Roberts v. Teton County ( 2021 )


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  •                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
    Docket No. 48085
    LANCE A. ROBERTS,             )
    )                     Filed: October 18, 2021
    Plaintiff-Appellant,     )
    )                     Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
    v.                            )
    )                     THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
    STATE OF IDAHO, TETON COUNTY, )                     OPINION AND SHALL NOT
    IDAHO; TETON COUNTY           )                     BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
    PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S        )
    OFFICE, PROSECUTING ATTORNEY )
    BILLIE SIDDOWAY,              )
    )
    Defendants-Respondents,  )
    )
    and                           )
    )
    JOHN DOES I-X,                )
    )
    Defendants.              )
    )
    Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
    Teton County. Hon. Steven Boyce, District Judge.
    Judgment dismissing complaint, order denying motion for reconsideration, and
    award of attorney fees, affirmed.
    Lance A. Roberts, Victor, pro se appellant.
    Hall Angell & Associate, LLP; Blake G. Hall, Idaho Falls, for respondent.
    ________________________________________________
    HUSKEY, Chief Judge
    Lance A. Roberts appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    the State of Idaho, Teton County, Idaho; Teton County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office; and
    Prosecuting Attorney Billie Siddoway (respondents), the district court’s order denying Roberts’
    motion for reconsideration, and the district court’s award of attorney fees and costs to respondents.
    For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    1
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Roberts, through counsel, filed a complaint against the named respondents, as well as John
    Does I-X, alleging that Roberts was “illegally and wrongfully sentenced and/or wrongfully
    imprisoned through the actions of the State of Idaho, the Teton County Magistrate Court under the
    direction of and pursuant to the request and actions of the Teton County Prosecuting Attorney’s
    Office, Billie Siddoway and John Does I-X.” Roberts’ complaint was based on his multiple driving
    under the influence (DUI) convictions. Roberts claimed many of his prior DUI convictions were
    improperly charged and, therefore, he has been wrongfully sentenced and/or imprisoned, and as a
    result, he incurred monetary damages. 1 Specifically, Roberts argued that his DUI charges in CR-
    1998-096 and CR-1998-128 should not have been charged pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8004(1)(a)
    (DUI), but rather, pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(1)(d) (under 21 DUI) because Roberts was not yet
    twenty-one years of age when he was charged and pleaded guilty in those two cases. Roberts
    argued that as a result of these charging errors, all of Roberts’ subsequent DUI convictions are
    invalid and the respondents are liable under the Idaho Tort Claims Act for all erroneous charging
    decisions, including charging Roberts as a felon and as a persistent violator in CR-2016-047, which
    resulted in fines and periods of incarceration.
    Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, which was set for hearing. Roberts
    filed a motion to continue the hearing and requested additional time to conduct discovery. The
    district court granted the motion and reset the hearing. After the motion for summary judgment
    hearing, the district court issued its decision granting respondents’ motion for summary judgment.
    Respondents timely filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees. On April 3, 2020, the district
    court entered a final judgment dismissing all claims with prejudice. On May 3, 2020, Roberts,
    1
    Roberts was charged as follows in the relevant cases: CR-1998-096 (DUI, second offense
    under 21 misdemeanor); CR-1998-128 (DUI, second offense misdemeanor); CR-2001-144 (felony
    DUI); and CR-2016-047 (felony DUI with persistent violator enhancement). Roberts pleaded
    guilty in each case and did not timely appeal the validity of the underlying convictions. Roberts
    did appeal the denial of his Idaho Rule 35 motion in CR-2016-047; this Court affirmed. State v.
    Roberts, Docket No. 44356 (Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2017) (unpublished). Although not included in the
    complaint as a basis for the persistent violator enhancement in CR-2016-047, Roberts
    acknowledges he was also convicted of a felony DUI in CR-2005-727, but his trial attorney failed
    to include this conviction as a basis for relief in the complaint. Roberts also pleaded guilty to
    felony burglary in Teton County Case No. CR-1999-24.
    2
    although still represented by counsel, filed a pro se motion to reconsider. On June 11, 2020, the
    district court issued an order allowing Roberts’ counsel to withdraw.
    In September 2020, the district court denied the motion to reconsider, finding that it was
    untimely pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2 because Roberts failed to file the motion
    within fourteen days of entry of the final judgment. Although Roberts characterized the motion
    as a motion to reconsider, the district court also analyzed whether Roberts was entitled to relief
    under I.R.C.P. 60; the district court concluded he was not.
