State v. A.D. , 305 Neb. 154 ( 2020 )


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    305 Nebraska Reports
    STATE v. A.D.
    Cite as 
    305 Neb. 154
    State of Nebraska, appellee,
    v. A.D., appellant.
    State of Nebraska, appellee,
    v. C.M., appellant.
    ___ N.W.2d ___
    Filed February 28, 2020.   Nos. S-19-583, S-19-678.
    1. Judgments: Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question
    that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate
    court as a matter of law, which requires the appellate court to reach a
    conclusion independent of the lower court’s decision.
    2. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a question of
    law, which an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
    3. Statutes. Where it is possible to harmonize apparently conflicting stat-
    utes, a court should do so.
    4. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. When a lower court lacks the power,
    that is, the subject matter jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a
    claim, issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to
    determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented to the
    lower court.
    5. ____: ____. When an appellate court is without jurisdiction to act, the
    appeal must be dismissed.
    Appeals from the County Court for Sarpy County: Robert
    C. Wester and Todd J. Hutton, Judges. Appeals dismissed.
    Dennis P. Marks, Deputy Sarpy County Public Defender,
    and Mitchell S. Sell, Senior Certified Law Student, for appel-
    lant A.D.
    Todd A. West, Sarpy County Public Defender, Dennis P.
    Marks, Deputy Sarpy County Public Defender, and Mitchell S.
    Sell, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellant C.M.
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    STATE v. A.D.
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    Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Siobhan E.
    Duffy for appellee.
    Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke,
    Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
    Papik, J.
    Appellants in both of these consolidated appeals contend
    that the county court erred by concluding it lacked jurisdic-
    tion to decide motions to transfer their felony criminal cases
    to juvenile court. We conclude that the county court correctly
    found it lacked jurisdiction over the motions to transfer to
    juvenile court. Because the county court lacked jurisdic-
    tion, we find that we too lack jurisdiction and dismiss the
    appeals.
    BACKGROUND
    In both of these consolidated cases, the State filed com-
    plaints in county court charging appellants with felonies. The
    State charged A.D. with first degree sexual assault, a Class II
    felony. The State charged C.M. with possession of a stolen
    firearm, a Class IIA felony. Both offenses were alleged to have
    been committed when appellants were older than 14 years old
    but younger than 18 years old.
    Both A.D. and C.M. filed motions asking the county court
    to transfer their respective cases to juvenile court under Neb.
    Rev. Stat. §§ 29-1816 (Cum. Supp. 2018) and 43-276 (Reissue
    2016). In both cases, the State argued that the county court did
    not have jurisdiction to decide a motion to transfer to juvenile
    court in felony cases. And in both cases, after a hearing, the
    county court issued orders stating that it did not have juris-
    diction to rule on a motion to transfer to juvenile court and
    scheduled preliminary hearings.
    Before a preliminary hearing was held in either case,
    appellants filed notices of appeal. We moved the appeals
    to our docket and consolidated them for oral argument and
    disposition.
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    STATE v. A.D.
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    ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    Both appellants claim that the county court erred in one
    respect: by holding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on their
    respective motions to transfer to juvenile court.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    [1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual
    dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law,
    which requires the appellate court to reach a conclusion inde-
    pendent of the lower court’s decision. Green v. Seiffert, 
    304 Neb. 212
    , 
    933 N.W.2d 590
    (2019).
    [2] Statutory interpretation is a question of law, which
    an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court.
    Griffith v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 
    304 Neb. 287
    , 
    934 N.W.2d 169
    (2019).
    ANALYSIS
    This case presents multiple jurisdictional arguments.
    Appellants argue that the county court erred by finding it
    lacked jurisdiction to decide their motions to transfer to juve-
    nile court. The State contends that the county court correctly
    determined it lacked jurisdiction of the motions to transfer to
    juvenile court in felony cases. Alternatively, the State contends
    that the orders at issue are not final and appealable, an argu-
    ment we discuss briefly below.
    Final Order.
    In State v. Bluett, 
    295 Neb. 369
    , 
    889 N.W.2d 83
    (2016),
    we held that a trial court’s denial of a motion to transfer to
    juvenile court was not a final, appealable order. In response
    to our decision, the Legislature amended § 29-1816 to provide
    that “[a]n order granting or denying transfer of [a] case from
    county or district court to juvenile court” may be appealed
    to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, provided a party files a
    notice of appeal within 10 days of the entry of such an order.
    § 29-1816(3)(c). See 2017 Neb. Laws, L.B. 11, § 1. See, also,
    State v. Uhing, 
    301 Neb. 768
    , 
    919 N.W.2d 909
    (2018). Both
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    appellants filed notices of appeal within 10 days of the county
    court orders at issue, but the State argues that the county court
    declined to rule on the motions to transfer, as opposed to grant-
    ing or denying them, and that thus, the orders are not covered
    by § 29-1816(3)(c) and are not appealable.
