Holcim (US) Inc. and Holcim Texas Limited Partnership v. Ellis County Appraisal District ( 2021 )


Menu:
  •                            In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-20-00096-CV
    HOLCIM (US) INC. AND HOLCIM TEXAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Appellants
    V.
    ELLIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 40th District Court
    Ellis County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 104026
    Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
    Opinion by Justice Stevens
    OPINION
    Holcim (US) Inc. and Holcim Texas Limited Partnership (collectively Holcim) appeal the
    trial court’s order granting a plea to the jurisdiction filed by the Ellis County Appraisal District
    (District). In a single issue, Holcim argues that the trial court erred by granting the plea to the
    jurisdiction and dismissing its lawsuit, which sought to challenge the District’s valuation of
    Holcim’s property for tax purposes. We affirm the trial court’s order of dismissal for want of
    jurisdiction.1
    I.      Standard of Review
    Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that is properly
    asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 
    133 S.W.3d 217
    , 224 (Tex. 2004). We review the trial court’s ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo.
    Chambers-Liberty Ctys. Navigation Dist. v. State, 
    575 S.W.3d 339
    , 345 (Tex. 2019). This case
    also presents questions of statutory construction, which we also review de novo. 
    Id.
    A plea to the jurisdiction can challenge either the pleadings or the existence of
    jurisdictional facts. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Where, as here, ‘“a plea to the
    jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts, we consider relevant evidence
    submitted by the parties when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised,’ even where
    those facts may implicate the merits of the cause of action.” City of Waco v. Kirwan, 
    298 S.W.3d 618
    , 622 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227).
    1
    Originally appealed to the Tenth Court of Appeals, this case was transferred to this Court by the Texas Supreme
    Court pursuant to its docket equalization efforts. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. We are unaware of any
    conflict between precedent of the Tenth Court of Appeals and that of this Court on any relevant issue. See TEX. R.
    APP. P. 41.3.
    2
    Parties may submit evidence supporting or opposing the plea, which we review under the
    same standard applicable to a traditional motion for summary judgment. Chambers-Liberty Ctys.
    Navigation Dist., 575 S.W.3d at 345 (citing Sampson v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 
    500 S.W.3d 380
    ,
    384 (Tex. 2016)). “[W]e take as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff, indulging every
    reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the plaintiff’s favor.” Sampson v. Univ. of Tex.
    at Austin, 
    500 S.W.3d 380
    , 384 (Tex. 2016). “[I]f the relevant evidence . . . fails to raise a fact
    question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the jurisdiction as a matter
    of law.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. But if the evidence creates a fact question regarding the
    jurisdictional issue, then the trial court must deny the plea to the jurisdiction and allow the fact-
    finder to resolve the issue. Id. at 227–28.
    II.    Administrative Procedures Under the Texas Tax Code and Relevant Caselaw
    An understanding of the parties’ arguments in this case requires an upfront examination
    of the Texas Tax Code, which “provides detailed administrative procedures for those who would
    contest their property taxes.” Bundren v. Collin Cent. Appraisal Dist., No. 05-18-01048-CV,
    
    2019 WL 6649053
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 6, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Cameron
    Appraisal Dist. v. Rourk, 
    194 S.W.3d 501
    , 502 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (citing TEX. TAX CODE
    ANN. §§ 41.01–.71)). “The administrative procedures are ‘exclusive’ and most defenses are
    barred if not raised therein.” Id. (quoting Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at 502 (citing TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
    § 42.09)).
    “A property owner is entitled to protest before the appraisal review board the . . .
    determination of the appraised value of the owner’s property or, in the case of land appraised
    3
    . . . [a] determination of its appraised or market value.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.41(a)(1)
    (Supp.). On the filing of a protest, the appraisal review board must schedule a hearing. TEX.
    TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45(a) (Supp.). “A taxpayer may ‘appear’ before the [Appraisal Board] in
    person, through a representative, or by means of an affidavit.” Webb Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. New
    Laredo Hotel, Inc., 
    792 S.W.2d 952
    , 953 (Tex. 1990). Section 41.45(b) of the Texas Tax Code
    reads:
    A property owner initiating a protest is entitled to appear to offer evidence or
    argument. A property owner may offer evidence or argument by affidavit without
    personally appearing and may appear by telephone conference call or
    videoconference to offer argument. A property owner who appears by telephone
    conference call or videoconference must offer any evidence by affidavit. A
    property owner must submit an affidavit described by this subsection to the board
    hearing the protest before the board begins the hearing on the protest.
    TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45(b). Also, “[a] property owner who is entitled as provided by this
    chapter to appear at a hearing may appear by himself or by his agent.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
    § 41.66(c) (Supp.).    After a hearing, “[t]he appraisal review board hearing a protest shall
    determine the protest and make its decision by written order.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.47(a)
    (Supp.). “A property owner is entitled to appeal . . . an order of the appraisal review board
    determining . . . a protest by the property owner as provided by Subchapter C of Chapter 41.”
    TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(1)(A) (Supp.).
    Despite the language stating that a property owner “may” appear or is “entitled” to
    appear, the Texas Supreme Court has determined that “Chapter 41 of the Texas Tax Code
    assumes appearance.” Webb Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. New Laredo Hotel, Inc., 
    792 S.W.2d 952
    ,
    953 (Tex. 1990) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 41.45, 41.66(c)). “Put simply, it is not a
    4
    question of whether the taxpayer must appear, but rather how the taxpayer will make its
    appearance.” Id. This is because an appraisal board “must have evidence before it from which it
    can determine if the property was overvalued.” Id. at 953–54. As a result, the Texas Supreme
    Court has held that “taxpayers contesting property valuation must appear, either personally, by
    representative, or by affidavit, at the protest hearing as a prerequisite to an appeal to district
    court.” Id. at 955. In so holding, it explained that a ruling otherwise
    would be the emasculation of the administrative hearing process. Filing a protest
    would become merely one more hoop to jump through before appealing to district
    court. It would not be inconceivable for a taxpayer to file a protest with the
    appraisal review board and simultaneously file a petition in district court based on
    the alleged overevaluation. By requesting a trial date after the review board’s
    hearing, the taxpayer could merely amend his petition to reflect the board’s
    decision if the protest was denied, or dismiss the suit if the protest was granted.
    The intent of the administrative review process is to resolve the majority of tax
    protests at this level, thereby relieving the burden on the court system. The
    corollary to this rule is that judicial review of administrative orders is not
    available unless all administrative remedies have been pursued to the fullest
    extent.
    . . . . [I]f the taxpayer is not required to appear at the protest hearing in order to
    appeal to district court, the administrative hearing process would become useless.
    Id. at 954 (citations omitted). As a result, “a taxpayer’s failure to pursue an appraisal review
    board proceeding deprives the courts of jurisdiction to decide most matters relating to ad valorem
    taxes.” Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at 502; Bundren, 
    2019 WL 6649053
    , at *2; see Atascosa Cty.
    Appraisal Dist. v. Tymrak, 
    858 S.W.2d 335
    , 336 (Tex. 1993); Aramco Associated Co. v. Harris
    Cty. Appraisal Dist., 
    33 S.W.3d 361
    , 364 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (“As a
    prerequisite to appeal to the district court, a taxpayer contesting property evaluation is required
    5
    to appear at the protest hearing either personally, by representative, or by affidavit.”) (citing New
    Laredo Hotel, 792 S.W.2d at 954–55).
    Even so, the Texas Tax Code provides relief in certain circumstances when there is a
    failure to appear. Section 41.45(e-1) states,
    A property owner or a person designated by the property owner as the owner’s
    agent to represent the owner at the hearing who fails to appear at the hearing is
    entitled to a new hearing if the property owner or the owner’s agent files, not later
    than the fourth day after the date the hearing occurred, a written statement with
    the appraisal review board showing good cause for the failure to appear and
    requesting a new hearing.
    TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45(e-1) (Supp.) (emphasis added).2 Also, amendments made by the
    Texas Legislature in 2019 to the Texas Tax Code provide additional relief. Section 42.01, which
    states:
    (a)      A property owner is entitled to appeal:
    ....
    (E)   that the appraisal review board lacks jurisdiction to finally
    determine a protest by the property owner under Subchapter C, Chapter
    41, . . . because the property owner failed to comply with a requirement of
    Subchapter C, Chapter 41 . . . .
    ....
    2
    “[G]ood cause . . . means a reason that includes an error or mistake that: (1) was not intentional or the result of
    conscious indifference, and (2) will not cause undue delay or other injury to the person authorized to extend the
    deadline or grant a rescheduling.” TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45 (e-2) (Supp.).
    6
    (c)     A property owner who establishes that the appraisal review board
    had jurisdiction to issue a final determination of the protest by the property owner
    under Subchapter C, Chapter 41, . . . in an appeal under Subsection (a)(1)(E) of
    this section is entitled to a final determination by the court of the protest under
    Subchapter C, Chapter 41.
    TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(E), (c) (Supp.). Section 42.231 provides,
    (a)     This section applies only to an appeal by a property owner of an
    order of the appraisal review board determining:
    (1)    a protest by the property owner as provided by Subchapter C,
    Chapter 41; or
    (2)     a motion filed by the property owner under Section 25.25.
