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the
    defendant’s request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of
    perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a
    preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material
    set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to
    establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the
    fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was
    lacking on the face of the affidavit.
    Id. at 155-156. “Reckless disregard” under Franks means that the affiant had serious
    doubts of an allegation’s truth. State v. Waddy, 
    63 Ohio St.3d 424
    , 441, 
    588 N.E.2d 819
     (1992), citing U.S. v. Williams, 
    737 F.2d 594
     (7th Cir.1984).
    After careful review, we find Shary has failed to carry his burden in
    rebutting the presumed validity of the affidavit in the absence of any evidence of
    deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth. Det. Smith explained at the
    suppression hearing that the investigating detectives has credible information
    linking “Robert Shary” to the residence, including (1) a call-in complaint that
    reported “drug activity” in the upstairs unit of the residence and identified Shary by
    name, and (2) information from an anonymous caller that “Robert Shary does live
    at [the residence] and utilizes the attic as well.” (Tr. 36.) Although Det. Smith
    conceded that the detained individuals referred to an individual located inside the
    residence as “Bob” and not “Robert,” Det. Smith explained that he had a reasonable
    and justified belief that the individuals were referring to Shary based on the totality
    of the information gathered during the course of the vice unit’s investigation. Under
    these circumstances, we are unable to conclude that Det. Smith, as the affiant,
    knowingly made a false statement, or “had serious doubts of an allegation’s truth.”
    Further, even if Det. Smith’s direct reference to Robert Shary was
    excluded from the paragraphs of the affidavit that referred to the traffic stops, the
    remainder of the affidavit established sufficient probable cause to search the
    residence. In this case, detectives conducted an extensive investigation of the
    residence following a complaint that Shary was engaging in drug activity “at all
    hours” of the day in the upstairs unit of the residence. During the course of their
    investigation, detectives observed various factors indicative of unlawful drug
    activity, including (1) individuals walking in and out of the residence via foot or via
    car traffic, (2) the short duration of the visits inside the residence, and (3)
    suspiciously placed surveillance cameras.      As set forth in the affidavit, the
    investigation culminated in the detention of two individuals seen leaving the
    residence. One individual admitted that he purchased drugs inside the residence
    while the second individual was found to be in possession of drugs after leaving the
    residence.
    When considering the totality of the information contained in the
    search-warrant affidavit, probable cause existed to search the residence, regardless
    of whether the stopped individuals did or did not refer to Shary by his government
    name.      For the purposes of suppression, it was irrelevant who the detained
    individuals were visiting inside the residence prior to their traffic stop given the
    overwhelming evidence of drug activity inside the residence. As stated, the search
    warrant sought to discover information regarding the identity of the person(s) in
    control of the premises by permitting law enforcement to search all papers and
    individuals located inside the residence at the time of the search. Ultimately, Shary
    and papers linking him to the residence were discovered inside the residence at the
    time of the search. Under these circumstances, we find Det. Smith’s reference to
    Shary by name in the supporting affidavit, when the detained individuals referred
    to a person named “Bob,” did not negate the probable cause supporting the search
    warrant.
    Accordingly, we conclude that the issuing judge had a substantial
    basis for finding probable cause to issue the warrant to search the residence. Based
    on the information set forth in the supporting affidavit, the issuing judge could have
    reasonably concluded that there was a fair probability that other drugs or evidence
    of drug trafficking would be found inside the residence. Because the record reflects
    that the issuing judge had a substantial basis for finding a fair probability that drugs
    and the other items specified in the search warrant would be found in the residence,
    the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress the evidence seized during the
    search of the residence.
    Shary’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    B. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence
    In his second assignment of error, Shary argues his convictions are not
    supported by sufficient evidence and are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    “[T]he test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the
    prosecution met its burden of production at trial.” State v. Bowden, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 92266, 
    2009-Ohio-3598
    , ¶ 13. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after
    viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
    of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991),
    paragraph two of the syllabus. The state may use direct evidence, circumstantial
    evidence, or both, in order to establish the elements of a crime. See State v. Durr,
    
    58 Ohio St.3d 86
    , 
    568 N.E.2d 674
     (1991). Circumstantial evidence is “proof of facts
    or circumstances by direct evidence from which the trier of fact may reasonably infer
    other related or connected facts that naturally or logically follow.” State v. Seals,
    8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101081, 
    2015-Ohio-517
    , ¶ 32.
