McQuarrie v. McQuarrie , 2019 UT App 147 ( 2019 )


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    2019 UT App 147
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    MELVIN C. MCQUARRIE,
    Appellant and Cross-appellee,
    v.
    JANETTE COLLEDGE MCQUARRIE,
    Appellee and Cross-appellant.
    Opinion
    No. 20170956-CA
    Filed August 29, 2019
    Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
    The Honorable Robert P. Faust
    No. 084904419
    James A. McIntyre and Richard R. Golden, Attorneys
    for Appellant and Cross-appellee
    Douglas B. Thayer, Andrew V. Wright, and Cole L.
    Bingham, Attorneys for Appellee and
    Cross-appellant
    JUDGE KATE APPLEBY authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER and DAVID N.
    MORTENSEN concurred.
    APPLEBY, Judge:
    ¶1    Melvin C. McQuarrie appeals the district court’s order
    dismissing his counter-petition to modify a divorce decree
    (Decree). He argues the court erred in determining that his
    alimony obligation did not terminate when Janette Colledge
    McQuarrie remarried. Janette 1 cross-appeals, arguing the court
    1. As is our practice when the parties have the same last name,
    we refer to them by their first names with no disrespect intended
    by the apparent informality.
    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    erred in calculating her attorney fees award and in denying
    portions of her motion for an order to show cause why
    Melvin should not be held in contempt of court (Show Cause
    Motion). We affirm the district court’s determination that
    Melvin’s alimony obligation continued after Janette’s
    remarriage. We conclude the court abused its discretion in
    denying portions of the Show Cause Motion but not in
    calculating Janette’s attorney fees award. We therefore affirm in
    part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings
    consistent with this opinion.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2     Janette and Melvin divorced in 2008, and a Decree
    was entered pursuant to a mediated stipulation for divorce.
    The Decree named Janette primary caregiver to the parties’
    minor child and ordered Melvin to pay $3,000 per month in
    child support until the child reached “the age of 26 or so long
    as [the child remained] a college student, whichever occur[red]
    later.” A child support obligation worksheet was attached to
    the stipulation. In that worksheet, the parties acknowledged
    that Janette’s child support award was greater than the
    amount set by the statutory guidelines and indicated that the
    reason for the upward deviation was the parties’ “property
    settlement.”
    ¶3     The Decree ordered Melvin to pay “$2,000.00 per month
    as alimony with a cost of living increase up to 3% per annum”
    while child support continued. After child support terminated,
    alimony would be “adjusted pursuant to the sum set forth
    in ‘Exhibit C’ to the [parties’ stipulation], with a cost of living
    increase of up to 3% per annum.” Exhibit C is a spreadsheet
    that appears to summarize the payments and assets Janette
    would receive under the stipulation. It lists yearly payments
    from 2008 to 2039 (372 months) in each of the following
    categories: (1) Alimony and Child Support, (2) Taxes on
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    Alimony, (3) Health Insurance, (4) Car Allowance, (5) Utilities
    and Property Taxes, and (6) House Maintenance. Exhibit C
    also provides sums labeled “House Value,” “New Furniture,”
    and “Personal Assets,” as well as a sum labeled “Total Net
    Present Value.” The alimony and child support category
    provides for a $5,000 payment in 2008, and the payment
    increases each year until the final payment of $12,500.40 in 2039.
    The Decree states that alimony will continue “until the first of
    any of the following occurrences: [Melvin’s] death; [t]he
    expiration of 372 months from the signing of the [Decree]; or
    [Janette’s] death.”
    ¶4      The Decree ordered Melvin to purchase a $1,000,000
    annuity for Janette within “[t]hirty-six months after the signing
    of the [Decree].” Janette was “to be irrevocably designated as
    the beneficiary of the annuity during her lifetime with the
    power to designate any blood relative as the beneficiary of
    any death benefit provided by the annuity” and was to dictate
    a “payout duration in excess of fifteen years.” The Decree said
    it was “anticipated that the annuity [would] provide a stream
    of income to [Janette] for her lifetime sufficient to supplement
    what [Melvin] pays as alimony.” In a footnote, the Decree
    ordered Janette and Melvin to meet every three years “at
    the Hyatt Regency, or comparable hotel, in San Diego,
    California” “without spouses or attorneys” “to review their
    respective standard of living.” To maintain an “equal” standard
    of living, the footnote also permitted “an upward adjust[ment]
    of alimony . . . , but never a downward adjustment.”
    ¶5     Next, the Decree “divided and awarded” the parties’
    property and their “marital debts and obligations.” Janette was
    awarded the parties’ marital house. The Decree ordered
    Melvin to pay various expenses related to the house, and
    those payments were listed in sub-paragraphs 18(a)–(g).
    Sub-paragraph 18(a) ordered Melvin “to satisfy the monthly
    payments owing on the first deed of trust,” and sub-paragraphs
    18(b)–(g) ordered him to, among other things, pay the “real
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    property taxes and homeowner’s insurance” until the first
    deed of trust was satisfied. But paragraph 21 provides, “Upon
    [Melvin’s] purchase of the annuity . . . [his] responsibility for the
    payments outlined in paragraph 18(b)–(g) is ordered to
    cease and [his] obligation with respect to those items will be
    at an end.” The Decree states that “[Melvin’s] payment of
    the first deed of trust, the real property taxes, and the
    homeowner’s insurance constitutes a part of the property
    settlement.” Janette also received an award of “one-half of
    [Melvin’s] 401(k) retirement benefits accrued during the parties’
    marriage.”
    ¶6     As “part of the property settlement agreed upon by the
    parties,” the Decree ordered Melvin to permanently “employ
    [Janette] with one of his companies” and, as a benefit of that
    employment, the company was required to “pay for [Janette’s]
    health insurance premiums for as long as [she] require[d]
    medical insurance.” The Decree also ordered Melvin to
    “maintain medical insurance for the medical expenses of the
    [parties’] minor child” and to “pay for the minor child’s
    out-of-pocket costs” and “uninsured medical expenses.” The
    Decree ordered that if Janette incurred “medical expenses on
    behalf of the minor child,” she was to either “provide written
    verification of the cost and payment of the medical expenses she
    paid on the minor child’s behalf” to Melvin or make
    arrangements “so that [Melvin] may be billed directly.”
    Following the provisions dealing with medical insurance, the
    Decree states that “[t]he payment of [Janette’s] health insurance
    premiums and uncovered medical expenses constitute a portion
    of the property settlement.”
    ¶7     Many of the Decree’s provisions mention Janette’s
    potential remarriage, and the Decree provides that certain
    obligations will terminate if she remarries. For example,
    sub-paragraph 7(a) states that Melvin “shall not be responsible
    for any medical premium, prescription, out of pocket, or co-pay
    expense related to [Janette’s] future spouse, or spouse’s children.”
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    (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 11 allows Janette “to designate
    any blood relative as the beneficiary of any death benefit
    provided by the annuity,” but “in the event she remarries, she may
    not designate her spouse or his children as beneficiaries.”
