Greenwell v. Palani Ranch Company, Inc. ( 2021 )


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  • NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI'I] REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
    Electronically Filed
    Intermediate Court of Appeals
    CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    26-NOV-2021
    07:58 AM
    Dkt. 77 MO
    NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
    IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
    OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
    ROBERT KELSHAW GREENWELL and LOU ELLEN LAMBERT,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    Vv.
    PALANI RANCH COMPANY, INC.; HSA-UWC, a Hawai‘i corporation,
    GUY C. MIRANDA; JERRAE A. MIRANDA; CAROL ADAMSON GREENWELL,
    Successor Trustee of the F.R. Peter Greenwell Trust, dated
    October 23, 1989, as amended;
    CAROL ADAMSON GREENWELL, Trustee of the Carol Adamson
    Greenwell Trust, dated October 23, 1989, as amended,
    Defendants—-Appellees,
    and
    DOE DEFENDANTS 1-20, Defendants
    APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    (CIVIL NO. 13-1-636K)
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    (By: Ginoza, Chief Judge, Wadsworth and McCullen, JJ.)
    Plaintiffs-Appellants Robert Kelshaw Greenwell (Kelly)
    and Lou Ellen Lambert (collectively, Appellants) appeal from the
    Final Judgment entered on September 11, 2017, by the Circuit
    Court of the Third Circuit (Cireuit Court) in favor of
    Defendants-Appellees Frank Russell Greenwell (Peter)! and Carol
    1 Defendant-Appeliee Frank Russell Greenwell, also known as F,R. Peter
    Greenwell, also known as Frank Russell Peter Greenwell, is deceased. Pursuant
    to Hawai‘i Rules of Appellate Procedure (HRAP) Rule 43, this court issued an
    order on April 13, 2018, wherein Carol Adamson Greenwell, Successor Trustee of
    the F.R. Peter Greenwell Trust, dated October 23, 1989, as amended, was
    substituted for Frank Greenwell, Trustee of the F.R. Peter Greenwell Trust,
    dated October 23, 1989, as amended.
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    2 In the appeal,
    Adamson Greenwell (collectively, Appellees).
    Appellants challenge the Circuit Court's (1) "Order Granting
    Defendants Frank Russell Greenwell and Carol Adamson Greenwell's
    Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and for Substitution of Real
    Parties in Interest, filed June 20, 2016" (Order Granting Motion
    for Partial Summary Judgment) filed August 17, 2016; and (2)
    "Order Granting Defendants Frank Russell Greenwell, also known as
    F.R. Peter Greenwell, also known as Frank Russell Peter
    Greenwell, Trustee of The F.R. Peter Greenwell Trust dated
    October 23, 1989, as amended, and Carol Adamson Greenwell,
    Trustee of The Carol Adamson Greenwell Trust, dated October 23,
    1989, as amended's [sic] Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs"
    (Order Granting Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Costs), filed
    March 16, 2017.
    This appeal addresses a land boundary disagreement
    between brothers (and their wives, respectively) with regard to
    property conveyed to each by their parents' trusts.
    On appeal, Appellants contend the Circuit Court erred
    by determining: (1} the boundary between the properties at issue
    is correctly baséd on a survey map rather than the historic
    ahupua‘a boundary; (2) no genuine issue of material fact exists
    as to the location and description of Appellees' property; (3)
    Appellees are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs; (4) the
    award of attorneys' fees and costs to Appellees was reasonable;
    and (5) Appellees are the sole owners of the subject property.
    We conclude the Circuit Court properly granted summary
    judgment and properly awarded attorneys' fees and costs in favor
    of Appellees. We therefore affirm. |
    I. Background
    A. Undisputed Facts and Evidence
    On December 8, 1970, Robert Francis Greenwell (Robert
    F. Greenwell), the father/father-in-law of Appellants and
    Appellees, along with his brothers, James M. Greenwell ana'l.
    2 The Honorable Melvin H. Fujino presided.
    2
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    Radcliffe Greenwell (collectively, the brothers), established the
    Palani Land Trust II (PLY II) to which they agreed to transfer
    each of their one-third undivided interests in lands located in
    North Kona as well as other assets.
    1. The Palani Land Trust II
    Around March 1982, Robert F. Greenwell expressed his
    desire to withdraw his one-third undivided interest from PLT II.