    (b)     Subject to the provisions of this section and notwithstanding any
    other law, if a plea to the jurisdiction is filed in the appeal on the basis that the
    property owner failed to exhaust the property owner’s administrative remedies,
    the court may, in lieu of dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, remand the
    action to the appraisal review board with instructions to allow the property owner
    an opportunity to cure the property owner’s failure to exhaust administrative
    remedies.
    TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.231(a)–(b) (Supp.).
    III.   Factual Background
    Holcim filed a protest challenging the District’s valuation of its property and hired
    counsel to represent it in front of the Ellis Appraisal Review Board (ARB). On June 8, 2020,
    Amber Brackens, a District employee, sent notices of a June 23 ARB hearing date by regular
    mail and email to Holcim’s counsel. It is undisputed that counsel received the hearing notices.
    The hearing notices explained that evidence was required at the hearing and warned, “[Y]our
    protest may be dismissed if you fail to appear,” and “Failure to appear at your hearing either in
    person, by sending a sworn affidavit containing evidence to support your protest, or by an
    7
    authorized agent may jeopardize your right to appeal the appraisal review board’s decision to
    district court.” The hearing notice also stated,
    ALL EVIDENCE YOU WOULD LIKE THE ARB TO CONSIDER MUST BE
    SUBMITTED PRIOR TO YOUR HEARING and if you are offering
    TESTIMONY, please also send the enclosed AFFIDAVIT of SWORN
    TESTIMONY as well. This will be reviewed by the ARB at the beginning of the
    hearing.
    ....
    If you decide to submit an affidavit or declaration, please make sure it identifies
    you as the property owner and your address . . . and that i[t] shows the date and
    time of the hearing. For an affidavit to be considered, WE MUST RECEIVE IT
    AT THE HEARING LOCATION SHOWN ABOVE PRIOR TO YOUR
    HEARING.
    It is undisputed that no one appeared on Holcim’s behalf at the hearing. On the day of
    the hearing, Brackens contacted Holcim’s counsel’s office and asked whether they had submitted
    an affidavit. In response, “[a] representative” from counsel’s firm “indicated the affidavit was
    mailed certified.” Because no evidence was received at the hearing and there was no request to
    postpone the hearing, the ARB issued a notice of dismissal of Holcim’s protest on June 29. The
    dismissal notice stated, “The property owner failed to appear either in person, by authorized
    agent, by affidavit, or by telephone” at the hearing. As a result, the notice stated that the protest
    was forfeited by the failure to appear and was dismissed. It is undisputed that no written request
    showing good cause for failing to appear was made within four days after the hearing as required
    by Section 41.45 to obtain a new hearing. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45(e-1).
    On July 9, Jana Fletcher, an employee of Holcim’s counsel’s firm, emailed Brackens to
    ask whether the hearings had been rescheduled because the ARB had received the affidavits after
    8
    the hearing. In response, Brackens wrote, “ARB and Chief Appraiser has requested a good cause
    letter.” On July 10, 2020, a letter from Holcim’s counsel stated that the firm had mailed by
    certified mail affidavits to be considered at the hearing on June 18, 2020, but the postal service
    had failed to “log the mail package into their system . . . until June 20” or timely deliver them.
    Holcim’s counsel said he first became aware of this issue on the day of the hearing when
    Brackens called the firm. Fletcher swore that she had mailed the hearing affidavits by certified
    mail on June 18 and gave the tracking numbers to Brackens when she called on the date of the
    hearing.
    On August 20, 2020, Holcim appealed to the 40th Judicial District Court of Ellis County
    and argued that the properties’ appraised value exceeded the market value. Holcim’s petition
    requested that the protest be remanded to the ARB pursuant to Section 42.231 of the Texas Tax
    Code. Even so, Holcim’s prayer requested that the trial court order an appraisal and “fix and
    determine the Property’s appraised value to be no more than its market value.”
    The District filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction
    because Holcim failed to exhaust administrative remedies and never requested a new hearing
    under Section 41.45(e-1).3 The District attached the affidavit of Kathy Rodrigue, its chief
    appraiser, stating that Brackens reviewed her emails and other records before the hearing to
    make sure that no affidavit in support of the protest had been received. Rodrigue said she never
    instructed Brackens to contact anyone to inquire about affidavits related to Holcim’s accounts
    and that she was not authorized to extend any deadlines under the Texas Tax Code. Rodrigue
    3
    The District also raised the issue of governmental immunity.
    9
    also said Brackens did not inform her of the July 9 email and that she was not directed or
    authorized to respond to Fletcher’s email.
