Adoption of J.D.D., minors, Appeal of: K.D. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.D.D., A.N.S., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
AND T.S., JR., MINORS : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: K.D., NATURAL MOTHER : No. 219 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order, December 28, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County
Orphans’ Court Division at Nos. 2016-204 IVT,
2016-205 IVT, 2016-206 IVT
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J. AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 26, 2017
Appellant, K.D. (“Mother”), appeals from the order of December 28,
2016, terminating her parental rights to the children, J.D.D., A.N.S., and
T.S., Jr. (“the Children”). After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court, following three evidentiary hearings, made the
following findings:
1. On March 9, 2016, Cambria County
Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) filed petitions to
terminate the parental rights of [K.D., “Mother”],
age 23, [], and [Father], age 32, [], to their
respective children. [Mother] is the biological
mother of [J.D.D.], [] age 3, []; [A.N.S.], [] age 2,
[]; and [T.S., Jr.], [] now 11 months old []. [Father]
is the biological father of [A.N.S.] and [T.S., Jr.].
The biological father of [J.D.D.] is unknown. The
grounds alleged are 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] Section 2511(a)
Subsections (1), (2), (5), and (8).
2. Counsel was appointed for the parents and
children, and after continuance requests granted by
the Court evidentiary hearings were held on June 22,
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2016; September 20, 2016; and September 29,
2016. After transcripts of the hearings were
prepared and reviewed by counsel, all counsel
submitted memoranda of their respective positions.
3. In July 2014, [Mother] and [Father] moved
to Johnstown, Cambria County, Pennsylvania from
Onondaga County, New York where [Mother] was
involved with the New York Department of Social
Services as a result of issues resulting in a neglect
petition being filed involving [J.D.D.] and then newly
born [A.N.S.].
4. Both [Mother] and [Father] were referred
to Dennis M. Kashurba, a licensed psychologist.
[Mother] was evaluated by Mr. Kashurba who issued
a report dated August 20, 2014 (Petitioner Exhibit
11). The purpose of the evaluation was to gather
information pertinent to ascertaining what type of
services would be appropriate to ensure the best
interests of [Mother]’s two children. [Mother] had a
history of anger management and impulse control
problems. Mr. Kashurba in his report stated in part:
“Her judgment in the session
appeared to be good once she would
pause and think about the answer she
had impulsively given to a question. Her
level of insight appeared to be at an
early adolescent level of development
and rather consistent with the obtained
estimate of intellectual functioning as
noted below.”
In his diagnostic impression, Mr. Kashurba
wrote:
“Axis I Impulse Control Disorder,
NOS Relational Problem NOS
Anxiety Disorder NOS ADHD,
Combined Type Disruptive
Behavior Disorder, NOS, by
history Mathematics Disorder
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Bipolar Disorder, NOS, by
history
Axis II Borderline Intellectual
Functioning Histrionic
Personality Disorder with
Paranoid Traits and
Obsessive Compulsive
Features”
In Mr. Kashurba’s summary of the various
tests administered to [Mother], he stated:
“All of her performances fell within
a relatively consistent band between the
normal late 10-year level of development
and the normal early 12-year level of
development.”
5. In Mr. Kashurba’s conclusion he stated:
“The total information available at
the present time suggests that [Mother]
has below average overall intellectual
ability and academic skills. She also
appears to have long-standing mental
health issues which may adversely affect
her ability to harness her intellectual
skills in terms of learning and
independently implementing appropriate
parenting techniques with her children.
Thus, it does appear that there will be
the ongoing need for comprehensive,
multimodal mental health services as
well as a variety of social services that
can typically be facilitated through CYS.
[Mother] claims that she plans to
become enrolled in parenting classes at
some time in the future whenever an
opening exists for a six-week class.
However, her mental health and
cognitive issues clearly indicate that her
need for services is well beyond the
scope of typical parent training classes.
