Westmark International Corp. v. Gold Hill Placers, Inc. , 315 Mont. 492 ( 2003 )


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  •                                            No. 02-289
    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
    
    2003 MT 119
    WESTMARK INTERNATIONAL CORP.,
    a Nevada Corporation,
    Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.
    GOLD HILL PLACERS, INC.; THOMAS R. CAMPBELL and LINDA M.
    CAMPBELL, individually; THOMAS R. CAMPBELL and LINDA M. CAMPBELL,
    partners, doing business under the firm name and style of CAMPBELL PROPERTIES
    PARTNERSHIP; HAROLD REID; DONALD WOGAMON; HAROLD REID,
    JIM BRADY & DONALD WOGAMON, partners, d/b/a GOLD HILL PLACERS;
    DONALD M. HARPER and RONALD P. HARPER, partners, d/b/a MISSOULA MINING;
    BRIAN LOUCKS, TOM STORM, ROGER HATLER, and TOWNSEND MINES,
    a limited partnership, d/b/a ANTELOPE PLACERS; B & B MINING PARTNERSHIP,
    LTD; SEAHAWK, INC.; WILLIAM C. BALTRUSH; LSE, INC.; the heirs and devisees of
    Defendants, if deceased; any personal representatives of Defendants; and all other persons,
    unknown claiming, or who might claim any right, title, estate or interest in, or a lien or
    encumbrance upon the real property or any part thereof, adverse to Plaintiff’s ownership or
    any cloud upon Plaintiff’s title thereto whether such claim or possible claim be present
    or contingent including any claim or possible claim of dower, in chaote or accrued,
    Defendants and Appellants.
    APPEAL FROM:          District Court of the First Judicial District,
    In and for the County of Broadwater, Cause No. DV-98-47,
    The Honorable Jeffrey Sherlock, Judge presiding.
    COUNSEL OF RECORD:
    For Appellants:
    Kevin E. Vainio, Attorney at Law, Butte, Montana
    For Respondent:
    Thomas A. Budewitz, Attorney at Law, Helena, Montana
    Submitted on Briefs: October 24, 2002
    Decided: April 29, 2003
    Filed:
    __________________________________________
    Clerk
    Justice Jim Regnier delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    ¶1     Respondent Westmark International Corp. (Westmark) filed a complaint to quiet title
    in the First Judicial District Court, Broadwater County. Although the complaint named
    several defendants, Appellant Gold Hill Placers, Inc. (Gold Hill) was the only defendant to
    appear. As the case proceeded, Westmark and Gold Hill were unable to agree upon a final
    pretrial order. Frustrated by this delay, the District Court stated that if the parties failed to
    present a final pretrial order by February 25, 2002, the trial date set for the case would be
    vacated. The parties failed to present a final pretrial order by February 25, 2002; however,
    the case proceeded to trial as scheduled. Gold Hill failed to appear at the trial, and the
    District Court entered judgment in favor of Westmark. Gold Hill subsequently filed a motion
    for a new trial. The District Court denied the motion, and Gold Hill appeals. We affirm.
    ¶2     We restate the sole issue on appeal as follows:
    ¶3     Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Gold Hill’s motion for a
    new trial?
    BACKGROUND
    ¶4     On August 27, 1998, Westmark filed a complaint to quiet title on certain real property
    located in Broadwater County, Montana. The complaint named several defendants; however,
    Gold Hill was the only defendant to appear. The District Court subsequently entered
    judgment by default against the remaining defendants. On November 10, 1998, Gold Hill
    filed a counterclaim against Westmark, asserting that it was entitled to take possession of the
    2
    disputed property, or in the alternative, to recover damages from Westmark in the amount
    of $3,700,000.00.
    ¶5     A pretrial conference was held on February 22, 2002. Counsel for both Westmark
    and Gold Hill appeared at the conference; however, the parties were not able to agree upon
    a final pretrial order. Frustrated by this delay, the District Court stated that if the parties
    failed to present a final pretrial order by February 25, 2002, the trial date set for the case
    would be vacated. The case was set for trial on March 4, 2002. On February 27, 2002, Gold
    Hill filed a motion to stay the trial date, as the parties failed to reach an agreement regarding
    the final pretrial order. The District Court denied Gold Hill’s motion on February 28, 2002.
    ¶6     Gold Hill failed to appear at the March 4, 2002, trial. On March 5, 2002, the District
    Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment, in which it quieted title
    of the disputed property in favor of Westmark. Gold Hill filed a motion for a new trial on
    March 15, 2002. On March 22, 2002, the District Court issued an order, stating that
    Westmark was entitled to recover $23,507.50 in attorney’s fees, and $1,904.10 in costs, from
    Gold Hill. The District Court denied Gold Hill’s motion for a new trial on March 26, 2002.
    Gold Hill appealed the District Court’s: (1) findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
    judgment; (2) March 22, 2002, order; and (3) denial of its motion for a new trial, on April
    23, 2002.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7     The standard of review of a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial is
    manifest abuse of discretion. Satterfield v. Medlin, 
    2002 MT 260
    , ¶ 14, 
    312 Mont. 234
    , ¶
    3
    14, 
    59 P.3d 33
    , ¶ 14. The decision to grant or deny a new trial is within the sound discretion
    of the trial judge and will not be disturbed absent a showing of manifest abuse of that
    discretion. Satterfield, ¶ 14.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8     Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it denied Gold Hill’s motion for a
    new trial?
    ¶9     The District Court’s minute entry from the pretrial conference on February 22, 2002,
    contained the following statement: “The Court ordered the parties to present the Final
    Pretrial Order by Monday, February 25, 2002, or the Trial date will be vacated.” The parties
    failed to present a final pretrial order by February 25, 2002; however, the case proceeded to
    trial on March 4, 2002, as scheduled. Gold Hill did not appear at the trial.
    ¶10    The District Court entered judgment in favor of Westmark on March 5, 2002. Gold
