Bell v. Hargrove ( 2021 )


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  • In the Supreme Court of Georgia
    Decided: December 14, 2021
    S21G0459. BELL v. HARGROVE.
    COLVIN, Justice.
    Georgia law generally requires a person to apply for and
    receive a valid weapons carry license from a probate judge before
    carrying a handgun or other weapon in public. 1                   The General
    Assembly has identified specific categories of people to whom “[n]o
    weapons carry license shall be issued,” including people with certain
    1 “No person shall carry a weapon without a valid weapons carry license
    unless he or she meets one of the exceptions to having such license as provided
    in subsections (a) through (g) of this Code section.” OCGA § 16-11-126 (h) (1).
    See also id. § 16-11-125.1 (5) (defining “weapon” as including handguns).
    Under the enumerated exceptions, if certain conditions are met, a person need
    not have a valid weapons carry license to, among other things, carry a handgun
    on his or her property or in his or her home, motor vehicle, or place of business,
    openly carry a loaded long gun, carry an unloaded handgun in an enclosed case,
    or carry a handgun or long gun while hunting, fishing, or engaging in shooting
    sports. See id. § 16-11-126 (a)-(c), (f). We note that the statutes governing
    weapons carry licenses have been amended several times since February 2018,
    when the weapons carry license application at issue in this case was submitted.
    Unless otherwise indicated, however, the provisions of the statutes cited in this
    opinion are the same today as they were in February 2018.
    criminal convictions. OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2). To assist probate
    judges in determining whether an applicant has a disqualifying
    conviction, the General Assembly has provided a mechanism for a
    probate judge to obtain a criminal history report for an applicant.
    See id. § 16-11-129 (d). Once a probate judge has a sworn application
    and a criminal history report in hand, the probate judge’s discretion
    to deny a weapons carry license is limited. Under OCGA § 16-11-
    129 (d) (4), a probate judge “shall issue” a license “unless” (1) “facts
    establishing ineligibility have been reported,” or (2) “the judge
    determines such applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not
    of good moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the
    [statutory] requirements.”     We granted certiorari to determine
    whether a probate judge may deny an application for a weapons
    carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 based on a determination
    that the applicant’s criminal history records report fails to show the
    outcome of an arrest that could have resulted in a disqualifying
    conviction. Applying the plain language of the statute, we conclude
    that a probate judge has no such authority. We therefore reverse
    2
    the Court of Appeals’ decision to the contrary. See Bell v. Hargrove,
    
    357 Ga. App. 802
     (849 SE2d 554) (2020).
    1. On February 13, 2018, Clinton Bell filed an application for a
    Georgia weapons carry license with the DeKalb County Probate
    Court. After running a criminal history records check on Bell, law
    enforcement returned a criminal history report to Probate Judge
    Bedelia Hargrove. The report stated that Bell had been arrested on
    May 27, 1986, for the “Misdemeanor” offense of “Pointing or Aiming
    Gun or Pistol at Another.” 2 But the report did not include any
    information about whether the State had prosecuted Bell for the
    offense or the results, if any, of such a prosecution.
    Based on Bell’s 1986 arrest, the probate judge denied his
    application for a weapons carry license, concluding that, if Bell’s
    1986 arrest had resulted in a conviction and the conviction had
    involved domestic violence, Bell would be ineligible for a weapons
    carry license. The judge reasoned that OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E)
    2 “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he intentionally and without
    legal justification points or aims a gun or pistol at another, whether the gun or
    pistol is loaded or unloaded.” OCGA § 16-11-102.
    3
    provides that “[n]o weapons carry license shall be issued to . . . [a]ny
    person who is prohibited from possessing or shipping a firearm in
    interstate commerce pursuant to subsections (g) and (n) of 18 [USC
    §] 922,” and 
    18 USC § 922
     (g) (9), in turn, prohibits the
    possession or shipment of a firearm in interstate commerce by
    someone “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor
    crime of domestic violence.” Although Bell had sworn under penalty
    of perjury in his application that he had never been convicted of a
    misdemeanor crime of domestic violence 3 and nothing whatsoever in
    the criminal history report indicated that the 1986 arrest involved
    domestic violence, the judge concluded that the “incomplete”
    information on the report about the “disposition” of his 1986 arrest
    3   Bell checked the box for “No” in response to the following question:
    Have you ever been convicted of, or pled guilty to, any
    misdemeanor crime involving the use or attempted use of physical
    force or threatened use of a deadly weapon towards (a) anyone as
    to whom at the time of the offense you were a current or former
    spouse, parent or guardian or similarly situated to a spouse,
    parent or guardian, (b) a person with whom you had a child in
    common, or (c) a person you lived with or had lived with as a
    spouse, parent or guardian or similarly situated to a spouse,
    parent or guardian, including but not limited to a girlfriend,
    boyfriend, step-child, foster child or ward?