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Additionally, the mental health issues of
her paramour ([Father]) suggests that
there will be an ongoing need for an
external agent of control (CYS)...”
6. On September 24, 2014, Mr. Kashurba
penned a report based upon his evaluation of
[Father]. The purpose of that evaluation was to
gather information pertinent to determining the
probability of [Father] developing the ability to
parent his children by himself or with the assistance
of his paramour, [Mother]. In the clinical interview
portion of his report, Mr. Kashurba states:
“[Father] presented on time for his
scheduled appointment. Initially, his
affect was calm and composed.
However, later when he was informed of
ongoing CYS concerns that were
inconsistent with his perspective of the
home and family situation, he became
somewhat irate. He then proceeded to
engage in denial and minimize the
circumstances documented by the CYS
caseworker, CYS social worker, and the
IFS [(“Independent Family Services”)]
home management person. [Father]
actually appeared to possess grossly
normal intellectual potential. He
admitted that he has been hearing
‘voices’ for the past eight years’ time.
These voices were described as ‘Bob’
who supposedly is ‘a mean son of a bitch
and what I would be like if I was bad.’
The other voice, Tom, was described as
‘my good side.’ Supposedly Tom tells
[Father] not to listen to Bob. In addition
to hearing these voices, [Father]
admitted that he sometimes sees them.
Bob was described as being ‘tall and
built’ and being blond with blue eyes.
Tom, on the other hand, was described
as having dark hair and hazel eyes and
being slim.”
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Further, Mr. Kashurba notes:
“[Father] clearly had a
preoccupation with the overvalued idea
regarding the status of the dogs in his
life...[.] It was reasonably obvious that
[Father] viewed the dogs at least as
equals to the children in terms of status
within the family and perhaps higher in
status.”
In Mr. Kashurba’s summary he notes:
“[Father]’s performance on
academic testing today found him to
meet with frustration in basic reading
skills at a beginning 4th grade level of
difficulty. This performance placed him
within the mildly mentally deficient range
and only at the 1st percentile for his
chronological age group.”
Mr. Kashurba concludes:
“The total information available at
the present time suggests that [Father]
would have adequate intellectual
potential to learn appropriate parenting
strategies if his mental health issues
could be ameliorated. In his current
‘off meds’ condition, there is little
likelihood that he will be able to
ameliorate his mental health difficulties,
which are chronic and severe, to a
degree that he will be able to harness his
low average intellectual potential to learn
and independently implement
appropriate parenting strategies for the
children. His overvalued idea regarding
the status of the dogs (supposed service
animals) suggests that these animals will
continue to be a higher priority to
[Father] than the children in the
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household. Unfortunately, it would be
this examiner’s opinion that the
supposed service animals have actually
adversely affected [Father]’s ability to
function in society.”
7. As a result of a permanency review hearing
held on April 20, 2015, the Juvenile Court found that
the parents had only been minimally compliant with
the permanency plan and that there had been
minimal progress toward alleviating the
circumstances necessitating the original placement.
8. Among the Juvenile Judge’s orders, both
parents were to enroll, participate, attend, and
successfully complete parenting skill classes; comply
with the agency social worker in addressing their
mental health issues; no pets were permitted in the
residence; and all pets were to be removed prior to
any consideration of the children’s return home to
either parent’s residence. [Father] was to have a
psychiatric evaluation, which the Court notes he
successfully completed on January 13, 2016
(Respondent Exhibit 2).
9. Another permanency review hearing was
held on September 21, 201[5]. Again the Juvenile
Court found only minimal compliance with the
permanency plan and only minimal progress toward
eliminating the circumstances necessitating the
original placement. Supervised visits were to
continue, and both [Mother] and [Father] were
ordered to submit to random drug screens.
10. [Father] was again evaluated by
Mr. Kashurba resulting in reports of November 5 and
November 12, 2015. Mr. Kashurba noted in his
report:
“It would be this examiner’s
impression that the prognosis for
significant improvement in the parenting
domain would not be substantially
improved and in all likelihood would not
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make positive contribution to the
children. Thus, this examiner has no
choice but to concur with the opinion of
the CYS and home management staff
that permanency through adoption would
be in the children’s best interests.”