    Hill subsequently filed a motion for a new trial. Gold Hill’s motion asserted that because
    the parties did not present a final pretrial order by February 25, 2002, it believed that the trial
    date was vacated. Therefore, Gold Hill alleged that it was deprived of its substantive rights
    by: (1) an irregularity in the proceedings; or (2) an accident or surprise, when the District
    Court conducted the trial in its absence. Accordingly, Gold Hill maintained that it was
    entitled to a new trial pursuant to either subsection (1) or (3) of § 25-11-102, MCA.
    ¶11    Section 25-11-102, MCA, provides, in pertinent part, that:
    The former verdict or other decision may be vacated and a new trial granted
    on the application of the party aggrieved for any of the following causes
    materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
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    (1) irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, or adverse party or any
    order of the court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
    from having a fair trial;
    ....
    (3) accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded
    against[.]
    ¶12    When considering Gold Hill's motion for a new trial, the District Court noted that at
    no point did it ever vacate the March 4, 2002 trial date. Gold Hill apparently recognized that
    the trial was still scheduled because shortly after the pretrial conference it filed a motion
    requesting that the District Court continue the trial date. The District Court denied this
    motion on February 28, 2002. As such, the District Court found that it was unreasonable for
    Gold Hill to have assumed, in light of the above facts, that the March 4, 2002, trial date was
    vacated. Therefore, the District Court denied Gold Hill’s motion for a new trial.
    ¶13    It is apparent that the District Court was exasperated with Gold Hill's conduct in this
    matter. In fact, in its order denying the motion for a new trial, the District Court concluded
    that Gold Hill's strategy was to "muck up" the water so that Westmark would have difficulty
    proceeding. Also, the District Court was convinced that Gold Hill's counsel refused to sign
    the final pretrial order presented by Westmark’s counsel in order to frustrate the process.
    Regardless of what the District Court may have stated out of frustration at the pretrial
    conference, it is obvious that Gold Hill knew it was obligated to file a formal motion seeking
    a continuance if the trial date was to be vacated. When Gold Hill filed the motion, the
    District Court denied the request. Therefore, we conclude that it is not plausible that Gold
    5
    Hill believed that the trial date had been vacated by the parties’ failure to file a final pretrial
    order.
    ¶14      In light of our above conclusion, we hold that Gold Hill was not deprived of its
    substantive rights by either: (1) an irregularity in the proceedings; or (2) an accident or
    surprise, as contemplated in subsections (1) and (3) of § 25-11-102, MCA. Accordingly, we
    hold that the District Court did not manifestly abuse its discretion when it denied Gold Hill’s
    motion for a new trial.
    ¶15      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
    /S/ JIM REGNIER
    We Concur:
    /S/ KARLA M. GRAY
    /S/ PATRICIA COTTER
    /S/ JAMES C. NELSON
    /S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART
    6
    Justice Terry N. Trieweiler dissenting.
    ¶16    I dissent from the majority Opinion. I conclude that the District Court abused its
    discretion when it denied the Defendant's motion for a new trial based on an irregularity in
    the proceedings which prevented a fair trial.
    ¶17    The District Court's February 22, 2002, minute entry which records what was said by
    the court to the parties on that date clearly states that if the parties cannot agree on a pretrial
    order by February 25, 2002, the trial will be vacated. That statement is unequivocal. No
    pretrial order was agreed upon on February 25, 2002. It is understandable that anyone
    paying attention to the court on February 22 would have assumed that the trial date was
    continued.
    ¶18    The majority states in ¶ 12 that Gold Hill must have recognized that the trial had not
    been continued because it filed a motion requesting an order to that effect from the District
    Court. However, I find nothing inconsistent about assuming that a trial date has been
    continued based on representations made verbally by the District Court and asking the
    District Court to reduce its decision to a written order. In that same paragraph, the majority
    states that the District Court denied the motion for a continuance on February 28, 2002.
    While it is true that the District Court's order denying the motion to continue is dated
    February 28, 2002, it was not filed with the clerk of court until Friday, March 1, 2002, and
    was not mailed by the clerk of court to the Defendant's attorney until March 4, 2002–the date
    on which the trial proceeded without the Defendant or its attorney.
    7
    ¶19      If the District Court Judge told the Defendant and its attorney on February 22 that the
    trial date would be continued unless there was a pretrial order signed by both parties, the
    parties had a right to take the trial judge's statement at face value. I do not buy the argument
    that they should have assumed he was just letting off steam or expressing frustration. While
    greater caution by Defendant's attorney might have been the more prudent course, when the
    Defendant did not show up based on the confusion created by the District Court's
    representation, the trial should have been continued. When it proceeded without the
    Defendant, an "irregularity in the proceedings" resulted which denied the Defendant a fair
    trial.
    ¶20      For these reasons, I dissent from the majority Opinion. I would reverse the judgment
    of the District Court.
    /S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER
    8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-289

Citation Numbers: 2003 MT 119, 315 Mont. 492

Judges: Cotter, Gray, Leaphart, Nelson, Regnier, Trieweiler

Filed Date: 4/29/2003

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023