    In its response to the plea to the jurisdiction, Holcim argued that the ARB knew on the
    day of the hearing that Holcim had timely mailed the affidavits, that Holcim wanted to pursue its
    protest and that there was good cause to reschedule the hearing.4 Holcim also argued that
    Section 42.231 allowed the trial court to remand the protest. At trial, Holcim represented that
    “[t]he language of [S]ection 42.231 is permissive because if it were mandatory, Plaintiffs or any
    other property owner could conceivably do absolutely nothing and attempt to bypass the
    administrative level and go directly to the district court.”
    The trial court granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction after finding that (1) the ARB
    did not receive the hearing affidavits before the hearing, (2) Holcim was notified that the ARB
    had not received the affidavits before the protest hearing but did not request a postponement of
    the hearing, (3) the ARB dismissed Holcim’s protest due to failure to appear, (4) Holcim was
    entitled to a new hearing if requested not later than the 4th day after June 23 but did not timely
    request a hearing or timely submit a letter showing good cause, (5) Holcim did not avail itself of
    the administrative remedies outlined in Section 41.45(e-1), and (6) exhaustion of administrative
    remedies was a prerequisite to appeal. As a result, the trial court dismissed Holcim’s petition for
    want of jurisdiction.
    4
    The hearing affidavits, which are not included in our appellate record, were required to meet the standards set forth
    by Section 41.45(i). See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.45(i) (Supp.).
    10
    IV.    Analysis
    It is undisputed that Holcim received timely notice of the hearing but failed to appear in
    person, by affidavit, or by any other method. As a result, the ARB had no evidence to consider
    at the hearing and dismissed Holcim’s protest. Holcim argues that the postal service’s failure to
    deliver timely mailed documents constituted good cause for a new hearing, but it is also
    undisputed that Holcim failed to request, within four days of the hearing, a new hearing based on
    good cause and that no determination on the issue of good cause was made by the ARB.
    “Property owners may not pursue judicial relief regarding a tax protest until they have
    exhausted administrative remedies.” Fort Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. McGee Chapel Baptist
    Church, 
    611 S.W.3d 443
    , 448 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). Holcim’s
    petition requested an appeal on the merits of his property tax protest, but the ARB never decided
    the merits, which was a prerequisite to obtaining the relief requested by Holcim’s prayer. See
    New Laredo Hotel, 792 S.W.2d at 955; Fort Bend Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. McGee Chapel
    Baptist Church, 
    611 S.W.3d 443
    , 451 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.); Aramco
    Associated Co., 
    33 S.W.3d at 364
    . We find that Holcim’s failure to follow the procedures of
    Chapter 41 deprived the trial court of jurisdiction. See Rourk, 194 S.W.3d at 502; New Laredo
    Hotel, 792 S.W.2d at 954–55; Bundren, 
    2019 WL 6649053
    , at *3 (“By failing to appear at the
    hearing or otherwise present evidence to the ARB, appellants failed to exhaust their
    administrative remedies and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider their complaints related
    to ad valorem taxes.”).
    11
    Even so, Holcim argues that the provisions of Sections 42.01 and 42.231 apply and
    confer jurisdiction on the trial court. We disagree.
    Section 42.01 allows an appeal from a lack of jurisdiction determination. See TEX. TAX
    CODE ANN. § 42.01(a)(1)(E) (Supp.). Holcim’s petition sought “a judicial determination of the
    appropriate tax treatment of its property for the tax year.” Holcim requested that the trial court,
    among other things, “fix and determine the Property’s appraised value to be no more than its
    market value,” “order the Property’s appraised value according to the appraisal roll reduced to no
    more than the appraised value determined by the Court,” “order the Property appraised equally
    and uniformly in accordance with the law,” and “remove or reduce to the lawful amount any tax
    liens upon the Property in favor of the taxing units.” Essentially, the petition sought a trial de
    novo of the valuation of the property even though the ARB did not make a final determination on
    the protest.   The petition did not mention Section 42.01 and did not appeal any lack of
    jurisdiction determination to the trial court. The District points out that it did not dismiss the
    protest for lack of jurisdiction, but because it determined that Holcim forfeited the protest by
    failing to appear. Because Holcim did not appeal a lack of jurisdiction determination, Section
    42.01 did not serve to confer jurisdiction over the claims asserted or the relief requested by
    Holcim.
    Holcim also requested a remand for a new hearing under Section 42.231, but that section
    only applies when an appraisal review board has entered an order determining the protest. See
    TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.231(a).          Because Holcim’s protest was dismissed, rather than
    determined, Section 42.231 does not apply.
    12
    We find that the trial court properly granted the District’s plea to the jurisdiction. As a
    result, we overrule Holcim’s sole point of error.
    V.     Conclusion
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Scott E. Stevens
    Justice
    Date Submitted:        June 1, 2021
    Date Decided:          November 18, 2021
    13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-20-00096-CV

Filed Date: 11/18/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/24/2021