    The district court issued an order awarding respondents $31,190.00 in attorney fees and
    $1,167.85 in costs. The district court found that Roberts waived all objections to respondents’
    request for costs and fees because he failed to timely file a motion to disallow the attorney fees
    pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). 2 The district court also found the case was brought and maintained
    in bad faith for multiple reasons: (1) Roberts failed to file a bond before initiating the action;
    (2) Roberts failed to personally name any prosecutor who had been involved with the criminal
    cases set forth in the complaint; (3) Roberts named Siddoway in her personal capacity despite
    Roberts’ acknowledgement that Siddoway was not involved with any of the relevant criminal
    cases; (4) Roberts failed to state a cause of action for which relief could be granted, as Roberts
    asserted that respondents were negligent in charging him as a persistent violator despite clear
    evidence that Roberts had been found guilty of three felonies; and (5) Roberts failed to amend his
    complaint or submit an amended response to the motion for summary judgment despite requesting,
    and the district court granting, additional time to conduct discovery.
    Following the filing of the amended final judgment and judgment of costs and fees, Roberts
    filed a notice of appeal. Roberts did not request a transcript on appeal, and the Idaho Supreme
    Court ordered the appeal to proceed on the clerk’s record only. Thereafter, Roberts filed a motion
    to augment the record, which was granted in part and denied in part.
    2
    On April 9, 2020, Roberts’ counsel filed an objection to the request for fees, however, the
    objection did not comply with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54. As such, the district court did
    not characterize the objection as a motion to disallow pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(6). Roberts did
    not file any additional objections or a motion to disallow the attorney fees or costs.
    3
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    On appeal, we exercise free review in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact
    exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Edwards v.
    Conchemco, Inc., 
    111 Idaho 851
    , 852, 
    727 P.2d 1279
    , 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). Summary judgment
    is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
    a judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). The movant has the burden of showing that no
    genuine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. Dist. No. 25, 
    149 Idaho 679
    , 683,
    
    239 P.3d 784
    , 788 (2010). The burden may be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an
    element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 
    126 Idaho 308
    , 311, 
    882 P.2d 475
    , 478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established
    either by an affirmative showing with the moving party’s own evidence or by a review of all the
    nonmoving party’s evidence and the contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v.
    Honker’s Mini-Mart, Inc., 
    134 Idaho 711
    , 712, 
    8 P.3d 1254
    , 1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an
    absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion
    to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine
    issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P. 56(d). Sanders
    v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 
    125 Idaho 872
    , 874, 
    876 P.2d 154
    , 156 (Ct. App. 1994). Disputed facts
    and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Castorena v. Gen. Elec.,
    
    149 Idaho 609
    , 613, 
    238 P.3d 209
    , 213 (2010). This Court freely reviews issues of law. Cole v.
    Kunzler, 
    115 Idaho 552
    , 555, 
    768 P.2d 815
    , 818 (Ct. App. 1989).
    The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound
    discretion of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 
    144 Idaho 254
    , 258, 
    159 P.3d 891
    , 895 (2007);
    Carnell v. Barker Mgmt. Inc., 
    137 Idaho 322
    , 329, 
    48 P.3d 651
    , 658 (2002).
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    Roberts, appearing pro se on appeal, asserts sixteen issues in his opening brief.
    Respondents contend that Roberts has made only three assignments of error on appeal.
    Respondents further assert that Roberts has failed to provide legal argument or authority to support
    the majority of his issues and that most of Roberts’ issues are raised for the first time on appeal.
    4
    A.      The District Court’s Judgment Dismissing the Complaint Is Affirmed
    Roberts alleges ten issues (designated in appellant’s brief as issues 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12,
    13, and 14) related to the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents. We
    note that Roberts is appearing pro se in this appeal. Pro se litigants are held to the same standards
    as those litigants represented by counsel. Michalk v. Michalk, 
    148 Idaho 224
    , 229, 
    220 P.3d 580
    ,
    585 (2009). Pro se litigants are not excused from abiding by procedural rules simply because they
    are appearing pro se and may not be aware of the applicable rules. 
    Id.