    It is unnecessary to resolve whether the orders appealed from
    were orders “denying transfer” for purposes of § 29-1816(3)(c).
    Even if they were, we find that we lack jurisdiction over these
    appeals and are obligated to dismiss them for another reason,
    as we explain in more detail below.
    County Court Jurisdiction Over
    Motions to Transfer Felony
    Cases to Juvenile Court.
    As noted above, appellants’ central argument in these appeals
    is that county courts have jurisdiction to decide motions to
    transfer felony cases to juvenile court. Any case in which the
    scope of a county court’s authority is at issue must begin with
    the understanding that county courts are statutorily created
    courts which possess limited jurisdiction. See In re Estate of
    Evertson, 
    295 Neb. 301
    , 
    889 N.W.2d 73
    (2016). More spe-
    cifically, county courts have only that jurisdiction which has
    been granted to them through specific legislative enactment.
    See
    id. And while
    county courts have been given jurisdiction
    of criminal matters classified as misdemeanors or infractions
    via Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-517 (Cum. Supp. 2018), that statute
    does not provide for county court jurisdiction over felonies. In
    State v. Schanaman, 
    286 Neb. 125
    , 
    835 N.W.2d 66
    (2013), we
    cited § 24-517 for the proposition that county courts cannot try
    felony cases.
    While we were correct in Schanaman to note that § 24-517
    does not generally grant county courts jurisdiction over felo-
    nies, other statutes do authorize county court judges to play
    a role in felony matters. For example, in those counties that
    do not have separate juvenile courts, county court judges
    can, sitting as a juvenile court, preside in proceedings against
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    juveniles who are alleged to have committed a felony. See,
    Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-245(12) (Supp. 2019); Neb. Rev. Stat.
    § 43-246.01(1)(d) and (2)(b) (Reissue 2016). See, also, In re
    Interest of Tyrone K., 
    295 Neb. 193
    , 
    887 N.W.2d 489
    (2016).
    Another statute authorizes county court judges to act as a dis-
    trict judge in Class IV felony cases, even without the consent
    of the parties. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-312 (Reissue 2016).
    The authority of the county court to act as a juvenile court or
    district court as described is not at issue in these appeals.
    Our opinion in 
    Schanaman, supra
    , discussed another func-
    tion county courts are authorized to serve in felony cases. As
    we noted, “a felony charge generally originates by complaint
    in county court, but after a preliminary hearing and prob-
    able cause finding, the county court must bind the defendant
    over to the district court.”
    Id. at 131,
    835 N.W.2d at 70. The
    authority of county courts to conduct preliminary hearings
    in felony cases referred to in Schanaman is derived from
    other statutes. As we explained in State v. Wilkinson, 
    219 Neb. 685
    , 686, 
    365 N.W.2d 478
    , 479 (1985), when a county
    court judge conducts a preliminary hearing, he or she is act-
    ing as an “examining magistrate,” pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
    §§ 29-201, 29-504, and 29-506 (Reissue 2016), and has only
    the authority to discharge the defendant or, upon a probable
    cause finding, bind the defendant over to the district court for
    further proceedings.
    The county court concluded in these matters that its author-
    ity was limited to conducting a preliminary hearing and that
    thus, a motion to transfer to juvenile court could only be
    decided by the district court in the event probable cause was
    found and the case was bound over. Appellants argue that the
    county court misunderstood its authority and that it is autho-
    rized to decide a motion to transfer to juvenile court even in
    felony cases.
    In support of this argument, appellants rely on several
    statutes that they contend provide such authority. First, they
    direct us to § 43-246.01(3), a statute that provides that juvenile
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    courts shall have “[c]oncurrent original jurisdiction with the
    county court or district court” in several categories of cases.
    One such category is cases involving juveniles that were
    younger than 18 years old and were 14 years old or older
    “when an alleged offense punishable as a Class I, IA, IB, IC,
    ID, II, or IIA felony was committed.” § 29-1816(1)(a)(ii). See
    § 43-246.01(3)(c).
    Appellants also find support for their position in § 29-1816,
    the statute discussing motions to transfer to juvenile court, and
    invoke the following portions of that statute:
    (1)(a) The accused may be arraigned in county court or
    district court:
    (i) If the accused was eighteen years of age or older
    when the alleged offense was committed;
    (ii) If the accused was younger than eighteen years
    of age and was fourteen years of age or older when an
    alleged offense punishable as a Class I, IA, IB, IC, ID, II,
    or IIA felony was committed;
    (iii) If the alleged offense is a traffic offense as defined
    in section 43-245; or
    (iv) Until January 1, 2017, if the accused was seven-
    teen years of age when an alleged offense described in
    subdivision (1) of section 43-247 was committed.