    4
    did not allow her to rule out a “possible” conviction for a
    misdemeanor domestic violence offense. Concluding that she could
    not determine whether Bell had met all the qualifications for a
    weapons carry license, the judge denied Bell’s application.
    Bell filed suit against the probate judge in superior court,
    alleging that her denial of his application violated OCGA § 16-11-
    129 (d) (4) and that he was entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering
    her to issue him a weapons carry license. The parties filed cross
    motions for summary judgment, and, after a hearing, the trial court
    ruled in favor of the probate judge. The Court of Appeals affirmed
    the trial court’s order, see Bell, 357 Ga. App. at 814 (1), and we
    granted certiorari.
    2. When a probate judge denies an application for a Georgia
    weapons carry license, the applicant has a statutory right to “bring
    an action in mandamus or other legal proceeding in order to obtain
    such license.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (j). “To obtain the right to the
    extraordinary remedy of mandamus, the petitioner must show
    either a clear legal right to the relief sought or a gross abuse of
    5
    discretion.” Hertz v. Bennett, 
    294 Ga. 62
    , 62 (1) (751 SE2d 90) (2013).
    Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that Bell
    failed to carry his burden to obtain mandamus relief, the plain
    language of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) leads us to conclude otherwise.
    When construing a statute, “we must presume that the General
    Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v.
    Coleman, 
    294 Ga. 170
    , 172 (1) (a) (751 SE2d 337) (2013)
    (punctuation omitted).    Accordingly, we “afford the statutory text
    its plain and ordinary meaning,” “view[ing] the statutory text in the
    context in which it appears,” and “read[ing] the statutory text in its
    most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the
    English language would.”      
    Id. at 172-173
     (1) (a) (punctuation
    omitted). When, as here, statutory text is “clear and unambiguous,”
    our interpretive task begins and ends with the text itself. 
    Id. at 173
    (punctuation omitted).
    In OCGA § 16-11-129, the General Assembly set out a
    streamlined procedure for processing applications for weapons carry
    licenses.   An applicant initiates the process by submitting an
    6
    application under oath to a probate judge, having his or her
    photograph and fingerprints taken, and paying the required fees.
    See OCGA § 16-11-129 (a), (c), (f) (2). After receiving the application,
    a probate judge must direct the “appropriate law enforcement
    agency in the county,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (c), to
    (d) (1) (a) . . . request a fingerprint based criminal history
    records check from the Georgia Crime Information Center
    and Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of
    determining the suitability of the applicant and return an
    appropriate report to the judge of the probate court. . . . [;]
    (2) . . . conduct a background check using the Federal
    Bureau of Investigation’s National Instant Criminal
    Background Check System and return an appropriate
    report to the probate judge[; and]
    (3) [w]hen a person who is not a United States citizen
    applies for a weapons carry license[,] . . . conduct a search
    of the records maintained by United States Immigration
    and Customs Enforcement and return an appropriate
    report to the probate judge.
    Id. § 16-11-129 (d) (1) (A), (2), (3). Based on the records check
    results, the county law enforcement agency must then report to the
    probate judge “any findings relating to the applicant which may bear
    on his or her eligibility for a weapons carry license.” Id. § 16-11-129
    7
    (d) (4). Finally, subsection (d) (4) provides that, “after the judge of
    the probate court receives the report from the law enforcement
    agency,” the probate judge
    shall issue such applicant a license or renewal license to
    carry any weapon unless facts establishing ineligibility
    have been reported or unless the judge determines such
    applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good
    moral character, or has failed to comply with any of the
    requirements contained in this Code section.
    Id. (emphasis supplied).