    (Emphasis added.) Paragraph 28 provides, “In the event [Janette
    was] unmarried, commencing in 2011, and every five years
    thereafter so long as [Janette] remain[ed] single, [Melvin was]
    ordered to purchase or lease for [her] . . . a model year 2012
    Cadillac Escalade, or equivalent.” (Emphasis added.) Under
    paragraph 19, “should [Janette] remarry,” Melvin shall “continue
    to pay the first deed of trust until it is paid in full” but he will be
    “relieved of any and all obligations to pay and maintain the
    items in . . . sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g).” (Emphasis added.)
    Finally, paragraph 29 provides that the parties cannot divest
    assets to a future spouse, and paragraph 30 prohibits the
    disclosure of any settlement or of the terms of the Decree to
    future spouses. The Decree does not contain a separate provision
    addressing whether Melvin’s alimony obligation would
    terminate or continue if Janette remarried.
    ¶8     Janette remarried in 2014. That year, she filed a petition to
    modify the Decree (Petition to Modify) based on Melvin’s
    alleged fraud. She claimed Melvin did not disclose certain assets
    and “misrepresented the value of the marital home . . . for
    purposes of inducing her to enter into the property settlement.”
    Janette also filed the Show Cause Motion, asserting Melvin
    should be held in contempt of court for, among other things,
    failing to pay a cost of living increase on the alimony award,
    Janette’s “uncovered” and “out-of-pocket medical expenses,”
    and “one-half of [his] 401(k),” and for failing to purchase the
    $1,000,000 annuity.
    ¶9     Melvin      filed   a     counter-petition    to    modify
    (Counter-petition). He asserted Janette’s remarriage constituted
    “a substantial and material change in the parties’ circumstances”
    that justified terminating his alimony obligation. Specifically, he
    argued that alimony terminated as a matter of law upon Janette’s
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    remarriage because the Decree did not “specifically provide
    otherwise.” See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (9) (LexisNexis Supp.
    2018) (“Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides
    otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a
    former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or
    death of that former spouse.”).
    ¶10 After a hearing, a court commissioner entered a
    recommendation on the Petition to Modify, the Show Cause
    Motion, and the Counter-petition. To start, the commissioner
    recommended denying Melvin’s request to terminate alimony.
    The commissioner reasoned, “[A]lthough the decree does not
    state alimony will not terminate upon remarriage, the Decree is
    clear on its face considering all the other references to remarriage
    in the other provisions . . . that the parties intended for alimony
    to survive remarriage.”
    ¶11 Next, the commissioner addressed the Show Cause
    Motion, beginning with the cost of living adjustment to alimony.
    First, the commissioner concluded that the alimony provisions
    established “a cost of living increase of up to 3% per annum (and
    never downward),” but that the actual increase was “to be
    determined by the Consumer Price Index [(CPI)].” Second, the
    commissioner concluded “the Decree does not require [Melvin]
    to pay for [Janette’s] out of pocket medical costs.” Third, the
    commissioner found “the payment of half of [Melvin’s] 401(k)
    account ha[d] been satisfied . . . by [Melvin’s] payment to
    [Janette] in the amount of $8,885.52.” Fourth, because Melvin did
    not purchase the annuity within thirty-six months of the entry of
    the Decree, the commissioner recommended that Janette receive
    “a judgment in an amount sufficient to compensate her for the
    loss of the stream of income, past and future, from the ordered
    annuity.” But if Melvin purchased “an annuity which pa[id]
    $6,728.63 per month for 140 months,” the commissioner
    concluded “his purchase of the annuity [would] satisfy the
    judgment entered against him.” The commissioner also
    concluded that Melvin should receive “credit against the annuity
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    judgment for payments he made . . . (that [Janette] would have
    otherwise been paying herself out of the stream of income from
    the annuity) . . . past the date that the annuity should have been
    purchased.”
    ¶12 Janette filed an objection to the commissioner’s
    recommendation. First, she claimed the cost of living adjustment
    to alimony should “be a straight 3% each year,” regardless of
    the CPI. Second, she asserted Melvin should not receive credits
    against his annuity obligation for payments listed in sub-
    paragraphs 18(b)–(g) of the Decree because those payments
    “were to continue until [he] purchased the annuity—which he
    did not do.” She objected to the recommended amount
    for Melvin’s annuity obligation, claiming the written
    recommendation differed from what the commissioner
    orally recommended at the hearing. Third, she argued that
    Melvin had not paid her half the value of his 401(k) account.
    Fourth, she asserted Melvin should pay her out-of-pocket
    medical expenses because “the Decree clearly states that
    [Melvin’s] payment of [Janette’s] health insurance premiums and
    uncovered medical expenses constitute a portion of the property
    settlement.”
    ¶13 After a period of discovery, Janette filed a motion to limit
    issues for trial. While that motion was pending, Melvin filed a
    motion for partial summary judgment on his claim that alimony
    terminated as a matter of law when Janette remarried because
    the Decree did not “specifically provide otherwise.” The court
    scheduled a hearing on the motion to limit issues for trial, and
    the court commissioner scheduled a hearing on the motion for
    partial summary judgment.
    ¶14 At the hearing on the motion to limit issues for trial, the
    district court told the parties it wanted to “simply have a
    discussion” about the case. It explained that the parties’
    stipulation that “made the basis of the [Decree was] going to be
    followed” and the only issue worth pursuing in the case was
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    “the possibility of the allegation of fraud.” The court determined
    that alimony did not terminate upon Janette’s remarriage
    because the Decree “could be fairly read and interpreted that the
    parties either negotiated away—or clearly understood . . . what
    those alimony provisions were.” And “[e]ven though they may
    have been characterized as . . . alimony, when you look at the
    way they were treated, . . . it clearly looks to be . . . that it was
    a—in a way, a property settlement agreement.” The court also
    said “you could interpret [the Decree] to read the parties
    specified, clearly, the terms of—as it relates to the alimony and
    waived, knowingly, the statutory benefit that they would have
    had on the issue of remarriage.”
    ¶15 The court also expressed skepticism toward the merits
    of the Petition to Modify. It said, “I don’t have any indications
    of all the facts or the evidence, but I don’t see any fraud here.
    Okay? There was negotiation and understanding with respect
    to what the settlement agreement was.” But “[i]f there really
    was two or three items left out of this property agreement,” the
    court explained, “whether they were left out intentionally, on
    purpose, [or] negligently, . . . fairness and equity would clearly
    require that they be looked at.” Janette responded that she was
    “willing to waive that claim altogether” and then said, “that
    leaves us—there’s nothing else to decide . . . other than the issue
    of fees.”
    ¶16 Melvin informed the court that a summary judgment
    motion on “the issue of remarriage and the fact that the [Decree]
    does not specifically provide that alimony doesn’t terminate
    upon remarriage . . . [was] before the commissioner [the
    following] week.” After acknowledging the commissioner’s
    order determining that alimony did not terminate upon
    remarriage—which was signed by the district court—Melvin
    said he would “like to have [the commissioner] have the
    opportunity to make a recommendation” with “the benefit of the
    [new] briefing that’s involved . . . [and] there are several more
    recent Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court cases that bear
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    on the issue.” The court responded, “If you want to try to get a
    second bite at the apple and convince [the commissioner], that’s
    fine.”
    ¶17 But the court concluded that it was “ready to issue an
    order of dismissal” 2 and saw no “need to set trial,” and turned
    to address Janette’s request for attorney fees. The court
    determined she was entitled to fees “that relate to the
    enforcement in the first place and the requirement for [Melvin]
    to give the annuity and to comply with the other terms and
    provisions” of the Decree. Specifically, the court found that
    Janette was the prevailing party on the Show Cause Motion,
    explaining that “the hearings brought up such quick decisions . .
    . [b]ecause [Melvin] was not in compliance with the [Decree].”
    But the court said it would view other fees “with some
    skepticism” because both parties “lost on [their petitions to
    modify] with respect to not being able to prove a substantial
    material change in circumstances.”
    ¶18 Although the district court dismissed the case, the court
    commissioner nevertheless held a hearing on Melvin’s motion
    for partial summary judgment and recommended that the
    motion be denied. Melvin filed an objection to the
    commissioner’s recommendation, asserting again that Utah
    Code section 30-3-5(9) required termination of his alimony
    obligation. The court rejected Melvin’s objection to the
    recommendation and entered an order denying his motion for
    summary judgment.
    2. We are puzzled by this “dismissal.” What began as a pre-trial
    hearing appears to have resulted in the court’s dismissal of both
    petitions to modify. In Janette’s case, this appears to have been
    because she waived the basis for the Petition to Modify at the
    hearing on the motion to limit issues; in Melvin’s case, the
    dismissal ruling was made even though a motion for partial
    summary judgment was still pending.
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    ¶19 The court then entered an order memorializing its verbal
    dismissal of the Petition to Modify and the Counter-petition. It
    found “that the Stipulation and Decree between the parties
    [would] be followed as written.” And after reviewing “all the
    language in the Decree,” it concluded the alimony provisions
    “were not something that would be terminated or eliminated
    based upon the remarriage of [Janette].” That is, it found “that
    the Decree language specifically provides that the alimony/child
    support payments would continue beyond remarriage and were
    structured to provide the appropriate division of the marital
    assets to [Janette].” The order also stated the court would
    “award [Janette’s] attorney’s fees regarding her attempts to
    enforce the Decree’s terms” and requested that Janette “submit
    the required affidavit on [her] attorney’s fees.”
    ¶20 After the petitions had been dismissed, Janette filed a
    request to submit for decision her objection to the
    commissioner’s recommendation on the Show Cause Motion.
    The court denied Janette’s objection. It explained, “[T]he
    recommendation signed by the commissioner and the court is
    the order that will be complied with by the parties as the court
    has not found the commissioner erred as a matter of law and the
    court independently agrees with the decision made by the
    commissioner.”
    ¶21 Janette submitted an attorney fees declaration that
    claimed she incurred $302,602 in attorney fees throughout the
    case with $275,659 “incurred in [her] efforts to enforce the terms
    of the [Decree]” and $61,448 relating “to the prosecution of [the
    Show Cause Motion].” Janette then filed a proposed order with
    an award of $275,659 in attorney fees. The court responded with
    a notice titled “Not Signed Order (Proposed) Awarding
    Attorney Fees and Costs.” The notice stated that “the only fees
    that [would] be awarded [were] those the court already so stated
    for the [Show Cause Motion].” Janette then filed a second
    proposed order with an award of $61,448 in attorney fees. Again,
    the court refused to sign the proposed order and noted, “These
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    fees are not reasonable for an [order to show cause] hearing
    before the commissioner and then the court.[3] The court will
    issue a ruling on the amount to be awarded.”
    ¶22 The court entered an order awarding Janette $9,480 in
    attorney fees. The order provided, “While both parties prevailed
    on some issues and were less successful on others, [Janette] was
    the prevailing party in relation to the prosecution of [the Show
    Cause Motion].” And “having conducted a review of the entries
    attached to the [attorney fees affidavit],” the court concluded
    that $9,480 “incurred in fees was reasonable and necessary in
    relation to the prosecution of the [Show Cause Motion].”
    ¶23   Melvin appeals; Janette cross-appeals.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶24 Melvin argues the district court erred in determining that
    his alimony obligation survived Janette’s remarriage. This issue
    requires us to review the court’s interpretation of the Decree as
    well as its interpretation and application of Utah Code section
    30-3-5(9). “Interpretation of a divorce decree presents a question
    of law, which is reviewed for correctness.” Gardner v. Gardner,
    
    2012 UT App 374
    , ¶ 14, 
    294 P.3d 600
    . “The proper interpretation
    and application of a statute is [also] a question of law which we
    review for correctness.” Veysey v. Veysey, 
    2014 UT App 264
    , ¶ 7,
    
    339 P.3d 131
     (quotation simplified). 4
    3. Again, we are puzzled. Our review of the record suggests that
    there was no show cause hearing before the district court.
    4. Melvin also argues the district court denied him “the right to
    adequate notice and a fair hearing on the issues he presented” by
    dismissing the Counter-petition. This issue was not preserved
    for appeal. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must
    (continued…)
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    ¶25 Janette cross-appeals, raising two issues. First, she argues
    “the district court erred in denying portions of [the Show Cause
    Motion]” by misinterpreting and misapplying the Decree. “An
    order relating to contempt of court is a matter that rests within
    the sound discretion of the district court.” Wolferts v. Wolferts,
    
    2013 UT App 235
    , ¶ 8, 
    315 P.3d 448
     (quotation simplified). “In
    the absence of any action by the [district] court which is so
    unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a
    clear abuse of discretion, we will not overturn the [district]
    court’s order.” Dansie v. Dansie, 
    1999 UT App 92
    , ¶ 6, 
    977 P.2d 539
     (quotation simplified). “We review the district court’s
    findings of fact for clear error and its legal determinations for
    correctness.” LD III LLC v. Davis, 
    2016 UT App 206
    , ¶ 12, 
    385 P.3d 689
     (quotation simplified).
    (…continued)
    specifically and timely raise the issue before the district court
    and “introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority.”
    O’Dea v. Olea, 
    2009 UT 46
    , ¶ 18, 
    217 P.3d 704
     (quotation
    simplified). A review of the record reveals that Melvin did not
    present his due process argument to the district court, and
    therefore the court “did not have the opportunity to give full
    consideration to the issue[] at that time.” See id. ¶ 19. Further,
    Melvin’s principal appellate brief does not assert an exception to
    the preservation rule, and only in his reply brief does he argue
    “the [district] court committed plain error and the circumstances
    are exceptional.” Because Melvin has “not argued an exception
    to our preservation requirement to persuade us to reach” this
    issue, we do not consider it further. See True v. Utah Dep’t of
    Transp., 
    2018 UT App 86
    , ¶ 22, 
    427 P.3d 338
    ; see also Marcroft v.
    Labor Comm’n, 
    2015 UT App 174
    , ¶ 4, 
    356 P.3d 164
     (“[W]e have
    consistently refused to consider arguments of plain error raised
    for the first time in an appellant’s reply brief, even if the plain
    error argument is in response to a dispute over preservation
    raised for the first time in the appellee’s brief.” (quotation
    simplified)).
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    ¶26 Second, Janette argues the district court erred in awarding
    her only $9,480 in attorney fees. “We review a [district] court’s
    decision regarding attorney fees in a divorce proceeding for an
    abuse of discretion.” Jensen v. Jensen, 
    2008 UT App 392
    , ¶ 8, 
    197 P.3d 117
    .
    ANALYSIS
    I. Alimony
    ¶27 Melvin argues his alimony obligation automatically
    terminated upon Janette’s remarriage because the Decree did not
    “specifically provide otherwise.” See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (9)
    (LexisNexis Supp. 2018). We disagree.
    ¶28 “Alimony is presumed to terminate upon the remarriage
    of the receiving spouse.” Johnson v. Johnson, 
    855 P.2d 250
    , 252
    (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Utah courts have long recognized this
    presumption, see, e.g., Austad v. Austad, 
    269 P.2d 284
    , 290 (Utah
    1954) (“[T]here is implicit in the divorce decree the provision
    that the alimony continues only so long as the [receiving spouse]
    remains unmarried.”), and it is now codified in Utah Code
    section 30-3-5(9). That provision provides, “Unless a decree of
    divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court
    that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically
    terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse.”
    
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (9).
    ¶29 Here, the Decree was entered by default “pursuant to the
    terms set forth in” Melvin and Janette’s “mediated stipulation
    for divorce.” “[I]n the context of a divorce, parties are generally
    bound by their stipulations.” Thayer v. Thayer, 
    2016 UT App 146
    ,
    ¶ 17, 
    378 P.3d 1232
    . “Accordingly, we interpret [the Decree]
    according to established rules of contract interpretation.” 
    Id.
    (quotation simplified). “The underlying purpose in interpreting
    a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the
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    contract.” 
    Id.
     (quotation simplified). To do that, “we look to the
    plain meaning of the contractual language, and we consider each
    contract provision in relation to all of the others, with a view
    toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” 
    Id.
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ¶30 The Decree does not identify Janette’s remarriage as
    an event that will terminate Melvin’s obligation to pay
    alimony. Instead, paragraph 10 orders Melvin to make alimony
    payments “until the first of any of the following occurrences:
    [Melvin’s] death; [t]he expiration of 372 months from the signing
    of the [Decree]; or [Janette’s] death.” As Janette notes in her brief,
    “‘the specification of terms in a contract implies the exclusion of
    all not expressed.’” (Quoting 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 415.) And
    absent the statute, we would infer that the parties intended
    alimony to survive Janette’s remarriage based on their
    decision to omit remarriage from paragraph 10’s list of
    terminating events. See Martin v. Rasmussen, 
    2014 UT App 200
    ,
    ¶ 18, 
    334 P.3d 507
     (“This court will not rewrite a contract
    to supply terms which the parties omitted.” (quotation
    simplified)). But our precedent establishes that paragraph 10,
    without more, does “not provide for an exception to the general
    rule.” See Lord v. Shaw, 
    682 P.2d 853
    , 855 (Utah 1984)
    (determining that a divorce decree stating “alimony is to run for
    a period of three years” did “not provide for an exception to the
    general rule that alimony terminates upon remarriage”),
    disavowed on other grounds by Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 
    694 P.2d 1043
     (Utah 1984); see also Eames v. Eames, 
    735 P.2d 395
    , 398–99
    (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (Orme, J., dissenting in part) (rejecting the
    “frivolous” argument that language in a divorce decree
    providing “alimony would continue until [the receiving party]
    reached 65” without referring to “earlier termination upon . . .
    remarriage” “might be deemed to mean the decree had
    ‘specifically provided otherwise’ and required alimony to be
    paid until age 65 regardless of whether [the receiving party]
    remarried” (quotation simplified)).
    20170956-CA                      14               
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    ¶31 Nevertheless, our analysis must consider paragraph 10
    “in relation to” each of the Decree’s other provisions, “with a
    view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none.” See Thayer,
    
    2016 UT App 146
    , ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). And based on our
    review of the Decree “as a whole,” we conclude that its language
    specifically provides that alimony would survive Janette’s
    remarriage. See 
    id.
     For example, paragraphs 19 and 28 state that
    certain payments—the car allowance and various expenses
    related to the marital house—would terminate upon Janette’s
    remarriage. These provisions strengthen an inference that the
    parties intentionally omitted remarriage from paragraph 10.
    ¶32 We also find it significant that paragraph 10 includes
    Janette’s death as a terminating event. The statute creates a
    presumption that alimony “terminates upon the remarriage or
    death” of the receiving spouse. 
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (9)
    (emphasis added). If the parties intended alimony to terminate
    either upon Janette’s death or remarriage, the reasonable action
    would have been to allow the statute to govern either event or
    include them both in paragraph 10. Indeed, listing Janette’s
    death as a terminating event would have been unnecessary
    under those circumstances, and it seems the parties’ decision to
    do so would be rendered meaningless if we were to conclude
    that alimony also terminated upon Janette’s remarriage. The
    rules of contract interpretation dictate that we avoid such a
    result. See Fisher v. Davidhizar, 
    2018 UT App 153
    , ¶ 16, 
    436 P.3d 123
     (“In interpreting a contract, . . . we look for a reading that
    harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any provision
    meaningless.” (quotation simplified)).
    ¶33 Further, footnote 4 orders Melvin and Janette to meet
    every three years—without spouses—“to review their respective
    standard of living” and potentially adjust alimony upward to
    comply with the order that “the standard of living . . . be equal.”
    (Emphasis added.) The same footnote prohibits Janette and
    Melvin from “sharing any documentation or making any
    disclosure regarding the [parties’ stipulation] with future
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    spouses,[5] [or] spouses’ children.” (Emphasis added.) We cannot
    ignore this provision, which orders the parties to discuss and
    potentially adjust alimony even after Janette’s potential
    remarriage.
    ¶34 Melvin attempts to diminish footnote 4’s significance by
    claiming our interpretation “requires [us] to assume that one of
    the spouses would be [Janette’s] spouse.” That is, he asserts “it is
    equally logical that over a period of more than thirty years
    [Melvin] might remarry more than once and thus have
    [multiple] spouses who would be excluded from the meeting or
    from knowledge of the negotiations.” This argument is not well
    taken. Although Melvin possibly could have a current spouse as
    well as multiple former spouses at the time of the triennial
    review, we do not assume that the parties anticipated Melvin
    having multiple spouses at the same time. Instead, the only
    reasonable interpretation of this provision establishes that the
    spouse of each party who is married at the time of the review is
    prohibited from attending. And because footnote 4 contemplates
    the parties discussing alimony during the triennial review, it
    shows a clear intent that those payments would not terminate
    upon Janette’s remarriage. Moreover, any other interpretation
    would render this provision meaningless.
    ¶35 As outlined above, see supra ¶ 7, the Decree is replete with
    references to future spouses. The Decree’s provisions delineate
    obligations, but they expressly exclude a future spouse or that
    spouse’s children. Janette is allowed to designate a beneficiary
    for a required annuity, but she expressly may not designate a
    future spouse or that spouse’s children. The requirement for
    Melvin to pay off the marital house’s mortgage continues even if
    Janette remarries. Finally, the Decree prohibits divestiture of
    assets or the disclosure of the terms of the Decree to a future
    5. “Spouse” is defined as “[o]ne’s husband or wife by lawful
    marriage.” Spouse, Black’s Law Dictionary 1533 (9th ed. 2009).
    20170956-CA                     16               
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    spouse. These provisions lead us to conclude that the parties
    considered Janette’s potential remarriage and specifically agreed
    on how that event would affect their respective rights and
    obligations under the Decree. Accordingly, the only
    “reasonable” interpretation of the Decree as a whole is that
    alimony terminates only as expressly provided in paragraph 10.
    See Peirce v. Peirce, 
    2000 UT 7
    , ¶ 19, 
    994 P.2d 193
     (“[W]e interpret
    the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of
    the parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the
    circumstances, nature, and purpose of the contract.” (emphasis
    added)).
    ¶36 Therefore, we conclude that Melvin’s alimony obligation
    did not automatically terminate upon Janette’s remarriage,
    because the Decree “specifically provides otherwise,” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5
    (9), and we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
    Melvin’s petition to terminate alimony.
    II. Show Cause Motion
    ¶37 The Show Cause Motion asked the district court to hold
    Melvin in contempt of court for not complying with various
    provisions of the Decree. Janette argues the court “erred in
    denying portions of [the Show Cause Motion] because it failed to
    interpret and give the terms of the Decree the effect the plain
    language called for.”
    ¶38 “Disobedience of any lawful judgment or order of the
    court is contempt of the authority of the court.” Clarke v. Clarke,
    
    2012 UT App 328
    , ¶ 24, 
    292 P.3d 76
     (quotation simplified); see
    also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301(5) (LexisNexis 2018). To “prove
    contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be
    shown that the person cited for contempt knew what was
    required, had the ability to comply, and intentionally failed or
    refused to do so.” Clark, 
    2012 UT App 328
    , ¶ 24 (quotation
    simplified). “Once the court finds a person in contempt, it may
    then elect to impose an appropriate sanction.” Gardner v.
    20170956-CA                     17               
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    Gardner, 
    2012 UT App 374
    , ¶ 32, 
    294 P.3d 600
    . An appropriate
    sanction may include monetary damages “if an actual loss or
    injury to a party in an action is caused by the contempt.” In re
    Cannatella, 
    2006 UT App 89
    , ¶ 7, 
    132 P.3d 684
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ¶39 “The rule of damages in a contempt case is the same as if
    the party were being proceeded against directly on the
    underlying obligation.” Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 
    627 P.2d 528
    , 532
    (Utah 1981). The court’s order should seek to compensate the
    aggrieved party for the “actual loss or injury” caused by the
    contempt. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1) (allowing courts to
    “order the person proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved
    a sum of money sufficient to indemnify and satisfy the aggrieved
    party’s costs and expenses”); see also Goggin v. Goggin, 
    2013 UT 16
    , ¶ 37, 
    299 P.3d 1079
     (“Because these awards compensated [the
    aggrieved party] for the actual loss or injury that [the contempt]
    caused, they were proper under the Contempt Statute.”
    (quotation simplified)). Further, the court’s calculation of
    damages should be supported by evidence of the aggrieved
    party’s loss. See Valerios Corp. v. Macias, 
    2015 UT App 4
    , ¶ 24, 
    342 P.3d 1127
     (explaining that the evidence must “provide a
    reasonable, even though not necessarily precise, estimate of
    damages” (quotation simplified)).
    ¶40 Janette raises four issues regarding the Show Cause
    Motion. First, she challenges the court’s conclusion that Melvin
    was not required “to pay [her] out of pocket medical expenses.”
    Second, she claims the court erred in determining that the yearly
    cost of living increase to Melvin’s alimony obligation “could be
    less than 3%.” Third, she contends the court provided Melvin
    with a “windfall” by not requiring him to purchase an annuity
    that complied with “the terms of the annuity [he] was obligated
    to purchase” and by awarding him credit against the annuity
    judgment to which he was not entitled. Fourth, she argues the
    court erred in determining “Melvin satisfied his obligation to
    pay [her] half of his 401(k).” We address each argument in turn.
    20170956-CA                     18               
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    A.     Out-of-Pocket Medical Costs
    ¶41 In the Show Cause Motion, Janette moved the district
    court to hold Melvin in contempt for refusing to “pay for all
    of [her] uncovered medical expenses.” The court denied her
    motion after determining the Decree did not require Melvin to
    make any such payment. Janette argues the court’s decision was
    “contrary to the Decree’s plain and unambiguous language.” We
    disagree.
    ¶42 “We interpret a divorce decree according to established
    rules of contract interpretation.” Moon v. Moon, 
    1999 UT App 12
    ,
    ¶ 18, 
    973 P.2d 431
     (quotation simplified). “The underlying
    purpose in interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of
    the parties to the contract. To ascertain the parties’ intentions, we
    look to the plain meaning of the contractual language, and we
    consider each contract provision in relation to all of the others.”
    Thayer v. Thayer, 
    2016 UT App 146
    , ¶ 17, 
    378 P.3d 1232
     (quotation
    simplified).
    ¶43 A review of the Decree “as a whole” leads us to conclude
    that Melvin was not required to pay for Janette’s personal
    out-of-pocket medical costs. Paragraph 7 of the Decree orders
    Melvin to employ Janette with one of his companies and
    requires that company to “pay for [her] health insurance
    premiums for so long as [she] requires medical insurance.”
    Paragraph 7 does not state that Melvin must pay any of
    Janette’s out-of-pocket costs. In contrast, paragraph 6 orders
    Melvin to “maintain medical insurance for the medical
    expenses of the [parties’] minor child . . . through [his]
    employment” and “pay for the minor child’s out-of-pocket costs of
    the premium for the child’s portion of the insurance.” (Emphasis
    added.) Paragraph 6 also requires Melvin to “pay for the minor
    child’s reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses,
    including deductibles and co-payments, incurred for the parties’
    minor child.” (Emphasis added.) Under sub-paragraph 6(a),
    Janette must provide Melvin with written verification of any
    20170956-CA                     19               
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    medical expenses “[she] incurs on behalf of the minor child . . .
    within 30 days of payment” or make arrangements “so that
    [Melvin] may be billed directly.” Janette’s argument relies on
    sub-paragraph 7(b), which provides that “[t]he payment of
    [Janette’s] health insurance premiums and uncovered medical
    expenses constitute a portion of the property settlement.”
    (Emphasis added.)
    ¶44 Because the Decree includes the child’s out-of-pocket
    costs in paragraph 6 and omits Janette’s out-of-pocket costs
    from paragraph 7, it seems the parties intended that Melvin
    be responsible only for the out-of-pocket medical expenses
    incurred for the child’s benefit—not those incurred for
    the benefit of Janette. See Fisher v. Davidhizar, 
    2018 UT App 153
    ,
    ¶ 16, 
    436 P.3d 123
     (explaining that “we look for a reading
    that harmonizes the provisions and avoids rendering any
    provision meaningless” (quotation simplified)). If the parties
    intended to require Melvin to pay Janette’s out-of-pocket
    medical costs, they would have expressed such intent in
    paragraph 7. Pioneer Builders Co. of Nevada Inc. v. K D A Corp.,
    
    2018 UT App 206
    , ¶ 13, 
    437 P.3d 539
     (“The cardinal rule in
    contract interpretation is to give effect to the intentions of
    the parties as they are expressed in the plain language of
    the agreement itself.” (quotation simplified)). Sub-paragraph
    7(b) does not alter the result. The only “uncovered medical
    expenses” the Decree orders Melvin to pay are those incurred
    on behalf of the child. Thus, we see no reason to conclude
    that Janette’s personal out-of-pocket expenses were meant to
    be included among the expenses mentioned in sub-paragraph
    7(b).
    ¶45 In sum, we reject Janette’s argument that “the Decree’s
    plain and unambiguous language” requires Melvin to pay
    Janette’s own uncovered medical expenses. Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court’s decision to deny Janette’s motion to
    hold Melvin in contempt for refusing to pay for those costs.
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    B.    Annual Adjustments to Alimony
    ¶46 Janette argues the district court erred in determining that
    the yearly cost of living increase to Melvin’s alimony obligation
    “could be less than 3%.” We disagree. The Decree orders Melvin
    to pay alimony, “with a cost of living increase of up to 3% per
    annum (based upon the CPI, but never to be less than the
    present amount being paid).” (Emphasis added.) This
    unambiguous language does not support Janette’s argument that
    the yearly increase must be at least 3%. See Brady v. Park, 
    2019 UT 16
    , ¶ 53, 
    445 P.3d 395
     (“If the language within the four corners of
    the contract is unambiguous, the parties’ intentions are
    determined from the plain meaning of the contractual
    language.” (quotation simplified)). That is, stating that the
    increase will be up to 3% leaves open the possibility that the
    increase may be lower than 3%. Janette argues that Exhibit C
    to the parties’ stipulation shows that alimony was to increase
    at a fixed rate of 3% per year because the yearly payments
    for “Alimony/Child Support” listed on Exhibit C increase by
    3% each year. But the Decree is clear. It sets a flexible standard
    for the yearly increase to allow the parties to “equalize” their
    respective standards of living. For example, footnote 4 allows the
    parties to “include an upward adjustment to alimony beyond the
    CPI.” Thus, the amounts listed in Exhibit C are merely estimates.
    ¶47 In short, we see no support for Janette’s contention that
    the yearly increase to alimony must be at least “a flat 3% per
    year.” Accordingly, the court’s “interpretation of the [Decree]
    was [not] erroneous as a matter of law,” and Janette has
    therefore failed to “convince us that the [district] court
    committed error.” See Christensen v. Christensen, 
    2018 UT App 53
    ,
    ¶ 5, 
    420 P.3d 106
     (quotation simplified).
    C.    Melvin’s Annuity Obligation
    ¶48 The Decree ordered Melvin to purchase Janette a
    $1,000,000 annuity within thirty-six months of the entry of the
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    Decree. It is undisputed that Melvin did not purchase the
    annuity within that period. Accordingly, the district court
    entered a judgment against Melvin “in an amount sufficient
    to compensate [Janette] for the loss of the stream of income,
    past and future, from the ordered annuity.” The order allowed
    Melvin to “satisfy the judgment entered against him” by
    purchasing “an annuity which pays $6,728.63 per month for 140
    months.” The court also awarded Melvin “credit against
    the annuity judgment for payments he made to [Janette] for
    [her] benefit (that [she] would have otherwise been paying
    herself out of the stream of income from the annuity) past the
    date that the annuity should have been purchased.”
    ¶49 Janette argues the court abused its discretion by not
    requiring Melvin to purchase an annuity that complied with
    “the terms of the annuity [he] was obligated to purchase” and
    by awarding him credit against the annuity judgment to
    which he was not entitled. This argument has merit. Because the
    evidence does not support the district court’s order, see
    Valerios Corp. v. Macias, 
    2015 UT App 4
    , ¶ 24, 
    342 P.3d 1127
    (explaining that the evidence must “provide a reasonable, even
    though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages” (quotation
    simplified)), and does not compensate Janette for the “actual loss
    or injury” that Melvin caused her by failing to timely purchase
    the annuity, see Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1) (LexisNexis 2018)
    (allowing courts to “order the person proceeded against to
    pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to
    indemnify and satisfy the aggrieved party’s costs and
    expenses”), we conclude the court’s ruling amounted to an abuse
    of discretion.
    ¶50 First, the evidence does not support the court’s decision to
    award Melvin “credits toward the annuity price” for making the
    payments listed in sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g) “past the date that
    the annuity should have been purchased.” Sub-paragraphs
    18(b)–(g) ordered Melvin to pay various expenses related to the
    marital house. But paragraph 21 states, “Upon [Melvin’s]
    20170956-CA                    22              
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    purchase of the annuity . . . , [his] responsibility for the payments
    outlined in paragraph 18(b)–(g) is ordered to cease.” Thus,
    Melvin was obligated to make the payments listed in
    sub-paragraph 18(b)–(g) until he purchased the annuity. Because
    it is undisputed that Melvin did not timely purchase the annuity,
    it follows that his obligation to make those payments did not
    “cease” at the time the annuity should have been purchased.
    Accordingly, we see no evidentiary basis for the court’s decision
    to grant Melvin credit against the annuity judgment for
    payments made under sub-paragraphs 18(b)–(g) “past the date
    the annuity should have been purchased.” And we conclude that
    doing so amounted to an abuse of discretion. See Gardner v.
    Gardner, 
    2012 UT App 374
    , ¶ 33, 
    294 P.3d 600
     (“[A]ny award of
    damages must be based on something more than mere
    speculation.”).