    On May 31, 1984, after years of discussions failed to result ina
    satisfactory distribution of Robert F. Greenwell's interest in
    PLT II, he initiated a lawsuit against James M. Greenwell and L.
    Radcliffe Greenwell (1984 Complaint or 1984 Lawsuit).
    In October 1986, stemming from the 1984 Lawsuit, the
    brothers entered into a Letter of Mutual Understanding (LMU) in
    which they agreed to settle the dispute of property in PLT II by,
    inter alia, distributing certain parcels to Robert F. Greenwell
    based on approximate fair market value and acreage, "subject to
    change based upon actual survey and description." The LMU
    expressly states:
    7. Procedures to Effect Final Settlement
    The parties agree that the following procedures are
    reasonably necessary to effect the final settlement:
    a. Survey of Parcels. It will be necessary
    for surveys to be made of some of the parcels to be
    distributed to Robert. The only parcels which will
    be surveyed are those that must be surveyed for
    subdivision purposes or to otherwise effect the
    distribution made pursuant to this final
    settlement. The parties agree that Haruo Shigeoka
    of the office of Towill, Shigqeoka & Associates,
    inc., Surveyors, shall be retained to conduct the
    surveys and monument the boundary locations.
    b. Description. The surveyor shall prepare metes and
    bounds descriptions of the parcels to be conveyed,
    (Emphasis added). The LMU makes no reference that the ahupua‘a
    line between Honoké6hau 1st and Honokéhau 2nd would serve as the
    boundary between the Subject Property and TMK 7-4-006-006 for
    purposes of distribution to Robert F. Greenwell.
    In accordance with the LMU, the brothers entered into a
    settlement agreement dated June 19, 1987 (1987 Settlement
    Agreement), by which Robert F. Greenwell received 476.454 acres.
    Of the parcels distributed to Robert F. Greenwell were TMKs 7-4-
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    006-006, consisting of 27.13 acres, and 7-4-002-011 (Subject
    Property), consisting of 26.107 acres. Pursuant to the 1987
    Settlement Agreement, a deed was executed by L. Radcliffe
    Greenwell and James M. Greenwell as Grantors, and by Robert F.
    Greenwell as Grantee, with the deed expressly stating:
    This Deed is being delivered by the Grantors to the Grantee
    pursuant to that certain unrecorded Settlement Agreement,
    dated June 19, 1987 (the "Settlement Agreement"), executed
    by the Grantors and the Grantee for the purpose of
    effectuating the settlement and satisfaction of the
    Grantee's claim to a one-third interest in the Trust and the
    Trust property.
    The property descriptions attached to the deed for both TMK 7-4-
    006-006 and the Subject Property state the properties are
    "Dounded and described" per a survey conducted by Haruo Shigeoka
    (Shigeoka Survey), a registered professional land surveyor.
    The 1987 Settlement Agreement provides in relevant
    part:
    WHEREAS, there presently exists a dispute between
    Robert on the one hand, and James and Radcliffe on the other
    hand as to the Trust and the distribution to Robert, which
    dispute includes a lawsuit described as Robert F. Greenwell.
    vy. James M. Greenwell and L. Radcliffe Greenwell, Civil No.
    9764, Third Circuit Court (Kona), State of Hawaii (the
    "lawsuit"); and
    WHEREAS, on October 21, 1986, the parties hereto
    executed that certain Letter of Mutual Understanding in an
    effort to establish a procedure to arrive at a final
    settlement of the dispute and lawsuit, which procedure
    imeluded the survey of certain lands and further mutual
    agreement as to other matters; and
    WHEREAS, the parties have followed the terms of the
    Letter of Mutual Understanding and now desire to resolve,
    compromise and settle the dispute and lawsuit on the terms
    and conditions provided herein;
    THEREFORE, in consideration of the promises, releases
    and covenants herein, the parties hereto agree to settle,
    resolve and compromise the dispute on the following terms
    and conditions:
    8. The parties understand and agree that this is the
    final, binding and complete agreement among them to settle
    and resolve ail matters and disputes involving in any way
    the Trust, the trust property, and the management of the
    Trust, and that this Agreement is the entire agreement of
    the parties and supersedes all other agreements as to the
    Trust, whether in writing or orai[.]
