United States v. Carmelina Vera Rojas ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                              [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________            FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-14662         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar        JUNE 24, 2011
    ________________________        JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cr-20236-AJ-2
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                             Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    CARMELINA VERA ROJAS,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                          Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (June 24, 2011)
    Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The issue in this appeal is whether the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
    (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010), applies to defendants who
    committed crack cocaine offenses before August 3, 2010, the date of its
    enactment, but who are sentenced thereafter. We conclude that it does.
    In May 2010, Carmelina Vera Rojas pleaded guilty to one count of
    conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine
    base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), and two counts of
    distributing 5 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of § 841(a)(1). Her
    sentencing was scheduled for August 3, 2010, which as it so happened, was the
    date on which President Obama signed the FSA into law. The district court
    granted the parties a continuance to determine whether Vera Rojas should be
    sentenced under the FSA. After considering the parties’ arguments, the district
    court concluded that the FSA should not apply to Vera Rojas’s offenses; in
    September 2010, the court sentenced Vera Rojas to ten years’ imprisonment.
    On appeal, Vera Rojas argues that the district court erred in refusing to
    apply the FSA to her sentence. Because she had not yet been sentenced when the
    FSA was enacted, Vera Rojas believes that she should benefit from the FSA’s
    provision raising the quantity of crack cocaine required to trigger a ten-year
    mandatory minimum sentence. Further, Vera Rojas contends that the FSA falls
    within recognized exceptions to the general savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109.
    Relying in large part on the general savings statute, the government contends that
    2
    Congress’s omission of an express retroactivity provision requires that the FSA be
    applied only to criminal conduct occurring after its August 3, 2010, enactment.
    We conclude that the FSA applies to defendants like Vera Rojas who had
    not yet been sentenced by the date of the FSA’s enactment. The interest in
    honoring clear Congressional intent, as well as principles of fairness, uniformity,
    and administrability, necessitate our conclusion. Accordingly, we reverse and
    remand to the district court for re-sentencing.
    DISCUSSION
    We review de novo the legal question of whether the FSA applies to
    defendants who had not been sentenced by the date of the FSA’s enactment. See
    United States v. Olin Corp., 
    107 F.3d 1506
    , 1509 (11th Cir. 1997).
    1.     The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
    The preamble to the FSA describes it as “[a]n Act To [sic] restore fairness to
    Federal cocaine sentencing.” The FSA sought to reduce the disparity between
    federal criminal penalties for crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses by
    lowering the gram-penalty ratio from 100:1 to 18:1. United States v. Douglas, 
    746 F. Supp. 2d 220
    , 222, 224 (D. Me. 2010). To this end, the FSA amended the
    Controlled Substances Act and Controlled Substances Import and Export Act by
    raising the drug quantities required to trigger mandatory minimum sentences. See
    3
    United States v. Bell, 
    624 F.3d 803
    , 814 (7th Cir. 2010). Further, the FSA
    provided the Sentencing Commission with the emergency authority to promulgate
    all necessary amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines within 90 days of the
    FSA’s August 3, 2010, enactment. FSA § 8, Pub. L. No. 111-220. Specifically,
    the Sentencing Commission was charged with “mak[ing] such conforming
    amendments to the Federal sentencing guidelines as the Commission determines
    necessary to achieve consistency with other guideline provisions and applicable
    law.” 
    Id. The consequent
    amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines became
    effective no later than November 1, 2010.
    Under the FSA, a ten-year mandatory minimum applies to first-time
    trafficking offenses involving 280 grams or more of crack cocaine, while a five-
    year mandatory minimum applies to first-time trafficking offenses involving 28
    grams or more of crack cocaine. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii).
    Thus, the FSA amended the Anti-Drug Act of 1986 to lower the mandatory
    minimum sentence for first-time trafficking offenses involving between 50 and
    280 grams of crack cocaine from ten years to five years. Compare
    § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006), with § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2010). The FSA is silent as to
    whether it applies to all criminal sentencings taking place after its enactment or,
    conversely, to only criminal conduct occurring after its enactment.
    4
    The district court sentenced Vera Rojas in September 2010 for conspiring
    with intent to distribute 71.8 grams of crack cocaine, among other offenses. If the
    court had sentenced Vera Rojas under the FSA, her offenses would have been
    insufficient to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum sentencing provision. For
    the following reasons, we conclude that Vera Rojas’s sentence is subject to the
    FSA’s five-year mandatory minimum provision.
