Noah Johnson, Jr. v. Viskase , 457 F. App'x 594 ( 2012 )


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  •                      United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 11-3505
    ___________
    Noah Johnson, Jr.,                       *
    *
    Appellant,                  *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                 * District Court for the Eastern
    * District of Arkansas.
    Viskase,                                 *
    * [UNPUBLISHED]
    Appellee.                   *
    ___________
    Submitted: April 4, 2012
    Filed: April 6, 2012
    ___________
    Before BYE, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    Noah Johnson appeals the district court’s1 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e) dismissal of his
    employment-discrimination complaint. Following careful de novo review, we affirm.
    See Moore v. Sims, 
    200 F.3d 1170
    , 1171 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (standard of
    review).
    To begin, we note that we do not consider any claims that were not both
    presented to the district court and discussed on appeal, or any exhibits that were filed
    1
    The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of Arkansas.
    in this court but not filed in the district court. See Bath Junkie Branson, L.L.C. v.
    Bath Junkie, Inc., 
    528 F.3d 556
    , 559-60 (8th Cir. 2008) (appellate court can properly
    consider only record before district court, and thus only papers and exhibits filed in
    district court can constitute record on appeal); Stone v. Harry, 
    364 F.3d 912
    , 914 (8th
    Cir. 2004) (in reviewing dismissal of pro se complaint, appellate court applies general
    rule that claims not presented in district court may not be advanced for first time on
    appeal); Jasperson v. Purolator Courier Corp., 
    765 F.2d 736
    , 740 (8th Cir. 1985)
    (party’s failure to raise or discuss issue in his brief is deemed abandonment of that
    issue).
    We conclude that the dismissal of Johnson’s disability-discrimination claim
    was appropriate for the reasons discussed in the district court’s order. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 12102
    (1)(A) (defining “disability”); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    555 (2007) (plaintiff’s obligation to provide grounds for entitlement to relief requires
    more than labels and conclusions; factual allegations must be enough to raise right
    to relief above speculative level). We also conclude that the court did not abuse its
    discretion or demonstrate bias in declining to appoint counsel. See Davis v. Scott, 
    94 F.3d 444
    , 447 (8th Cir. 1996) (indigent civil litigants do not have constitutional right
    to appointed counsel; trial court has broad discretion to decide whether plaintiff and
    court will benefit from appointment of counsel, taking into account, inter alia, factual
    and legal complexity of case); Harris v. Missouri, 
    960 F.2d 738
    , 740 (8th Cir. 1992)
    (unfavorable judicial ruling does not raise inference of bias).
    Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    ______________________________
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