Fitch v. Public Utility Commission , 261 F. App'x 788 ( 2008 )


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  •        IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    January 16, 2008
    No. 07-50088               Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    F. CARY FITCH, doing business as Affordable Telecom,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION OF TEXAS; SOUTHWESTERN BELL
    TELEPHONE COMPANY, doing business as AT&T Texas,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    F. CARY FITCH, doing business as Affordable Telecom,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    PAUL HUDSON, in his individual and official capacity; JULIE
    CARRUTHERS PARSLEY, in her individual and official capacity; BARRY
    SMITHERMAN, in his individual and official capacity; TEXAS PUBLIC
    UTILITY COMMISSION,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Texas
    USDC No. 1:06-CV-176
    Before REAVLEY, STEWART, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
    No. 07-50088
    PER CURIAM:*
    Affordable Telecom (“Affordable”) appeals from the district court’s order
    affirming the Texas Public Utility Commission’s (“PUCT”) approval of an
    arbitrated interconnection agreement between Affordable and Southwestern Bell
    Telephone Company (hereinafter “AT&T Texas”). We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    In 2002, Affordable, a small telecommunications company that provides
    paging service and Internet access, received commercial mobile radio service
    (“CMRS”) licenses from the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to
    provide interconnected common carrier paging services to the public in Corpus
    Christi and Victoria, Texas. In order to effectuate the services provided by the
    licenses, Affordable had to enter into an interconnection agreement with AT&T
    Texas. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“FTA”), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 
    110 Stat. 56
     (1996), codified at 
    47 U.S.C. § 151
     et seq., which was adopted to
    encourage the entry of new telecommunications carriers into local service
    markets, allows competing local exchange carriers (“CLECs”) to negotiate
    interconnection agreements with incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”).
    However, the FCC has also stipulated that ILECs cannot charge for the use of
    interconnection facilities for services that do not originate traffic, such as one-
    way paging. Since Affordable’s licenses were for paging services which do not
    originate any traffic, it was not obligated to provide AT&T Texas any
    compensation under the terms of the licenses.
    The case below began in 2004 as a compulsory arbitration before the
    PUCT, see 
    47 U.S.C. § 252
    , when Affordable and AT&T failed to reach a
    voluntary agreement on all terms. The central issue in contention before the
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
    R. 47.5.4.
    2
    No. 07-50088
    PUCT arbitrators was whether Affordable was legally authorized to avoid
    payment for the business lines and equipment it had access to through its
    interconnection agreement with AT&T Texas even though Affordable had used
    its interconnection agreement to provide dial-up Internet access to its customers.
    In rendering their decision, the PUCT arbitrators made a number of
    factual findings.        The PUCT arbitrators determined that Affordable had
    approximately 5,000 dial-up Internet access customers (through the trade name
    USAWIDE.net), 200-300 resold numeric paging customers, and 15 Superpaging1
    customers, and they concluded that although Affordable’s licenses only allowed
    it to provide paging services, the majority of the traffic carried over its existing
    interconnection arrangements was dial-up internet service provider (“ISP”)
    traffic.2 Relying on the FCC rule laid out in 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.100
    (b),3 the PUCT
    1
    Superpaging employs the paging spectrum to transmit “pages” to subscribers’ wireless
    receivers. The page can consist of any type of data that can be sent to a computer (not just
    phone numbers as with traditional paging). Additionally, the calling party can, if it subscribes
    to such function, use the Internet to gather information for transmission in the Superpage.
    In fact, the PUCT arbitrators found that Affordable’s dial-up Internet access service
    subscribers could access the Internet by calling the same platform used to initiate Superpages.
    2
    According to AT&T Texas, 99% of Affordable’s traffic was dial-up ISP traffic.
    3
    
    47 C.F.R. § 51.100
    (b) states:
    A telecommunications carrier that has interconnected or gained
    access under Sections 251(a)(1), 251(c)(2), 251(c)(3) of the Act,
    may offer information services through the same arrangement, so
    long as it is offering telecommunications services through the
    same arrangement as well.
    Telecommunications service means “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the
    public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, regardless
    of the facilities used.” 
    47 U.S.C. § 153
    (46). Telecommunications is defined as “the
    transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s
    choosing, without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received.” 
    47 U.S.C. § 153
    (43). An information service offers the capability for “generating, acquiring,
    storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
    telecommunications,” but does not include providing telecommunications itself. 
    47 U.S.C. § 153
    (20).