    2.     Case Law
    Vera Rojas argues that this Court’s statement in United States v. Gomes,
    
    621 F.3d 1343
    , 1346 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)—“because the FSA took effect
    in August 2010, after appellant committed his crimes, [the general savings statute]
    bars the Act from affecting his punishment”—was merely dicta and is not
    controlling precedent. We need not consider this argument because, in any event,
    Gomes does not apply here. The record reveals that Gomes was indicted in July
    2009 and sentenced on March 11, 2010—nearly five months before the FSA was
    signed into law. The issue before the Court therefore was whether the FSA
    applied retroactively to lighten the defendant’s existing sentence.
    This appeal presents a different issue. Vera Rojas’s circumstances require
    that we determine whether the FSA applies to a defendant who had not been
    sentenced when the law was enacted. The government cites published opinions
    5
    from the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, ostensibly in support of its
    proposition that “[e]very circuit court to have addressed the issue has concluded
    that the FSA may not be applied retroactively.” Like Gomes, each of those cases
    involved a defendant who had been charged, convicted, and sentenced before the
    effective date of the FSA; those defendants were arguing for the first time on
    appeal that the FSA should apply retroactively to a previously imposed sentence.
    See United States v. Carradine, 
    621 F.3d 575
    , 577–78, 580 (6th Cir. 2010)
    (defendant indicted in July 2005 and sentenced in January 2008); 
    Bell, 624 F.3d at 814
    (Seventh Circuit stating that “[i]f Bell were sentenced today under the FSA,
    his distribution of 5.69 grams of crack cocaine would be insufficient to trigger the
    mandatory minimum sentencing provisions” (emphasis added)); United States v.
    Brewer, 
    624 F.3d 900
    , 909 n.7 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that the defendant first
    submitted a letter requesting re-sentencing under the FSA on August 27, 2010,
    where the record indicates that defendant was originally sentenced in November
    2009); United States v. Lewis, 
    625 F.3d 1224
    , 1228 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[The FSA]
    is not, however, retroactive and thus does not apply to this case. It does, on the
    other hand, relegate this case to a relatively short shelf-life, inasmuch as
    defendants being sentenced henceforth will be sentenced under a different
    applicable ratio.” (emphasis added)).
    6
    We do not disagree with our sister circuits. Absent further legislative action
    directing otherwise, the general savings statute prevents a defendant who was
    sentenced prior to the enactment of the FSA from benefitting from retroactive
    application. Further, we share in the apparent view of the Seventh and Tenth
    Circuits that sentences imposed after August 3, 2010, must comply with the FSA.
    
    See supra
    citations to 
    Bell, 624 F.3d at 814
    , and 
    Lewis, 625 F.3d at 1228
    .
    3.     The Savings Clause of 1 U.S.C. § 109
    The government argues that Congress did not intend for the FSA to apply to
    defendants like Vera Rojas, as a contrary conclusion would render the general
    savings statute, 1 U.S.C. § 109, a nullity. Vera Rojas, on the other hand, contends
    that § 109 does not apply to the FSA, because sentencing some defendants under
    the old statute would frustrate the clearly evinced goals of Congress.1
    The relevant clause of the general savings statute provides:
    The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or
    extinguish any penalty . . . incurred under such statute, unless the
    repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be
    treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any
    proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty . . . .
    1
    Citing United States v. Kolter, 
    849 F.2d 541
    , 544 (11th Cir. 1988), Vera Rojas also
    argues that “the FSA did not release or extinguish the penalty for crack cocaine,” but that it
    merely “redefined the classes of persons to whom the minimum mandatories apply to remedy the
    defects in the 1986 law.” The Seventh Circuit recently rejected the same argument. See 
    Bell, 624 F.3d at 814
    –15. However, we need not consider it here because we resolve Vera Rojas’s
    appeal on other grounds.
    7
    § 109. Stated another way, if § 109 applies to the FSA, the FSA cannot “release or
    extinguish” the penalty Vera Rojas would have received under the old version of
    21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). For the reasons explained below, we conclude that
    § 109 does not “save” the older mandatory minimum sentence for a defendant who
    had not been sentenced by the date the FSA was enacted.