    By its plain terms, subsection (d) (4) sets out a mandatory
    requirement that a probate judge “shall” issue a license “unless” a
    listed exception applies.4 OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4); see Mead v.
    Sheffield, 
    278 Ga. 268
    , 269 (601 SE2d 99) (2004) (“‘Shall’ is generally
    construed as a word of command.”)5; see also Merriam-Webster’s
    Collegiate Dictionary 1370 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “unless” as
    4 The phrase “shall issue . . . a license . . . unless” first appeared in the
    2008 version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008).
    5 “Although the word ‘shall’ is ‘generally construed as a mandatory
    directive,’ this Court has explained that it ‘need not always be construed in
    that fashion,’ if the context in which it is used indicates a permissive
    instruction.” Carr v. State, 
    303 Ga. 853
    , 865 n.15 (5) (815 SE2d 903) (2018).
    Here, we discern no contextual basis for concluding that the word “shall,” as
    used in OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), does not function as a mandatory directive.
    8
    “except on the condition that”). The statute enumerates only two
    exceptions to this command, both of which require that the probate
    judge make an affirmative factual determination that the applicant
    does not qualify for a weapons carry license. First, a probate judge
    may deny a license if “facts establishing ineligibility have been
    reported.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). Second,
    a probate judge may deny a license if “the judge determines such
    applicant has not met all the qualifications, is not of good moral
    character, or has failed to comply with any of the [statutory]
    requirements.” Id. (emphasis supplied). The statute recognizes no
    other exceptions to a probate judge’s duty to grant an application for
    a weapons carry license.     Accordingly, “unless” one of the two
    exceptions applies, the probate judge must issue a weapons carry
    license. See id.
    3. With this understanding of OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) in
    mind, we turn to the heart of the question presented on certiorari:
    Does a probate judge have discretion to deny an application for a
    weapons carry license based solely on a determination that an
    9
    applicant’s criminal history report raises a question about whether
    the applicant has a disqualifying conviction? Applying the plain
    language of the statute, the clear answer to this question is “no.”
    Information that merely indicates or leaves open the possibility that
    an applicant might be ineligible for a weapons carry license neither
    “establish[es]” the applicant’s “ineligibility” nor provides evidentiary
    support for a “determin[ation]” that the “applicant has not met all
    the qualifications, is not of good moral character, or has failed to
    comply with any of the [statutory] requirements.” OCGA § 16-11-
    129 (d) (4).6 In other words, mere speculation or uncertainty about
    an applicant’s qualifications for a weapons carry license cannot
    support a determination that an applicant is ineligible or
    disqualified from obtaining a license. Cf. Selph v. Williams, 
    284 Ga. 349
    , 352 (667 SE2d 40) (2008) (holding that “mere speculation” could
    not support a factual finding in a special master’s report); see also
    6 The probate judge does not argue that Bell’s 1986 arrest showed that
    he “[wa]s not of good moral character” or that he “failed to comply with any of
    the [statutory] requirements,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), so we will not address
    the substance of those grounds in this opinion.
    10
    Davis v. Davis, 
    262 Ga. 420
    , 421 (3) (419 SE2d 913) (1992) (noting
    that “speculative” findings “not supported by the evidence” are
    clearly erroneous).
    4. Here, Bell had a clear legal right to receive a weapons carry
    license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). In his sworn application,
    Bell stated that he had never been convicted of a misdemeanor crime
    of domestic violence, which would have rendered him ineligible for
    a weapons carry license under OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E), and no
    evidence indicated that his statement was false.       Nevertheless,
    because Bell’s criminal history report did not allow the probate judge
    to rule out the possibility that his 1986 arrest for pointing a pistol
    at another might have resulted in a disqualifying conviction, she
    concluded that she could not determine whether Bell qualified for a
    weapons carry license and denied his application on that basis.
    Given the record here, the probate judge had no valid statutory basis
    for denying Bell’s application on that ground.
    The rationale the probate judge gave for denying Bell’s
    application finds no support in the statute.     A finding that the
    11
    probate judge cannot determine whether an applicant is ineligible or
    unqualified cannot itself justify the denial of an application.