    A manifest weight challenge questions whether the state met its
    burden of persuasion. Bowden at ¶ 12. A reviewing court “‘weighs the evidence and
    all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines
    whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created
    such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a
    new trial ordered.’” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st
    Dist.1983). “A conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the
    evidence only in the most ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
    against the conviction.’” State v. Burks, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106639, 2018-Ohio-
    4777, ¶ 47, quoting Thompkins at 387.
    At trial, the state maintained that Shary, at the very least, aided and
    abetted his codefendants in the commission of the drug offenses. At the close of
    trial, the court provided the jury with a complicity instruction pursuant to R.C.
    2923.03. The statute provides in pertinent part that “[n]o person, acting with the
    kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense, shall * * * [a]id or abet
    another in committing the offense.” R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). When an individual acts
    to aid or abet a principal in the commission of an offense, the individual and
    principal are equally guilty and the individual is prosecuted and punished as if he
    were a principal offender. R.C. 2923.03(F). The statute further states that “[i]t is no
    defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in
    complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.” R.C. 2923.03(B).
    To prove complicity by aiding and abetting under R.C. 2923.02(A)(2),
    the evidence must demonstrate that the defendant “supported, assisted,
    encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of
    the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal.” State
    v. Johnson, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 240
    , 
    754 N.E.2d 796
     (2001), syllabus. Such intent may
    be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime. 
    Id.
     “‘[P]articipation in
    criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship and conduct before
    and after the offense is committed.’” Id. at 245, quoting State v. Pruett, 
    28 Ohio App.2d 29
    , 34, 
    273 N.E.2d 884
     (4th Dist.1971). A common purpose among persons
    to commit a crime need not be shown by positive evidence but may be inferred from
    circumstances surrounding the act and from the defendant’s subsequent conduct.
    State v. Gonzalez, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-628, 
    2011-Ohio-1193
    , ¶ 25, citing
    Pruett.
    In this case, Shary was convicted of drug possession in violation of
    R.C. 2925.11(A). Count 2 of the indictment pertained to the discovery of an amount
    of methamphetamine that equaled or exceeded five times the bulk amount. Counts
    6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 related to the discovery of fentanyl, MDMA, amphetamine,
    cocaine, heroin, lorazepam, and dronabinol. To sustain a conviction for drug
    possession, the evidence must demonstrate that Shary knowingly obtained,
    possessed, or used “a controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.” R.C.
    2925.11(A).
    Shary was also convicted of possessing criminal tools in violation of
    R.C. 2923.24(A). The criminal tools relevant in this case included a cell phone, three
    digital scales, U.S. currency, a ledger, packaging materials, and a grinder. To sustain
    a conviction for possession of criminal tools, the state was required to prove that
    Shary possessed or had under his control “any substance, device, instrument, or
    article, with purpose to use it criminally.”
    In challenging the evidence supporting his drug possession and
    possession of criminal tools convictions, Shary broadly asserts that there was no
    testimony or forensic evidence linking him to the drugs or criminal tools seized from
    the residence. Shary notes that he was not in physical possession of any contraband
    and that there were numerous individuals inside the home at the time the search
    warrant was executed.
    “Possession” is statutorily defined as “having control over a thing or
    substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance
    through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance
    is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). A person can have actual or constructive possession of
    a controlled substance. State v. Payne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107825, 2019-Ohio-
    4158, ¶ 67, citing State v. Messer, 
    107 Ohio App.3d 51
    , 56, 
    667 N.E.2d 1022
     (9th
    Dist.1995). “‘Actual possession exists when the circumstances indicate that an
    individual has or had an item within his immediate physical possession.’” State v.
    Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95816, 
    2011-Ohio-3469
    , ¶ 11, quoting State v.
    Kingsland, 
    177 Ohio App.3d 655
    , 
    2008-Ohio-4148
    , 
    895 N.E.2d 633
    , ¶ 13 (4th Dist.).
    “Constructive possession exists when an individual exercises dominion and control
    over an object, even though that object may not be within [the individual’s]
    immediate physical possession.” State v. Hankerson, 
    70 Ohio St.2d 87
    , 91, 
    434 N.E.2d 1362
     (1982), citing State v. Wolery, 
    46 Ohio St.2d 316
    , 329, 
    348 N.E.2d 351
    (1976). Constructive possession may be established by circumstantial evidence.