    (b) Arraignment in county court or district court shall
    be by reading to the accused the complaint or informa-
    tion, unless the reading is waived by the accused when
    the nature of the charge is made known to him or her. The
    accused shall then be asked whether he or she is guilty or
    not guilty of the offense charged. If the accused appears
    in person and by counsel and goes to trial before a jury
    regularly impaneled and sworn, he or she shall be deemed
    to have waived arraignment and a plea of not guilty shall
    be deemed to have been made.
    (2) At the time of the arraignment, the county court or
    district court shall advise the accused, if the accused was
    younger than eighteen years of age at the time the alleged
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    offense was committed, that the accused may move the
    county court or district court at any time not later than
    thirty days after arraignment, unless otherwise permitted
    by the court for good cause shown, to waive jurisdiction
    in such case to the juvenile court for further proceedings
    under the Nebraska Juvenile Code.
    Appellants contend that §§ 43-246.01 and 29-1816 give
    county courts the power to decide motions to transfer to
    juvenile court in felony cases. They contend that by its plain
    language, § 43-246.01(3)(c) gives county courts concurrent
    jurisdiction of cases involving juveniles charged with the enu-
    merated felonies. If that were not enough, they contend that
    § 29-1816(1)(a) authorizes county courts to conduct arraign-
    ments in those cases. And finally, they argue that the advise-
    ment at arraignment required by § 29-1816(2) indicates that
    the accused may seek transfer in either county court or dis-
    trict court.
    The State interprets each of these statutes differently. It
    argues that each time the statutes mentioned above refer to
    “county court or district court,” they do so against the back-
    drop of the jurisdiction that has been granted to those respec-
    tive courts. So, according to the State, § 43-246.01(3)(c)
    should not be read to give county courts and district courts
    (along with juvenile courts) concurrent jurisdiction over all of
    the enumerated categories of cases, but to give juvenile courts
    concurrent jurisdiction with county courts over those cases for
    which the county court has jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdic-
    tion with district courts over those cases for which the district
    court has jurisdiction.
    The State urges us to interpret § 29-1816 in a similar fash-
    ion. It argues that statute should be understood to give county
    courts the authority to arraign defendants and decide motions
    to transfer to juvenile court in cases in which it has jurisdic-
    tion over the underlying charge and to give district courts the
    same authority in cases in which it has jurisdiction over the
    underlying charge. Under the State’s interpretation, the county
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    court could not entertain the motions to transfer to juvenile
    court, because it did not have jurisdiction to try these cases
    in which appellants were charged with Class II and Class IIA
    felonies. Although it does not appear we were addressing this
    particular issue, language in one of our recent opinions is con-
    sistent with the State’s interpretation. See State v. Tyler P., 
    299 Neb. 959
    , 967, 
    911 N.W.2d 260
    , 266-67 (2018) (“in deciding
    whether to grant the requested waiver and to transfer the pro-
    ceedings to juvenile court, the court having jurisdiction over
    a pending criminal prosecution must carefully consider the
    juvenile’s request in the light of the criteria or factors set forth
    in § 43-276”) (emphasis supplied).
    Appellants contend that their interpretation gives effect to
    the plain language of the statutes at issue and that the State’s
    does not. In our view, however, both sides present plausible
    interpretations of the plain language of the statutes if that lan-
    guage is viewed in isolation. Statutes, however, are not prop-
    erly interpreted in isolation. See State v. Jedlicka, ante p. 52,
    ___ N.W.2d ___ (2020). Rather, when interpreting a statute,
    well-established principles of statutory interpretation require a
    court to take account of context and of other statutes pertaining
    to the same subject. See
    id. As we
    will explain below, those
    principles lead us to conclude that the State’s interpretation is
    correct and that county courts have not been given authority to
    decide motions to transfer to juvenile court in cases in which
    they lack jurisdiction to try the case.
    First, we note that the interpretations offered by appel-
    lants sweep much more broadly than they are willing to
    acknowledge. Appellants assert repeatedly that § 43-246.01(3)
    gives county courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases involv-
    ing juveniles who are between 14 and 18 years old accused
    of Class I and Class II felonies. Appellants attempt to cabin
    their argument, however, by conceding that county courts can-
    not decide the merits of these felony cases and contending
    that this case involves only the authority of a county court to
    decide a motion to transfer to juvenile court. But appellants’
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    textual argument cannot logically stop at a motion to transfer
    to juvenile court. If county courts truly have concurrent juris-
    diction over cases in which juveniles are accused of Class I
    and Class II felonies, they have jurisdiction to decide not only
    motions to transfer but also the merits of such cases.