    Over a hundred years ago, the Supreme Court explained that the general
    savings statute “cannot justify a disregard of the will of Congress as manifested,
    either expressly or by necessary implication, in a subsequent enactment.” Great
    N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 
    208 U.S. 452
    , 465 (1908); see also Warden,
    Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 
    417 U.S. 653
    , 659 n.10 (1974) (“[O]nly if [the
    repealing statute] can be said by fair implication or expressly to conflict with
    § 109 would there be reason to hold that [the repealing statute] superseded
    § 109.”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has “made clear” that a savings provision
    “cannot nullify the unambiguous import of a subsequent statute. . . . A subsequent
    Congress . . . may exempt itself from [express-provision] requirements by ‘fair
    implication.’” Lockhart v. United States, 
    546 U.S. 142
    , 148 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
    concurring). Where Congress’s intent for a new statute to supersede a prior one is
    8
    clear, it is not required to use “magical” words to do so. 
    Id. at 145
    (majority
    opinion).
    The government cites Marrero for the proposition that § 109 bars the
    application of the FSA to Vera Rojas’s case. There, the Supreme Court applied
    § 109 to reject the claim that a new statute loosening parole eligibility should be
    applied to those who committed their crimes before the new statute’s 
    enactment. 417 U.S. at 659
    –64. But Marrero is not on-point: the repealing statute in that case
    had its own savings clause that specifically sought to preserve the harsher penalty
    for prosecutions initiated before its effective date. 
    Id. at 656
    n.4.
    Unlike the statute at issue in Marrero, the FSA is silent as to whether the
    harsher mandatory minimums should be preserved for defendants whose cases
    were pending on the date of its enactment. However, the necessary and fair
    implication of the FSA is that Congress intended the Act to apply to all
    sentencings going forward, because a contrary conclusion would be logically
    inconsistent and would achieve absurd results: The Sentencing Reform Act of
    1984 expressly states that the governing Sentencing Guidelines are those in effect
    on the day a defendant is sentenced. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A)(ii). But under the
    government’s rationale, courts could sentence Vera Rojas and other defendants in
    her position under the old, higher mandatory minimums until August 3, 2015,
    9
    when the five-year general statute of limitations would run. Congress could not
    have intended this result. By granting the Sentencing Commission the emergency
    authority to amend the Sentencing Guidelines by November 1, 2010, Congress
    necessarily indicated its intent for the FSA to apply immediately. To ask district
    courts to consider the date the offense was committed to determine the statutory
    minimum, but the date of sentencing to determine the guidelines range, would lead
    to an incongruous result that is inconsistent with Congressional intent. See United
    States v. Rutherford, 
    442 U.S. 544
    , 552 (1979) (explaining that when interpreting
    statutes, exceptions may be implied “where essential to prevent ‘absurd results’ or
    consequences obviously at variance with the policy of the enactment as a whole”).
    What is more, such an interpretation of the FSA would run afoul of the policies
    motivating its enactment and render ineffectual Congress’s express directive to the
    Sentencing Commission. See FSA, Preamble & § 8, Pub. L. No. 111-220 (stating
    that “the United States Sentencing Commission shall . . . make such conforming
    amendments to the Federal sentencing guidelines as the Commission determines
    necessary to achieve consistency with . . . applicable law” (emphasis added)).
    Moreover, with respect to § 109, we have stated in a somewhat similar
    context that “[t]he general rule is that a new statute should apply to cases pending
    on the date of its enactment unless manifest injustice would result or there is a
    10
    statutory directive or legislative history to the contrary.” United States v. Kolter,
    
    849 F.2d 541
    , 543 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing, among other cases, Bradley v. Sch. Bd.
    of Richmond, 
    416 U.S. 696
    (1974)). Congress stated that it passed the FSA to
    “restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.” Preamble, FSA, Pub. L. No. 111-
    220. As one district court aptly stated in an opinion thoroughly discussing this
    issue, “what possible reason could there be to want judges to continue to impose
    new sentences that are not ‘fair’ over the next five years while the statute of
    limitations runs?” 
    Douglas, 746 F. Supp. 2d at 229
    .
    The necessary inference is that the will of Congress was for the FSA to halt
    unfair sentencing practices immediately. See Great N. Ry. 
    Co., 208 U.S. at 465
    .
    We therefore hold that the general savings statute cannot bar application of the
    FSA to sentencings conducted after its August 3, 2010, enactment. Accordingly,
    we remand Vera Rojas’s case to the district court for re-sentencing consistent with
    this opinion.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.
    11