     While the district court’s
    memorandum decision on summary judgment was filed with the notice of appeal, the
    memorandum was not included in the clerk’s record, as part of Roberts’ motion to augment the
    clerk’s record, or in the augmented record. Because the memorandum decision on summary
    judgment is not included in the appellate record, Roberts has failed to present an adequate record
    to review assignments of error arising from the district court’s memorandum decision. The Court
    is bound by the record on appeal and cannot consider matters or materials that are not part of the
    record or not contained in the record. Kootenai Cty. v. Harriman-Saylor, 
    154 Idaho 13
    , 16, 
    293 P.3d 637
    , 640 (2012); see also Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Eddins, ___ P.3d ___, ___, ___ Idaho
    ___, ___ (Sept. 1, 2021) (declining to consider claims that district court erred by failing to rule on
    motion for reconsideration or in its application of judicial estoppel when appellant did not ensure
    motion for reconsideration or relevant briefing from intermediate appeal was included in record
    on appeal). Moreover, the Court does not search the record for error, as it is the responsibility of
    the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate his or her claims on appeal. Powell v.
    Sellers, 
    130 Idaho 122
    , 127, 
    937 P.2d 434
    , 439 (Ct. App. 1997). Any missing portions are
    presumed to support the trial court’s ruling. Kugler v. Drown, 
    119 Idaho 687
    , 690, 
    809 P.2d 1166
    ,
    1169 (Ct. App. 1991).
    Additionally, Roberts asserts in multiple claims that the district court erred by finding
    Roberts’ prior convictions properly reflected his status as a persistent violator. The record on
    appeal does not include certified copies of Roberts’ judgments of conviction, thus, there is no basis
    for this Court to reject the district court’s determination regarding Roberts’ status as a persistent
    violator.
    Finally, the gravamen of Roberts’ complaint is that his prior convictions were not correctly
    charged. A civil complaint alleging violations of the Idaho Tort Claims Act is not the appropriate
    mechanism to collaterally challenge the validity of Roberts’ prior convictions. See State v.
    5
    Schwab, 
    153 Idaho 325
    , 329, 
    281 P.3d 1103
    , 1107 (Ct. App. 2012) (holding that defendant could
    not collaterally attack validity of prior conviction used to enhance a pending crime unless such
    attack was provided by statute or based on denial of the right to counsel); State v. Weber, 
    140 Idaho 89
    , 96, 
    90 P.3d 314
    , 321 (2004) (holding that “challenges to the validity of prior convictions
    alleged to have been obtained as the result of invalid guilty pleas must be raised either through a
    direct appeal or by post-conviction relief and not in proceedings related to a subsequent felony
    DUI offense”). For all of the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing
    Roberts’ complaint.
    B.     The District Court’s Order Denying Roberts’ Motion to Reconsider Is Affirmed
    Roberts asserts that the district court “erred in its denial of the Motion to Reconsider
    pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b).” Respondents argue Roberts’ motion to reconsider was untimely under
    I.R.C.P. 11.2.
    The motion to reconsider is not in the appellate record; therefore, it is unclear under which
    rule the motion for reconsideration was filed. The district court’s order denying the motion
    suggests that Roberts argued he was entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60, and the district court
    denied the motion on the basis that Roberts failed to show he was entitled to relief under that rule.
    Whether Roberts’ motion to reconsider was filed under Rule 11.2 or Rule 60, the district court did
    not err in denying the motion.
    If Roberts was challenging the district court’s memorandum decision granting summary
    judgment, Roberts’ motion was untimely pursuant to I.R.C.P. 11.2. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
    11.2(b) states:
    (1) In General. A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered
    before final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the
    entry of a final judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after the entry
    of final judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the order.
    (2) Certain Orders Not Subject to Reconsideration. No motion to
    reconsider an order of the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a),
    52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b) may be made.
    Thus, a party may file a timely motion to reconsider an interlocutory order: (1) any time before
    the court enters a final judgment; or (2) within fourteen days after the court enters a final judgment.
    Agrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 
    156 Idaho 903
    , 911, 
    332 P.3d 815
    , 823 (2014). A motion to reconsider
    pursuant to Rule 11.2(b) must be made prior to or within fourteen days after the entry of final
    judgment. Here, final judgment was entered on April 3, 2020, and the motion to reconsider was
    6
    filed on May 3, 2020. Thus, the motion to reconsider was not filed prior to or within fourteen days
    after the entry of final judgment. As such, the motion was untimely and the district court did not
    err by denying it.