    3
    No. 07-50088
    arbitrators held that Affordable could not use the interconnection facilities to
    carry       Internet   access    traffic    because      Affordable      does     not    offer
    telecommunications service “through” interconnection facilities; rather, it merely
    transmits radio signals to activate its pagers. The PUCT arbitrators explained
    that “
    47 C.F.R. § 51.100
    (b) allows the offering of information service through an
    interconnection facility, but only as an incident to the telecommunications
    service for which the carrier obtained the interconnection facility.” The PUCT
    arbitrators concluded that Affordable is only authorized to provide paging
    services, and “consequently [it] may not receive any traffic other than paging
    traffic through the interconnection facility.”4
    On June 29, 2005, the parties filed exceptions to the PUCT arbitrators’
    award proposal. The PUCT approved the arbitration award, making only one
    modification.5
    Affordable filed suit in state court, challenging the PUCT’s award and its
    conclusion that Affordable is not entitled to continue providing internet services
    through its interconnection agreement with AT&T.6 The case was removed to
    federal district court by the PUCT Defendants and AT&T Texas (collectively
    “Defendants”), on the grounds that the case involved federal questions. The
    district court denied Affordable’s motion to remand and ordered Affordable to
    4
    The arbitrators, in their award, also restricted the services Affordable could provide
    under its Superpaging services. Additionally, they made findings regarding the compensation
    rates between Affordable and AT&T Texas under the interconnection agreement.
    5
    The PUCT decided that long-distance calls (calls routed through an interexchange
    carrier) were not subject to the same reciprocal compensation rates as calls not routed through
    third party interexchange carriers.
    6
    Affordable also challenged the PUCT’s imposition of sanctions arising out of a
    discovery dispute. Affordable initially sued the individual PUCT Commissioners for imposing
    sanctions, but amended its complaint to target the PUCT and the Commissioners in their
    official capacities.
    4
    No. 07-50088
    amend its complaints to address the claims under the FTA.7 The parties briefed
    all issues, except Affordable’s damages claims against AT&T Texas.                        On
    December 12, 2006, the district court entered an order affirming the PUCT order
    in all respects and ordered that Affordable’s damages claim against AT&T be
    dismissed with prejudice. Affordable timely filed its notice of appeal.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review state commission rulings that interpret federal law de novo.
    Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 
    208 F.3d 475
    , 482 (5th Cir.
    2000). Factual findings and state law determinations by state commissions are
    reviewed “under the more deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.” 
    Id.
    We have previously recognized that there is no meaningful difference between
    the arbitrary and capricious standard and the “substantial evidence” standard.
    
    Id.
     at 482 n.8 (citing GTE South Inc. v. Morrison, 
    199 F.3d 733
    , 745 n.5 (4th Cir.
    1999)).
    III. DISCUSSION
    First, Affordable contends that the PUCT erred when it refused to
    arbitrate Affordable’s claims under 
    47 U.S.C. §§ 201
    , 332(c)(1)(B) and 
    47 C.F.R. § 20.11
    . It also asserts that the district court erroneously concluded that § 332
    is “outside the scope of an arbitration under § 252.” In making this claim,
    Affordable recognizes that the FCC prefers that LEC-CMRS disputes are
    handled through the negotiation/arbitration process that was adopted in §§
    251/252 of the 1996 amendments, but Affordable nevertheless asserts that the
    FCC has also “taken great care to ensure that where § 332 or FCC wireless
    precedent requires a different substantive result than would the 1996
    amendments standing alone, then its CMRS rules prevail.”
    7
    Affordable initially filed two suits in state court—the first one after the PUCT order
    approving the award with changes and again after the interconnection agreement was filed.
    The two cases were consolidated and certain state law issues were remanded to state court.
    5
    No. 07-50088
    Affordable’s argument must fail. The FCC has clearly directed state
    commissions to arbitrate LEC-CMRS interconnection agreements under §§ 251
    and 252, concluding that state commission arbitration proceedings would
    achieve “just, reasonable, and fair” agreements, which is the “common goal” of
    §§ 201, 332, 251, and 252.     In the Matter of Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Interconnection
    Between Local Exchange Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service
    Providers, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16005 ¶ 1023 (Aug. 8,
    1996).