    [T]he parties recognize that several steps must be taken to
    effectuate this Settlement Agreement, and the parties agree-
    to perform such acts and execute such documents as may be
    necessary to effectuate this Settlement Agreement.
    Specifically, but without limitation, the following steps
    will be taken:
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    b. The surveyor shall also prepare parcel maps
    for the conveyed property, which maps will also
    indicate the easements both conveyed and
    retained.
    e. The conveyance shall be documented, which
    documents shall be prepared by the Trust (or its
    attorneys) and which shall or may include
    conveyance documents and amendment to the Trust,
    and dismissal of the lawsuit, it being
    specifically understood and agreed that no
    property shall be conveyed until all necessary
    steps are taken for all parcels such that all
    property to be conveyed to Robert shall be
    conveyed at the same time.
    9. The parties further agree that this Agreement
    shall be binding on each of them, their respective
    successors, heirs, beneficiaries and assign.
    (Emphases added). Nothing in the 1987 Settlement Agreement
    indicates the brothers intended for the ahupua‘a line dividing
    Honokdhau lst and 2nd to determine the boundary between the
    Subject Property and TMK 7-4-006-006 for purposes of distribution
    to Robert F. Greenwell.
    Pursuant to the 1987 Settlement Agreement, the lawsuit
    initiated by the 1984 complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
    2. Conveyance of Land After 1987 Settlement Agreement
    After the distribution of land from PLT II to Robert F.
    Greenwell, he conveyed a one-half undivided interest in all lands
    from the 1987 Settlement Agreement to the Robert Francis
    Greenwell Revocable Living Trust and the Alice Emily Greenwell
    Revocable Living Trust (collectively, Greenwell Trusts). The
    Greenwell Trusts conveyed their respective one-half undivided
    interests in the Subject Property to Appellees, and their
    respective one-half undivided interests in TMK 7-4-006-006 to
    Appellants.
    In 2002, Appellants conveyed TMK 7-4-006-006 to Pacific
    Rim and in 2003, Pacific Rim conveyed TMK 7-4-006-006 to HSA-UWC.
    3. The Current Dispute
    In 2001, Kelly sent a letter to Peter disputing the
    boundary between HonokGhau 1st and Honokéhau 2nd. Peter
    responded "there is no issue as to what the boundary is between
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    Honokohau [lst] and Honokohau [2nd]" and there is no issue
    "regarding the acreage and boundaries of [the Subject Property]."
    B. Procedural History
    On November 8, 2013, Appellants filed their original
    complaint contending, among other things, the Shigeoka Survey
    improperly moved the historical ahupua‘a boundary between
    Honok6Ghau ist and Honokdhau 2nd further south and therefore the
    metes and bounds deed descriptions incorrectly increase the
    acreage of the Subject Property and decrease the acreage of TMK
    7-4-006-006. Appellants urge the boundary must be corrected to
    reflect the historical ahupua‘a boundary, as established by
    physical evidence in the field and descriptions to original land
    commission awardees of land in Honokéhau lst and 2nd.
    According to Appeilants' theory, once the Honokdhau lst
    and Honokéhau 2nd boundary is corrected to reflect the historical
    ahupua‘a boundary, a 14 acre "remnant parcel” would result that
    should have been part of the original deed for TMK 7-4-006-006
    from PLT II to Robert F. Greenwell and ultimately to Appellants.
    Approximately 4 acres of the alleged remnant parcel are derived
    from the 26.107 acres of the Subject Property belonging to
    Appéllees. Appellants claim that, although they have conveyed
    TMK 7-4-006-006 to other parties, they "reserved for themselves
    the rights of the Remnant Parcel."
    In their First Amended Complaint, filed on January 9,
    2015, Appellants allege that when the 1987 Settlement Agreement
    was entered into, "it was always understood that the [Subject]
    [P]roperty [and TMK 7-4-006-006 were] being divided along the
    ahupuaa [sic] lines between Honokohau 1st and Honokohau 2nd,
    which line is culturally and historically significant."
