Guzman-Guzman v. Holder , 530 F. App'x 41 ( 2013 )

12-1794
Guzman-Guzman v. Holder
BIA
Verrillo, IJ
A200 689 052
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC
DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 18th day of July, two thousand thirteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JON O. NEWMAN,
8 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
9 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MANUEL GUZMAN-GUZMAN,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 12-1794
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gregory C. Osakwe, Hartford, CT.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy,
26 Assistant Attorney General; Shelley
27 R. Goad, Assistant Director; Julia
28 J. Tyler, Trial Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, Civil
30 Division, United States Department
31 of Justice, Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is
3 hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for
4 review is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Manuel Guzman-Guzman, a native and citizen
6 of Ecuador, seeks review of an April 6, 2012, order of the
7 BIA affirming the August 8, 2011, decision of Immigration
8 Judge (“IJ”) Philip Verrillo, denying his application for
9 withholding of removal and relief under the Convention
10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Manuel Guzman-Guzman, No.
11 A200 689 052 (B.I.A. Apr. 6, 2012), aff’g No. A200 689 052
12 (Immig. Ct. Hartford, Aug. 8, 2011). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 of the case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision. See Shunfu
17 Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). The
18 applicable standards of review are well-established. See
19 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Yanqin Weng v. Holder,
20 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 As the agency concluded, Guzman-Guzman failed to
22 demonstrate that he would be persecuted on account of his
2
1 membership in a social group. Guzman-Guzman argues that he
2 will be persecuted by gang members in Ecuador due to his
3 membership in a social group defined as “perceived wealthy
4 Ecuadorians.” The BIA has long interpreted the term social
5 group to mean “a group of persons all of whom share a
6 common, immutable characteristic.” Matter of Acosta, 19 I.
7 & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). An “immutable
8 characteristic” is one that members of the group “either
9 cannot change, or should not be required to change because
10 it is fundamental to their individual identities or
11 consciences.” Id. A particular social group “is comprised
12 of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic
13 in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a
14 persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general.”
15 Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007).
16 In order to be sufficiently visible, a group must also
17 have “well-defined boundaries”; accordingly, “relative and
18 subjective” descriptors will not suffice. Id. at 73-74 (the
19 group “wealthy Guatemalans” is not cognizable because wealth
20 is a relative term). Neither “wealth” nor “perceived
21 wealth” serves as the boundary of a cognizable social
22 group. Id. at 73. Accordingly, because Guzman-Guzman
3
1 defined the social group of which he was a part as
2 “perceived wealthy Ecuadorians,” the agency did not err in
3 finding him ineligible for withholding of removal because he
4 failed to demonstrate a nexus to a protected ground. See
5 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A); Ucelo-Gomez, 509 F.3d at 73.
6 As to Guzman-Guzman’s CAT claim, the IJ found that he
7 failed to demonstrate a clear probability of torture, or
8 that the Ecuadorian government would acquiesce to his
9 torture. CAT relief requires that government officials
10 perform the acts of torture or “know of or remain willfully
11 blind to an act and thereafter breach their legal
12 responsibility to prevent it.” Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361
13 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Guzman-Guzman
14 presented no evidence showing that Ecuadorian officials
15 would consent or acquiesce in his torture, we find no error
16 in the agency’s denial of CAT relief.
17 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
18 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
19 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
20 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
21 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
22 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
4
1 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
2 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
3 FOR THE COURT:
4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5