11. The results of the January 27, 2016
permanency review hearing are significant in that
the parties again had made only minimal compliance
with the permanency plan, but the Court further
found that the children had been in placement for 15
of the last 22 months, neither parent was a
placement option for the children, and that the
parents had refused to allow the agency to inspect
and photograph any residence since October of that
year. In addition, even with attending mental health
services both parents continued [to] display
significant mental health instability. Both parents
have cognitive limitations that are not likely to
change in a reasonable period of time. The children
need a permanent, consistent environment, and the
goal was changed to adoption.
12. This Court further reviewed in detail
Petitioner’s Exhibit 13, which were court summaries
given to the Juvenile Court in October 2014, April
2015, September 2015, and January 2016.
In the April 13, 2015 court summary it was
noted that the home was found to be in a deplorable
condition, including but not limited to garbage, food,
clothes, dog feces and dog urine on the[] floor and
furniture. Due to the ongoing nature of the house
and the parents’ aggressive conversation with the
social worker, all social worker visits were moved to
the [CYS] Office.
In the September 21, 2015 report, it was
noted that the parents now lived separately from
each other. [Mother] still required constant
redirection to focus on the skills that she was being
taught. The social worker continued to observe
positive progress in her ability to control her
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impulses and aggressive outbursts however. The
social [worker] noted that neither parent appeared
to be able to multitask and supervise and interact
with both children at the same time. When the
social worker addressed making good decisions,
[Father] and [Mother] became very angry and
defensive and verbalized their belief they are fine
because they do not have their children so they are
doing nothing wrong. The parents were not open[]
to changing their lifestyle to demonstrate stability for
their children to return home.
In the final report to the Court dated
January 22, 2016, the social worker noted:
“This social worker continues to
have numerous concerns regarding
[Mother]’s ability to provide for her
children’s basic needs, safety, and
well-being due to her parenting deficit,
cognitive limitations, and mental health.
[Mother] has demonstrated that she is
unable to adequately parent her children
during a two-hour visitation, as well as
maintain a stable lifestyle. It is this
social worker’s opinion [that] due to
[Mother]’s cognitive limitations, her
resistance to participate in parenting
instruction, and her mental health it is
not likely she can remedy these concerns
in a timely manner.
Regarding [Father], he has shown
consistency when parenting one child;
however, he is resistant to social work
services. This social worker has serious
concerns regarding his mental health
stability and his need for changing his
daily functioning. It is this social
worker’s opinion that [because of]
[Father]’s mental health, cognitive
limitations, and unwillingness to change
his daily functioning [] it is also unlikely
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he could alleviate the concerns in a
timely manner.”
13. This Court is well aware that the
termination of parental rights is one of the most
serious and severe steps a court can take. As to
[Father], this Court admits to struggling between
separating the concept of “reasonable doubt” versus
a civil case, clear and convincing evidence. This
Court has examined the individual circumstances of
this case and considered all explanations and
accomplishments as to the [F]ather and the lack of
explanations as to the [M]other on the issues before
the Court.
14. Addressing the best interests of the
children, the Court may rely on the testimony of the
caseworkers and/or social workers. In the report
(Petitioner Exhibit 10), the caseworker and
caseworker supervisor note that:
“[Father] and [Mother] have the
barrier of their mental health and
cognitive limitations that prevent them
from making the necessary significant
changes to provide for their children’s
safety and well-being in a reasonable
period of time. In addition, they lie,
attempt to manipulate, and refuse to
take responsibility for their actions.
[Father] and [Mother] do love the
children. There is no bond between both
parents and [T.S., Jr.] as they have only
seen him three times since his placement
from the hospital on January 15, 2016.