    In addition, if, as appellants contend, the authority to
    arraign defendants given to county courts and district courts in
    § 29-1816(1)(a) is made without reference to existing jurisdic-
    tional limitations, county courts’ authority would be expanded
    in another way. One type of case listed in that statute is one in
    which “the accused was eighteen years of age or older when
    the alleged offense was committed.” § 29-1816(1)(a)(i). Under
    appellants’ interpretation then, county courts would have the
    authority to conduct an arraignment and, presumably, accept a
    guilty plea in any case in which a defendant 18 years of age or
    older was charged with a felony.
    Interpreting the statutes discussed above as appellants sug-
    gest would significantly expand the authority of county courts
    over felony cases. While § 24-517 does not confer jurisdiction
    over felony cases to county courts, appellants’ interpretations
    would result in county courts having jurisdiction to try cer-
    tain felony cases and to conduct arraignments in many oth-
    ers. One would expect such significant expansions of county
    court authority to be stated in much clearer terms. As the U.S.
    Supreme Court memorably observed, legislative bodies do “not
    alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague
    terms or ancillary provisions—[they do] not, one might say,
    hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. American Trucking
    Assns., Inc., 
    531 U.S. 457
    , 468, 
    121 S. Ct. 903
    , 
    149 L. Ed. 2d 1
    (2001).
    Appellants’ interpretation has other problems. As the State
    points out, it creates conflicts with other statutes. Section
    43-246.01(3)(b) states that the juvenile court shall have con-
    current original jurisdiction with the county court or district
    court as to juveniles described in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(9)
    (Reissue 2016). That section refers to adoption or guardianship
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    proceedings for a child over which the juvenile court already
    has jurisdiction. Under appellants’ interpretation of § 43-246.01,
    the district court would have concurrent jurisdiction over such
    adoption proceedings. Section 24-517(11), however, provides
    that if a separate juvenile court already has jurisdiction over
    the child to be adopted, the county court has concurrent juris-
    diction with the separate juvenile court. No mention is made of
    the district court.
    [3] Where it is possible to harmonize apparently conflicting
    statutes, a court should do so. Salem Grain Co. v. City of Falls
    City, 
    302 Neb. 548
    , 
    924 N.W.2d 678
    (2019). Interpreting the
    references to “county court or district court” in §§ 43-246.01
    and 29-1816, in light of the jurisdiction granted to those courts
    elsewhere, results in no such conflicts. This interpretation also
    still allows juvenile offenders to seek transfer to juvenile court
    when the county court does not have jurisdiction to decide the
    case. It merely requires that in such cases, they seek transfer in
    the district court after the case is bound over.
    Perhaps recognizing the problems posed by their reliance on
    §§ 43-246.01 and 29-1816, appellants shifted course in their
    reply brief and primarily argued that county courts have juris-
    diction to decide motions to transfer to juvenile court in felony
    cases by analogizing to county courts’ authority to conduct
    preliminary hearings in felony cases. Appellants suggest that
    just as a county court can find probable cause and bind over
    a felony case to district court for disposition of the merits, it
    should be able to decide that a case alleging a felony should
    be transferred to juvenile court for further proceedings. But
    appellants’ analogy is flawed. As noted above, county courts
    have authority to conduct preliminary hearings in felony cases
    because statutes specifically authorize them to do so. Those
    same statutes cannot be interpreted to authorize county courts
    to decide motions to transfer to juvenile court. See §§ 29-201,
    29-504, and 29-506.
    Finally, we note that throughout their briefing and again in
    oral argument, appellants have emphasized that juveniles will
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    benefit from having a transfer motion decided as soon as pos-
    sible and that such motions can be resolved sooner in felony
    cases if they can be decided in county court. All of this may
    be true, but it is also a policy argument about whether county
    courts should have the power to decide motions to transfer
    to juvenile court in felony cases. That is a question for the
    Legislature to resolve rather than this court. See Rogers v.
    Jack’s Supper Club, 
    304 Neb. 605
    , 614, 
    935 N.W.2d 754
    , 762
    (2019) (“[b]ut we are not tasked with selecting what we believe
    is the best policy”). Our role is limited to deciding whether
    the Legislature has given county courts the authority to decide
    motions to transfer to juvenile court in these cases. For all the
    reasons discussed herein, we conclude it has not.
    [4,5] When a lower court lacks the power, that is, the sub-
    ject matter jurisdiction, to adjudicate the merits of a claim,
    issue, or question, an appellate court also lacks the power to
    determine the merits of the claim, issue, or question presented
    to the lower court. In re Estate of Evertson, 
    295 Neb. 301
    , 
    889 N.W.2d 73
    (2016). When an appellate court is without juris-
    diction to act, the appeal must be dismissed.
    Id. Because the
    county court lacked jurisdiction over the motions to transfer,
    we lack jurisdiction over these appeals and must dismiss.
    CONCLUSION
    Because we conclude we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss the
    appeals.
    Appeals dismissed.