    Second, Affordable argues that the PUCT erroneously held that paging
    carriers (as contrasted with LECs and cellular carriers) are not allowed to
    provide both telecommunications and information services under their
    interconnection agreements with ILECs. Affordable asserts that the FCC has
    recognized that paging carriers can provide information services, and that the
    PUCT interpreted 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.100
    (b) too narrowly. According to Affordable,
    the PUCT interpreted the word “through” to mean “in one side and out the
    opposite,” when in the context of § 51.100(b) the word actually means “by the
    means and agency of.” When the proper definition of through is applied,
    Affordable contends that § 51.100(b) allows it to offer information services
    through the interconnection agreement it has with AT&T Texas for one-way
    paging. On the other hand, AT&T Texas and the PUCT Defendants urge this
    Court to affirm the PUCT award and the district court’s determination. They
    argue that under the proper reading of § 51.100(b), Affordable’s licenses permit
    it to interconnect with AT&T and use AT&T facilities for a limited purpose—to
    provide one-way paging service—and since § 51.100(b) only permits
    telecommunications carriers to offer information services “through the same
    arrangement,” Affordable cannot, under its existing one-way paging
    6
    No. 07-50088
    interconnection agreement (which just involves receiving information) provide
    information services (which involves sending and receiving information).
    This issue is the heart of this dispute. Affordable believes that the rights
    it has under its licenses should be interpreted broadly so it can offer a wide
    range of services via its interconnection agreement with AT&T Texas. AT&T, the
    PUCT, and the district court all believe that Affordable’s licenses only permit it
    to provide one-way paging.      For the following reasons, we hold that the
    interpretation suggested by Affordable is incorrect.
    As the district court recognized, one-way paging is not a service provided
    “through” an interconnection facility, because the facility is merely relaying a
    call from the person initiating a page to the paging service provider. The district
    court cites from the PUCT arbitrators award, where they explain:
    [§ 51.100(b)] does not just require that communications occur
    through the arrangement. If this were the standard, then all
    carriers would be able to offer information services through
    interconnection agreements, since the very purpose of an
    interconnection agreement is to transit communications. Rather,
    the carrier must offer telecommunication services through the
    arrangement.
    Affordable argues that the PUCT and the district court unreasonably
    discriminated by acknowledging differences between CMRS providers (i.e., those
    that provide telephone exchange service versus those that provide
    telecommunications services), but Affordable is unable to establish how the
    PUCT or the district court’s interpretations are inconsistent with any FCC
    decisions or orders issued since the 1996 amendments. Not only is Affordable’s
    argument at odds with the plain language of § 251, but it also goes against the
    FCC precedent that has recognized the distinctions between different CMRS
    providers.
    7
    No. 07-50088
    Further, common sense demands that we reject Affordable’s argument.
    If its interpretation of § 51.100(b) is correct, it would be able to provide
    information services without having to pay AT&T Texas anything for using its
    facilities. This is clearly contrary to FCC precedent, as the FCC has recognized
    that ISPs are end users of telecommunications services that are required to
    purchase LEC business lines. In the Matter of Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 3689,
    3690 ¶ 4 (1999), vacated on other grounds, Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 
    204 F.3d 1
    (D.C. Cir. 2000).
    Third, Affordable asserts that the PUCT erroneously concluded that it was
    not authorized to provide services to laptop computers and mobile signs through
    its Superpaging service.8 The PUCT’s determination about which Superpaging
    services are permitted under Affordable’s interconnection agreement is a factual
    finding. We agree with the PUCT that many of the services Affordable provided
    under the umbrella of Superpaging, such as information storage and retrieval
    and access to the Internet, are not CMRS services, and therefore Affordable is
    not permitted, under § 51.100(b), to provide those services through its
    interconnection with AT&T Texas. Accordingly, we cannot hold that the PUCT’s
    determination was arbitrary and capricious.
    Fourth, Affordable Telecom challenges two of the PUCT rulings regarding
    intercarrier compensation.9 First, it asserts that the PUCT violated the FTA
    8
    Specifically, the PUCT arbitrators found that: “Superpaging only qualifies as CMRS
    to the extent that it meets the previously outlined definition of paging. Accordingly, the
    arbitrators conclude that Superpaging qualifies as CMRS only when the end user’s wireless
    receiver meets the FCC’s definition of a pager. Among the possible applications cited by Fitch
    Affordable Telecom, only the Pocket PC fits the definition of pager.”
    9
    When a call originating from one carrier’s customer is made to a customer of another
    interconnected carrier, the originating carrier must pay the terminating carrier for the costs
    of transporting and terminating the call. 