    Alternatively, Roberts failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60.
    Rule 60 provides the mechanism for a party to file a motion for a trial court to reconsider a
    judgment or order. The district court’s order denying Roberts’ motion to reconsider states:
    “Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to an order reconsidering the final judgment pursuant to Idaho
    Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(3).”
    Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1)-(3) provides multiple grounds for relief:
    (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
    (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
    been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
    (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
    or misconduct by an opposing party.
    The district court found that Roberts was not entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60 because
    Roberts failed to present any new evidence or legal argument to support his claim that he was
    entitled to relief.   Because the record on appeal does not include Roberts’ motion for
    reconsideration, we are unable to review the evidence cited and arguments made in Roberts’
    motion. Therefore, we will not presume the district court erred by denying the motion on the basis
    that Roberts was not entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60. Powell, 130 Idaho at 127, 937 P.2d at
    439. The district court’s order denying Roberts’ motion to reconsider is affirmed.
    C.     Roberts’ Remaining Claims of Error Fail on Appeal
    Roberts asserts five additional claims. First, Roberts appears to allege that the district court
    lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. Specifically, Roberts asserts: “General and
    subject matter jurisdiction of a previous criminal case and tort claim item in complaint case CR-
    98-96 where in fact a ‘void’ ruling was made allowing Summary Judgment in CV41-l9-0l24
    erroneously.” Roberts provides no argument or authority in support of this assertion. A party
    waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. Id. at 128, 937 P.2d at 440.
    Accordingly, Roberts has waived the issue on appeal.
    Second, Roberts asserts that the district court erred by “allowing or awarding fees and costs
    as this claim was absolutely not brought frivolously or in bad faith pursued.” The district court
    granted respondents’ motion for attorney fees on several bases. First, the district court found that
    Roberts failed to timely object to respondents’ memorandum of costs and fees and failed to file a
    7
    motion to disallow the fees and costs as required by I.R.C.P. 54(d) and (e), and thus, waived any
    objection to respondents’ request for attorney fees and costs. Second, the district court found the
    respondents were entitled to attorney fees as the prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54. Third,
    the district court found the action was pursued in bad faith and the respondents were entitled to
    attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. § 6-918A. Because Roberts does not address the district
    court’s alternate holdings that Roberts waived any objection by failing to timely file a response or
    challenge that respondents were the prevailing parties, we affirm the district court’s award of fees
    and costs on those grounds. T3 Enterprises, Inc. v. Safeguard Bus. Sys., Inc., 
    164 Idaho 738
    , 755,
    
    435 P.3d 518
    , 535 (2019) (when a trial court’s decision is based on alternative grounds and only
    one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on the uncontested
    basis).
    As to the remaining basis for awarding fees, Roberts’ conclusory statement that the case
    was not pursued in bad faith is insufficient for this Court to conclude the district court erred. The
    Idaho Appellate Rules require that the parties’ arguments “contain the contentions of the appellant
    with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities,
    statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon.” I.A.R. 35(a)(6). An appellant must
    assert assignments of error with particularity and support positions with sufficient authority or the
    issues are waived for purposes of appeal. PHH Mortg. v. Nickerson, 
    164 Idaho 33
    , 38, 
    423 P.3d 454
    , 459 (2018). As Roberts does not do so, he waives any claims regarding the district court’s
    award of attorney fees and costs.
    Third, Roberts contends the district court erred by finding that bond was required in this
    case because he characterizes this case as a habeas corpus case and asserts that bond is not required
    in what is “essentially” a habeas corpus lawsuit. Alternatively, he argues he filed a motion for
    bond on February 6, 2018, but the district court did not address the motion. Roberts provides no
    authority to support his claim that his civil tort complaint should be construed as a habeas corpus
    petition; therefore, he has waived the issue. Powell, 130 Idaho at 128, 937 P.2d at 440. We will
    read the complaint as drafted, which has none of the hallmarks of a habeas petition and all the
    characteristics of a general civil case, including a request for monetary damages. In reading the
    complaint, it clearly alleges a civil claim against a prosecuting attorney pursuant to the Idaho Tort
    Claims Act.