    Payne at ¶ 68.
    Shary correctly states that he was not found to be in actual possession
    of drugs or criminal tools at the time the search warrant was executed at his home.
    Relevant to this case, however, this court has recognized that “knowledge of an
    illegal object on one’s property is sufficient to show constructive knowledge as long
    as the person is conscious of the object’s presence.” State v. Jones, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 101311, 
    2015-Ohio-1818
    , ¶ 46, citing State v. Santiago, 8th Dist.
    Cuyahoga No. 95333, 
    2011-Ohio-1691
    ; State v. Hankerson, 
    70 Ohio St.2d 87
    , 
    434 N.E.2d 1362
     (1982). Similarly, although a defendant’s mere proximity is in itself
    insufficient to establish constructive possession, one’s “‘presence in the vicinity of
    contraband, coupled with another factor or factors probative of dominion or control
    over the contraband, may establish constructive possession.’” State v. Wiley, 8th
    Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107417, 
    2019-Ohio-3092
    , ¶ 14, quoting State v. Chafin, 4th Dist.
    Scioto No. 16CA3769, 
    2017-Ohio-7622
    , ¶ 41; see also State v. Slade, 
    145 Ohio App.3d 241
    , 243, 
    762 N.E.2d 451
     (8th Dist.2001) (“readily usable drugs in close
    proximity to an accused may constitute sufficient circumstantial evidence to support
    a finding of constructive possession”).
    After careful review of the evidence, we find the state presented
    sufficient evidence to establish that Shary consciously exercised dominion and
    control over the drugs and criminal tools discovered in his residence. In this case,
    the state’s evidence demonstrated that the vice unit investigated reported drug
    activity in the residence and confirmed that Shary was “living in the house.” (Tr.
    377.) Upon the execution of the warrant, Shary was present inside the residence and
    personal papers containing his name and the residence’s address were discovered
    therein. At trial, Shary’s landlord confirmed that Shary was renting the upstairs unit
    at the time the search warrant was executed. Once inside the upstairs unit, Det.
    Salupo testified that drugs and drug paraphernalia were found in various locations.
    Regarding the handbag hidden under a couch cushion, Det. Salupo testified that in
    his experience as a detective and in conducting search warrants, it is common for
    individuals to try and conceal drugs located inside the home. When Shary was
    confronted with the discovered drugs, he became agitated and immediately
    attempted to have his girlfriend, codefendant Walker, take responsibility for the
    drugs. Regarding Shary’s knowledge of the drug activity occurring inside the home,
    Det. Smith explained that the breadth of the contraband discovered inside the
    residence, coupled with the number of individuals present at the scene at the time
    of the search, indicated that Shary was operating a “tramp house,” which Det. Smith
    described as:
    a location where numerous people go and buy drugs and they’ll use
    drugs there. Generally, what I’ve seen is * * * the seller will be within
    that house.
    (Tr. 412.) Collectively, the evidence demonstrated, albeit circumstantially, that
    Shary permitted rampant drug use in the residence and/or encouraged drug use in
    the residence for profit. Accordingly, we find Shary had both knowledge of the drugs
    and criminal tools, and the ability to exercise dominion and control over the
    contraband.
    Furthermore, while there were approximately seven or eight
    individuals in Shary’s residence at the time of the search, this is not dispositive of
    the issue of whether he had constructive possession of the contraband. See State v.
    Scalf, 
    126 Ohio App.3d 614
    , 620, 
    710 N.E.2d 1206
     (8th Dist.1998) (finding that
    possession may be established where the defendant occupies the premises with
    others but the drugs are found in the defendant’s living area and in plain view
    throughout the apartment). Exclusive control over the premises is not required.
    State v. Howard, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85034, 
    2005-Ohio-4007
    , ¶ 15, citing In re
    Farr, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 93AP-201, 
    1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5394
    , *16 (Nov. 9,
    1993) (concluding that nothing in the statute states that illegal drugs must be in the
    sole or exclusive possession of the accused at the time of the offense); R.C.
    2925.01(K). The fact that others were on the premises in addition to Shary does not
    mean that Shary could not exercise dominion or control over the drugs and criminal
    tools. This is particularly true where Shary lived in the residence and Det. Smith
    estimated that many of the individuals present inside the home were there because
    Shary was operating a home designated for drug-sales and use. We, therefore, find
    the state’s evidence was sufficient to prove that Shary possessed the seized drugs
    and criminal tools or aided and abetted another in their possession of the items.
