State v. Warner , 2021 Ohio 4182 ( 2021 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Warner, 
    2021-Ohio-4182
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    MARION COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                               CASE NO. 9-21-15
    v.
    JASON D. WARNER,                                          OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 2020CR0346
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: November 29, 2021
    APPEARANCES:
    Samuel H. Shamansky for Appellant
    Andrea K. Boyd for Appellee
    Case No. 9-21-15
    PER CURIAM.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Jason Warner (“Jason”), brings this appeal from
    the April 16, 2021, judgment of the Marion County Common Pleas Court sentencing
    him to twenty-four months in prison after he was convicted in a bench trial of
    “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity” in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2)
    and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b),1 a fourth degree felony, and “Tampering with
    Evidence/Complicity” in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2921.12(A)(1),
    a third degree felony. On appeal, Warner argues that there was insufficient evidence
    presented to convict him, that his convictions were against the manifest weight of
    the evidence, that the trial court’s general findings of guilt constituted a legal
    impossibility, that the trial court committed repeated misconduct depriving him of
    a fair trial, and that if no single error was prejudicial, the cumulative effect of the
    trial court’s errors was prejudicial.
    Background
    {¶2} On June 4, 2020, just after midnight, the record indicates that Jason’s
    wife, Julia Warner (“Julia”), was driving a black Jeep Wrangler southbound on SR
    203 with Jason in the passenger seat. At the same time, Colton G. was driving
    1
    Pursuant to R.C. 4549.02(B)(1), a person who violates R.C. 4549.02(A) is guilty of “failure to stop after an
    accident.” However, in the indictment the State titled the crime “Complicity to Leaving the Scene of an
    Accident.” In addition, the trial court used the terminology “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity”
    in its final judgment entry. Notably, the Supreme Court of Ohio has colloquially called a violation of R.C.
    4549.02 “leaving the scene of an accident.” State v. Bryant, 
    160 Ohio St.3d 113
    , 
    2020-Ohio-1041
    , ¶ 2. We
    will use the terms interchangeably in this opinion.
    -2-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    northbound on SR 203 in a BMW X3. As both vehicles approached CR 106, also
    known as Somerlot Hoffman Road, Julia attempted to make a left turn onto CR 106
    without yielding to Colton’s vehicle. The Warners’ Jeep Wrangler struck the left
    front of Colton’s BMW, causing the BMW to travel off the right side of the road
    and strike a utility pole. The wreck resulted in serious damage to Colton’s vehicle
    and trapped him, semi-conscious, inside.
    {¶3} Some nearby residents in the rural area heard the crash and saw a male
    and female—the Warners, who were not known to the witnesses—walking around
    the crash site and looking into the damaged BMW. Julia was observed to have her
    hand over her mouth by one witness. Shortly thereafter, the witnesses saw the black
    Jeep Wrangler drive away from the scene of the accident prior to the arrival of law
    enforcement.
    {¶4} One of the nearby witnesses approached the scene after the Jeep
    Wrangler left and saw that Colton’s vehicle was smoking and noisy. Colton himself
    was trapped in his vehicle, bloody, and semi-conscious. One witness called 911 and
    emergency services responded. Colton had to be extracted from his vehicle with a
    “hydraulic spreader,” also known as the “jaws of life,” before being taken to the
    hospital.
    {¶5} Meanwhile, the Warners went home, leaving marks in the roadway and
    their driveway where the vehicle’s rim was scraping the pavement through a
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    deflated tire. A neighbor of the Warners was out walking and heard their vehicle
    making a lot of noise coming up the street. He saw the Warners’ Jeep pull into their
    garage and close the door, though the neighbor did not see who was driving.
    {¶6} The Warners did not contact anyone regarding the accident until
    approximately nine hours later, when they approached law enforcement together to
    accept responsibility for the accident. At that time, and over the ensuing weeks,
    Julia made multiple statements indicating that she was driving during the accident,
    that she thought there was a stop sign in the other direction, and that she misjudged
    the turn in the dark and the rain. When law enforcement investigated the matter,
    virtually all of the evidence pointed to Julia driving at the time of the crash, such as
    the bruising on her body consistent with the driver’s-side seatbelt, her DNA on the
    driver’s-side airbag, and Jason’s DNA on the passenger’s-side airbag. As for his
    part, Jason initially told a coworker that he had basically been “passed out” or
    “asleep” through the whole incident, though he later acknowledged to the same
    coworker that he had gotten out of the Jeep Wrangler at the scene, as other witnesses
    had claimed.
    {¶7} On September 9, 2020, a joint indictment was filed against Jason and
    Julia alleging that they had each individually committed Complicity to Vehicular
    Assault in violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b), a felony of
    the fourth degree (Count 1); Complicity to Vehicular Assault in violation of R.C.
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    2923.03(A)(2), R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)/(b), and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1), a felony of the
    third degree (Count 2); Complicity to “Leaving the Scene of an Accident” in
    violation of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1), a felony of the fourth
    degree (Count 3); and Complicity to Tampering with Evidence in violation of R.C.
    2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a felony of the third degree (Count 4).2
    Jason and Julia pled not guilty to the charges. They also waived a jury trial and
    elected to proceed to a bench trial, with a visiting judge assigned to preside over the
    matter.
    {¶8} Prior to trial, the parties entered into a number of stipulations, which
    included the authenticity of various lab reports, photographs, medical records,
    phone records, etc.3 In addition, the Warners also agreed to stipulate that Colton
    suffered serious physical harm as a result of the accident, obviating the need for
    testimony from a significant number of medical professionals.
    {¶9} The Warners’ bench trial was held March 8-10, 2021. Importantly, the
    two charges for Complicity to Vehicular Assault against Jason were dismissed,
    though Vehicular Assault charges remained pending against Julia as the driver of
    the vehicle at the time of the accident.4 At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court
    2
    The indictment was amended to correct typos and incorrect numbers in portions of code sections.
    3
    The Warners also waived any objections to proceeding to trial together after the issue was raised by the
    State.
    4
    The State requested the dismissal of Complicity to Vehicular Assault charges against Jason after a review
    of the evidence and after speaking with the witnesses in preparation for trial. The State was satisfied that
    Julia was driving at the time of the crash, thus the State also requested the removal of “Complicity” language
    from her Vehicular Assault charges. The State’s requests were not opposed and they were granted.
    -5-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    noted that it did not have to provide any reasoning to support its general findings;
    nevertheless, the trial court made some statements regarding the evidence on the
    record. Ultimately, the trial court found Julia and Jason guilty of Count 3 of the
    indictment, “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity” in violation of R.C.
    2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b), a fourth degree felony, and Count
    4 of the indictment, “Tampering with Evidence/Complicity” in violation of R.C.
    2923.03(A)(2) and R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), a third degree felony.
    {¶10} As for the remaining charges pending against Julia, the trial court
    found Julia not guilty of both counts of Vehicular Assault, reasoning that while she
    may have been negligent in causing the accident, she was not reckless, as exhibited
    by her speed at the time of the crash (roughly 12 or 13 mph). Nevertheless, the trial
    court initially stated that Julia was guilty of the “lesser-included offense” of
    Negligent Assault, despite no requests for any lesser-included offenses to be
    considered by either party. Although the trial court made this initial “finding”
    regarding lesser-included offenses, at sentencing the trial court subsequently
    withdrew the findings of guilt regarding-lesser included offenses and did not convict
    Julia of Negligent Assault, reasoning that an additional element was actually
    required to establish Negligent Assault. Thus Julia was entirely acquitted of the
    Vehicular Assault charges and no convictions were ever journalized regarding any
    purported lesser-included offenses.
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    {¶11} Following the findings of guilt against the Warners, but prior to
    sentencing, the Warners filed written, renewed motions for acquittal. They had
    previously made motions for acquittal during the trial. The Warners took issue with
    many of the trial court’s factual “findings” and legal conclusions that led to the
    general findings of guilt.
    {¶12} On April 14, 2021, the matter proceeded to sentencing; however, prior
    to sentencing the Warners, the trial court addressed the Warners’ renewed motions
    for acquittal finding that defense counsel was mischaracterizing the evidence and/or
    the trial court’s statements related to the evidence. The trial court further analyzed
    the evidence, explained its general findings, and overruled the Warners’ motions for
    acquittal. The trial court also filed a written entry denying the renewed motions for
    acquittal for the reasons stated on the record.
    {¶13} The trial court then proceeded to sentencing solely on Counts 3 and 4
    of the indictment, ordering Jason and Julia to both serve eighteen months in prison
    for “Leaving the Scene of an Accident/Complicity,” and twenty-four months in
    prison for “Tampering with Evidence/Complicity.” Those prison terms were
    ordered to be served concurrently, so Jason and Julia Warner each received a
    twenty-four-month prison term. A judgment entry memorializing Jason’s sentence
    was filed April 16, 2021. It is from this judgment that Jason now appeals, asserting
    the following assignments of error for our review.
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    Assignment of Error No. 1
    Appellant was convicted in the absence of evidence sufficient to
    support findings of guilty in violation of his rights as guaranteed
    by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
    Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
    Assignment of Error No. 2
    Appellant’s convictions were against the manifest weight of the
    evidence in violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by
    the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
    Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
    Assignment of Error No. 3
    The trial court’s guilty verdicts constituted a legal impossibility,
    were contrary to law, and violated Appellant’s rights to due
    process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and
    Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitutions and
    comparable provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
    Assignment of Error No. 4
    The trial court’s repeated misconduct throughout its
    deliberations and Appellant’s sentencing violated his rights to due
    process and a fair trial as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth
    Amendments to the United States Constitution and comparable
    provisions of the Ohio Constitution.
    Assignment of Error No. 5
    Appellant was deprived of a fair trial by the cumulative errors of
    the trial court in violation of his right to due process as
    guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
    United States Constitution and comparable provisions of the Ohio
    Constitution.
    First Assignment of Error
    {¶14} In his first assignment of error, Jason argues that there was insufficient
    evidence   presented   to   convict    him    of   “Leaving    the   Scene    of   an
    Accident/Complicity” and “Tampering with Evidence/Complicity.”
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    Standard of Review
    {¶15} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a
    question of law.” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 386 (1997); State v. Groce,
    
    163 Ohio St.3d 387
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6671
    , ¶ 7. Therefore, our review is de novo. In re
    J.V., 
    134 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 
    2012-Ohio-4961
    , ¶ 3. In a sufficiency-of-the-evidence
    inquiry, the question is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
     (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by constitutional
    amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 102,
    (1997), fn. 4) following Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
     (1979).
    “In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy.” Thompkins at 386.
    Controlling Statutes
    {¶16} In this case, Jason was convicted of a violation of R.C.
    4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b), and a violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), both by means of
    being Complicit pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2).
    {¶17} Revised Code 4549.02(A)(1)/(B)(2)(b) (Failure to Stop After an
    Accident or, as styled here, “Leaving the Scene of an Accident”) reads as follows:
    (A)(1) In the case of a motor vehicle accident or collision with
    persons or property on a public road or highway, the operator of
    the motor vehicle, having knowledge of the accident or collision,
    immediately shall stop the operator's motor vehicle at the scene
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    of the accident or collision. The operator shall remain at the scene
    of the accident or collision until the operator has given the
    operator's name and address and, if the operator is not the owner,
    the name and address of the owner of that motor vehicle, together
    with the registered number of that motor vehicle, to all of the
    following:
    (a) Any person injured in the accident or collision;
    (b) The operator, occupant, owner, or attendant of any motor
    vehicle damaged in the accident or collision;
    (c) The police officer at the scene of the accident or collision.
    ***
    (B)(1) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of
    failure to stop after an accident. Except as otherwise provided in
    division (B)(2) or (3) of this section, failure to stop after an
    accident is a misdemeanor of the first degree.
    (2) If the accident or collision results in serious physical harm to
    a person, failure to stop after an accident is whichever of the
    following is applicable:
    ***
    (b) If the offender knew that the accident or collision resulted in
    serious physical harm to a person, a felony of the fourth degree.
