United States v. Garfield Campbell , 462 F. App'x 409 ( 2012 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4578
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
GARFIELD D. CAMPBELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:09-cr-00236-FDW-1)
Submitted: January 4, 2012 Decided: February 2, 2012
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Richard L. Brown, Jr., LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD L. BROWN, Jr.,
Monroe, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne M. Tompkins, United
States Attorney, Richard Lee Edwards, Assistant United States
Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Garfield F. Campbell appeals the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress evidence. After the district
court denied the motion, Campbell pled guilty to one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2006) and was sentenced to 120 months’
imprisonment. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Campbell
preserved the right to appeal the district court’s ruling on the
motion to suppress. On appeal, he argues that the police
officer’s command for him to stop constituted an unauthorized
seizure.
This court reviews the factual findings underlying a
district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for clear error
and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634
F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011). When evaluating the denial of a
suppression motion, this court construes the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Government. Id. Finding no error
in the district court’s ruling, we affirm.
Consistent with the Fourth Amendment, a police officer
may stop a person for investigative purposes when the officer
has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that
criminal activity is afoot. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). A
“seizure” warranting Fourth Amendment protection occurs when, in
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view of the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person
would not feel free to leave or otherwise terminate the
encounter. United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 653 (4th
Cir. 1996). Not all police-citizen interactions constitute a
seizure; “[o]nly when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” Terry,
392 U.S. at 19 n.16. The general rule is that a seizure
“requires either physical force . . . or, where that is absent,
submission to the assertion of authority.” California v. Hodari
D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991). A defendant who flees the police
in response to an assertion of authority has not been seized,
and thus his Fourth Amendment rights are not implicated. Id. at
626, 629.
Campbell’s encounter with the officer was not a
seizure within the protections of the Fourth Amendment because,
as the district court reasonably found, he did not submit to the
officer’s assertion of authority and was not physically
restrained. Indeed, he fled from the officer’s presence. See
United States v. Brown, 401 F.3d 588, 594 (4th Cir. 2005) (“A
defendant who flees the police in response to an assertion of
authority has not been seized, and thus his Fourth Amendment
rights are not implicated.”). Because Campbell was not seized
and the protections of the Fourth Amendment were thus not
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implicated, a discussion of the reasonableness of the officer’s
suspicion is unnecessary.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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