[Mother] has demonstrated minimal
bonding with [A.N.S.] and [J.D.D.] and
with that it was not a true parent-child
bond with either due to her mental
health and cognitive limitations. For the
brief period of time [Father] visited with
[A.N.S.] alone a parent-child bond was
present. Once the visits resumed
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together again both parents paid less
attention and time with [A.N.S.]. The
most significant bond was the bond
between [J.D.D.] and [Father] though
[Father] is not [J.D.D.]’s biological
father.
[J.D.D.] and [A.N.S.] have a
genuine bond with their foster family and
[T.S., Jr.] is bonding with his foster
family which demonstrates that they will
be able to build a healthy bond with an
adoptive family.”
....
16. This Court has found that there does not
presently exist a strong bond between [Mother] and
her three children. In terminating the parental rights
of [Mother], this Court has found that this will best
meet the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the children.
17. In regard to [Father], the Court has found
that any bond that exists is minimal. Further, that in
terminating the rights of [Father] to his two children,
this Court has found that this will best meet the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare of those children.
Order, 12/28/16 at 1-11.
By order entered December 28, 2016, the trial court terminated the
parental rights of both Mother and Father. The trial court determined that
CYS established a basis for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), & (8). (Id. at 11-12.) The trial court also found that termination
best met the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of
the Children under Section 2511(b). (Id. at 10-11.) This timely appeal
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followed. In response to Mother’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal, the trial court relied on its Opinion and
Order of December 28, 2016. (Order, 2/14/17 at 1; docket #18.)1
Mother has raised the following issue for this court’s review on appeal:
“Whether the Court either abused its discretion or committed an error of law
when it granted the Petition for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights,
thereby terminating the parental rights of [Mother] to [the Children][?]”
(Mother’s brief at 2.)
When considering appeals such as the one presently
before us, we are guided by the following:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree
terminating parental rights, we are
limited to determining whether the
decision of the trial court is supported by
competent evidence. Absent an abuse of
discretion, an error of law, or insufficient
evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. Where
a trial court has granted a petition to
involuntarily terminate parental rights,
this Court must accord the hearing
judge’s decision the same deference that
we would give to a jury verdict.
In re: Involuntary Termination of C.W.S.M. and
K.A.L.M., 839 A.2d 410, 414 (Pa.Super. 2003). We
are also aware that:
In a proceeding to involuntarily
terminate parental rights, the burden of
proof is upon the party seeking
termination to establish by “clear and
1
Father filed a separate appeal at No. 218 WDA 2017, assigned to this same
panel.
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convincing” evidence the existence of
grounds for doing so. The standard of
“clear and convincing” evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear,
direct, weighty, and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the
truth of the precise facts in issue.
In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 336 (Pa.Super. 2002)
(quoting In re Adoption of Atencio, 539 Pa. 161,
650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1994)).
In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1003-1104 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
Moreover, an abuse of discretion occurs “when the
course pursued represents not merely an error of
judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly
unreasonable or where the law is not applied or
where the record shows that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. Generally,
[o]ur case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a
bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. In re D.W., 856 A.2d
1231, 1234 (Pa.Super. 2004). Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent.
The party seeking termination must
prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). In re
B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013-14
(Pa.Super. 2001). Only after
determining that the parent’s conduct
warrants termination of his or her
parental rights must the court engage in
the second part of the analysis:
determination of the needs and welfare
of the child under the standard of best
interests of the child. C.M.S., supra,
[884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa.Super.
2005)]; A.C.H., supra, [803 A.2d 224,
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229 (Pa.Super. 2002)]; B.L.L., supra.
Although a needs and welfare analysis is
mandated by the statute, it is distinct
from and not relevant to a determination
of whether the parent’s conduct justifies
termination of parental rights under the
statute. One major aspect of the needs
and welfare analysis concerns the nature
and status of the emotional bond
between parent and child.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 508
(Pa.Super. 2006).
Id. at 1004 (brackets in original).
We need only agree with the orphans’ court as to
any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as
Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc),
appeal denied, 581 Pa. 668, 863 A.2d 1141
(2004). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to
terminate under Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which
provide as follows.
(a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after
a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be
without essential parental
care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or
mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
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***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall
give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of
the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6)
or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the
conditions described therein which are
first initiated subsequent to the giving of
notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215-1216 (Pa.Super. 2015).
In order to terminate parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2),
the following three elements must be
met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control
or subsistence necessary for his physical
or mental well-being; and (3) the causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272
(Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). “The grounds
for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative
misconduct. To the contrary, those grounds may
include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
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perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d
326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citations omitted).
Id. at 1216.
The case was first initiated in August 2014 for lack of mental health
treatment, parenting skills, and budgeting skills. (Notes of testimony,
9/20/16 at 128-129.) In October 2014, the Children were ordered to be
removed. (Id. at 133.) CYS received a report that Mother was beating
J.D.D. and that A.N.S. was soiled and extremely dirty. (Id. at 134; notes of
testimony, 6/22/16 at 79.) A hearing was held on October 20, 2014, and
reunification was the original goal. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 27-28.)
The juvenile court ordered Mother and Father to, inter alia: keep all
appointments with mental health providers and follow through with any
recommendations; complete parenting classes; follow through with the
Independent Family Services (“IFS”) home management program; maintain
a safe, clean, and adequately furnished residence for at least six months;
pay rent, utilities, and other bills on time; permit caseworkers to enter,
inspect, and photograph the home; remove all pets from the residence; and
complete psychiatric evaluations. (Id. at 28.)
The record indicates that Mother failed to comply with the court’s
directives. For example, Mother and Father refused to get rid of the Pitbull
dogs, which was a condition of having the Children returned. At one time,
there were as many as 10 dogs in the residence, including 7 puppies.
(Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 37.) The residence was covered in dog
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feces and smelled of ammonia due to the presence of dog urine. (Id. at
169.) The Pitbull dogs were aggressive, overly protective, and
malnourished, leading to a fear that they would attack the Children. (Notes
of testimony, 9/20/16 at 131, 152-153.) Mr. Lonnie Maldet, a CYS
caseworker, testified that Mother and Father asked for money for dog food
and baby formula. (Id. at 131.) He was concerned that a hungry Pitbull
dog could turn on one of the Children. (Id.) Sabrina Uebel, another CYS
caseworker, testified that there was one cup of dog food for three large
Pitbulls, including one that was pregnant. (Id. at 152.) The baby slept on
the floor with the hungry Pitbulls. (Id.) Ms. Uebel testified that the dogs
were large and aggressive and had to be put in the room upstairs during
CYS visits. (Id. at 152-153.)
The condition of the family’s residence was described as deplorable
and unsanitary. The house was littered with garbage and dog waste. (Notes
of testimony, 6/22/16 at 169.) There was clutter and dried vomit
throughout the house. (Id. at 21-22, 33.) Ashley Shaffer, a licensed social
worker for CYS, testified that the smell made her physically ill. (Id. at 169.)
The kitchen was covered in trash, empty beer bottles, and dirty dishes.
(Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 33.) Louann Gustkey-Patterson, the
parents’ landlord at 482 Rear First Street, testified that the house smelled
like dogs. (Id. at 86, 100.) There was trash in and around the home and
cockroaches. (Id.) Sometimes she was afraid to enter the property. (Id.
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at 99-100.) In addition, the residence was not child-proofed and was
unsafe, with knives lying around within reach of the Children. (Id. at 31,
101, 142.) Mr. Maldet testified that there were pocket knives, hunting
knives, and kitchen knives strewn about, as well as cigarette butts and
lighters. (Id. at 136, 142.) There was evidence of drug and alcohol abuse
at the home. (Id. at 87-90; notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 194-195.)
Mother and Father never complied with the court’s directive to maintain a
consistently safe and clean home.2
Regarding the deplorable conditions, while they would show some
measurable improvement over short periods of time, they would always
return to the status quo. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at 16.)
Ms. Kathy Scaife from IFS testified that some months the house looked okay
and then other months it was terrible. (Id.) The conditions were not
consistently acceptable. (Id. at 17-18.) Ms. Scaife described clothing,
papers, empty food containers, and food wrappers spread throughout the
home. (Id. at 30-31.) She testified that the clutter was a tripping hazard
2
Mother and Father lived at 482 Rear First Street until June 2015, when
they moved to 1122 Ridge Avenue. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 31-33,
59.) At some point in May 2015, Mother moved her belongings to an
apartment at Solomon Homes; however, she continued to reside with
Father. (Id. at 32-33.) Barbara Brzana, a caseworker for CYS,
characterized it as a ruse so that Mother could get the Children back while
Father kept the dogs. (Id. at 38.) Ms. Brzana never saw the inside of the
Solomon Homes apartment since Mother was rarely there, and pursuant to
Johnstown Police Department policy, CYS cannot enter Solomon Homes
without a police escort due to safety concerns. (Id. at 59-60, 62.)
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for the Children. (Id.) According to Ms. Shaffer, in April 2015 she had to
move visits off-site due to poor housekeeping. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16
at 169.) She described dog feces and garbage strewn about the floor, as
well as the odor of urine and marijuana smoke. (Id.) This testimony was
corroborated by Ms. Brzana who described a house full of fecal matter, dried
vomit, clutter, and garbage. (Id. at 33.) On each of three occasions she
visited the home from January 2015 to March 2015, the conditions were the
same. (Id.; notes of testimony, 9/29/16 at 36.)
Ms. Brzana testified that she still has not seen the inside of their
current residence because Mother and Father refused entry, in violation of
the juvenile court order. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 33-36.) Mother
and Father gave numerous excuses for refusing entry. (Id.) Mother also
failed to comply with mental health treatment. (Id. at 36.) She started the
Alternative Community Resource Program (“ACRP”) in February 2015 but
was discharged in September for missing appointments. (Id.)
Ms. Brzana testified that Mother’s parenting skills were very limited.
(Id. at 39.) She had difficulty initiating and maintaining play with the
Children. (Id.) Mother would complain of being tired and direct either
Father or J.D.D. to get things for her. (Id.) Mother and Father would arrive
late and unprepared for supervised visits. (Id. at 39-40.)
Ms. Brzana testified to safety concerns as well. She testified that
A.N.S. was “kind of forgotten” during supervised visits. (Id. at 40.) CYS
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caseworkers would warn Mother and Father of potential injuries to the
Children but they would not react until injuries had already occurred. (Id. at
40-41.) When J.D.D. hit his head and was crying, Mother told him, “Come
over here.” (Id. at 41.) She would not go to him to pick him up and soothe
him. (Id.) According to Ms. Brzana, neither Mother nor Father made
significant progress. (Id. at 42.)
Ms. Brzana also testified regarding ongoing financial pressures.
Mother and Father relied on Father’s social security disability and Mother did
not work. (Id. at 46-47.) Mother was employed for one month from
October 2015 until November 2015 but was terminated for failure to perform
her job duties. (Id. at 47.) Mother did work at the soup kitchen but that
was unpaid; she was required to do community service in order to collect
cash assistance. (Id. at 60.) The parents’ monthly expenses exceeded their
meager income and they were behind on their bills. (Id. at 46-48.)
Mr. Kashurba characterized Mother’s intelligence as between the
normal late 10-year level of development and the early 12-year level of
development. (Id. at 96-97.) Academically, Mother functioned at a
7th grade level. (Id. at 97-98.) Mr. Kashurba observed Mother with the
Children on several occasions. (Id. at 105.) He noted bickering between
Mother and Father during the visitations as well as lack of preparation. (Id.)
His impression was of two teenagers “playing family” while babysitting
someone else’s children. (Id. at 106.) Mr. Kashurba testified that there
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were a variety of tripping hazards left on the floor. (Id.) Mother spent
much of the visit talking to the social worker who was supervising the visit.
(Id.) Mr. Kashurba’s opinion was that Mother would not be able to
adequately parent the Children within a reasonable amount of time. (Id. at
106-107.) Therefore, Mr. Kashurba supported a goal change to permanency
through adoption. (Id. at 108.)
Ms. Shaffer testified that she began working with Mother and Father in
August 2014. (Id. at 166-167.) With regard to Mother, she canceled
6 sessions and failed to show up for 11 sessions. (Id. at 168-169.) Mother
did keep 44 sessions, and Ms. Shaffer also supervised 24 visitations with
Mother. (Id. at 168.) Ms. Shaffer testified that in April 2015, they had to
move the sessions out of the home because of deplorable housekeeping and
also because Mother had threatened the CYS caseworker. (Id. at 169.)
According to Ms. Shaffer, Mother becomes easily overwhelmed during
visitations, has an explosive temper, and poor impulse control. (Id. at 170.)
Ms. Shaffer testified that Mother lacks motivation to parent the Children and
has to be prompted to get up and play with them. (Id.) Mother would
spend most of the time during visitation sitting in a chair either eating or
trying to converse with Ms. Shaffer. (Id.)
Ms. Shaffer did testify that Mother showed some improvement with
regard to her temper. (Id. at 171.) In the beginning, she would yell at
J.D.D. and grab him by the arm. (Id.) Later, she was utilizing the
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“time out” method and was able to better control her anger. (Id.)
However, in other areas, the parents showed limited or no improvement.
(Id.) For example, CYS attempted to work with them on nutrition and
providing healthy lunches for the Children instead of just potato chips and
juice boxes. (Id. at 171-172.) Mother commented that she was too lazy to
walk to the grocery store to buy fruit. (Id. at 172.) On one occasion, they
brought whole, unpeeled carrots for A.N.S. to eat, who had just turned one
year old. (Id.) They did not understand how that could be a choking hazard
for a one-year-old baby. (Id.)
Ms. Shaffer testified that Mother was very defensive and would dismiss
any concerns or suggestions. (Id. at 173.) Mother maintained that she
knew how to parent the Children and did not need CYS’s help. (Id.) Mother
felt that the parenting classes she received in New York State were
sufficient. (Id.)
Similarly, Candice Mishler, a social worker for CYS, testified that
Mother took an inactive role during supervised visits. (Notes of testimony,
9/20/16 at 41.) She described Mother’s approach as “aloof.” (Id. at 42.)
After about 40 minutes, Mother would become overwhelmed and frustrated
and snap at the Children for minor transgressions. (Id. at 42-43.) Mother
struggled with multitasking and had difficulty interacting with both J.D.D.
and A.N.S. simultaneously. (Id. at 45.) This testimony was corroborated by
Ms. Brzana who testified that Mother and Father could not clean up the room
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and dress the Children at the same time. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at
73.) Mother and Father were unable to adequately supervise the Children
due to their problems multitasking. (Id.) In addition, Ms. Mishler testified
that neither Mother nor Father had appropriate insight into the needs of the
Children or their own mental health needs. (Notes of testimony, 9/20/16 at
43.) They denied or refused the need for services. (Id.)
Mother claims that these issues were de minimus and that the
Children were never in any form of danger. (Mother’s brief at 6.) Mother
argues that there were no allegations that the Children were suffering due to
her shortcomings or that the pets posed any legitimate risk. (Id. at 7.) As
set forth at length supra, the Children were in physical and psychological
danger. They were living in filth. Besides the hungry Pitbulls and hunting
knives lying around, there was testimony of ongoing drug use and domestic
violence. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 44, 194-195.) It was readily
apparent to the trial court that despite 15 months of intensive services,
Mother was unable or unwilling to remedy the conditions which led to the
Children’s placement, and they would continue to be at risk if returned to
her care. Our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that
Mother is incapable of parenting the Children and that her parental
incapacity has left the Children without essential parental care or control.
Additionally, it was reasonable for the court to determine that Mother will
not, or cannot, remedy this incapacity.
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Next, we consider whether termination was proper
under Section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) “focuses on
whether termination of parental rights would best
serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of
J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010). As this
Court has explained, “Section 2511(b) does not
explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term
‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
however, provides that analysis of the emotional
bond, if any, between parent and child is a factor to
be considered” as part of our analysis. In re
K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008).
“While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her
child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.”
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)
(citing K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 533-36).
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster parent.
Additionally, this Court stated that the
trial court should consider the
importance of continuity of relationships
and whether any existing parent-child
bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
Id. (quoting In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483
(Pa.Super. 2010)); see also In re T.D., 949 A.2d
910, 920-23 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 601
Pa. 684, 970 A.2d 1148 (2009) (affirming the
termination of parental rights where “obvious
emotional ties exist between T.D. and Parents, but
Parents are either unwilling or unable to satisfy the
irreducible minimum requirements of parenthood,”
and where preserving the Parents’ rights would
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prevent T.D. from being adopted and attaining
permanency).
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219.
Ms. Brzana testified that at the time of the last hearing on
September 29, 2016, J.D.D. was 42 months old and had spent 27 of those
months in out-of-home placement, including 4 months in New York. (Notes
of testimony, 9/29/16 at 38.) A.N.S. was 27 months old and spent only
2 months at home prior to placement with CYS. (Id. at 38-39.) T.S., Jr.,
was 8 months old and had been in CYS’s care since his birth. (Id. at 39.)
Ms. Brzana testified that any bond between J.D.D. and Mother was not a
parent/child bond. (Notes of testimony, 6/22/16 at 43-44.) J.D.D. enjoyed
seeing Mother but did not look at her as a mother figure. (Id. at 44.)
Regarding A.N.S., Ms. Brzana did not see any bond with Mother. (Id.
at 44.) Ms. Brzana testified that, “[A.N.S.] is left to her own devices a lot
during the visits.” (Id.) T.S., Jr., was placed directly from the hospital and
because his permanency goal was changed immediately, Mother and Father
had only monthly visits. (Id.) Ms. Brzana testified that there is no bond
between T.S., Jr., and his parents. (Id.)
Ms. Brzana testified that in her professional opinion, it is in the
Children’s best interests for the goal to be changed to adoption. (Id. at 45.)
J.D.D. has had four different placements in 42 months and needs stability.
(Id.) A.N.S. has thrived in foster care and feels safe and stable. (Id.)
Ms. Brzana testified that A.N.S. connects with her foster parents as though
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they are her mom and dad. (Id.) Regarding T.S., Jr., Ms. Brzana opined
that delaying the adoption process “would be like just holding off the
inevitable.” (Id. at 45-46.) CYS provided both parents with services for
15 months without significant progress. (Id. at 46.)
Ms. Brzana sees the foster parents once a month in their home and
also follows up with e-mail or phone calls at least twice a month. (Id. at
60.) Ms. Brzana has had no issues with the foster parents and has no
concerns about their ability to care for the Children. (Id. at 60-61.) The
trial court found that the Children are successfully bonding with their foster
family, indicating that they will be able to build a healthy bond with an
adoptive family. (Order, 12/28/16 at 10 ¶14.)
The evidence supports the trial court’s determination that it would be
in the Children’s best interests if Mother’s parental rights were terminated.
Clearly, it would not be in the Children’s best interests for their lives to
remain on hold indefinitely in hopes that Mother will one day fulfill her
obligations and be able to act as their parent. See In re Adoption of
C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1220, quoting M.E.P., 825 A.2d at 1276 (“A child’s life
simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” (citations omitted)).
Mother is not entitled to relief.
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Accordingly, because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), we affirm the order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2017
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