Soumah v. Gonzales , 155 F. App'x 655 ( 2005 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 05-1615
    MARIA SOUMAH,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General,
    Respondent.
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
    Appeals. (A97-920-713)
    Submitted:   November 4, 2005            Decided:   November 23, 2005
    Before WILKINSON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
    Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Sopo Ngwa, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner.     Peter D.
    Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, James A. Hunolt, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, M. Jocelyn Lopez Wright, Assistant Director,
    Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
    JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    See Local Rule 36(c).
    PER CURIAM:
    Maria Soumah, a native and citizen of Guinea, petitions
    for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“Board”) denial of
    her applications for asylum and withholding from removal and the
    affirmation of the immigration judge’s denial of her motion for a
    continuance.*
    The INA authorizes the Attorney General to confer asylum
    on any refugee.   
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (a) (2000).    It defines a refugee
    as a person unwilling or unable to return to her native country
    “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
    account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
    social group, or political opinion.”      
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A)
    (2000).
    An applicant can establish refugee status based on past
    persecution in her native country on account of a protected ground.
    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1) (2005).     “An applicant who demonstrates
    that he was the subject of past persecution is presumed to have a
    well-founded fear of persecution.”     Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 
    371 F.3d 182
    , 187 (4th Cir. 2004).   This presumption can be rebutted on a
    finding of a fundamental change of circumstances so that the alien
    no longer has a well-founded fear, or a finding that the alien
    *
    The Board also denied Soumah’s application for withholding
    under the Convention Against Torture. She does not challenge that
    holding.
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    could    avoid   persecution    by    relocating     within   the   country    of
    removal.    
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (b)(1)(i)(A), (B) (2005).
    Without   regard     to    past   persecution,     an   alien     can
    establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected ground.
    Ngarurih, 
    371 F.3d at 187
    .           The well-founded fear of persecution
    standard contains both a subjective and an objective component.
    “An applicant may satisfy the subjective element by presenting
    ‘candid, credible, and sincere testimony demonstrating a genuine
    fear of persecution.’”       Chen v. INS, 
    195 F.3d 198
    , 201-02 (4th Cir.
    1999) (quoting Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 
    955 F.2d 1251
    , 1256 (9th
    Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).                 The objective
    element requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would
    lead a reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
    Huaman-Cornelio v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, 
    979 F.2d 995
    , 999
    (4th Cir. 1992).
    An   applicant     has    the   burden    of   demonstrating      his
    eligibility for asylum.        
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.13
    (a) (2005); Gonahasa v.
    INS, 
    181 F.3d 538
    , 541 (4th Cir. 1999).               Credibility findings,
    relevant to the subjective component, are reviewed for substantial
    evidence.    A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony on
    credibility grounds must offer specific, cogent reasons for doing
    so.     Figeroa v. INS, 
    886 F.2d 76
    , 78 (4th Cir. 1989).             We accord
    broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings
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    supported by substantial evidence.          Camara v. Ashcroft, 
    378 F.3d 361
    , 367 (4th Cir. 2004).
    To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, an
    alien must show a clear probability that, if she were removed to
    her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened” on a
    protected ground. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(A) (2000); see Camara, 
    378 F.3d at 370
     (4th Cir. 2004).       A “clear probability” means it is
    more likely than not the alien would be subject to persecution.
    INS v. Stevic, 
    467 U.S. 407
    , 429-30 (1984).           “The burden of proof
    is on the applicant for withholding of removal . . . to establish
    that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in the proposed
    country of removal” on account of a protected ground.               
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b) (2005).     A showing of past threat to life or freedom
    on such a ground creates a rebuttable presumption that the threat
    would recur upon removal. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1208.16
    (b)(1)(i); Camara, 
    378 F.3d at 370
    .      Withholding of removal is mandatory if the alien
    meets the standard of proof.      Stevic, 
    467 U.S. at 429-30
    .
    A    determination   regarding    eligibility     for   asylum   or
    withholding of removal is conclusive if supported by substantial
    evidence   on    the   record   considered     as     a   whole.     INS    v.
    Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992).           Administrative findings
    of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be
    compelled to decide to the contrary.           
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B)
    (2000). We will reverse the Board “only if ‘the evidence presented
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    by the petitioner was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
    could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.’”                   Rusu v.
    INS, 
    296 F.3d 316
    , 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Huaman-
    Cornelio, 
    979 F.2d at 999
     (internal quotation marks omitted)).                   We
    find the evidence was not so compelling as to warrant reversal.
    We further find the Board did not abuse its discretion in
    affirming   the   immigration   judge’s      denial   of   a     motion    for   a
    continuance. Initially, we note the immigration judge did not deny
    Soumah her statutory and constitutional right to counsel.                   After
    being informed of her right to counsel, Soumah voluntarily chose to
    proceed pro se.     Moreover, even if she was denied her right to
    counsel, Soumah has not shown she was prejudiced.                Rusu, 
    296 F.3d at 320
    .
    Accordingly,   we   deny   the   petition      for    review.        We
    dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
    are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    PETITION DENIED
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