    8
    Civil actions against law enforcement officers, including prosecuting attorneys, are
    governed by I.C. § 6-610. Idaho Code § 6-610 provides in part:
    (2) Before any civil action may be filed against any law enforcement officer
    or service of civil process on any law enforcement officer, when such action arises
    out of, or in the course of the performance of his duty, or in any action upon the
    bond of any such law enforcement officer, the proposed plaintiff or petitioner, as a
    condition precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with, and at the time of filing the
    complaint or petition in any such action, a written undertaking with at least two
    (2) sufficient sureties in an amount to be fixed by the court. The purpose of this
    requirement is to ensure diligent prosecution of a civil action brought against a law
    enforcement officer, and in the event judgment is entered against the plaintiff or
    petitioner, for the payment to the defendant or respondent of all costs and expenses
    that may be awarded against the plaintiff or petitioner, including an award of
    reasonable attorney’s fees as determined by the court.
    ....
    (4) At any time during the course of a civil action against a law enforcement
    officer, the defendant or respondent may except to either the plaintiff’s or
    petitioner’s failure to file a bond or to the sufficiency of the sureties or to the amount
    of the bond.
    (5) When the defendant or respondent excepts to the plaintiff’s or
    petitioner’s failure to post a bond under this section, the judge shall dismiss the
    case.
    Based on the plain language of the statute, posting a bond is mandatory pursuant to I.C.
    § 6-610; thus, the district court did not err by finding that bond was required in this case. We also
    note that there is nothing in the record indicating that Roberts filed a bond or motioned for a bond
    as he claims.
    Fourth, Roberts contends the district court erred in denying the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion
    because there was newly discovered evidence showing the respondents admitted liability. Roberts
    argues that had the evidence been considered in the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, it would have
    established a triable issue under subsection (l) or (3) of the Idaho Tort Claims Act, thereby
    precluding summary judgment. It is unclear from Roberts’ briefing if he is challenging the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment or the court’s denial of Roberts’ motion for reconsideration.
    More importantly, Roberts does not identify or include in the record the alleged new evidence
    wherein the respondents admit liability. This lack of clarity is fatal to Roberts’ claim. See PHH
    Mortg., 164 Idaho at 38, 423 P.3d at 459. Additionally, Roberts provides no relevant authority in
    support of this claim and has therefore waived this issue on appeal. Powell, 130 Idaho at 128, 937
    P.2d at 440.
    9
    Finally, Roberts alleges the district court erred in allowing Siddoway to be dismissed as a
    party because there was evidence of Siddoway’s admitted malice and intentional tortious acts in
    the record. In his response to Teton County’s motion for summary judgment, Roberts’ attorney
    conceded that Siddoway was “entitled to dismissal” because she was not the prosecutor until after
    the judgments were entered in Roberts’ cases and because she was entitled to absolute
    prosecutorial immunity. However, he asked that Siddoway be dismissed without prejudice so that
    if he decided to allege claims for which Siddoway might be liable, he would not be precluded from
    making those claims at a future date. The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from
    asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the commission of the error. Thomson v.
    Olsen, 
    147 Idaho 99
    , 106, 
    205 P.3d 1235
    , 1242 (2009). One may not complain of errors one has
    consented to or acquiesced in. 
    Id.
     In short, invited errors are not reversible. 
    Id.
     Because Roberts
    stipulated to the dismissal of Siddoway, he cannot now claim the district court erred by dismissing
    her.
    D.     Attorney Fees on Appeal
    Respondents seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 6-918A. Respondents argue
    that Roberts’ improperly brought this civil case as an attempt to collaterally challenge his prior
    convictions and, therefore, it is clear this case and appeal have been brought and maintained in bad
    faith. Under I.C. § 6-918A, attorney fees may be awarded upon “a showing, by clear and
    convincing evidence, that the party against whom or which such award is sought was guilty of bad
    faith in the commencement, conduct, maintenance or defense of the action.” Bad faith is defined
    as dishonesty in belief or purpose. Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't of Agric., 
    149 Idaho 777
    , 781, 
    241 P.3d 950
    , 954 (2010). Respondents have shown that Roberts proceeded with bad faith in this
    appeal. Therefore, we award costs and attorney fees on appeal to respondents.
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the complaint, order denying Roberts’
    motion for reconsideration, and order awarding attorney fees to respondents. Respondents are
    entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal.
    Judge LORELLO and Judge BRAILSFORD CONCUR.
    10