    47 U.S.C. § 251
    ; 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.701
    (e). The FCC has
    established rules that govern these “reciprocal compensation” payments. 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.701
    (e);
    see also 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.701
    -.717. In pertinent part, these rules state that CMRS providers may
    8
    No. 07-50088
    and FCC rules by failing to establish a rate to be paid for termination of AT&T
    originated calls. Affordable asserts that under § 251(b)(5), it is entitled to
    reciprocal compensation for paging, citing to FCC decisions that held that ILECs
    are required to at least offer to exchange both § 251(b)(5) traffic and ISP-bound
    traffic at the rate of $0.0007 per minute of use.                    See Petition of Core
    Communications, Inc. for Forbearance Under 
    47 U.S.C. § 160
    (C) from
    Application of the ISP Remand Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 20179, 20181 ¶ 6 (2004); see
    also T-Mobile Order, 20 F.C.C.R. at 4862 ¶ 12; see generally In the Matter of
    Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996: Intercarrier compensation for ISP-Bound Traffic, 16 F.C.C.R. 9151
    (1999). Affordable argues that since AT&T failed to offer a rate during the
    arbitration before the PUCT, the arbitrators should have prescribed the FCC’s
    $0.0007 compensation rate. However, a review of the record indicates that
    AT&T Texas inadvertently omitted its pricing index during the PUCT
    arbitration. When AT&T attempted, by motion, to correct its omission and to
    provide a reciprocal compensation rate of $0.0013 per minute, Affordable
    objected, and as a result, AT&T withdrew its motion. AT&T Texas now argues
    that this classifies as invited error, and assert that because of that, this Court
    should not reverse the PUCT’s determination. See Hidden Oaks Ltd. v. City of
    Austin, 
    138 F.3d 1036
    , 1051 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Having made such a choice at trial,
    Hidden Oakes hardly can request now that we reverse and remand in order for
    it to reassess its earlier strategy.”). We agree, and as a result, this issue cannot
    be compensated for terminating calls that originate from customers of the interconnected
    telecommunications carriers. 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.701
    (c) & (e); 
    47 C.F.R. § 51.701
    (e). The rules also
    stipulate that carriers that only provide one-way paging service do not owe reciprocal
    compensation to LECs.
    9
    No. 07-50088
    be raised on appeal. See Flores v. Cameron County, 
    92 F.3d 258
    , 270 (5th Cir.
    1996) (explaining that “the invited error doctrine . . . preclude[s] our review”).10
    Affordable next argues that the PUCT order adopting the award
    erroneously concluded that any reciprocal compensation paid by AT&T Texas to
    Affordable should be limited to those calls originating within AT&T and
    terminating directly with Affordable, and in which (i) the originating caller and
    the recipient are in the same Metropolitan Traffic Area (“MTA”) and (ii) no
    intervening interexchange carrier is involved (i.e., the call is not a long-distance
    call requiring “1+” dialing.) Affordable Telecom argues that the PUCT’s holding
    in this regard is at odds with the manner in which federal courts have
    interpreted this issue. See e.g., Iowa Network Servs. v. Qwest Corp., 
    466 F.3d 1091
     (8th Cir. 2006); Atlas Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n, 
    400 F.3d 1256
    (10th Cir. 2005). However, this argument is flawed as well. As the PUCT
    Defendants observe in their brief: “It would be entirely incongruous to require
    AT&T to pay Affordable for a long-distance page originated by a customer using
    interexchange service, especially considering that AT&T had nothing to do with
    the termination of the call.” We agree, and the case law cited by Affordable is
    inapplicable to this case.
    Finally, Affordable sued AT&T Texas for damages under 
    47 U.S.C. §§ 206
    & 207,11 arguing that AT&T violated the FTA by refusing to interconnect with
    10
    Even if we were to refrain from classifying it as invited error, we need not reverse
    the PUCT order on this ground because the PUCT included language in the interconnection
    agreement that will allow the parties to prospectively include a rate which could be
    retroactively implemented. And because AT&T’s rate in its withdrawn filing ($0.0013) is
    higher than the rate Affordable Telecom alleges should have been adopted ($0.0007), the
    parties should be able to reach an agreement on a appropriate rate for reciprocal compensation
    without intervention from this Court or the PUCT.
    11
    
    47 U.S.C. § 206
     provides that if common carriers violate any provisions of the TCA
    they shall be liable for damages sustained in consequences of that violation, along with
    reasonable attorney’s fees. 
    47 U.S.C. § 207
     similarly authorizes any person who claims to be
    damaged by a common carrier to either file a complaint with the FCC or to bring a lawsuit in
    federal district court to recover damages.
    10
    No. 07-50088
    Affordable and for refusing to negotiate in good faith. Affordable argues that the
    district court’s dismissal of these claims was in err, especially since the court
    never specifically addressed all of Affordable’s allegations.        Affordable’s
    argument is without merit. There is no evidence that AT&T Texas violated any
    provision of the TCA, damaged Affordable in any way, or even acted in bad faith.
    Therefore, Affordable is not entitled to damages under §§ 206 or 207.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    11