    On June 20, 2016, Appellees filed their Motion for
    Partial Summary Judgment. In support of their motion, Appellees
    7 In the lower court, Appellants also sued Palani Ranch Company, Inc.,
    HSA-UWC, Guy C. Miranda and Jerrae A. Miranda and other unknown defendants,
    all owning land adjacent te the historic ahupua‘a boundary and/or the
    Honokdéhau ist and Honokéhau 2nd boundary as described by the Shigeoka Survey.
    No other parties have made an appearance in this appeal.
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    submitted, inter alia, the 1984 Complaint, the LMU, the 1987
    Settlement Agreement, the deed conveying to Robert F. Greenwell
    various lands from PLT II, and a declaration from David L.
    Fairbanks, who represented Robert F. Greenwell in the
    distribution of his interest from PLT II. In opposition to
    Appellees' motion, Appellants submitted a report conducted by
    their expert estimating the actual boundary between Honokoshau lst
    and Honokdhau 2nd and two declarations from Kelly. In both of
    his declarations, Kelly asserts, "[a]t that time of the
    Settlement Agreement. and thereafter, the settlors, trustees and
    beneficiaries of the Palani Land Trust II understood that the
    property held in the Palani Land Trust II was to be divided along
    the ahupua‘a lines between Honokohau lst and Honokohau 2nd."
    On August 17, 2016, the Order Granting Motion for
    Partial Summary Judgment was filed, concluding Appellants were
    bound by the 1987 Settlement Agreement between the brothers
    "(that] was based upon surveys and maps prepared by surveyor
    Haruo Shigeoka[.]"’
    On December 8, 2016, Appellees filed a Motion for
    Attorneys' Fees and Costs pursuant to Hawaii Revised Statutes
    (HRS) § 607-9 (2016) {costs statute), HRS § 607-14 {2016)
    (assumpsit statute), and Hawai‘i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP)
    Rule 54(d) (costs to prevailing party). Appellees argued that
    * On January 3, 2017, the Circuit Court filed a "Stipulated Order
    Granting Partition in Kind and Establishing Boundaries of the Subject
    Properties" (Stipulated Order) between Appellants and other owners of property
    adjacent to TMK 7-4-006-006 or TMK 7-4-006-011, also owned by Appellants.
    With regard to claims against Appellees, the Stipulated Order concluded:
    7. This stipulation by Plaintiffs and the disclaimer filed
    by Defendants Greenwell as to the location of the K. Greenwell
    Kuleana, Miranda Kuleana, Remnant Parcel, Palani Parcel and HSA
    Parcel, and the resulting boundaries of said properties, does not
    result in Plaintiffs or Defendants Greenwell admitting or
    conceding any other fact or arqument as to the previously
    entered summary judgment in favor of Defendants Greenwell and
    against Plaintiffs, by the August 17, 2016 Order Granting
    Defendants Frank Russell Greenwell and Carol Adamson Greenwell's
    Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and for Substitution of Real
    Parties in Interest, filed June 20, 2016 (the “August Greenwell
    Order").
    (Emphasis added).
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    because Appellants based their First Amended Complaint on the
    1987 Settlement Agreement and prayed for attorneys' fees and
    costs, their claim was in the nature of assumpsit, entitling
    Appellees ‘to attorneys' fees as the prevailing party.
    Additionally, Appellees argued they were entitled to costs
    pursuant to HRS § 607-9 and HRCP Rule 54(d)(1). In opposition,
    Appellants argued their claims were not in the nature of
    assumpsit but instead sought declaratory judgment. Appellants
    further argued Appellees' request for attorneys' fees and costs
    was unreasonable.
    On March 16, 2017, the Circuit Court issued its order
    granting attorneys' fees and costs to Appellees in the amount of
    $65,504.
    II. Standards of Review
    A. Summary Judgment
    The grant or denial of summary judgment is reviewed de
    novo. Nozawa v. Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 3, 
    142 Hawai'i 331
    , 338, 
    418 P.3d 1187
    , 1194 (2018) (citing Adams v. CDM Media
    USA, Inc., 135 Hawai‘i 1, 12, 
    346 P.3d 70
    , 81 (2015)). “Summary
    judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
    interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
    as a matter of law." 
    Id. at 342
    , 418 P.3d at 1198 (brackets
    omitted) (quoting Adams, 135 Hawai‘i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81)). "A
    fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of
    establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause
    of action or defense asserted by the parties." Id. (quoting
    Adams, 135 Hawai‘i at 12, 346 P.3d at 81)).
