United States v. Earl Carter, Jr. , 517 F. App'x 925 ( 2013 )


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  •            Case: 12-12613   Date Filed: 04/30/2013   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 12-12613
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 2:11-cr-00099-JES-SPC-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    EARL CARTER, JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (April 30, 2013)
    Before CARNES, BARKETT and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 12-12613     Date Filed: 04/30/2013    Page: 2 of 5
    Earl Carter Jr. appeals his sentence of 60 months’ incarceration and 10
    years’ supervised release after he pled guilty to the failure to register as a sex
    offender, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2250
    (a). Carter contends that both the 60-
    month term of imprisonment and the 10-year term of supervised release imposed
    by the district court were procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
    Procedural Reasonableness
    Carter contends the sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
    court failed to: (1) first consider an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a),
    before applying a variance, and (2) provide adequate findings for appellate review.
    Both of these arguments fail.
    First, Carter relies on an unpublished, non-binding, subsequently abrogated
    decision of the Fourth Circuit for his claim that the district court should have first
    considered an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A.13(a)(1), before imposing an
    upward variance. In United States v. Diosdado-Star, 
    630 F.3d 359
     (4th Cir.),
    cert.denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 2946
     (2011), the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the
    Supreme Court decisions in Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
     (2007), and Rita v.
    United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
     (2007), overruled the language from their earlier
    opinions that an upward departure must be considered before a variance is applied.
    Diosdado-Star, 
    630 F.3d at 363-64
    . Declining to consider a departure before
    2
    Case: 12-12613   Date Filed: 04/30/2013    Page: 3 of 5
    imposing an upward variance did not render Carter’s sentence procedurally
    unreasonable.
    Second, the district court adequately explained its reasons for deviating from
    the Guidelines. The district court discussed Carter’s lengthy criminal history,
    dating back to 1991, and stated that in the court’s opinion Carter was a “violent
    and dangerous person.” The court also noted that it appeared Carter had fled
    Mississippi in order to avoid arrest and had knowingly failed to register as a sex
    offender once he arrived in Florida. Carter contends this explanation is inadequate
    to allow for appellate review because the district court did not discuss the degree to
    which each of the stated factors impacted the sentencing decision. However, the
    sentencing court is not required to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors or even to
    state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the factors. United
    States v. Scott, 
    426 F.3d 1324
    , 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Therefore, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion by discussing these factors without specifically stating
    how each individual fact impacted the decision to impose a variance. See Gall,
    
    552 U.S. at 47, 51
     (explaining the reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under a
    deferential abuse of discretion standard and rejecting a rule imposing a rigid
    mathematical formula for determining the justifications required for a specific
    sentence).
    3
    Case: 12-12613        Date Filed: 04/30/2013       Page: 4 of 5
    Substantive Reasonableness
    Next, Carter contends the sentence was substantively unreasonable because
    (1) the court unjustifiably relied on the factors in U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and failed to
    consider other pertinent § 3553(a) factors, and (2) the sentence is too lengthy.
    These arguments are also meritless.
    The district court considered all of the factors in § 3553(a)1 and discussed
    particular aspects of Carter’s case that merited an upward variance. The court then
    imposed a sentence that, while above the applicable Guidelines range, was well
    within the statutory maximum penalty of 10 years’ incarceration and lifetime
    supervised release. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2250
    (a), 3583(k). While Carter argues the
    sentence is unreasonable because it “unjustifiably” relies on § 3553(a)(2) and fails
    to consider other pertinent factors, he provides no information as to other pertinent
    factors the court should have considered.
    Finally, Carter argues the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it
    is too lengthy. Because the sentence was supported by the § 3553(a) factors and
    1
    The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary to
    comply with the purposes” listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2), including the need to reflect the
    seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense,
    deter criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(2). In imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the
    nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
    kinds of sentences available, the applicable Guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of
    the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need
    to provide restitution to victims. 
    Id.
     § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
    4
    Case: 12-12613       Date Filed: 04/30/2013   Page: 5 of 5
    was well below the statutory maximum term, the court did not commit a clear error
    in judgment and did not abuse its discretion. See United States v. Irey, 
    612 F.3d 1160
    , 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (explaining we will vacate a sentence as
    unreasonable only if we are left with the firm conviction “the district court
    committed a clear error in judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
    at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
    facts of the case”); United States v. Gonzalez, 
    550 F.3d 1319
    , 1324 (11th Cir.
    2008) (stating that the sentence imposed is below the statutory maximum is a
    factor to consider in determining its reasonableness). Accordingly, we affirm
    Carter’s sentence as reasonable.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-12613

Citation Numbers: 517 F. App'x 925

Judges: Barkett, Black, Carnes, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 4/30/2013

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023