Michelle Tuttle v. Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1246
Filed December 21, 2022
MICHELLE TUTTLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
IOWA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSIONER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County,
Samantha J. Gronewald, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s dismissal of her petition for writ of
certiorari which challenges the workers’ compensation commissioner’s ruling on
an interlocutory appeal involving a discovery dispute in proceedings before the
commissioner. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Dennis Currell, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Emily Willits, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Michelle Tuttle appeals the district court’s dismissal of her petition for writ
of certiorari challenging the workers’ compensation commissioner’s ruling on an
interlocutory appeal concerning a discovery dispute in proceedings before the
commissioner. We find the exclusive means of challenging a decision of the
workers’ compensation commissioner regarding a discovery dispute is through a
petition for judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A (2020). We reverse the
district court’s decision because Tuttle’s petition for writ of certiorari could be
considered by the district court as a petition for judicial review. On remand, the
court should determine the appropriateness of interlocutory review considering
whether adequate administrative remedies have been exhausted and whether
review of the final agency action would not provide an adequate remedy.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Tuttle had multiple workers’ compensation claims arising from her
employment with Archer Daniels Midland Co. (ADM). During discovery, Tuttle
requested, “[c]omplete copies of all photographs, surveillance films and/or
videotapes that Employer and insurance carrier have of [Tuttle], in or at the factory
or adjacent parking lots.” ADM’s response to this particular discovery request was
“none.” ADM did not update its discovery responses.
ADM requested an independent medical examination (IME) with Dr. Chad
Abernathey. The materials ADM submitted to Dr. Abernathey included a statement
from ADM’s counsel: “Visual images exist at ADM that display [Tuttle] walking as
she arrives to work at the beginning of her shift, and leaves work at the end of her
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shift, on her last date worked, March 19, 2020, with no visual signs of injury or
altered gait/limp.”
After Dr. Abernathey issued a final IME report, Tuttle served Dr. Abernathey
with a subpoena at his home, requesting documents supporting the report,
including the visual images ADM offered to Dr. Abernathey. Dr. Abernathey
provided the information requested in the subpoena.
On November 19, in the workers’ compensation proceedings, ADM moved
to quash or enter a protective order regarding the subpoenas. ADM also sought
sanctions against Tuttle. Tuttle resisted ADM’s motions, claiming the workers’
compensation commissioner did not have jurisdiction to address the motions.
Tuttle asserted that ADM needed to seek relief in district court. A hearing was not
held on ADM’s motions.
A deputy commissioner found that under Iowa Code section 17A.13(1), the
agency lacked authority to quash a subpoena and determined ADM would need to
proceed with an action to quash in district court. The deputy found, however, that
the agency had jurisdiction to adjudicate discovery disputes and could address a
protective order. The deputy granted the protective order, finding the subpoenas
were overbroad.1 The deputy determined that as a sanction, Tuttle should pay Dr.
Abernathey’s fees, which were $3900.2 The deputy denied Tuttle’s motion filed
1 The deputy found Tuttle should have filed a motion to compel for allegedly
deficient discovery responses, rather than serving a subpoena on Dr. Abernathey.
2 Tuttle also served two ADM employees with subpoenas that requested
surveillance films or videotapes of Tuttle at her workplace. The deputy
commissioner concluded “[t]he service of subpoenas on ADM employees, as the
alleged custodians of records is not unreasonable,” and did not order any
sanctions for the subpoenas on the ADM employees. That ruling has not been
challenged on appeal.
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pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), asking the deputy to reconsider
the ruling.
Tuttle filed an application for an interlocutory appeal to the workers’
compensation commissioner. The commissioner denied the request for an
interlocutory appeal:
Upon review of the record in the agency file, I find that the
ruling at issue is interlocutory. I further find that while substantial
rights may be affected by the ruling, the ruling will not necessarily
materially affect the final decision and that determination of the
correctness of the ruling at this time will not necessarily better serve
the interests of justice than preserving the potential issue for review
when the case in chief is decided on appeal if events progress to that
point. Grounds do not exist to grant an appeal from the interlocutory
ruling.
Tuttle filed a petition for writ of certiorari in district court, claiming the
commissioner acted illegally by acting outside the agency’s jurisdiction by ruling
on the contested subpoenas. The commissioner moved to dismiss on the grounds
that (1) judicial review under Iowa Code chapter 17A was the exclusive means to
challenge the commissioner’s decision and (2) Tuttle was required to exhaust
administrative remedies. Tuttle resisted the motion to dismiss.
The district court determined there was a complete remedy available to
Tuttle under Iowa Code chapter 17A and she “cannot rely on a writ of certiorari
under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1401 to circumvent the exclusivity of Chapter
17A.” The court stated:
Therefore, the Court rejects Tuttle’s arguments that Chapter
17A is not the exclusive means to challenge this agency action
because: (1) the plain language of 17A.19 makes it clear that it is the
exclusive means to challenge an agency action, unless expressly
provided otherwise by referring to Chapter 17A by name and (2) the
cases cited by and relied upon by Tuttle stating the contrary as to the
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exclusivity of 17A are distinguishable from the facts presented to the
Court in this case.
The court granted the commissioner’s motion to dismiss the petition for writ of
certiorari.3 Tuttle appeals the district court’s decision.
II. Standard of Review
A district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed for the correction
of errors at law. Askvig v. Snap-On Logistics Co., 967 N.W.2d 558, 560 (Iowa
2021). “For purposes of reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as
true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.”
Struck v. Mercy Health Servs.-Iowa Corp., 973 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 2022)
(citation omitted). A motion to dismiss will be affirmed “only if the petition shows
no right of recovery under any state of facts.” Id. (citation omitted).
III. Discussion
A. The district court granted the commissioner’s motion to dismiss
because Tuttle sought to challenge the commissioner’s decision denying her
request for interlocutory relief on issues involving discovery disputes through a
petition for writ of certiorari to the court. The court determined that a petition for
judicial review under chapter 17A was the sole means of relief available to Tuttle.
The court concluded that because Tuttle sought the wrong form of relief, her
petition should be dismissed.
Section 17A.19 provides:
Except as expressly provided otherwise by another statute
referring to this chapter by name, the judicial review provisions of this
chapter shall be the exclusive means by which a person or party who
is aggrieved or adversely affected by agency action may seek judicial
3 In the same ruling, the court denied ADM’s motion to intervene.
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review of such agency action. However, nothing in this chapter shall
abridge or deny to any person or party who is aggrieved or adversely
affected by any agency action the right to seek relief from such action
in the courts.
An issue similar to the one raised in this case is found in Iowa Industrial
Commissioner v. Davis, where an employer filed a petition for writ of certiorari in
district court seeking review of intermediate agency action. 286 N.W.2d 658, 659
(Iowa 1979). The commissioner objected, claiming the exclusive means of judicial
review of agency action was through chapter 17A. Id. at 660. The district court
granted the petition for writ of certiorari, and the matter was appealed to the Iowa
Supreme Court. Id.The supreme court stated, “Chapter 17A provisions ordinarily prevail over
the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure governing common-law writs such as certiorari.”
Id. (citing Salisbury Labs. v. Iowa Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 276 N.W.2d 830, 835
(Iowa 1979)). The court concluded, “Because under this record chapter 17A.19
provides the ‘exclusive means’ of challenging agency action, [the] district court’s
granting of [the employer’s] Petition for Writ of Certiorari did not conform to our
law.” Id. at 661; see also Tindal v. Norman, 427 N.W.2d 871, 874 (Iowa 1988) (“It
is undisputed that no exception exists for section 17A.19’s exclusivity for a writ of
certiorari.”).
Any exception to the exclusivity provision in section 17A.19 must be
expressly stated in a statute. Marek v. Johnson, 958 N.W.2d 172, 177 (Iowa 2021).
Section 86.26(1) provides, “Judicial review of decisions of the workers’
compensation commissioner may be brought in accordance with chapter 17A.”
We conclude that the statute governing judicial review of workers’ compensation
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cases, section 86.26, does not expressly provide an exception to the exclusivity
provision of section 17A.19. See Davis, 286 N.W.2d at 660.
Furthermore, section 17A.13, regarding agency subpoena powers, “does
not purport to create an exception to the prerequisites for judicial review
established in section 17A.19(1).” Christensen v. Iowa Civ. Rts Comm’n, 292
N.W.2d 429, 431 (Iowa 1980). The Iowa Supreme Court has stated:
If parties were able to interrupt agency proceedings by
bringing original district court actions to obtain assistance with every
discovery problem which conceivably might arise, the agency
process could be effectively disrupted and courts would have a
difficult additional burden. We believe the legislature intended that
discovery problems in administrative proceedings be settled before
the agency whenever possible and, in any event, that judicial review
ordinarily await final agency action. We hold that sections 17A.13
and 17A.19 do not give nonagency parties a right of immediate
recourse to the courts. Discovery disputes are subject to review on
the same terms as other agency action.
Id.; see also Wai Cheng v. Stanley, No. 08-0737, 2009 WL 3337636, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2009) (“Therefore, only upon final agency action, may the
aggrieved party seek judicial review to enforce compliance with the subpoena.”).
We find the exclusive means of challenging a decision of the workers’
compensation commissioner regarding a discovery dispute is through a petition for
judicial review under chapter 17A.4
4 We distinguish this case from Denison Municipal Utilities v. Iowa Workers’
Compensation Commissioner, where an employer challenged the assessment of
a fine imposed by the commissioner for failing to file a first report of injury. 857
N.W.2d 230, 233 (Iowa 2014). There, the Iowa Supreme Court stated “because
[the employer] challenged the authority and legality of the commissioner’s actions
in district court, the district court should have treated [the employer’s] appeal as a
writ of certiorari.” Id. at 234. The court noted, “the commissioner is the only party
interested in assuring that such assessments are upheld.” Id. Unlike Denison,
both parties here are involved in the discovery dispute. “[C]ontests over discovery”
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B. Tuttle filed a petition for writ of certiorari, rather than a petition for
judicial review. The district court determined that because Tuttle sought the
incorrect form of relief, the petition should be dismissed.
In general, when a petition for writ of certiorari is improper, “we may treat
[the] case as a proper chapter 17A appeal if the situation merits.” Walmart Stores,
Inc. v. Iowa Civ. Rts. Comm’n, No. 15-1691, 2016 WL 7403726, at *1 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2016); see also Tindal, 427 N.W.2d at 874 (“Although the petition is
labeled certiorari, that is not fatal to the district court’s jurisdiction if the instrument
may be treated and the case heard through appropriate procedure.”); Neumeister
v. City Dev. Bd., 291 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Iowa 1980) (“That the petition was labeled
one for declaratory judgment and not review is not fatal if the instrument, its filing
and other procedural steps, met section 17A.19 requirements.”); Salsbury Labs.,
276 N.W.2d at 835 (“Rather than conclude Salsbury can have no relief because it
has not pled the only cause of action available, we look beyond the labels of
Salsbury’s petition.”).
We look to Tuttle’s petition for writ of certiorari to determine if it may be
considered as a petition for judicial review. See Salsbury Labs., 276 N.W.2d at
835. A petition for judicial review must be filed within thirty days after an agency’s
final decision. Iowa Code § 17A.19(3). We consider whether the petition
“contain[s] a concise statement of the nature of its subject agency action, the
particular action appealed from, the basis of venue, the grounds for relief and the
relief sought.” Tindal, 427 N.W.2d at 873–74. Additionally, a party must comply
do not come within “an exception to the prerequisites for judicial review.”
Christensen, 292 N.W.2d at 431.
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with the service of notice requirements of section 17A.19(2). Neumeister, 291
N.W.2d at 13–14; see also Logan v. Bon Ton Stores, 943 N.W.2d 7, 12 (Iowa 2020)
(concluding substantial compliance with the service requirement was all that was
required).
The commissioner’s ruling denying Tuttle’s application for interlocutory
appeal was filed on February 19, 2021. Tuttle’s petition for writ of certiorari was
filed on March 19, so it was within the thirty days required for a petition for judicial
review. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(3). The petition explains the nature of the
agency action being challenged and the commissioner’s decision Tuttle was
asking to be reviewed. See Tindal, 427 N.W.2d at 873–74. The petition was filed
in Polk County, where all petitions can be filed. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(2). The
petition also set out the grounds for relief and the relief sought. See Tindal, 427
N.W.2d at 873–74. There has been no complaint that Tuttle failed to comply with
the service of notice requirements for petitions for judicial review. See Neumeister,
291 N.W.2d at 13–14.
Under section 17A.19(1), “A person or party who has exhausted all
adequate administrative remedies and who is aggrieved or adversely affected by
any final agency action is entitled to judicial review thereof under this chapter.” In
regard to interlocutory review, we have stated:
A party seeking judicial review of non-final agency action, as here,
must show that (1) adequate administrative remedies have been
exhausted and (2) review of the final agency action would not provide
an adequate remedy. Because “both requirements must be satisfied
before intermediate judicial review is permitted, the failure to meet
one requirement disposes of the issue.”
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Walmart Stores, 2016 WL 7403726, at *1 (quoting Richards v. Iowa State Com.
Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 616, 620 (Iowa 1978)).
We conclude Tuttle’s petition for writ of certiorari could be considered by the
district court as a petition for judicial review. The court should order Tuttle to
present a recast petition. See Tindal, 427 N.W.2d at 874. “As the district court did
not address the petition’s merits, we do not address them on appeal. Such matters
are, initially, for the district court’s determination.” Id. (citations omitted).
We reverse the district court’s decision dismissing Tuttle’s petition on the
ground that she filed a petition for writ of certiorari rather than a petition for judicial
review. On remand, the court should consider whether adequate administrative
remedies have been exhausted and whether review of the final agency action
would not provide an adequate remedy. See Walmart Stores, 2016 WL 7403726,
at *1. If both of these requirements are met, the court should consider the merits
of Tuttle’s claims. See id.REVERSED AND REMANDED.