    ¶51 Second, we agree with Janette that the district court
    abused its discretion by allowing Melvin to satisfy the judgment
    against him by purchasing an annuity that (1) did not list Janette
    as the irrevocable beneficiary, (2) had a term fewer than fifteen
    years, (3) was less than the face value of the annuity he was
    obligated to purchase under the Decree, and (4) did not account
    for the loss in value Janette incurred by Melvin failing to
    purchase the annuity in a timely fashion. Although the court
    concluded Janette was entitled to “a judgment in an amount
    sufficient to compensate her for the loss of the stream of income,
    past and future, from the ordered annuity,” its order allowed
    Melvin to satisfy that judgment without compensating Janette
    for the “actual loss or injury” that resulted from him not
    fulfilling his obligations under the Decree. See Utah Code Ann.
    § 78B-6-311(1).
    ¶52 The Decree ordered Melvin to purchase an annuity of
    $1,000,000 and required its “payout duration” to be “in excess of
    fifteen years.” Further, Janette was to “be irrevocably designated
    as the beneficiary of the annuity during her lifetime with the
    power to designate any blood relative as the beneficiary of any
    20170956-CA                     23               
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    death benefit provided by the annuity.” In direct conflict
    with those terms, the court’s order allowed Melvin to “satisfy
    the judgment entered against him for the annuity” by
    purchasing “an annuity which pays $6,728.63 per month for 140
    months”—a total of $942,008 paid over a period of less than
    twelve years. Further, the order did not satisfy the Decree’s
    requirement that Janette “be irrevocably designated as the
    beneficiary of the annuity.” Accordingly, we see no evidentiary
    basis for the court’s order, and we agree with Janette that the
    court abused its discretion by allowing Melvin a “windfall as a
    result of his own breach.” See Valerios Corp., 
    2015 UT App 4
    , ¶ 24
    (explaining that the evidence must “provide a reasonable, even
    though not necessarily precise, estimate of damages” (quotation
    simplified)).
    ¶53 Because we see no evidence supporting the court’s
    calculation of damages for Melvin’s failure to timely purchase
    the annuity, we conclude its actions amount to “a clear abuse of
    discretion.” Gardner, 
    2012 UT App 374
    , ¶ 14 (quotation
    simplified). Accordingly, we reverse its order and remand for
    further proceedings. On remand, the court should enter a
    judgment against Melvin that adequately compensates Janette
    for the “actual loss or injury” caused by Melvin’s failure to
    purchase the annuity within thirty-six months after the Decree
    was entered. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311(1).
    D.    401(k)
    ¶54 Janette argues the district court erred in determining that
    Melvin had “satisfied his obligation to pay [Janette] half of his
    401(k).” We are not persuaded.
    ¶55 The Decree awarded Janette “one-half of [Melvin’s] 401(k)
    retirement benefits accrued during the parties’ marriage.”
    Paragraph 16 provided for an “appropriate Qualified Domestic
    20170956-CA                    24              
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    Relations Order[6] securing [Janette’s] interest in said retirement
    plan,” but Melvin was “ordered to try and have the account
    divided equally without the necessity of a QDRO.” In its
    recommendation, the court commissioner found that “the
    payment of half of [Melvin’s] 401(k) account ha[d] been
    satisfied . . . by [his] payment to [Janette] in the amount of
    $8,885.52.” The district court approved the commissioner’s
    determination.
    ¶56 Janette challenges the court’s decision. She starts by
    claiming Melvin’s “401(k) had a balance of $37,612.62” when the
    Decree was entered on November 21, 2008. According to Janette,
    Melvin “waited until February 20, 2009, to liquidate the
    account”—about three months after the Decree was entered—
    when “the account’s balance had allegedly dropped from
    $37,612.62 to approximately $17,771.04.” Janette then argues that
    because the Decree ordered Melvin to pay her one-half of the
    account’s balance when the Decree was entered (which she
    claims was $18,803.31), she was entitled to “a judgment against
    [Melvin] in the amount of $9,922.79; i.e., the difference between
    the amount received and half of the account’s balance when the
    Decree was entered.”
    ¶57 Janette has failed “to carry [her] burden of persuasion on
    appeal.” See Bank of Am. v. Adamson, 
    2017 UT 2
    , ¶ 12, 
    391 P.3d 196
     (quotation simplified). First, the record does not support
    Janette’s assertion that the 401(k)’s balance was $37,612.62 when
    the Decree was entered. Her brief cites an account summary for
    the period of October 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008, that
    lists a “total value” of $37,612.62 on October 1, 2008, and a “total
    value” of $28,904.27 on December 31, 2008. But because the
    6. “A qualified domestic relations order [(QDRO)] instructs the
    trustee of a retirement plan and specifies how distributions
    should be made, to whom, and when.” Potts v. Potts, 
    2018 UT App 169
    , ¶ 1 n.2, 
    436 P.3d 263
     (quotation simplified).
    20170956-CA                     25               
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    Decree was not entered until November 28, 2008, the account
    summary does not reveal the account’s balance at the time the
    Decree was entered. The account summary supports the district
    court’s finding that the balance was declining because “the
    market had tanked,” and it shows that the “total value” of the
    401(k) when the Decree was entered was likely between
    $37,612.62 (value as of October 1) and $28,904.27 (value as of
    December 31). Further, the account summary divides the “total
    value” into two categories: “employee money” and “employer
    money.” It states that the “employer account balance may not
    [have been] 100% vested” and “if [Melvin] terminate[d]
    employment, [he] might not [have] receive[d] all of the money
    [his] employer [had] contributed to the plan.” The “employee
    money” was $28,173 on October 1, 2008, and $21,650.32 on
    December 31, 2008. Accordingly, the record shows that the
    amount of “employee money” in Melvin’s 401(k) when the
    Decree was entered was between $21,650.32 and $28,173; not, as
    Janette claims, $37,612.62.
    ¶58 Second, Janette has not convinced us that the court
    abused its discretion in concluding that Melvin satisfied his
    obligation to pay her half of the 401(k) with the $8,885.52
    payment. Below, Melvin argued that “due to the rapidly
    declining value of the mutual funds in which the 401(k) was
    invested, the parties agreed to try and divide the account equally
    without the necessity of a QDRO by liquidating the account.”
    And he asserted that when the 401(k) was liquidated, “a direct
    deposit was made into [his] account in the amount of
    $18,421.13.” He “paid the mandatory 10% penalty of $1,842
    which yielded a balance of $8,289.52 each.” Thus, Melvin
    claimed that he actually “over-paid Janette by $595.95” because
    she received $8,885.52 when “[her] one-half of the 401(k) was
    only $8,289.57.”
    ¶59 The court commissioner accepted Melvin’s argument,
    finding that Melvin “took the check that he got” for “the reduced
    value of the 401(k) after the market had tanked, divided that in
    20170956-CA                    26              
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    half, and gave half of the remaining value to [Janette].” The
    commissioner even found that Melvin paid “some taxes on—on
    the withdrawal, but those were not taken out of [Janette’s]
    share.” Based on those findings, the commissioner concluded
    that Janette had “been made whole by [Melvin] paying her
    [$8,885.52].” Janette has not shown that this conclusion was in
    error. As far as we can tell, Melvin complied with the Decree’s
    order to divide the 401(k) equally between the parties by
    liquidating the account and paying Janette half of what he
    received.
