United States v. Lynch ( 2003 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_________________________
No. 02-20482
SUMMARY CALENDAR
_________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
CEDRIC DEMONT LYNCH
Defendant - Appellant
______________________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas
(H-01-CR-185-1)
______________________________________________________________________________
January 2, 2003
Before REYNALDO G. GARZA, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
REYNALDO G. GARZA, Circuit Judge:1
In this appeal we review a district court's bench trial conviction of Defendant Cedric
Demont Lynch, on stipulated facts, for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922 (g)(1), 924(a)(2). For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
1
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
-1-
I.
On January 17, 2001, members of the Pasadena Police Department’s Direct Action
Response Team were conducting surveillance of Robert Tanner, a burglary suspect, at an
apartment complex in Pasadena, Texas. Detectives David Matlock and Randall Merritt were
observing Tanner from inside an unmarked, white Chevrolet Blazer, which was parked in the
apartment complex’s parking lot. Police had information suggesting that some of Tanner’s stolen
property had been taken to Apartment Number 96, where an individual by the name of Cedric was
living. Cedric was suspected of purchasing some of the stolen items in exchange for narcotics.
During the surveillance, officers observed Tanner repeatedly walking back and forth from
Apartment #96 to a blue Plymouth Caravan, accompanied by an individual later determined to be
Cedric Lynch.
As the officers continued their surveillance, Lynch and an Hispanic male who was sitting
in the driver’s seat both situated themselves in the vehicle as if preparing to leave. At the time,
Tanner was walking towards the van. While walking to the van, Tanner apparently noticed the
undercover agents; he then turned around and began walking back toward the apartment complex
at a rapid pace. The officers subsequently moved in.
Tanner was arrested and both Lynch and the Hispanic male were detained. Officer
Matlock stated that, as the events were unfolding, he observed Lynch make a motion that was
consistent with throwing an object in the back of the van. After arresting Tanner, Officer Matlock
found crack cocaine on the rear floorboard of the van behind the driver’s seat. Officer Matlock
then told other officers to further detain Lynch for possible narcotics investigation. Although
Lynch was never told he was under arrest, he was handcuffed and taken to jail.
-2-
After the situation in the parking lot was resolved, Chemetria Robinson, who lived with
Lynch and their children in Apartment Number 96, consented to a search of their apartment. A
Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun was found during the search.
After spending the night in jail, Lynch spoke with narcotics officers about the drugs found
in the van. During a subsequent interview with police, Lynch talked with other officers about the
shotgun found in the apartment, leading ultimately to a statement by Lynch admitting ownership
of the gun.
Lynch had previously been convicted of a felony drug offense in 1992, and after it was
determined that the seized shotgun was manufactured in Connecticut and had been transported in
interstate commerce, Lynch was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Lynch filed a motion to suppress the shotgun and any statements he made while he was
being detained. The district court, after holding a hearing on the issue, denied the motion to
suppress. The district court found that, because officers had seen Lynch make a suspicious move
toward the rear of the van, the officers had probable cause to arrest Lynch.
Lynch was convicted following a bench trial on stipulated facts, including the statement
Lynch unsuccessfully sought to suppress. Lynch was sentenced to 27 months in prison and three
years of supervised release. Lynch then filed a timely notice of this appeal.
II.
On appeal, Lynch argues that probable cause was lacking at the time of his arrest, and
that, therefore, the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. In an appeal from the
denial of a motion to suppress, this Court reviews legal questions de novo and factual findings for
clear error. United States v. Valadez, 267 F.3d 395, 397 (5th Cir. 2001). In addition, “[t]he
-3-
evidence presented at a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress is viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.” United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1994).
This Court may affirm the district court’s judgement on any grounds supported by the record. See
United States v. McSween, 53 F.3d 684, 687 n.3 (5th Cir. 1995).
Lynch argues that he was placed under arrest at the time he was taken from the van at
gunpoint. He submits that, because the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him at that
time, his arrest was unlawful. According to Lynch, because his arrest was unlawful, his statement
should be suppressed due to the fact that “the taint of the illegal arrest was not sufficiently
attenuated to break the causal link to the confession.”
The government maintains that Lynch was arrested only after the officers discovered crack
cocaine, in plain view, behind the driver’s seat of the minivan Lynch was seated in. Furthermore,
the government submits that, if Lynch was briefly detained prior to his arrest, his pre-arrest
detention was valid under Terry v. Ohio. We therefore begin our inquiry by examining the issue of
whether Lynch was placed under arrest prior to discovery of the drugs.
As this Court has noted, “The line between a valid investigatory stop and an arrest
requiring probable cause is a fine one.” United States v. Hanson, 801 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir.
1986). We have also observed, however, that “drawn guns and handcuffs do not necessarily
convert a detention into an arrest.” United States v. Campbell, 178 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1999).
Whether a detention is an arrest or merely a Terry-stop depends on the “reasonableness” of the
intrusion under all the facts. United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1987).
The record shows that Lynch was forced to kneel beside the vehicle in which he was
found for a short period of time; during this brief interval, he was not handcuffed or otherwise
-4-
restrained. Officer Matlock’s testimony indicates that Tanner’s arrest took a matter of seconds
and that, after quickly concluding Tanner’s arrest, Matlock immediately proceeded to the van,
observed the cocaine, and issued an order leading to Lynch’s arrest. Given the facts surrounding
the events, neither the duration of Lynch’s detention nor the means employed to effectuate it were
unreasonable. Accordingly, Lynch was not placed under arrest prior to the discovery of the crack
cocaine. See Martinez, 808 F.2d at 1053.
Given the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the district court did not clearly
err in its factual findings relating to the issue of whether probable cause for the arrest of Lynch
existed. Prior to arresting Lynch, police officers observed Lynch making suspicious motions in the
direction of the backseat of the vehicle. The officers later discovered crack cocaine behind the
driver’s seat. Such observations provided probable cause for Lynch’s subsequent arrest. See
United States v. Ramirez, 145 F.3d 345, 352 (5th Cir. 1998)(“Probable cause exists when the
totality of facts and circumstances within a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect had committed or was committing
an offense”).
As Lynch has failed to show that his arrest was unlawful, there is no need to consider his
argument that his statement regarding ownership of the shotgun was tainted by his illegal arrest.
III.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
-5-