    Revised Code 2921.12(A)(1) (Tampering with Evidence) reads as follows:
    (A) No person, knowing that an official proceeding or
    investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be
    instituted, shall do any of the following:
    (1) Alter, destroy, conceal, or remove any record, document, or
    thing, with purpose to impair its value or availability as evidence
    in such proceeding or investigation[.]
    -10-
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    Jason was alleged to commit the above crimes via Complicity, which as charged in
    this case is codified in R.C. 2923.03(A)(2). This provision, and other relevant
    provisions of the statute read:
    (A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for
    the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
    ***
    (2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense[.]
    ***
    (B) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person
    with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a
    principal offender.
    ***
    (F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the
    commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished
    as if he were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be
    stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
    Evidence Presented
    {¶18} The record indicates that on the evening of June 3, 2020, Jason and his
    wife, Julia, went to the residence of Todd and Kimberly Anderson for a social
    gathering. The Warners and the Andersons were very close friends, and had been
    for years. Kimberly Anderson was having a female friend visit from out-of-town,
    so she was hosting a gathering that Julia was attending. Jason was planning on
    attending a separate social gathering with Todd that evening.
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    {¶19} The Warners arrived at the Andersons’ residence around 6:00 p.m. At
    that time, Todd Anderson was not home. However, shortly after Todd arrived home
    around 6:30 p.m., Todd and Jason left the Andersons’ residence and went to their
    own social gathering at the home of Rob Lust. Todd, Jason, Robb, and others were
    part of a group planning a “cigar smoker,” a cigar-related event. (Tr. at 223). While
    at Rob Lust’s home, Todd had a few drinks and he thought Jason might have had a
    drink but Todd was unsure. Regardless, Todd and Jason returned to the Andersons’
    residence between 11:30 and 11:45 p.m.
    {¶20} Meanwhile, at the Andersons’ residence, Julia and Kimberly were
    drinking wine and snacking. Julia admitted to having three drinks throughout the
    evening, claiming that her last drink was at 9:30 or 10 p.m. Kimberly’s guests at
    the social gathering, other than Julia, left around 10-10:30 p.m. Julia stayed at the
    Andersons’ residence until Jason returned with Todd. At that time, the Warners left
    together, with Julia driving the black Jeep Wrangler they owned. The Warners’
    home was approximately a 15-20 minute drive.
    {¶21} On the ride home, Julia was driving south on SR 203 approaching an
    intersection with CR 106, also known as Somerlot Hoffman Road. The area was
    relatively rural. Julia slowed down to make the turn onto Somerlot Hoffman Road
    from 25 mph to 12 or 13 mph. However, she failed to yield to a driver coming north
    on SR 203 before she made her turn. Julia would later claim that she thought there
    -12-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    was a stop sign in the opposite direction, and, alternatively, that she misjudged the
    turn. Regardless of the reason, the Warners’ vehicle struck a BMW X3 being driven
    by Colton G. The collision caused Colton to veer off the road into a telephone pole.
    Colton’s vehicle was seriously damaged to the point that the engine compartment
    on the left side was shifted toward the passenger compartment. (State’s Ex. 23).
    Colton was trapped inside the vehicle.
    {¶22} Jennifer Mehaffey resided at 2815 Larue Prospect Road South
    approximately 185 yards south of the crash intersection. At the time of the crash,
    Jennifer’s daughter, Ashtan, and her boyfriend, Marquis, were on the front porch of
    the residence. Marquis saw Colton’s silver vehicle drive past the residence, then he
    heard the crash at the intersection. Marquis stated he did not have a clear view of
    the intersection from the porch due to the angle.
    {¶23} When he heard the crash, Marquis stepped off the porch and moved
    toward the intersection. As he did, he saw two people outside of the damaged
    vehicles: a woman who had her hands to her face looking into the silver crashed
    vehicle, and a man. Ashtan testified that she also saw a male and a female outside
    of the crashed vehicles.
    {¶24} Ashtan notified her mother Jennifer of the incident, who was upstairs
    when it happened, and Ashtan called 911. Jennifer came outside and saw someone
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    circling the damaged vehicle, although she thought she saw a male get out of the
    driver’s side of the Jeep and get into the passenger side of the Jeep Wrangler.
    {¶25} Seeing the male and female together at the crash site from a distance,
    Marquis thought that the two must be exchanging information from the accident,
    and that they had the situation handled, so he changed direction and began walking
    back toward the porch. However, shortly thereafter, the Jeep Wrangler left the scene
    of the accident and the individuals were gone. When Marquis realized that both
    individuals from the scene were gone, yet one vehicle was still present, he ran to the
    damaged vehicle.
    {¶26} Another individual, Keith Bentley, lived slightly closer to the rural
    intersection where the accident occurred, but to the north of it, and he also heard the
    crash. At the time of the crash, Keith was sitting in his living room watching
    television when he heard a “loud pop.” (Tr. at 64). He went to his door and saw
    two vehicles, one of which had struck the pole on his property. The pole was
    approximately 85 yards away from Keith at that time.
    {¶27} Keith walked out of his house to the southern portion of his driveway
    and he saw a male figure walking around the crashed vehicle. Keith went back into
    his house to get flashlights and a raincoat, but as he did, the Jeep Wrangler left the
    scene. Keith did not see a second person at the crash site, and he did not see who
    was driving when the Jeep Wrangler departed.
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    {¶28} After the Jeep Wrangler left the scene of the accident, Marquis,
    Jennifer and Keith went to the area of the crash to check on the other vehicle. When
    Marquis arrived, he saw the driver of the crashed vehicle bleeding, with the airbags
    deployed. Marquis indicated that the vehicle was noisy and smoking from the front.
    Marquis and Keith both asked the driver some questions, but according to them, the
    driver was not making sense. Keith described Colton as “very disoriented.” (Tr. at
    70).
    {¶29} Jennifer was a nurse, so she got into Colton’s vehicle and helped
    stabilize Colton’s head/neck until emergency services responded. Upon arrival,
    emergency services noted that Colton was trapped in the vehicle, that he was semi-
    conscious, had a large “goose egg” on his head, and that Colton did not know the
    place and time. (Tr. at 123). Firefighters employed a “hydraulic spreader” to
    extricate Colton from the vehicle. He was taken to Marion General Hospital, but he
    had to be transferred to another hospital because Marion General was not a trauma
    hospital.
    {¶30} Shortly after the crash, after midnight on June 4, 2020, David Bailey
    was walking around his cul-de-sac to deal with medical issues. He lived near the
    Warners. Despite the fact that he was wearing headphones and listening to music,
    he heard a very loud noise approaching and saw a black Jeep Wrangler coming up
    his road. According to him, the vehicle was making “all kinds of noise.” (Tr. at
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    126). He stressed that it was “[r]eal loud[.]” (Id.) David watched the Jeep Wrangler
    pull into the Warners’ garage and the garage door closed behind it. David did not
    see who was driving the vehicle.
    {¶31} According to testimony, the Warners’ residence was approximately
    5.5 miles from the crash site. The Warners made no calls and sent no text messages
    regarding the accident over the next 8 hours.
    {¶32} At 8:06 a.m. on June 4, 2020, Jason sent a text message to an employee
    at the Marion County Common Pleas Court stating that he had a personal issue that
    he had to deal with and that he would not be at work. Jason was an elected common
    pleas court judge. He asked if another judge could cover his docket for the day.
    {¶33} Around 9:30 a.m. on June 4, 2020, Jason and Julia willingly went to
    the police to report the accident and were transferred to the Ohio State Highway
    Patrol, which was handling the crash investigation. Jason and Julia met with Marion
    Post Commander Troy Sexton of the State Highway Patrol. At that time, Julia
    admitted she was driving the vehicle during the crash. She filled out a written
    statement indicating that she thought there was a stop sign in the other direction and
    that after the crash she panicked and drove away. When questioned by Commander
    Sexton, Julia denied being impaired at the time of the crash, though she admitted to
    having three drinks that night, ending as late as 10 p.m.
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    {¶34} Commander Sexton testified that he did not give Julia a field sobriety
    test during the interview because he did not feel she was impaired at the time of the
    interview. He also did not administer a blood test because there was a time
    restriction on law enforcement wherein they were expected to get any alcohol or
    drug results after a crash and they were past the time limit. (Tr. at 198). However,
    the Warners gave law enforcement permission to go to their residence and inspect
    the Jeep, collect evidence, and take DNA samples.
    {¶35} At 12:47 p.m. that same day, Jason sent a text message to the other
    elected judge of the Marion County Common Pleas Court, and to some of the staff
    members of the court. The text stated that Jason and Julia had been in a “pretty
    serious car accident.” (State’s Ex. 46). Jason stated that Julia failed to yield and hit
    another vehicle, and that, “in a hysterical panic, [she] drove away from the scene of
    the accident. After a long discussion that went on throughout the night, we agreed
    that we needed to go in and report it, which we did this morning.” (Id.)
    {¶36} On the same day that the Warners reported the accident, law
    enforcement officers went to the Warners’ residence to take pictures of their
    damaged Jeep Wrangler. The Jeep was in the garage when officers arrived, and
    after they took initial photographs, they asked Jason to back the Jeep out of the
    garage. Jason did so, with some difficulty.5 One officer noted that the damage to
    5
    Officers on the scene did not notice if Jason moved the seat or not prior to backing the vehicle out of the
    garage.
    -17-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    the driver’s-side front tire would have made the vehicle extremely difficult to drive.
    Testimony indicated that the “rim ha[d] been separated from the tie rod end
    underneath the fender well.” (Tr. at 205). Photographs of the Warners’ Jeep showed
    extensive damage to the left front wheel, including a deflated tire. There was also
    “buckling * * * on the left front fender above the wheel well.” (State’s Ex. 23).
    Due to the deflated tire, there were marks in the road and in the driveway leading to
    the Warners’ garage from where the rim had scraped the asphalt. There were
    additional marks made when the vehicle was pulled out of the garage.
    {¶37} With the Warners’ permission, law enforcement officers collected the
    airbags that had deployed from the vehicle. DNA samples were taken from each
    airbag. DNA consistent with Julia’s was found on the driver’s-side airbag, and
    DNA consistent with Jason’s was found on the passenger’s-side airbag. Julia also
    had bruising consistent with the driver’s-side seatbelt. Once officers were done with
    the vehicle, it was towed to Buckeye Collision.
    {¶38} The next day, June 5, 2020, Jason returned to work. That day, he had
    a meeting scheduled with the other Marion County Common Pleas Court Judge,
    Judge Edwards, about court matters unrelated to the crash. Following the meeting,
    Judge Edwards asked to speak with Jason privately about the accident, because the
    local chief of police had indicated that Jason might have been the driver of the
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    vehicle in the crash, which was contrary to what Jason had said in his text message
    to Judge Edwards.
    {¶39} Jason denied being the driver, and told Judge Edwards that he was
    “passed out” when the collision occurred. (Tr. at 433). According to Judge
    Edwards, after Jason said the words “passed out,” it “was almost like his tongue
    came out of his mouth and tried to grab the words and pull them back in. And
    [Jason] said instead that he was asleep. [Jason] said: Well, you know, asleep.” (Id.)
    {¶40} Jason told Judge Edwards that he was awakened by the impact, that he
    recalled looking up and seeing his wife bleeding from her nose, and that he then
    remembered the sound of the Jeep Wrangler pulling off. Judge Edwards indicated
    that it left him with the impression that Jason was sleeping through most of the
    incident. Further, Judge Edwards testified that he felt that was the impression Jason
    wanted him to have from the conversation.
    {¶41} Later that same day, Judge Edwards went to Buckeye Collision to
    check on a vehicle he was having restored there. While there, he saw the Warners’
    Jeep Wrangler in the parking lot, which he was familiar with. Judge Edwards was
    “shocked” at the damage, especially to the driver’s side front wheel. (Tr. at 437).
    It caused him to question how Jason could have been asleep. He also noticed the
    airbags had been removed from the vehicle, and he sent Jason a text message to ask
    -19-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    who had removed them, thinking that it could be tampering with evidence if Jason
    had done it, but the airbags had been removed by law enforcement.
    {¶42} In the week following the accident, Colton was released from the
    hospital. However, he was having significant memory issues that required him to
    stay with his family. While Colton was staying with his family, and not present at
    the apartment he rented, a letter was dropped off that was written by Julia
    apologizing for the accident. She stated she was very sorry, that she did not want
    Colton to think she was “crazy, or drunk, or insensitive.” (State’s Ex. 41). She
    stated that it was not like her to misjudge a turn in the dark and the rain, and that it
    was not like her to “freak out” and “panic and leave[.]” (Id.)
    {¶43} From June 9, 2020, to June 17, 2020, Julia and Jason went on a pre-
    scheduled vacation with the Andersons to Texas. According to the Andersons, the
    accident was never discussed.
    {¶44} On June 19, 2020, just over two weeks after the accident, a televised
    news story aired about the crash. The story contained information that witnesses in
    the area of the accident saw a man exit the Jeep Wrangler at the crash site. Judge
    Edwards saw the news story and sent a text message to Jason about it because Jason
    had not indicated he had gotten out of the Jeep at the scene previously. Rather,
    Jason had left Judge Edwards with the impression that he had been sleeping. When
    asked by Judge Edwards, Jason acknowledged getting out of the Jeep. Judge
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    Edwards asked Jason if Jason had informed disciplinary counsel about the incident,
    and Jason responded that he did not think he had done anything wrong.
    {¶45} Over the ensuing months, Colton went through physical therapy and
    had various medical issues including memory problems, a concussion, a kidney tear,
    cellulitis, knee/walking problems, and bell’s palsy. The parties stipulated at trial
    that he suffered serious physical harm as a result of the accident.
    Analysis
    {¶46} At the outset of our review of sufficiency of the evidence, we note that
    many of Jason’s arguments in his brief related to sufficiency of the evidence
    challenge specific statements the trial court made on the record explaining its
    “reasoning” before entering its general finding that Jason and Julia were guilty of
    Counts 3 and 4 and the indictment. Importantly, and as the trial court noted before
    making those statements, there is no obligation whatsoever for the trial court to
    make factual findings or to express its reasoning that led to the general finding.
    State v. Ham, 3d Dist. Wyandot No. 16-09-01, 
    2009-Ohio-3822
    , ¶ 37.
    {¶47} Rather, pursuant to Crim.R. 23(C), in a trial without a jury, the court
    “shall make a general finding.” This Court has repeatedly expressed, in varying
    circumstances, that anything stated beyond the required “general finding” of guilt
    or innocence in a criminal bench trial is “ ‘mere surplusage without legal
    significance.’ ” State v. Ham, 
    2009-Ohio-3822
     at ¶ 37, citing State v. Crawford,
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    10th Dist. Franklin No. 85AP-324, 
    1986 WL 1715
     at *7 (“Therefore, sub judice, the
    trial court should only have entered findings of guilty based upon the evidence.
    Separate findings of fact and conclusions of law are neither countenanced nor
    permitted. Therefore, we find the trial court’s reasoning as mere surplusage without
    legal significance sufficient to impeach the general findings of guilt.”); see also
    State v. Fisher, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-10-09, 
    2010-Ohio-5192
    , at fn 2 (“We note
    that the trial court issued written findings of fact in this case, which is contrary to
    the directive contained in Crim.R. 23. When a bench trial is held, the court is to
    make a general finding; i.e. guilty or not guilty.”); State v. Kalonji, 3d Dist. Paulding
    No. 11-15-07, 
    2016-Ohio-991
     at fn. 3 (“Because the trial court’s purported findings
    of fact are mere surplusage, the trial court’s use of an erroneous date—August 26,
    2015 rather than July 4, 2015—has no bearing on our disposition of this appeal.”).
    {¶48} Other Ohio Appellate Courts have also indicated that anything beyond
    a trial court’s general finding in a criminal bench trial constitutes “surplusage”
    without legal significance. See State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25287, 2011-
    Ohio-1041, ¶¶ 41-42; Crawford, supra; State v. Cattledge, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
    10AP-105, 
    2010-Ohio-4953
    , ¶ 26; State v. Singleton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
    27916, 
    2019-Ohio-1477
    , ¶ 18; but see State v. Ndiaye, 10th Dist. Franklin No.
    19AP-10, 
    2020-Ohio-1008
    , ¶ 30, appeal not allowed, 
    159 Ohio St.3d 1437
    , 2020-
    Ohio-3634 (indicating that a trial court’s comments made after a general finding of
    -22-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    guilt were surplusage, but if the comments or statements were made before a general
    finding of guilt the comments may not be surplusage).
    {¶49} Thus based on the authority cited, we could overrule Jason’s
    challenges to the trial court’s statements as those challenges are mere surplusage
    without legal significance whatsoever. However, notwithstanding this point, we
    review the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution to examine whether the evidence would allow any rational trier of fact
    to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks,
    
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
     (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus (superseded by
    constitutional amendment on other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St.3d 89
    , 102, (1997), fn. 4) following Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    (1979). We are not tasked with reviewing any specific statements of the trial court
    in a sufficiency review, regardless of whether the statements are categorized as
    “findings” or “surplusage.” Rather, we must look at the evidence.
    {¶50} Thus, turning to the evidence presented in this matter, we must
    determine whether the evidence supports Jason’s convictions for Complicity to
    Failure to Stop After an Accident and Complicity to Tampering with Evidence.
    {¶51} Importantly, Jason was convicted of Complicity through “aiding and
    abetting.” “To support a conviction for Complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant
    to R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported,
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the
    commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the
    principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
    crime.” State v. Johnson, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 240
    , 245 (2001).                 Furthermore,
    “‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence, companionship
    and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’” 
    Id.
     quoting State v. Pruett,
    
    28 Ohio App.2d 29
    , 34, 
    57 O.O.2d 38
    , 41 (1971).
    {¶52} Regarding his convictions for Complicity to Failure to Stop After an
    Accident and Complicity to Tampering with Evidence, Jason contends that the
    evidence never established that he was a principal actor in this case, and that he did
    nothing that would constitute aiding and abetting Julia. Essentially, he contends
    that he was simply present for the incident that occurred, and he argues that, legally,
    presence or acquiescence alone is not enough to support aiding and abetting. State
    v. Law, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-950651, 
    1996 WL 539792
    .
    {¶53} However, Jason’s argument that he was merely “present” for the
    incident ignores several key facts. First, and most importantly, once the crash
    occurred, Jason got out of the vehicle and was observed walking around the accident
    scene. He was observed looking into Colton’s vehicle, wherein Colton was, at best,
    semi-conscious, trapped, bleeding, and had his airbags deployed.
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    {¶54} After seeing the significant damage to Colton’s vehicle, and
    presumably to the driver himself, Jason got back into his own damaged vehicle with
    his wife and left the scene. Their own vehicle was extremely noisy, by all accounts
    likely difficult to control, and riding on a rim that was scraping the road. Still they
    did not stop. Then, when the Warners got home, Jason and Julia, by Jason’s own
    statement, talked about the matter throughout the night for over 8 hours before
    deciding to come forward and admit that they had been in the vehicle that caused
    Colton serious physical harm.
    {¶55} While Jason’s decision to get back into the vehicle after seeing the
    damage that had been caused from the crash might not alone have been
    overwhelming evidence to show that he was aiding and abetting, there is also
    evidence of his conduct after-the-fact to consider. When asked about the incident,
    Jason initially told Judge Edwards that he was “passed out” or asleep when
    everything occurred. It was only when confronted with statements from other
    witnesses that Jason admitted to getting out of his vehicle. This is evidence that a
    factfinder could utilize to determine that Jason was aware he was aiding and abetting
    his wife by leaving the scene of the accident.
    {¶56} Based on our review of the record in its entirety, we find that a rational
    trier-of-fact could determine from all the evidence presented that the elements of
    Complicity to Failure to Stop After an Accident were established here. In sum, it is
    -25-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    essentially undisputed that the accident was caused by Julia, that Jason and Julia got
    out of their vehicle, looked into Colton’s vehicle, that Colton suffered serious
    physical harm, and that the Warners drove off anyway after viewing the scene. The
    primary issue is simply whether there was sufficient evidence to find that Jason
    aided and abetted his wife, and under the facts and circumstances of this case, we
    find that a rational trier of fact could determine as much beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Thus Jason’s arguments related to Complicity to Failure to Stop After an Accident
    are not well-taken.
    {¶57} Turning to the conviction for Complicity to Tampering with Evidence,
    it was undisputed that the Warners left the scene and it is a readily permissible
    inference that they knew an investigation of the crash was likely to begin. Despite
    this, even after viewing Colton trapped in his vehicle, they left the scene making
    what would have been a difficult 5 mile drive in their damaged jeep in order to place
    it in their enclosed garage. Law enforcement testified that this hindered their
    investigation.
    {¶58} Again, based on Jason’s own statements and actions, and his decision
    to get back into the vehicle after viewing the scene, we cannot find that there was
    insufficient evidence presented to convict him of Complicity to Tampering with
    Evidence.6 A rational trier-of-fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that this
    6
    In his brief, Jason challenges numerous statements made by the trial court, arguing that the trial court was
    “confused” as to what crimes were indicted in this matter due to the way the trial court worded or phrased
    -26-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    was not a situation where Jason was merely “present” for the incident. For all of
    these reasons, Jason’s first assignment of error is overruled.
    Second Assignment of Error
    {¶59} In his second assignment of error, Jason argues that even if there was
    sufficient evidence presented to convict him, his convictions were against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    Standard of Review
    {¶60} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of
    the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record, “ ‘weigh[ ] the
    evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of witnesses and
    determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier-of-fact] clearly
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
    must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    ,
    387 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175 (1st Dist.1983). A
    reviewing court must, however, allow the trier-of-fact appropriate discretion on
    matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the
    witnesses. State v. DeHass, 
    10 Ohio St.2d 230
    , 231 (1967). When applying the
    the crimes at times. At best, Jason’s arguments are not persuasive given that the trial court found the Warners
    guilty of “Count 3 and Count 4” at the trial, then referenced the counts in the indictment at the sentencing
    hearing and in the final judgment entry. There is no confusion expressed by the trial court and Jason never
    objected to how the trial court worded matters at the time they were spoken. The Warners were ultimately
    convicted of the specific counts they were charged with in Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment.
    -27-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    manifest-weight standard, “[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs
    heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s
    judgment.” State v. Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 
    2012-Ohio-5233
    , ¶ 9,
    quoting State v. Hunter, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 67
    , 
    2011-Ohio-6524
    , ¶ 119.
    Analysis
    {¶61} In his second assignment of error, Jason contends that even if there
    was sufficient evidence to convict him, his convictions were against the manifest
    weight of the evidence. He summarily refers to arguments he made in his first
    assignment of error and then contends that the greater weight of the credible
    evidence demonstrated that Jason did not aid or abet Julia in any manner. Further,
    he claims that none of the witnesses observed Jason speaking with Julia, providing
    advice, guiding her to the Jeep, or assisting with its operation. He again maintains
    he was merely present for what happened.
    {¶62} However, as we stated in the previous assignment of error, Jason was
    not merely in the Jeep as a passenger while this event occurred. He got out of the
    Jeep, viewed the wreckage, then decided to get back into the vehicle. Then, in the
    days after the incident, he lied about the fact that he was asleep during the crash,
    minimizing his conduct, and he only admitted to getting out of the vehicle when
    confronted with statements of witnesses at the scene. Jason further acknowledged
    in his text messages that he and his wife went home and discussed the matter for
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    hours before deciding to report the accident to law enforcement.            As noted
    previously, “ ‘[p]articipation in criminal intent may be inferred from presence,
    companionship and conduct before and after the offense is committed.’ ” State v.
    Johnson, 
    93 Ohio St.3d 240
    , 245 (2001). A factfinder could find that these incidents
    were circumstantial evidence of Jason’s Complicity in this matter to Failure to Stop
    After an Accident and Tampering with Evidence.
    {¶63} We note that we are aware of Jason’s repeated challenges in his brief
    to the trial court’s statements made prior to announcing the general finding of guilt.
    Initially, we again refer to the “surplusage” law of the previous assignment of error.
    Completely notwithstanding the surplusage point, however, we note that Jason’s
    arguments often cherry-pick statements of the trial court or read them out of context
    to suit his claims. For example, Jason strongly challenges the trial court’s statement
    that “there was conflicting testimony – and I think perhaps maybe this is the State’s
    theory, I don’t know, in charging aiding and abetting. There is evidence that Jason
    warner was driving [after the accident].” (Tr. at 529). The trial court also later
    stated, “I think it’s more likely that Jason Warner drove away” because the vehicle
    would be “extremely difficult for a woman to control the operation of that [damaged
    Jeep.]” (Tr. at 532).
    {¶64} Jason argues that these statements are unsupported by the evidence,
    and that the latter is simply sexist. However, taking these statements alone and out-
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    of-context ignores other more definite statements wherein the trial court states:
    “Now, whether – whichever one drove it, it doesn’t matter for aiding and abetting
    purposes, because you can be charged as the principal offender, or as an aider and
    abettor.” (Tr. at 530). Further, the trial court found, after discussing who may have
    driven the vehicle, “In any event, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that
    they aided or abetted in the commission of the offense of leaving the scene of the
    accident.” (Tr. at 533). Finally, the trial court stated, “For all these reasons, and all
    of the other reasons in the record, the Court finds both Defendants guilty of Count
    3 and Count 4.”7 (Tr. at 538).
    {¶65} Notably, because of the Warners’ challenges to the trial court’s
    statements made prior to the general findings of guilt, and because of the Warners’
    renewed motions for acquittal prior to sentencing in this matter, the trial court again
    addressed its statements from the trial at the sentencing hearing. At that time, the
    trial court said, inter alia, “The Court does not know – and as I said – for sure, who
    was driving [after the accident]. All the Court can say is that based on the law and
    the evidence, they acted in concert with one another.” (Sent. Tr. at 28). Thus Jason’s
    references in his brief to isolated statements such as the one that it was “more likely”
    that Jason was driving ignore the fact that the trial court stated it was ultimately
    7
    Notably, the State did argue in closing that reasonable minds could differ as to who drove the Jeep from the
    crash site. The State questioned whether Julia was strong enough, noted that Jason quickly volunteered to
    move the Jeep when law enforcement asked, and law enforcement testified the vehicle would be very difficult
    to move/direct.
    -30-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    irrelevant who was driving based on the finding the trial court made.8 Further
    explanations like this establish that Jason’s attempt to randomly pick statements
    made by the trial court, without viewing everything in its entirety, is problematic.
    Thus even if the comments were not “surplusage”, the trial court clarified its
    findings and we see no prejudicial error here because the appropriate general
    findings were made and they were supported by the evidence.
    {¶66} After reviewing the record, giving deference to credibility findings of
    the trial court, we cannot find that the trial court clearly lost its way by convicting
    Jason of Complicity to Failure to Stop After an Accident and Complicity to
    Tampering with Evidence.                 Therefore, Jason’s second assignment of error is
    overruled.
    Third Assignment of Error
    {¶67} In Jason’s third assignment of error, he contends that the trial court’s
    determination that both of the Warners were guilty of Failure to Stop After an
    Accident and Tampering with Evidence via Complicity constituted a legal
    impossibility. He argues that there were only two individuals who could have been
    the principal offenders and that by convicting each defendant of Complicity, the
    trial court effectively found that both individuals were principal actors and both
    8
    Jason states that “more than likely” is a preponderance finding and does not equate to beyond a reasonable
    doubt. While this may have been true if the trial court rested solely on this point, as we have stated, the trial
    court made numerous statements that, if we were to consider them anything other than surplusage, must be
    viewed in their entirety.
    -31-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    were aiders and abettors. Jason argues that this leads to the impossibility of Jason
    being guilty of Complicity in his indicted crimes, and effectively “guilty” as the
    “primary offender” in Julia’s indicted crimes. In his brief, he argues: “No single
    person is capable of being two separate people at the same time. Similarly, no
    person can simultaneously be guilty and not guilty of the same offense as asserted
    in a single count of an indictment.” (Appt.’s Br. at 22).
    {¶68} First, we note that Jason’s argument hinges largely on challenging not
    only his conviction, but also Julia’s conviction. It is unclear, at best, to what extent
    he would have standing to do so. “The issue at trial was not the absent principal’s
    guilt, but rather the appellant’s guilt.” State v. Graven, 
    52 Ohio St.2d 112
    , 116
    (1977).
    {¶69} Second, and notwithstanding the first point, the Complicity statute
    itself directly addresses the situation where there is no convicted principal. As
    noted earlier, pursuant to R.C. 2923.03(B), “It is no defense to a charge under this
    section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted
    as a principal offender.”
    {¶70} Essentially Jason is arguing that he cannot be convicted of Complicity
    if his wife is not the principal offender. However, the trial court could have found
    that she was the principal offender or that she was not; regardless, the trial court
    could readily have found that Jason aided and abetted her in committing those
    -32-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    offenses. Julia’s status as principal or not a principal does not create a defense in
    this matter per the Complicity statute itself. In fact, even if Julia had been acquitted
    of either being a principal or being complicit, Jason still could have been convicted
    of Complicity. See Graven, supra.
    {¶71} Given the plain statement in the Complicity statute, and Jason’s failure
    to cite any legal authority that would compel us otherwise, we cannot find that his
    convictions constituted a legal impossibility.     Therefore, Jason’s third assignment
    of error is overruled.
    Fourth Assignment of Error
    {¶72} In his fourth assignment of error, Jason argues that the trial court
    committed “repeated misconduct” during its “deliberations” and at Jason’s
    sentencing hearing. Jason argues that the same standard that would apply to juror
    misconduct should apply in a bench trial.