    ¶60 We conclude that the court’s order was not “so
    unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a
    clear abuse of discretion,” Dansie v. Dansie, 
    1999 UT App 92
    , ¶ 6,
    
    977 P.2d 539
     (quotation simplified), and we affirm the court’s
    determination that Melvin satisfied his obligation to pay Janette
    one-half of his 401(k) benefits accrued during the parties’
    marriage.
    III. Attorney Fees
    ¶61 Janette argues “the district court erred by arbitrarily
    reducing [her] attorney fee award.” We disagree.
    ¶62 “Utah Code section 30-3-3(2) authorizes an award of costs
    and attorney fees ‘in any action to enforce an order of custody,
    parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of property in a
    domestic case’ upon the court’s determination ‘that the party
    substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense.’” Wollsieffer v.
    Wollsieffer, 
    2019 UT App 99
    , ¶ 13 (quoting 
    Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3
    (2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2018)). Fees awarded under section
    30-3-3(2) “serve no equalizing function but allow the moving
    party to collect fees unnecessarily incurred due to the other
    party’s recalcitrance.” Connell v. Connell, 
    2010 UT App 139
    , ¶ 30,
    
    233 P.3d 836
    . “In other words, when one party refuses to comply
    with a court order, thereby compelling another party to seek its
    enforcement, that party risks liability for the fees and costs
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    accrued in the enforcement proceeding.” Wollsieffer, 
    2019 UT App 99
    , ¶ 13.
    ¶63 “Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount
    of such fees are within the [district] court’s sound discretion.”
    Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 
    2008 UT App 11
    , ¶ 10, 
    176 P.3d 476
    (quotation simplified). But in fixing the amount of reasonable
    fees, the court should consider (1) the legal work “actually
    performed,” (2) the amount of work that was “reasonably
    necessary to adequately prosecute the matter,” (3) whether the
    attorney’s billing rate is “consistent with the rates customarily
    charged in the locality for similar services,” and (4) any
    “circumstances which require consideration of additional
    factors.” Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
    764 P.2d 985
    , 990 (Utah
    1988).
    ¶64 Here, the district court awarded Janette attorney fees
    “regarding her attempts to enforce the Decree’s terms” and said,
    “While both parties prevailed on some issues and were less
    successful on others, [Janette] was the prevailing party in
    relation to the prosecution of [the Show Cause Motion].” The
    court explained further that the Show Cause Motion “brought
    up such quick decisions . . . [b]ecause [Melvin] was not in
    compliance with the [D]ecree.” We see no abuse of discretion in
    the district court’s decision to award attorney fees to Janette only
    for her efforts to prosecute the Show Cause Motion. See Neff v.
    Neff, 
    2011 UT 6
    , ¶¶ 70–71, 
    247 P.3d 380
     (explaining that a court’s
    “decision about who prevailed” should be “based on an
    approach that [is] flexible and reasoned” and highlighting “the
    importance of . . . common sense”). In prosecuting that motion,
    Janette successfully enforced the Decree by showing that Melvin
    failed to timely purchase the annuity. Thus, it was reasonable for
    the court to award her attorney fees “accrued in [that]
    enforcement proceeding.” See Wollsieffer, 
    2019 UT App 99
    , ¶ 13.
    ¶65 Janette submitted an attorney fees affidavit detailing the
    fees she incurred in the case. The affidavit claimed “$275,659.00
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    was incurred in [her] efforts to enforce the terms of the [Decree]”
    and, of that amount, $61,448 was incurred in “the prosecution of
    [the Show Cause Motion].” Based on that affidavit, Janette filed a
    proposed order with an award of $275,659 in attorney fees. After
    the court rejected this amount, Janette requested an award of
    $61,448. But the court determined that those “fees [were] not
    reasonable for an [order to show cause] hearing before the
    commissioner and then the court.” After reviewing Janette’s
    attorney fees affidavit, the court determined $9,480 “incurred in
    fees was reasonable and necessary in relation to the prosecution
    of [the Show Cause Motion]” and entered an order reflecting
    that amount.
    ¶66 The district court’s fees award does not constitute an
    abuse of discretion. Janette requested $61,448 in fees, but the
    record reveals that the court concluded such an amount was not
    “reasonably necessary to adequately prosecute” the Show Cause
    Motion. See Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 990. We cannot say such
    a conclusion was “beyond the limits of reasonability.” See Strohm
    v. ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 
    2013 UT 21
    , ¶ 52, 
    308 P.3d 424
    (quotation simplified). As the court explained, Janette prevailed
    on the Show Cause Motion because Melvin simply “was not in
    compliance with the Decree.” Janette may believe that $9,480 is
    insufficient for her enforcement efforts, but “the amount itself
    does not prove that the trial court abused its discretion.” Prince
    v. Bear River Mutual Ins. Co., 
    2002 UT 68
    , ¶ 55, 
    56 P.3d 524
    . And
    although Janette argues that “this matter has been heavily
    contested and aggressively litigated by both parties,” a district
    court “is in a better position than an appellate court to gauge the
    quality and efficiency of the representation and the complexity
    of the litigation.” Strohm, 
    2013 UT 21
    , ¶ 52 (quotation simplified).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s award of attorney fees
    to Janette because we are not convinced that the award
    amounted to “patent error or clear abuse of discretion.” See Dixie
    State Bank, 764 P.2d at 989 (quotation simplified).
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    McQuarrie v. McQuarrie
    ¶67 We note, however, that our remand of the annuity issue
    may affect Janette’s attorney fees award. As the prevailing party
    on the Show Cause Motion, Janette is entitled to fees on remand
    reasonably incurred enforcing the Decree’s terms. Further,
    because Janette received attorney fees for enforcing the Decree
    below and she has substantially “prevailed on the main issues
    on appeal,” she is entitled to attorney fees incurred for enforcing
    the Decree on appeal. See Oliekan v. Oliekan, 
    2006 UT App 405
    ,
    ¶ 32, 
    147 P.3d 464
     (quotation simplified). Accordingly, we direct
    the court to award Janette her fees incurred for that purpose on
    appeal and the fees she incurs for that purpose on remand.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶68 We affirm the district court’s determination that Melvin’s
    alimony obligation continued after Janette’s remarriage. But we
    conclude the court abused its discretion by entering a judgment
    against Melvin that failed to compensate Janette for the actual
    loss caused by his failure to timely purchase the annuity. And
    we affirm the court’s award of attorney fees to Janette as the
    prevailing party on the Show Cause Motion. Accordingly, we
    affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the district
    court should enter a judgment against Melvin that adequately
    compensates Janette for Melvin’s failure to timely purchase the
    annuity. It should also award Janette her attorney fees incurred
    for enforcing the Decree on appeal and the fees she incurs for
    that purpose on remand.
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