    "The burden is on the moving party to establish that
    summary judgment is proper." Id. (citing French v. Haw. Pizza
    Hut, Inc., 105 Hawai‘i 462, 470, 
    99 P.3d 1046
    , 1054 (2004)).
    "Once a summary judgment movant has satisfied its initial burden
    of producing support for its claim that there is no genuine issue
    of material fact, the party opposing summary judgment must
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    demonstrate specific facts, as opposed to general allegations,
    that present a genuine issue worthy of trial." 
    Id.
     (internal
    quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). "(W]e must
    view all of the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the
    light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Raiston
    v. Yim, 
    129 Hawai'i 46
    , 56, 
    292 P.3d 1276
    , 1286 (2013) (citation
    omitted).
    B. Award of Attorneys' Fees and Costs
    "The trial court's grant or denial of attorney's fees
    and costs is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard."
    Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 120 Hawai‘i 181, 197, 
    202 P.3d 1226
    , 1242 (2009) (internal quotation marks, citations, and
    brackets omitted). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the
    circuit court has clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or
    disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the
    substantial detriment of a party litigant." Pulawa v. GTE
    Hawaiian Tel, 112 Hawai‘i 3, 10-11, 
    143 P.3d 1205
    , 1212-13 (2006)
    (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).
    III. Discussion
    A. Appelliants' Claims Against Appellees are Barred By Res
    Judicata
    Appellants’ claims against Appellees stem from their
    contention that under the 1987 Settlement Agreement, property
    distributed to Robert F. Greenwell was supposed to be divided
    along the ahupua‘a lines between Honokdhau 18* and Honokdhau 2nd,
    and that the parties never agreed to move the ahupua‘a boundary.
    Thus, Appellants contend the metes and bounds description in the
    Subject Property deed cannot be supported as to the portion
    located outside of the historical ahupua‘a boundary. To the
    contrary, Appellees argue the litigation between the brothers
    initiated by the 1984 Complaint, which culminated in the 1987
    Settlement Agreement, prevents re-litigation of settled property
    boundaries.
    1. Claim Preclusion
    We agree with Appellees that Appellants are bound by
    the 1987 Settlement Agreement, which resolved the litigation
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    initiated by Robert F. Greenwell, who filed the 1984 Complaint
    against his brothers James M. Greenwell and L. Radcliffe
    Greenwell. The 1984 Complaint alleged two counts: first, that
    pursuant to the terms of the PLT II trust, Robert F. Greenwell
    was entitled to withdraw his undivided one-third interest in the
    lands of PLT II and receive a distribution of his one-third
    interest; and second, for the court to intervene to insure he
    received a just and fair distribution. In resolving these
    claims, the parties needed to determine the specific parcels held
    by PLT II that would be distributed to Robert F. Greenwell and
    the value of those parcels. These issues were resolved by way of
    the 1987 Settlement Agreement, which specified distribution of
    property to Robert F. Greenwell and specified that Towill,
    Shigeoka & Associates, Inc. would prepare parcel maps for the
    conveyed property and undertake necessary subdivisions of the
    parcels. The litigation initiated by the 1984 Complaint was
    dismissed pursuant to the 1987 Settlement Agreement.
    "Res judicata, or claim preclusion, . . . limit[s] a
    litigant to one opportunity to litigate aspects of the case to
    prevent inconsistent results and multiplicity of suits and to
    promote finality and judicial economy." Bremer v. Weeks, 
    104 Hawai'i 43
    , 53, 
    85 P.3d 150
    , 160 (2004) (citation omitted).
    Claim preclusion . . . “prohibits a party from relitigating
    a previously adjudicated cause of action." [citing Dorrance
    v. bee, 
    90 Hawai'i 143
    , 148, 
    976 P.2d 904
    , 909 (1999))].
    Moreover,
    (t]he judgment of a court of competent
    jurisdiction is a bar to a new action in any
    court between the same parties or their privies
    concerning the same subject matter, and
    precludes the relitigation, not only of the
    issues which were actually litigated in the
    first action, but also of all grounds of claim
    and defense which might have been properly
    litigated in the first action but were not
    litigated or decided.
    Povtik v. Chandier, 
    88 Hawai'i 307
    , 314, 
    966 P.2d 619
    , 626
    (1998) (quoting Morneau_v. Stark Enters., Ltd., 
    56 Haw. 420
    ,
    422-23, 
    539 P.2d 472
    , 474-75 (1975))[}. The party asserting
    claim preclusion has the burden of establishing that (1)
    there was a final judgment on the merits, (2) both parties
    are the same or _in privity with the parties in the original
    suit, and {3} the claim decided in the original suit is
    identical with the one presented in the action in question.
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    Bremer, 104 Hawai‘i at 53-54, 
    85 P.3d at 160-61
     (emphasis added).
    Here, the first element for res judicata is met because
    the 1987 Settlement Agreement resulted in the 1984 Lawsuit being
    dismissed with prejudice, which was a final judgment on the
    merits. See In re Dowsett Trust, 
    7 Haw. App. 640
    , 645, 
    791 P.2d 398
    , 402 (1990) ("(A] ‘stipulation of dismissal with prejudice
    constitutes a final judgment on the merits for the purpose of res
    judicata (claim preclusion) [.]'") (quoting Sullivan v. Easco
    Corp., 662 F. Suppo. 1396, 1408 (D. Md. 1987)).
    The second element is satisfied because Appellants are
    in privity with Robert F. Greenwell. To determine privity, this
    Court has considered the "relationship between the one who is a
    party of record and another [} close enough to include that other -
    within the res adjudicata." Id. at 646, 
    791 P.2d at 402
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Relating to
    property conveyance, "a grantee is in privity with his
    grantor[.]" Tibbetts v. Damon, 
    17 Haw. 203
    , 205 (Haw. Terr.
    1905); see also 18 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward
    H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4462 (2nd ed. 2002)
    ("Ordinarily, a judgment is binding on a nonparty who took by
    transfer from a party after judgment{.]"). Because Appellants
    were granted TMK (3) 7-4-006-006 from Robert F. Greenwell, who
    was a party to the 1987 Settlement Agreement, Appellants are in
    privity with him as grantee.
    Lastly, the third element is satisfied. Appellants
    argue they are not re-litigating any claims because the 1984
    Complaint did not seek to determine the boundary between
    Honokdhau lst and Honokdhau 2nd. Moreover, they contend all
    parties to the 1987 Settlement Agreement did not know the
    Shigecka Survey described the Honokédhau lst and Honckdhau 2nd
    boundary differently than the historical ahupua‘a boundary
    because only survey experts could understand the description.
    Appellees, however, argue the claim in dispute is the "proper
    one-third division and boundaries of the former Palani Trust
    lands" and the "settling parties expressly relied upon the
    Shigeoka maps and surveys and their specific metes and bounds[.]"
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    (Emphasis omitted). Thus, "property boundaries, including TMK
    No. (3) 7-4-002-011 containing 26.107 acres, were previous [sic]
    agreed and settled upon, and cannot be redetermined in a second
    lawsuit."
    The record contains ample evidence that Robert F.
    Greenwell and his brothers intended to rely on the metes and
    bounds survey conducted by Haruo Shigeoka, and there is no
    evidence of an intent to rely on any historic ahupua‘a boundary
    in distributing Robert F. Greenweil's share of PLT II. For one,
    the LMU, which outlined what would effectively become the 1987
    Settlement Agreement, states in relevant part that "[t]he parties
    agree that Haruo Shigeoka of the office of Towill, Shigeoka &
    Associates, Inc., Surveyors, shall be retained to conduct the
    surveys and monument the boundary locations." The LMU also
    states "[t]Jhe surveyor shall prepare metes and bounds
    descriptions of the parcels to be conveyed." Further, the 1987
    Settlement Agreement specifically states the parties executed the
    LMU "in an effort to establish a procedure to arrive at a final
    settlement of the dispute and lawsuit" and that "the parties have
    followed the terms of the [LMU.]" Nothing in the LMU or 1987
    Settlement Agreement expresses an intention for any of the
    parcels to be described by historic ahupua‘a location.°®
    Moreover, attorney David L. Fairbanks, who represented Robert PF,
    Greenwell in the settlement process of the 1984 Lawsuit,
    submitted a declaration attesting:
    7. For the purposes of the settlement process, the
    brothers also agreed to use and rely upon surveyor Haruo
    5 Appellant Kelly's statement in his declarations that PLT II was
    intended to be divided along the ahupua‘a Lines between Honokéhau lst and 2nd
    is not based on personal knowledge and therefore unavailing. HRCP Rule 56(e)
    provides in relevant part “[s]upporting and opposing affidavits shall be made
    on personal knowledge [and] shall set forth such facts as would be admissible
    in evidence[.]" HRCP Rule 56(e} (2000). Kelly declared "[a]t that time of
    the [1987] Settlement Agreement and thereafter, the settlors, trustees and
    beneficiaries of the Palani Land Trust II understood that the property held in
    the Palani Land Trust: II was to be divided along the ahupua‘a lines between
    Honokohau lst and Honokohau 2nd." He fails to set forth, however, any basis
    for him to have personal knowledge supporting this statement. Therefore, we
    do not consider his statement. See Adams v. CDM Media USA, Inc., 135 Hawai‘i
    1, 31, 
    346 P.3d 70
    , 100 (2015), as corrected (Mar. 11, 2015) (affiant's
    statement deemed inadmissible evidence under HRCP Rule 56{e) for lack of
    personal knowledge).
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    Shigecka ("Shigeoka") and his surveys and maps of the
    Trust's properties (the "Shigeoka Maps"), to determine the
    extent of the Trust's properties and the precise boundaries
    and acreages of those properties.
    8. As part of the Trust valuation process, the three
    brothers also agreed to use and rely upon for the settlement
    process, appraisals of the Trust's properties prepared by
    John Chiid & Company, Inc. ("Child"). In Child's appraisal
    of the Trust's properties, many of the acreages that Child
    assigned to the various properties were taken from the
    Shigeoka Maps and Shigeoka's determination as to the exact
    acreages and boundaries of the Trust's properties.
    Considering the admissible evidence, no genuine issue of material
    fact exists that the metes and bounds description established by
    the Shigeoka Survey was to be relied upon to settle the property
    distribution of PLT II. The claim in this case is identical to
    claims and issues settled by the 1987 Settlement Agreement, that
    is the boundaries of property distributed to Robert F. Greenwell
    from PLT II. Accordingly, Appellants are precluded from re-
    litigating the boundary of the Subject Property.
    2. Appellants' Other Arguments
    Appellants also argue the Circuit Court erred in
    determining no genuine issue of material fact existed as to the
    location and description of the Subject Property and that
    Appellees are the exclusive owners of the Subject Property, given
    the Shigeoka Survey incorrectly described the Subject Property as
    outside of Honokdhau lst. These issues, however, are covered by
    the res judicata analysis because they are essentially based on a
    dispute over the boundary of the Subject Property, which was
    conclusively determined in the 1987 Settlement Agreement
    according to the Shigeoka Survey.
    B. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
    Appellants argue the Circuit Court erred in awarding
    attorneys' fees to Appellees because Appellants' claims were not
    in the nature of assumpsit, but rather were for declaratory
    relief based on HRS Chapter 632 (declaratory judgment statute)
    and HRS Chapter 668 (partition actions). Appellants assert that
    references to the 1987 Settlement Agreement in the First Amended
    Complaint were for “historical context." Appellees, however,
    maintain they are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees because
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    Appellants' claims are for "declaratory relief and for monetary
    damages based upon rights allegedly arising out of the 1987
    Settlement Agreement [] in the nature of assumpsit." We affirm
    the Circuit Court's award of attorneys' fees to Appellees.
    HRS § 607-14 provides for an award of attorneys' fees
    to the prevailing party for actions in the nature of assumpsit.®
    "Assumpsit is a common law form of action which allows for the
    recovery of damages for the non-performance of a contract, either
    express or implied, written or verbal, as well as quasi
    contractual obligations." Schulz v. Honsador, Inc., 
    67 Haw. 433
    ,
    435, 
    690 P.2d 279
    , 281 (1984) (citation omitted). "The character
    of the action should be determined from the facts and issues
    raised in the complaint, the nature of the entire grievance, and
    the relief sought." Leslie v. Est. of Tavares, 93 Hawai‘i 1, 6,
    
    994 P.2d 1047
    , 1052 (2000) (citation omitted). Declaratory
    action claims may sound in the nature of assumpsit where the
    relief sought and award of attorneys’ fees and costs requested is
    premised on rights flowing from a contract. See Ranger Ins. Co.
    v. Hinshaw, 
    103 Hawai'i 26
    , 33-34, 
    79 P.3d 119
    , 126-27 (2003), as
    § HRS § 607-14 states in relevant part:
    §607-14 Attorneys' fees in actions in the nature of
    assumpsit, ete. In all the courts, in all actions in the
    nature of assumpsit and in all actions on a promissory note
    or other contract in writing that provides for an attcrney'’s
    fee, there shall be taxed as attorneys’ fees, to be paid by
    the losing party and to be included in the sum for which
    execution may issue, a fee that the court determines to be
    reasonable provided that the attorney representing the
    prevailing party shall submit to the court an affidavit
    stating the amount of time the attorney spent on the action
    and the amount of time the attorney is likely to spend to
    obtain a final written judgment, ox, if the fee is not based
    on an hourly rate, the amount of the agreed upon fee. The
    court shall then tax attorneys' fees, which the court
    determines to be reasonable, to be paid by the losing party;
    provided that this amount shall not exceed twenty-five per
    cent of the judgment.
    The above fees provided for by this section shall be
    assessed on the amount of the judgment exclusive of costs
    and all attorneys' fees obtained by the plaintiff, and upon
    the amount sued for if the defendant obtains judgment.
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    amended (Dec. 18, 2003) (holding declaratory action by liability
    insurer also claiming attorneys' fees and costs against insured
    for defending insured in a separate action allegedly not covered
    by policy was request for consequential damages in the nature of
    assumpsit); cf. Leslie, 93 Hawai‘i at 7, 
    994 P.2d at 1053
     (action
    in nature of assumpsit when factually implicating contract rather
    than basing recovery of money damages on it).
    Here, although Appellants' First Amended Complaint
    facially alleges that it seeks declaratory relief to settle the
    boundary between the Subject Property and TMK 7-4-006-006
    pursuant to HRS Chapter 632, as well as a partition of the
    Subject Property pursuant to HRS Chapter 668, the crux of
    Appellants' claims against Appellees flows from challenging the
    intent of the parties to the 1987 Settlement Agreement: "[a]t
    that time and thereafter [regarding the 1987 Settlement
    Agreement], it was always understood that the [Subject] [P]operty
    was being divided along the ahupuaa [sic] lines between Honokohau
    1st and Honokohau 2nd[.]" Essentially, Appellants asked the
    Circuit Court to enforce their interpretation of the 1987
    Settlement Agreement, which is undisputedly a contract agreed to
    by the brothers, rather than the boundary determined in the
    Shigeoka Survey. But for such an assertion, Appellants have no
    grounds on which to base their claims. Further, besides
    factually relying on their interpretation of the 1987 Settlement
    Agreement, Appellants sought consequential damages based on their
    dispute of the intent of the parties to that contract.
    Therefore, the Circuit Court did not abuse its discretion by
    awarding attorneys' fees to Appellees pursuant to HRS § 607-14.
    Appellants also claim the amount of the attorneys! fees
    award was unreasonable. However, based on our review of the
    record and arguments of the parties, the Circuit Court did not
    abuse its discretion in the amount it awarded to Appellees.
    Finally, although Appellants apparently also challenge
    the costs awarded to Appellees, they make no discernable argument
    that the Circuit Court lacked authority to make its award of
    costs. Further, we conclude the Circuit Court did not abuse its
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    discretion in the amount of costs awarded to Appellees. We
    therefore do not disturb the costs award either.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Final Judgment
    entered by the Circuit Court of the Third Circuit on September
    11, 2017.
    DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, November 26, 2021.
    On the briefs: /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
    Chief Judge
    Robert D. Triantos,
    Michelle Chi Dickinson, /s/ Clyde J. Wadsworth
    for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Associate Judge
    Charles A. Price, —  /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
    for CAROL ADAMSON GREENWELL, Associate Judge
    Successor Trustee of the F.R.
    Peter Greenwell Trust, dated
    October 23, 1989, as amended;
    CAROL ADAMSON GREENWELL,
    Trustee of the Carol Adamson
    Greenwell Trust, dated October
    23, 1989, as amended.
    16