    {¶73} As support for his statement that the trial court committed misconduct,
    Jason cites the trial court’s statements in what he characterizes as the trial court’s
    “findings.” He argues that the trial court made “findings” to support the convictions
    that were directly contradicted by the record “and or consisted of impermissible,
    baseless, and sexist stereotypes.” (Appt.’s Br. at 23). Further, Jason brings up the
    fact that the trial court initially stated Julia was guilty of the lesser-included offenses
    of Negligent Assault, before concluding that Negligent Assault actually contained
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    an additional element and thus was not actually a lesser-included offense. In
    addition, Jason takes issues with the trial court’s statement at sentencing that it had
    pulled out his docket, and [in] 2019 and 2020, he handled at least
    eight cases or more involving drunk driving. So he knows exactly
    what the time frame is. You have three hours, three hours to take
    a breath test from the time of the accident. There is even case law
    saying that because the test has substantial compliance, it can be
    even later, up to six hours.
    (Sent. Tr. at 24-25).     Jason contends that this constituted improper judicial
    investigation into the matter. Finally, Jason argues that the trial court’s statement
    that it was not unusual for an elected official to have a nonexistent criminal history,
    and thus a low “ORAS” score, showed that the trial court failed to conduct a
    meaningful review of Ohio’s sentencing factors.
    {¶74} Dealing first with Jason’s arguments regarding the trial court’s
    statements prior to its general finding of guilt, again these could be viewed as
    surplusage, but even if they were not, the trial court further explained its findings.
    Thus while the trial court might have found it hard to believe that Julia could have
    driven the severely damaged vehicle after the accident, the trial court also stated that
    it was irrelevant who was driving because the Warners aided and abetted each other.
    Thus any of the trial court’s comments regarding Julia or gender are really irrelevant
    to the final determination. Similarly, we find that the trial court’s over-arching
    finding was that the evidence supported the crimes.
    -34-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    {¶75} Next, as to Jason’s claims regarding the lesser-included offenses, the
    lesser-included offenses were not charges even levied against him, thus he has no
    standing to contest them. They do not impact his case. Moreover, there are no
    convictions for Negligent Assault against anyone in this case for us to actually
    review. Thus even if there was any improper comment by the trial court, the trial
    court corrected the matter itself and there is no resulting prejudice. This argument
    is not well-taken.
    {¶76} Regarding the trial court’s statement at the sentencing hearing that it
    had pulled Jason’s docket related to drunk-driving offenses, there was actual
    testimony from law enforcement in this case about how the time for alcohol testing
    had passed, juxtaposed with Jason’s admitted decision to wait approximately eight
    hours after the accident to report it, so it carried some relevance. Regardless, the
    rules of evidence do not even apply at sentencing hearings.           Evid.R. 101.
    Furthermore, the trial court’s statement only emphasized what was already
    presumed—that Jason was familiar with drinking and driving-related cases. In fact,
    the State argued in its closing argument that as a Judge, Jason would be aware that
    the Warners needed to stop after the accident and that there was a limited amount
    of time that the Warners could be tested for alcohol or drugs. Given that the rules
    of evidence do not apply in sentencing hearings, and given that the handling of any
    cases would likely be a matter of public record, we can find no error here.
    -35-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    {¶77} Finally, as to Jason’s claim that the trial court erred at sentencing and
    failed to conduct a meaningful review of the sentencing factors by stating it was not
    unusual that Jason had no criminal history as a public official, the trial court did
    what it was supposed to do and considered the fact that Jason had led a law-abiding
    life, and balanced that against him being a public official along with the nature of
    the crimes committed. Moreover, the trial court explicitly stated it had considered
    the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 and it did not have to do any more
    than that. State v. Osting, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-18-09, 
    2019-Ohio-1278
    , ¶ 9.
    Furthermore, in State v. Jones, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 242
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6729
    , the Supreme
    Court of Ohio conclusively held that there is no basis for an appellate court to
    modify or vacate a sentence even if the appellate court concludes that the record
    does not support the sentence under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.
    {¶78} In sum, we cannot find under the facts and circumstances of this case
    that the trial court failed to conduct a meaningful review of the sentencing factors
    where the trial court explicitly stated it had reviewed the sentencing factors.
    Moreover, under Jones we could also find no basis for reversal. For all of these
    reasons, Jason’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
    Fifth Assignment of Error
    {¶79} In his fifth assignment of error, Jason argues that even if there was no
    single error prejudicial enough to reverse his convictions, the cumulative errors in
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    Case No. 9-21-15
    this case combined were prejudicial. As support for his argument, he reasserts
    numerous claims referenced in the previous assignments of error.
    Standard of Review
    {¶80} “Under [the] doctrine of cumulative error, a conviction will be
    reversed when the cumulative effect of errors in a trial deprives a defendant of a fair
    trial even though each of the numerous instances of trial court error does not
    individually constitute cause for reversal.” State v. Spencer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-
    13-50, 
    2015-Ohio-52
    , ¶ 83, citing State v. Powell, 
    132 Ohio St.3d 233
    , 2012-Ohio-
    2577, ¶¶ 222-224 and State v. Garner, 
    74 Ohio St.3d 49
    , 64 (1995). “ ‘To find
    cumulative error, a court must first find multiple errors committed at trial and
    determine that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome below would have
    been different but for the combination of the harmless errors.’ ” State v. Stober, 3d
    Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-13, 
    2014-Ohio-5629
    , ¶ 15, quoting In re J.M., 3d Dist.
    Putnam No. 12-11-06, 
    2012-Ohio-1467
    , ¶ 36.
    Analysis
    {¶81} Because we have not found multiple errors in this matter, the doctrine
    of cumulative error does not apply. State v. Carpenter, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-18-
    16, 
    2019-Ohio-58
    , ¶ 104, citing State v. Bertuzzi, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-13-12,
    
    2014-Ohio-5093
    , ¶ 110. Therefore, Jason’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
    -37-
    Case No. 9-21-15
    Conclusion
    {¶82} For the foregoing reasons, Jason’s assignments of error are overruled
    and the judgment and sentence of the Marion County Common Pleas Court is
    affirmed.
    Judgment Affirmed
    ZIMMERMAN, J., MILLER, J., and SHAW, J., concur.
    /jlr
    -38-