In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: Thomas Aranda ( 2021 )

FILED
DECEMBER 14, 2021
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: ) No. 35949-2-III
)
)
THOMAS ARANDA, )
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner. )
)
FEARING, J. — Thomas Aranda seeks relief from personal restraint imposed for his
2010 Chelan County convictions upon a guilty plea for first degree rape with a firearm
enhancement, first degree robbery with a firearm enhancement, first degree burglary,
second degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. Aranda, who was 16 years old at the time of the offenses, contends he is
entitled to resentencing for the court to consider the mitigating qualities of his
youthfulness. He also argues he is entitled to vacation of his conviction of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance and resentencing on his remaining counts. This
Court concludes that Aranda is entitled to resentencing under State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d
170, 182-83, 186, 481 P.3d 521 (2021), and therefore does not reach Aranda’s argument
that he is also entitled to resentencing under State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 18,
391 P.3d 409 (2017) and its progeny.
No. 35949-2-III
In re Personal Restraint of Aranda
Background
In 2008, Thomas Aranda and four other individuals engaged in a home invasion to
confront an individual who they believed sold them bad drugs. While inside the
residence, Aranda raped a victim at gunpoint.
In 2009, Thomas Aranda pled guilty to the charges identified above, including one
count of first degree rape with a firearm enhancement and one count of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance. The high end of his standard range was 336
months. The State recommended a sentence of 324 months and Aranda asked for a low-
end range sentence of 282 months. On January 14, 2010, the sentencing court imposed a
determinate sentence of 324 months of confinement. On March 3, 2010, the court
entered an agreed clarification order that reflected that the rape sentence was an
indeterminate sentence, with a minimum term of 264 months and a maximum term of
life.
Thomas Aranda unsuccessfully appealed his convictions and filed two
unsuccessful post-conviction motions seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. State v.
Aranda, comm’r ruling No. 31311-5-III (Wash. Ct. App. 2014); In re Personal Restraint
of Aranda, No. 30082-0-III (Wash. Ct. App. 2012); See In re Personal Restraint of
Aranda, No. 34481-9-III (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). In 2018, Aranda filed a CrR 7.8 motion
with the superior court that sought resentencing pursuant to State v. Houston-Sconiers,
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In re Personal Restraint of Aranda
188 Wn.2d 1, 18, 391 P.3d 409 (2017). In a letter ruling, the superior court concluded
that
Houston-Sconiers was not material to Aranda’s sentence. The superior court reasoned
that, when Aranda failed to accept responsibility for the rape offense, he could not
demonstrate that youth was a mitigating factor as to that offense. The superior court
transferred the motion to this court pursuant to CrR 7.8(c) for consideration as a personal
restraint petition.
On multiple occasions, this court stayed Thomas Aranda’s personal restraint
petition pending various Supreme Court decisions in other cases involving youthfulness
as a mitigating factor. Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in In re Personal
Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255, 474 P.3d 524 (2020), and In re Personal
Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 474 P.3d 507 (2020), this Court lifted the stay and
requested supplemental briefing with regard to youth sentencing and State v. Blake, 197
Wn.2d 170, 182-83 (2021). Aranda submitted supplemental materials arguing that he is
entitled to resentencing under Ali and Domingo-Cornelio and that he is entitled to
vacation of the controlled substance conviction and resentencing under State v. Blake.
The State’s supplemental brief asserts that Mr. Aranda fails to demonstrate actual and
substantial prejudice under In re Personal Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 440
P.3d 978 (2019), with regard to his sentencing as a youth. The State did not provide any
briefing regarding the applicability of Blake to Mr. Aranda’s case.
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During the pendency of his personal restraint petition, Thomas Aranda filed a new
CrR 7.8 motion with the superior court. He claimed that his entire plea agreement was
void pursuant to Blake and that he was entitled to a new trial. The superior court recently
transferred the motion to this court for consideration as another restrain petition.
Nevertheless, this court ruled that the superior court’s transfer order did not comply with
the requirements of CrR 7.8(c)(2) and remanded the motion to the superior court.
Analysis
Since Thomas Aranda filed this petition more than one year after his judgment and
sentence became final on June 22, 2015, RCW 10.73.090(1) bars the petition as untimely
unless he shows the judgment and sentence to be invalid on its face, the court lacked
competent jurisdiction, or Aranda grounds his petition solely on one or more of the
exceptions set forth in RCW 10.73.100(1)-(6).
After Thomas Aranda filed his personal restraint petition, our Supreme Court
announced that Houston-Sconiers was a significant change in the law requiring
retroactive application. In re Personal Restraint of Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d 255,
263 (2020); In re Personal Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 233 (2020). The change in
law set forth in Houston-Sconiers “is material to adult standard range sentences imposed
for crimes the defendant committed as a child.” Domingo-Cornelio, 196 Wn.2d at 266.
Aranda was sentenced to an adult standard range sentence for crimes committed when he
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In re Personal Restraint of Aranda
was under the age of 18, and thus Houston-Sconiers is material to Aranda’s case and his
petition is timely under RCW 10.73.100(6).
Thomas Aranda’s petition is also timely under the facial invalidity exception to
RCW 10.73.090(1). In State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 182-83 (2021), the Supreme Court
held that Washington’s strict liability drug possession statute, former
RCW 69.50.4013(1), violated state and federal due process clauses and was therefore
void. Although the Supreme Court did not specify whether its ruling applied to cases
already final, established precedent counsels that Blake applies to such cases. An
accused cannot be convicted on a void statute. State v. Carnahan, 130 Wn. App. 159,
164, 122 P.3d 187 (2005). Since the former controlled substance possession statute is
void, we can determine on the face of Aranda’s judgment and sentence that his
conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance is void. Thus, no time bar
precludes his challenge to his possession conviction.
In the personal restraint context, this court will only grant relief for constitutional
errors resulting in actual and substantial prejudice. In re Personal Restraint of Cook, 114
Wn.2d 802, 813, 792 P.2d 506 (1990). Because a person cannot be punished for
violating a void statute, Thomas Aranda suffers actual and substantial prejudice based on
his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. See In re Pers. Restraint of
Hinton, 152 Wn.2d 853, 860, 100 P.3d 801 (2004). Aranda is entitled to vacation of his
conviction and to be resentenced on the remaining convictions under Blake.
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Since Thomas Aranda has demonstrated he is entitled to resentencing under Blake,
we decline to reach his request for resentencing under Ali, Domingo-Cornelio, and
Houston-Sconiers. At the resentencing hearing, the superior court will have the benefit
of Ali and Domingo-Cornelio when considering whether to reduce Aranda’s sentence for
the other crimes based on his youthfulness at the time of the offenses.
Accordingly, this court grants Thomas Aranda’s petition for relief and remands the
case to the trial court for vacation of the conviction for unlawful possession of a
controlled substance and resentencing in accordance with Blake and Houston-Sconiers.
RAP 16.4(a).
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________ _________________________________
Siddoway, A.C.J. Lawrence-Berrey, J.
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