    Subsection (d) (4) affords a probate judge no discretion to deny an
    application for a weapons carry license unless the probate judge
    makes an affirmative determination that the applicant is in fact
    ineligible or unqualified to receive such a license. See OCGA § 16-
    11-129 (d) (4). 7
    Moreover, the probate judge did not make a determination, and
    could not have determined based on the evidentiary record, that an
    7 We note that a prior version of the statute provided that a probate judge
    “shall issue . . . a license . . . if the judge determines the applicant has met all
    the qualifications.” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2006) (emphasis supplied). By
    its plain terms, that version of the statute required a probate judge to make an
    affirmative determination that an applicant was qualified before issuing a
    license. Cf. Moore v. Cranford, 
    285 Ga. App. 666
    , 671-672 (1) (647 SE2d 295)
    (2007) (holding that the 2006 version of the statute implicitly extended the
    deadline for processing an application for a weapons carry license when the
    law enforcement agency did not timely return a criminal history report because
    a probate judge could not determine that the applicant had met all the
    qualifications without the report). The General Assembly, however, has since
    flipped the burden of proof. Since 2008, the statute has provided that a probate
    judge must affirmatively determine that an applicant is not qualified before
    denying a license. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (2008) (providing that the
    probate judge “shall issue . . . a license . . . unless the judge determines such
    applicant has not met all the qualifications” (emphasis supplied)). A finding
    that the probate judge cannot determine whether the applicant is qualified is
    not equivalent to a finding that the applicant is not qualified.
    12
    exception to her duty to issue a license applied. As the Court of
    Appeals correctly found, and as the judge concedes before this Court,
    “facts establishing ineligibility” were not reported in Bell’s criminal
    history report or application. See OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). While
    Bell would have been ineligible for a weapons carry license if he had
    a conviction for a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, 8 the
    evidence before the probate judge showed that Bell did not have such
    a conviction. Bell swore under oath in his application that he was
    never convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, and
    his criminal history report – which showed only an arrest for an
    offense that hypothetically could have involved domestic violence –
    did not contradict his sworn statement.
    For the same reasons, the evidence before the probate judge
    did not support a “determin[ation]” that Bell “ha[d] not met all the
    qualifications” for a weapons carry license. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d)
    (4). The judge’s argument that this provision calls on a probate
    judge to make a “quintessentially discretionary” determination
    8   See OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (E) and 
    18 USC § 922
     (g) (9).
    13
    about an applicant’s qualifications is incorrect. Because the statute
    enumerates the categories of persons who are disqualified from
    receiving a weapons carry license, see 
    id.
     § 16-11-129 (b) (2),9 a
    probate judge has no discretion to create new grounds for
    disqualification. See Mooney v. Webster, 
    300 Ga. 283
    , 288 (794 SE2d
    31) (2016) (discussing “the long-recognized doctrine of statutory
    construction,    expressio     unius        est   exclusio   alterius,   which
    discourages judicial recognition of exceptions not specifically set
    forth in a legislative enactment when other exceptions are expressly
    stated”). Further, because no evidence supported a finding that Bell
    “ha[d] not met all the qualifications” for a weapons carry license
    based on a disqualifying conviction, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4), this
    case did not call upon the probate judge to exercise discretion in
    9 The statute identifies several categories of persons to whom “[n]o
    weapons carry license shall be issued,” including, for example, “[a]ny person
    younger than 21 years of age unless [certain conditions apply],” “[a]ny person
    who has been convicted of a felony,” “[a]ny person who has been convicted of
    an offense arising out of the unlawful manufacture or distribution of a
    controlled substance or other dangerous drug,” and “any person who has been
    hospitalized as an inpatient in any mental hospital or alcohol or drug
    treatment center within the five years immediately preceding the application.”
    OCGA § 16-11-129 (b) (2) (A), (B), (F), (J).
    14
    weighing conflicting evidence about his qualifications. Cf. Ellis v.
    Ellis, 
    290 Ga. 616
    , 617 (1) (724 SE2d 384) (2012) (“[T]he trial court
    is authorized to resolve conflicts in the evidence.”). Moreover, the
    probate judge did not purport to weigh the evidence and conclude
    that Bell did not meet the qualifications but rather said she could
    not make such a determination.
    5. The Court of Appeals concluded that OCGA § 16-11-129
    afforded the probate judge discretion to make a “judgment call” that
    Bell’s criminal history report was “incomplete” and therefore not
    “appropriate” because, in the court’s view, the structure of § 16-11-
    129 required a probate judge “to make a threshold determination as
    to whether the report returned by the law enforcement agency
    constituted an ‘appropriate’ report.” Bell, 357 Ga. App. at 812, 814
    (1). The court reasoned that, because subsections (d) (1) and (d) (2)
    contemplate that the county law enforcement agency will return an
    “appropriate report,” and receiving “the report” is what triggers a
    probate judge’s duty to process an application for a weapons carry
    license under subsection (d) (4), a probate judge cannot grant an
    15
    application unless it has first determined that the report is
    “appropriate.” Bell, 357 Ga. App. at 804, 812, 814 (1). Accordingly,
    the court concluded, a probate judge may deny an application if it
    determines that the report returned by the law enforcement agency
    is not “appropriate.” Id. at 814 (1).
    The Court of Appeals’ understanding of the statutory scheme
    was incorrect. As an initial matter, OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) does
    not state that a probate judge may deny an application based on a
    threshold determination that an applicant’s criminal history report
    is “incomplete” or otherwise not “appropriate.” Instead, as discussed
    above, the statute enumerates only two exceptions to a probate
    judge’s duty to issue a license: a probate judge may deny an
    application only if the judge determines that (1) the facts reported
    establish the applicant’s ineligibility, or (2) the applicant is
    unqualified, not of good moral character, or has not met all statutory
    requirements. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4). Given these enumerated
    exceptions, there is a strong presumption that the statute does not
    recognize additional exceptions. See Mooney, 
    300 Ga. at 288
    .
    16
    Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ analysis, the interplay
    between subsections (d) (1), (2), and (4) does not allow, let alone
    require, a probate judge to make a threshold determination that a
    criminal history report is “appropriate.” As explained in Division 2
    above, subsections (d) (1), (2), and (3) instead require a probate judge
    to direct the appropriate law enforcement agency in the county to
    request criminal history checks from state and federal law
    enforcement agencies and to conduct a background check using the
    FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check System “for
    purposes of determining the suitability of the applicant” and then to
    “return an appropriate report” to the probate judge. OCGA § 16-11-
    129 (d) (1) (A), (2), (3). The term “appropriate report” has a clear
    meaning in context that does not call upon a probate judge to
    exercise judgment about whether the information produced in the
    criminal history check process is comprehensive or sufficiently
    inclusive.   The ordinary meaning of “appropriate” is “especially
    17
    suitable or compatible” or “fitting.” 10 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
    Dictionary 61 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “appropriate”); see also Deal,
    
    294 Ga. at 172
     (1) (a) (explaining that we generally interpret
    statutory text in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning).
    Because the statute directs the law enforcement agency to return a
    “suitable” or “fitting” report after conducting a criminal history
    records check process meant to aid a probate judge in determining
    an applicant’s eligibility for a license, the “appropriate report”
    referenced in the statute is simply one that includes any potentially
    relevant information derived from the records check process.
    This interpretation of “appropriate report” is confirmed by
    subsection (d) (4), which provides that “[t]he law enforcement agency
    shall report to the [probate] judge . . . by telephone and in writing . .
    . any findings relating to the applicant which may bear on his or her
    eligibility for a weapons carry license,” and that the probate judge
    has a limited time to process an application after the judge “receives
    10 The phrase “return an appropriate report” first appeared in the 2006
    version of the statute. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (1), (2) (2006).
    18
    the report from the law enforcement agency concerning the
    suitability of the applicant for a license,” OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4)
    (emphasis supplied).        Here, too, the statute indicates that “the
    report” is simply a report identifying any potentially relevant
    “findings” from the criminal history checks. The fact that the law
    enforcement agency must report to the probate judge any relevant
    information discovered in the records check process does not suggest
    that a probate judge has discretion to deny an application if the
    report is not as thorough as the probate judge would like. 11
    To the extent that the statute grants discretion to determine
    what constitutes an “appropriate report,” it grants that discretion
    not to the probate judge but instead to the law enforcement agency.
    11  Notably, the criminal history information made available to a county
    law enforcement agency from the statutorily specified sources is limited to the
    information generated by computer databases maintained by the Georgia
    Crime Information Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and United
    States Immigration and Customs Enforcement. It is unclear what authority a
    probate judge or county law enforcement agency would have to require those
    entities to include more or different information in their criminal history
    records reports. Further, although the probate judge suggested that Bell could
    file a certified copy of his police report from his 1986 arrest and other evidence
    showing the disposition of that charge with a motion for reconsideration, such
    information would not change the report that the judge received.
    19
    Because the probate judge does not have access to information
    generated in the criminal history record check process until after the
    law enforcement agency “report[s] . . . any findings relating to the
    applicant which may bear on his or her eligibility for a weapons
    carry license,” only the law enforcement agency could determine
    what information might be relevant to include in the report. OCGA
    § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied). 12            The statute further
    clarifies that the duty to determine what to include in the report
    rests solely with the law enforcement agency by providing that,
    “[w]hen no derogatory information is found on the applicant bearing
    on his or her eligibility to obtain a license or renewal license, a report
    shall not be required.” Id. Only the law enforcement agency would
    be privy to whether the criminal history check produced “derogatory
    12For example, the record in this case indicates that the county law
    enforcement agency did not pick and choose what information to include in its
    report regarding the FBI’s National Instant Criminal Background Check
    System but simply relayed to the probate judge a computer-generated printout
    from the system, which included all information about Bell’s criminal history
    maintained in the system. Although the report was overinclusive, the law
    enforcement agency satisfied its duty to report “any findings relating to [Bell]
    which may bear on [Bell’s] eligibility for a weapons carry license” by sending
    the probate judge a report that included all information produced from the
    criminal history record check. OCGA § 16-11-129 (d) (4) (emphasis supplied).
    20
    information,” so only the law enforcement agency would be in a
    position to know whether a report is “required.” Id. Because the
    statute gives no indication that a probate judge has discretion to
    determine what constitutes an “appropriate report,” the Court of
    Appeals erred in concluding that the probate judge could make a
    discretionary choice to deny Bell’s application on the ground that
    she did not find his criminal history report “appropriate.” 13
    13 We note that nothing in the statute prohibits a probate judge who is
    dissatisfied with the law enforcement agency’s report from requesting
    additional information from the law enforcement agency or performing a
    follow-up investigation of his or her own, so long as the judge observes the
    statutory time requirements for processing applications. See OCGA § 16-11-
    129 (d) (4) (providing that a probate judge must rule on an application “[n]ot
    later than ten days after the judge of the probate court receives the report” and
    “shall not suspend the processing of the application or extend, delay, or avoid
    any time requirements provided for under this paragraph”). The statute also
    authorizes a probate judge to investigate potential grounds for ineligibility and
    to revoke a license through a notice-and-hearing process after issuing a license
    to an applicant, if certain conditions apply:
    If, at any time during the period for which the weapons carry
    license was issued, the judge of the probate court of the county in
    which the license was issued shall learn or have brought to his or
    her attention in any manner any reasonable ground to believe the
    licensee is not eligible to retain the license, the judge may, after
    notice and hearing, revoke the license of the person upon a finding
    that such person is not eligible for a weapons carry license
    pursuant to subsection (b) of this Code section or an adjudication
    of falsification of application, mental incompetency, or chronic
    alcohol or narcotic usage.
    21
    As a final matter, we are unpersuaded by the judge’s policy
    argument that a probate judge should be afforded greater discretion
    to deny weapons carry licenses to protect the public from dangerous
    people. Balancing policy considerations is a job for the General
    Assembly. It is not for us to second-guess the General Assembly’s
    policy determinations as embodied in the statutory language it
    enacted.14
    6. For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that Bell
    established that he had a clear legal right to a weapons carry license.
    Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision affirming the
    trial court’s denial of mandamus relief. The Court of Appeals is
    directed to remand the case to the trial court with instructions to
    issue a writ of mandamus ordering Judge Hargrove to issue Bell a
    weapons carry license.
    OCGA § 16-11-129 (e) (1).
    14 We note that, although Bell sought costs and attorney’s fees under
    OCGA § 16-11-129 (j), the trial court granted summary judgment to the
    probate judge on that issue, and Bell abandoned any challenge to the trial
    court’s ruling by failing to raise the issue before the Court of Appeals. See
    Blalock v. Cartwright, 
    300 Ga. 884
    , 889 n.4 (III) (799 SE2d 225) (2017).
    22
    Judgment reversed and case remanded with direction. All the
    Justices concur.
    23