    Finally, Shary was convicted of drug trafficking in violation of R.C.
    2925.03. The drug trafficking conviction pertained to the methamphetamine that
    was discovered inside the handbag that was hidden under a couch cushion. To
    sustain a conviction for trafficking as charged, the evidence must demonstrate that
    Shary knowingly prepared for shipment, shipped, transported, delivered, prepared
    for distribution, or distributed “a controlled substance or a controlled substance
    analog,” with knowledge or a reasonable belief that “the controlled substance or a
    controlled substance analog is intended for sale or resale by the offender or another
    person.” R.C. 2925.03(A)(2).
    R.C. 2901.22(B) provides that “[a] person acts knowingly, regardless
    of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause
    a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” Further, “[a] person has
    knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances
    probably exist.” 
    Id.
    At trial, Det. Salupo provided extensive testimony regarding his
    training and experience as a member of the vice unit. Det. Salupo described the
    various methods for packaging drugs for sale and explained the significant role
    certain items, including plastic baggies, cell phones, U.S. currency, scales, ledgers,
    and grinders, have in the drug trade. Det. Salupo also discussed the actions that are
    taken during a typical investigation into drug activity and explained the factors that
    distinguish a person who merely possesses drugs from a person who is engaged in
    trafficking.
    In this case, the investigating detectives observed numerous
    individuals coming and going from Shary’s upstairs residence at approximately 6:30
    a.m., which Det. Salupo stated is not uncommon in the sale of drugs. When the
    detectives entered the home, they discovered a large quantity of methamphetamine,
    various pills, and drug residue on items used in the drug trade, including scales,
    syringes, and grinders. As discussed, the detectives also discovered other items used
    in the sale of drugs, such as a ledger, packaging materials, a cell phone, and U.S.
    currency. Det. Salupo testified that the large amount of methamphetamine found
    inside Shary’s residence was indictive of drug trafficking. (Tr. 330.) Det. Smith
    agreed, stating that, based on his training and experience, the methamphetamine
    found in Shary’s residence was indicative of drug trafficking based on its weight,
    street value, and proximity to scales, packaging materials, and a ledger. (Tr. 391-
    393.)
    Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, we find that
    any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of drug trafficking
    proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence established that Shary permitted
    numerous individuals to come and go from his home for purposes related to drug
    use. Furthermore, Shary was in possession of a quantity of drugs indicative of
    trafficking, and his residence was littered with tools used to facilitate, package,
    weigh, and document drugs for sale. As recognized by this court, items such as
    plastic baggies, wrapping devices, digital scales, and large sums of money are often
    used in drug trafficking and may constitute circumstantial evidence of the conduct
    proscribed by R.C. 2925.03(A)(2). State v. Hawthorne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    102689, 
    2016-Ohio-203
    , ¶ 21, citing State v. Bowling, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    93052, 
    2010-Ohio-3595
    , ¶ 60; State v. Forte, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99573, 2013-
    Ohio-5126, ¶ 10; State v. Rutledge, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1043, 
    2013-Ohio-1482
    ,
    ¶ 15 (collecting cases). This evidence was sufficient to prove that Shary had
    trafficked drugs or aided and abetted another in the trafficking of drugs.
    Moreover, we are unable to conclude that Shary’s convictions are
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. Here, Shary does not challenge weight
    afforded to any specific testimony or evidence, but broadly reiterates his position
    that the state failed to connect him to the drugs and drug paraphernalia discovered
    inside the residence. We disagree. As previously discussed, the state presented
    ample evidence connecting Shary to the residence in question and the drug activity
    occurring inside his home. The state witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined
    about Shary’s involvement in their criminal investigation and the detective’s body
    camera videos were played for the jury at trial, allowing the jury to see relevant
    portions of the search as it occurred. Under these circumstances, the jury was
    presented with all relevant information, and was free to infer from the evidence that
    Shary knowingly engaged in drug trafficking and was in possession of various
    controlled substances and criminal tools. In light of the circumstantial evidence
    presented at trial, we cannot say the jury lost its way or created such a manifest
    miscarriage of justice that Shary’s convictions must be reversed.
    Shary’s second assignment of error is overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
    common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.           The defendant’s
    conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to
    the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
    LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
    EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR