Macfarlane v. CSRO , 2019 UT App 133 ( 2019 )


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    2019 UT App 133
    THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
    BRADLEY MACFARLANE,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    CAREER SERVICE REVIEW OFFICE AND
    DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
    Respondents.
    Opinion
    No. 20180199-CA
    Filed August 1, 2019
    Original Proceeding in this Court
    Bret W. Rawson, Nate N. Nelson, and Jeremy G.
    Jones, Attorneys for Petitioner
    Sean D. Reyes and Joshua D. Davidson, Attorneys
    for Respondent Department of Public Safety
    JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which
    JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN M. HARRIS concurred.
    POHLMAN, Judge:
    ¶1      After lying to his supervisors about his extramarital
    affairs, Bradley Macfarlane lost his position as a training officer
    and investigator at Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST),
    a division of the Department of Public Safety (DPS). Macfarlane
    contends that the agency acted arbitrarily and requests a less
    serious sanction than termination. DPS counters that honesty
    and integrity are vital to a POST officer’s job duties and that
    Macfarlane has lost its trust. The Career Service Review Office
    (CSRO) upheld DPS’s decision to dismiss Macfarlane, as do we.
    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    BACKGROUND 1
    POST
    ¶2      POST is responsible for the training and regulation of
    certified law enforcement personnel throughout the state. Its
    mission is to “promote and ensure the safety and welfare of
    [Utah’s] citizens . . . and provide for efficient and professional
    law enforcement by establishing minimum standards and
    training for peace officers.” 
    Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-103
    (3)
    (LexisNexis 2015). To that end, POST’s role is to “ensur[e] that
    certified individuals meet a minimum level of fitness” and to
    “investigate[] allegations regarding those individuals that
    implicate [their] certificate.”
    ¶3      All peace officers are required to be certified, 
    id.
    § 53-6-202(4), and officers may have their certification
    “suspend[ed] or revoke[d]” for several enumerated reasons, id.
    § 53-6-211(1). Typically, termination of an officer’s employment
    does not necessarily suspend or revoke the officer’s certification
    unless the termination was for one of the enumerated reasons.
    See id. § 53-6-211(5)(a).
    ¶4      Macfarlane joined POST in 2013 and holds a POST
    certification. His job duties at POST included investigating
    allegations of misconduct among certified law enforcement
    officers and teaching courses on topics such as report writing
    and ethics. Immediately before joining POST, Macfarlane
    1. “Because the party seeking review of an agency’s order
    following a formal administrative proceeding has the burden to
    prove that the agency’s factual findings are not supported by
    substantial evidence, we state the facts and all legitimate
    inferences to be drawn from them in the light most favorable to
    the agency’s findings.” WWC Holding Co. v. Public Service
    Comm’n of Utah, 
    2002 UT 23
    , ¶ 2, 
    44 P.3d 714
    .
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    worked in Summit County as a detective. As a POST employee,
    Macfarlane was expected to be “beyond reproach.”
    The 2015 Interview
    ¶5     In the latter part of 2015, Macfarlane’s supervisor at POST
    (Director) heard rumors that Macfarlane was having marital
    troubles. Director also heard that Macfarlane was having an
    affair with a woman named Kay. 2 In a meeting with Macfarlane
    (the 2015 Interview), Director asked Macfarlane “if he was
    having an extramarital affair with a woman named [Kay].”
    Though Macfarlane admitted to an “affair of the heart,” he
    truthfully responded “no” to Director’s specific question about a
    sexual relationship with Kay. Macfarlane later stated, however,
    that he understood that Director “was asking him whether he
    was having an affair generally, not specifically [with] one
    woman.” And as to that query, Macfarlane did not respond
    truthfully. Macfarlane even apologized to another supervisor
    (Captain) for “lying to Director” and being “deceptive” during
    the 2015 Interview. As put by Macfarlane in a later interview,
    “I’m not an idiot. . . . I knew where [Director] was going” with
    his question.
    Macfarlane’s Affairs
    ¶6    As it turned out, Macfarlane had affairs with five
    women—none of whom were named Kay. One of these women,
    Amy, was sexually involved with Macfarlane from November
    2014 through late 2015, but they knew each other for a “few
    years” before that. In early 2015, Amy called Macfarlane to help
    her with a criminal matter she was involved in for writing bad
    checks. Macfarlane looked up Amy’s case on a police database
    and discovered that the Draper Police Department was handling
    2. The names of the women associated with Macfarlane are
    changed to preserve their privacy.
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    the matter and that he knew the detective (Detective) assigned to
    the case. He then put Amy in touch with Detective.
    ¶7      Amy later informed Macfarlane that she resolved her debt
    and, with Detective’s assistance, was able to get the charges
    against her dismissed. But she also informed Macfarlane that
    Detective, after taking her to a restaurant, tried to kiss her in his
    patrol car and asked if she wanted to have sex. Amy asked if this
    kind of behavior was normal, and Macfarlane responded that he
    thought it sounded “predatory” and asked her if she wanted to
    file a complaint. Amy declined, and Macfarlane did not record
    the incident in POST’s complaint log or notify Detective’s
    superiors at the Draper Police Department about what he had
    been told.
    The Draper Investigation
    ¶8     Nearly a year later, Macfarlane did tell a sergeant at POST
    (Sergeant) about Amy’s incident with Detective. Sergeant
    relayed the information to Detective’s supervisor, which
    prompted an investigation (the Draper Investigation). The
    Deputy Chief at the Draper Police Department (Deputy Chief)
    called Sergeant for more information, and Sergeant asked
    Macfarlane to contact Deputy Chief and provide what details he
    could. After Sergeant made that request, Macfarlane’s
    “demeanor changed” and he “appeared extremely nervous.”
    Macfarlane asked Sergeant, over and over, “Why did you do
    this?” and said, “I’m going to lose my job. I’m going to be in so
    much trouble.” Macfarlane explained, “I should have put it on
    the complaint log, and I didn’t.”
    ¶9     Macfarlane then called Deputy Chief, who asked for
    identifying information about Amy so that he could investigate
    the matter. According to Sergeant, Macfarlane “minimiz[ed] his
    knowledge of [Amy]” while “appear[ing] to be helpful.” In
    response to Deputy Chief’s inquiry, Macfarlane said that he
    knew only Amy’s first name and did not have her telephone
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    number. He described his interaction with Amy as a “half a
    dozen texts, maybe two phone calls, and a face-to-face at the
    gym” they both attended. And when asked about Amy’s last
    name, Macfarlane said, “It seems to me like it’s a, like a Hispanic
    last name, but I can’t recall.”
    ¶10 Without more information, the Draper Police Department
    was unable to find Amy. When Macfarlane asked Sergeant if
    they had found Amy, Sergeant responded “no” because they
    had only her first name. This answer prompted Macfarlane to
    remark how easily he could have found her. On another
    occasion, nearly a year after the phone call with Deputy Chief,
    Macfarlane came to talk to Sergeant about “how [Macfarlane
    was] an awesome detective” and how Deputy Chief “doesn’t
    know what he’s doing,” because he should have already found
    Amy. Sergeant wondered how the Draper Police Department
    should have found Amy with only a “common first name like
    that,” and Macfarlane said that “they could have searched
    through” his Facebook friends or through her work address.
    Sergeant replied, “You never gave her last name,” and
    Macfarlane said, “Yes, I did.” Sergeant challenged this assertion 3
    and told Macfarlane that “Draper might still be interested in
    that” information. Sergeant then asked Macfarlane whether he
    was “going to tell them [how to find Amy] today.” Macfarlane
    responded, “Not unless they ask.”
    ¶11 After her conversation with Macfarlane, Sergeant called
    Deputy Chief, who was planning to meet with Macfarlane on an
    unrelated matter that day. Sergeant suggested that Deputy Chief
    ask Macfarlane about Amy because he had more information.
    Deputy Chief asked “why . . . Macfarlane sat on this information
    for so long,” and Sergeant told him she “did not know.” Deputy
    3. The audio recording of the phone call with Deputy Chief
    confirms that Macfarlane did not provide Amy’s last name
    during the conversation. See supra ¶ 9.
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    Chief said that he knew “Macfarlane knew more about [Amy]”
    than he let on in their earlier phone conversation. On another
    occasion, however, Deputy Chief said that he had no issues with
    Macfarlane.
    ¶12 After Macfarlane’s meeting with Deputy Chief,
    Macfarlane told Sergeant that “he was able to point out [Amy]
    . . . in two seconds” and that “he should be a Deputy Chief
    somewhere because it was so easy.” Sergeant asked why he
    could not have found Amy last year when Deputy Chief first
    asked, and Macfarlane said that he did “not want [Amy] or her
    drama in his life.”
    The 2017 Interview
    ¶13 In February 2017, Macfarlane’s supervisors—Director and
    Captain—still had concerns about Macfarlane’s work
    performance and rumors of his affairs. After interviewing
    Macfarlane’s coworkers, who said that Macfarlane was easily
    distracted and was often gone from the office for long periods,
    Director and Captain interviewed Macfarlane (the 2017
    Interview). Director told Macfarlane that he wanted a “very
    direct interview” and expected Macfarlane to be “completely
    honest.” Captain then gave Macfarlane a written Garrity
    warning, which Macfarlane signed.
    ¶14 A Garrity warning assures officers that their statements
    given in a disciplinary interview will not be used against them in
    a subsequent criminal prosecution. See Garrity v. New Jersey, 
    385 U.S. 493
    , 500 (1967); Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm’n,
    
    2000 UT App 235
    , ¶ 32 n.9, 
    8 P.3d 1048
    . But an officer who
    “refuses to respond, or fails to respond truthfully, to questions”
    after receiving a Garrity warning is subject to “suspen[sion] or
    revo[cation]” of his or her POST certification. 
    Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211
    (1)(e) (LexisNexis 2015). Indeed, under POST
    guidelines, if an officer is untruthful in an interview after
    receiving a Garrity warning, the officer’s certification will usually
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    be revoked. However, it was also POST’s practice at the time
    that if an officer initially lied during an interview but told the
    truth before the interview ended, POST would not revoke the
    officer’s certification based on a Garrity violation.
    ¶15 Director had not previously used a Garrity warning in
    conjunction with a preliminary investigation of DPS employees
    for disciplinary matters. But Director decided that a Garrity
    warning was warranted in this situation because he “didn’t have
    time for someone to decide if they were going to tell . . . the
    truth. [He] needed it right away.” Director also wanted to
    protect Macfarlane from criminal liability because he “did not
    know what was going to come out” during the interview based
    on Macfarlane’s “history” and “past conduct.”
    ¶16 Macfarlane was questioned about a number of topics: an
    inappropriate Facebook post; a high-speed pursuit in which
    Macfarlane tried to get involved; Macfarlane’s time away from
    the office; and, finally, allegations of extramarital affairs. 4 For
    approximately twenty minutes, Macfarlane “created detailed
    denials” to his supervisors’ inquiries about alleged affairs with
    specific women. Macfarlane also texted his wife during the
    interview. Macfarlane and his wife had previously decided that
    “they would lie about [his] affairs should the need arise.” But
    after receiving a text from his wife that it “was up to him”
    whether he wanted to divulge the affairs, Macfarlane’s “story
    changed.” Before the interview ended, he admitted to having
    affairs with five women, including women “he had specifically
    denied having affairs with previously.”
    4. According to Director, the “main reason for asking about
    affairs was to determine whether it was on or off duty because
    [on-duty affairs] would fall under [POST’s] jurisdiction to
    investigate.” See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211
    (1)(f) (LexisNexis
    2015).
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    ¶17 Macfarlane apologized to Director for not initially telling
    the truth but explained that he wanted to tell his wife first that
    he would be revealing his affairs. Macfarlane said he knew that
    his conduct reflected poorly on POST and “disrupt[ed] [its]
    trust.” Director then informed Macfarlane that the Office of
    Professional Standards, otherwise known as Internal Affairs
    (IA), would likely investigate.
    IA and the Decision to Terminate
    ¶18 IA has the responsibility “to investigate allegations of
    misconduct” on behalf of DPS employees and “to protect the
    good name” of DPS and its divisions. Whereas POST
    investigates an officer’s certification, IA investigates “particular
    policy violations that relate to” DPS more broadly.
    ¶19 IA was directed to conduct a “Category I” investigation of
    Macfarlane. 5 In a final written report, IA found that “Macfarlane
    created a conflict of interest” with regard to the Draper
    Investigation and “was less than forthright with his supervisors
    when asked about his relationships with other women.”
    ¶20 Following IA’s investigation and report, DPS gave
    Macfarlane its notice of intent to terminate his employment. DPS
    identified four of its policies that it believed Macfarlane
    violated. 6 The factual bases for its belief included that
    (1) Macfarlane omitted information and misled his supervisors
    about his extramarital affairs, (2) Macfarlane omitted
    5. Category I investigations are reserved for violations “of a
    more serious nature . . . that generally involve moral turpitude
    issues, honesty issues, and allegations of criminal conduct.”
    6. The identified policies generally proscribe dishonesty or
    conduct that jeopardizes the public trust, whether an officer is on
    or off duty.
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    information and misled another law enforcement agency in the
    Draper Investigation, and (3) Macfarlane compromised the
    integrity of POST and DPS.
    ¶21 Director told Macfarlane that termination, rather than a
    less serious sanction such as a transfer, was warranted. Director
    could not transfer Macfarlane out of POST because Macfarlane
    “had not gone through the requirements that other certified
    officers had to go through.” 7 Director also was not comfortable
    transferring Macfarlane within POST from investigation to
    training, “because [Director] worried about [Macfarlane]
    working closely with young recruits” and “was concerned that
    [Macfarlane] would be unable to teach the ethics and codes of
    conduct with any credibility.” Finally, Director could not keep
    Macfarlane as an investigator “due to [his] pattern of
    falsehoods.”
    ¶22 DPS’s Commissioner (Commissioner), who ultimately
    had the final say on Macfarlane’s sanction, likewise determined
    that termination was appropriate. Commissioner looked for
    “comparable cases [that] were on-point with [Macfarlane’s]
    conduct” to determine the proper discipline. The human
    resource department produced several cases, but Commissioner
    concluded that none were comparable to Macfarlane’s situation.
    He considered Macfarlane’s actions “especially severe in that he
    withheld information from another law enforcement agency,
    and . . . had a negative effect on POST’s operations.” Although
    DPS tries to use “progressive discipline,” Commissioner
    “believed [Macfarlane’s] misconduct was sufficiently egregious
    to justify dismissal.” Macfarlane then appealed his termination
    to the CSRO.
    7. Macfarlane came to POST directly after being a detective in
    Summit County. He therefore had not received the same training
    that other officers receive through the Utah Highway Patrol.
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    The CSRO Proceedings
    ¶23 The issue before the CSRO was whether there was “a
    basis in law and fact to support [DPS’s] decision to dismiss
    [Macfarlane].” The CSRO concluded that DPS “had substantial
    evidence on which to base its decision.”
    ¶24 Noting its own restricted role in reviewing agency action,
    the CSRO concluded that DPS “carried its burden” in showing
    that dismissal was warranted. The CSRO found that “POST
    required adherence to the highest ethical standards” and that
    Macfarlane “failed to cooperate with a separate law enforcement
    agency”; “repeatedly lied to his supervisors”; “failed to
    volunteer information he had, or easily could have obtained”;
    and “only eventually revealed the truth” after being pressured.
    All in all, the CSRO determined that DPS “took appropriate
    action after being confronted with extensive evidence that
    [Macfarlane] had violated DPS and POST policies and rules, and
    harmed (or potentially harmed) the credibility and reputation of
    a Division which needs to operate at the highest standards if it is
    to have any credibility at all.”
    ¶25 The CSRO also rejected Macfarlane’s contention that
    POST had abused its prior Garrity practice. Macfarlane asserted
    that he did not “lie under Garrity,” and therefore should not
    have been punished, because he was eventually truthful in the
    2017 Interview. The CSRO reasoned that “[i]f . . . POST[] had
    attempted to take action against [Macfarlane’s] POST
    certification . . . , that argument might be compelling.” But the
    CSRO determined that that “is not what happened”; POST did
    not take action against Macfarlane’s certification but only
    became concerned that Macfarlane “had lied to them for some
    time” and “had violated a number of DPS and POST policies and
    rules.” POST then referred the matter to IA for an investigation,
    which confirmed that Macfarlane had violated a number of DPS
    policies.
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    ¶26 Finally, the CSRO went through the proportionality
    factors set forth in Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 
    2005 UT App 274
    ,
    
    116 P.3d 973
    , and concluded that DPS’s “decision to dismiss
    [Macfarlane] was not disproportionate to his conduct.”
    Specifically, the CSRO concluded that the following factors
    weighed in favor of DPS’s decision: (1) Macfarlane was
    “dishonest”; (2) Macfarlane’s violations were “directly related to
    [his] official duties and significantly impede[d] his . . . ability to
    carry out those duties”; (3) Macfarlane’s offenses were “of a type
    that adversely affects the public confidence in the department”;
    (4) Macfarlane’s offenses “undermine[d] the morale and
    effectiveness of the department”; and (5) Macfarlane’s offenses
    were “committed willfully or knowingly, rather than negligently
    or inadvertently.” (Quoting factors (3), (6), (7), (8), and (9) from
    Burgess v. Department of Corr., 
    2017 UT App 186
    , ¶ 38, 
    405 P.3d 937
    .)
    ¶27 Macfarlane now petitions this court for review of the
    CSRO’s decision upholding his dismissal from POST.
    ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    ¶28 Macfarlane raises three issues. First, he contends that the
    CSRO lacked substantial evidence on “two core findings”
    supporting DPS’s decision to terminate his employment: that he
    was dishonest with Director in the 2015 Interview and that he
    did not cooperate in the Draper Investigation. Second,
    Macfarlane contends that the CSRO erred in concluding that
    POST did not violate its prior practice regarding Garrity
    interviews. Finally, he contends that the CSRO failed to make
    adequate findings on the proportionality and consistency of
    DPS’s decision to terminate.
    ¶29 This court’s authority to review the CSRO’s decision is
    derived from the Administrative Procedures Act (Act). Utah
    Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(1) (LexisNexis 2016); Burgess v.
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    Department of Corr., 
    2017 UT App 186
    , ¶ 14, 
    405 P.3d 937
    . That
    Act provides that we may grant relief only if we determine that a
    petitioner “has been substantially prejudiced” by, among other
    things, (1) the agency acting contrary to its prior practice or
    (2) the agency basing its action upon a factual determination
    “that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in
    light of the whole record before the court.” Utah Code Ann.
    § 63G-4-403(4)(g), (h)(iii).
    ¶30 As the Act itself suggests, we review a challenge to the
    CSRO’s findings of fact to determine whether substantial
    evidence supported POST’s allegations. Id. § 63G-4-403(4)(g);
    Provo City v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 
    2015 UT 32
    , ¶ 8, 
    345 P.3d 1242
    .
    And we review claims that an agency decision is contrary to the
    agency’s prior practice to determine if the agency’s explanation
    for its action is reasonable and rational. 8 Utah Code Ann.
    § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii); Benson v. Peace Officer Standards & Training
    Council, 
    2011 UT App 220
    , ¶ 11, 
    261 P.3d 643
    .
    ¶31 As for Macfarlane’s adequacy-of-the-findings challenge,
    an agency’s findings “should be sufficiently detailed to disclose
    the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or
    8. Macfarlane argues for a correctness standard for POST’s
    alleged deviation from prior practice. His argument misses the
    mark. He relies on Pickett v. Utah Department of Commerce, 
    858 P.2d 187
     (Utah Ct. App. 1993), for the proposition that challenges
    under Utah Code section 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii) (contrary to prior
    practice) are reviewed for correction of error. But in Pickett, we
    applied the correctness standard only to our review of the
    agency’s interpretation of that section of the Act, explaining that
    our review of the agency’s explanation for its deviation from prior
    practice “will be on the basis of ‘reasonableness and
    rationality.’” 
    Id. at 191
     (quoting SEMECO Indus., Inc. v. Auditing
    Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm’n, 
    849 P.2d 1167
    , 1174 (Utah 1993)
    (Durham, J., dissenting)); see also 
    id.
     at 191 n.8.
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached.” Milne Truck
    Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Comm’n of Utah, 
    720 P.2d 1373
    , 1378
    (Utah 1986).
    ANALYSIS
    I. The CSRO’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.
    ¶32 Macfarlane contends that the CSRO lacked substantial
    evidence for two findings: (A) that he was dishonest with
    Director in the 2015 Interview and (B) that he did not cooperate
    with the Draper Investigation.
    ¶33 “‘Substantial evidence’ is that quantum and quality of
    relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind
    to support a conclusion.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. County
    Board of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 
    799 P.2d 1163
    , 1165 (Utah
    1990). “It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence and
    something less than the weight of the evidence.” Burgess v.
    Department of Corr., 
    2017 UT App 186
    , ¶ 16, 
    405 P.3d 937
     (cleaned
    up). “In determining whether substantial evidence supports [the
    CSRO’s] decision we will consider all the evidence in the record,
    both favorable and contrary, and determine whether a
    reasonable mind could reach the same conclusion as the [CSRO].”
    See Pen & Ink, LLC v. Alpine City, 
    2010 UT App 203
    , ¶ 16, 
    238 P.3d 63
     (emphasis added) (cleaned up). And in reviewing the CSRO’s
    findings, we do not “reweigh the evidence.” Lucas v. Murray City
    Civil Service Comm’n, 
    949 P.2d 746
    , 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
    Moreover, “we defer to the [CSRO’s] findings on issues of
    credibility.” 
    Id.
    ¶34 As we defer to the CSRO, we note that the CSRO must
    likewise defer to the agency. See Sorge v. Office of Att’y Gen., 
    2006 UT App 2
    , ¶ 22, 
    128 P.3d 566
    . The CSRO “is restricted to
    determining whether there is factual support for the [agency’s]
    charges against a grievant.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up). Under these
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    standards, we examine whether the CSRO’s two core findings
    are supported by substantial evidence.
    A.    There is substantial evidence that Macfarlane was
    dishonest in the 2015 Interview.
    ¶35 In the 2015 Interview, Director asked Macfarlane about an
    extramarital affair with Kay. Macfarlane asserts that he “was
    honest in his response to the specific question he was asked” and
    that the CSRO erred in finding otherwise. He reasons that, in
    effect, the CSRO “determined that [he] was dishonest because he
    knew or should have known what was being asked of him, even
    though he was not actually asked about affairs generally.”
    Further, Macfarlane cautions that “[i]f an agency can simply re-
    cast questioning after the fact and assert that an officer should
    have known what [the questioner was] really getting at[,] merit
    employee protections would become meaningless.” (Cleaned
    up.)
    ¶36 There is some force to this argument. Indeed, answering a
    specific question honestly would not normally serve as grounds
    for a finding of general dishonesty. But Macfarlane ignores a
    unique fact in this case: he admitted to Director and Captain that
    he “l[ied] to Director” and was “deceptive” during the 2015
    Interview. Macfarlane told Director that he knew Director “was
    asking him whether he was having an affair generally, not
    specifically [with Kay].” Macfarlane also apologized to Captain
    for “lying to Director” and being “deceptive” in the 2015
    Interview. And in his interview with IA investigators, he said,
    “I’m not an idiot . . . I knew where [Director] was going” with
    his questioning. We do not decide whether there would be
    substantial evidence of dishonesty in the 2015 Interview absent
    Macfarlane’s explicit and numerous admissions of deceit. But
    given the unique facts here, we conclude that “a reasonable
    mind could” conclude that Macfarlane was dishonest with
    Director in the 2015 Interview and that substantial evidence
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    therefore supports the CSRO’s finding. See Pen & Ink, 
    2010 UT App 203
    , ¶ 16 (cleaned up).
    B.    There is substantial evidence that Macfarlane failed to
    cooperate in the Draper Investigation.
    ¶37 Macfarlane next contends that the CSRO erred in finding
    that he “failed to cooperate” with the Draper Investigation.
    According to Macfarlane, Sergeant had only “speculation and
    conjecture” that Macfarlane minimized his knowledge of Amy
    and could have found her sooner. And Macfarlane views as
    “dispositive” Deputy Chief’s belief that Macfarlane had been
    helpful in the investigation.
    ¶38 The CSRO found that “it defies belief that [Macfarlane]
    could not have assisted [Deputy Chief] more in his efforts to
    locate [Amy] or at least recalled her surname. [Macfarlane] was
    aware that another law enforcement agency was attempting [to]
    locate a witness, and [he] did not cooperate.” We do not
    “reweigh the evidence” and instead “defer to the [CSRO’s]
    findings on issues of credibility.” See Lucas v. Murray City Civil
    Service Comm’n, 
    949 P.2d 746
    , 758 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
    ¶39 In our view, there is ample evidence that Macfarlane did
    not cooperate in the Draper Investigation. The Draper Police
    Department was unable to find Amy for nearly a year. But
    Macfarlane was able to locate her “in two seconds” once
    Sergeant informed Deputy Chief that Macfarlane had more
    information. Macfarlane repeatedly bragged about how easily he
    could have found Amy but chose not to because he did “not
    want [Amy] or her drama in his life.” And in his phone call with
    Deputy Chief, Macfarlane claimed not to know the last name, or
    any other identifying information, of a woman he had been
    friends with for years and with whom he had had an affair for
    approximately one year. Further, Deputy Chief’s subjective
    belief that Macfarlane had been helpful in the investigation does
    not weigh any heavier than Sergeant’s belief, supported by clear,
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    reasonable inferences, that Macfarlane withheld information for
    personal reasons. See 
    id.
     After all, Deputy Chief may have
    perceived Macfarlane as cooperative, but he was not privy to
    Macfarlane’s conversations with Sergeant, which suggested that
    Macfarlane knowingly withheld information. We therefore
    conclude that the CSRO had substantial evidence that
    Macfarlane did not cooperate in the Draper Investigation. See
    Pen & Ink, 
    2010 UT App 203
    , ¶ 16.
    II. POST did not violate its prior Garrity practice, and even if it
    did, Macfarlane has not shown harm.
    ¶40 Macfarlane next contends that POST violated its prior
    practice regarding Garrity interviews. He asserts that “POST’s
    prior practice regarding Garrity interviews was undisputed:
    should an officer make misstatements but subsequently clarify
    those misstatements before the conclusion of the interview, the
    officer was not determined to have lied.” Because Macfarlane
    was truthful by the end of the 2017 Interview, he argues that his
    termination was unlawful.
    ¶41 We disagree. It is Macfarlane’s burden to demonstrate a
    prima facie case that POST acted contrary to prior practice. See
    Taylor v. Department of Commerce, 
    952 P.2d 1090
    , 1094–95 (Utah
    Ct. App. 1998). Macfarlane has not met his burden. He claims
    that POST’s prior practice was that no one would be terminated
    for lying under Garrity if the individual was eventually
    forthright. But the evidence on this score draws a more nuanced
    picture. What the CSRO found is that if an officer is eventually
    truthful, POST will not seek to revoke the officer’s certification.
    The evidence Macfarlane points to in the record confirms the
    CSRO’s understanding. 9 Here, POST did not take action against
    9. Captain testified that “[i]f [officers] tell the truth in a Garrity
    interview before the end of that interview, there are no charges
    for violating Garrity that are brought forth” and clarified that by
    (continued…)
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    Macfarlane’s certification. See 
    Utah Code Ann. § 53-6-211
    (1)(e)
    (LexisNexis 2015). Thus, once the relevant practice is accurately
    described, it is clear Macfarlane was not treated contrary to
    POST’s prior practice. And the CSRO did not err in so
    concluding.
    ¶42 But even if Macfarlane’s broad conception of POST’s prior
    practice is right—in other words, that no one would be found in
    violation of department policy for lying in the course of a Garrity
    interview as long as one was truthful by the end—he has not
    shown that he was harmed by any inconsistent treatment. As
    explained above, we may grant relief from final agency action
    that is “contrary to the agency’s prior practice” only if the
    petitioner seeking judicial review “has been substantially
    prejudiced” by that agency action. See 
    id.
     § 63G-4-403(4)(h)(iii)
    (2016); supra ¶ 29. “A person is substantially prejudiced when
    the agency’s [inconsistent action] is not harmless.” See Petersen v.
    Utah Labor Comm’n, 
    2017 UT 87
    , ¶ 8, 
    416 P.3d 583
     (cleaned up).
    “An error will be harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential
    that there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
    outcome of the proceedings.” Smith v. Department of Workforce
    Services, 
    2010 UT App 382
    , ¶ 17, 
    245 P.3d 758
     (cleaned up); see
    also Covey v. Covey, 
    2003 UT App 380
    , ¶ 21, 
    80 P.3d 553
     (noting
    that the party seeking review “has the burden of demonstrating
    [that] an error was prejudicial” (cleaned up)).
    ¶43 Macfarlane again does not meet his burden. Though he
    recognizes the burden placed on him to show harm, he makes no
    argument to support the conclusion that if the supervisors did
    (…continued)
    “charges” he meant “no action on their certification.” Director
    similarly testified that Macfarlane did not “l[ie] under Garrity”
    but that he “still lied to [him], which is a violation of [DPS]
    policy.” Macfarlane asserts that this testimony represents “a
    consistent and singular Garrity practice.” Indeed it does.
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    not deem him to have lied in the 2017 Interview he would not
    have been terminated. And we cannot conclude that it is
    reasonably likely that POST would not have terminated
    Macfarlane’s employment if it did not factor Macfarlane’s
    untruths in the Garrity interview into the equation. See Smith,
    
    2010 UT App 382
    , ¶ 17. After all, the most important evidence to
    Commissioner—what he found “especially severe”—is that
    Macfarlane “withheld information from another law
    enforcement agency, and . . . had a negative effect on POST’s
    operations.” See supra ¶¶ 37–39. Further, Macfarlane was
    dishonest in other ways. For example, he planned with his wife
    to lie about his affairs should it ever be necessary, and
    Macfarlane admitted to dishonesty during his conversation with
    Director in the 2015 Interview. Thus, even assuming Macfarlane
    was treated contrary to POST’s prior practice under Garrity, he
    has not demonstrated that POST’s actions substantially
    prejudiced him.
    III. The CSRO’s findings are adequate.
    ¶44 Macfarlane finally contends that the CSRO “failed to
    make adequately detailed findings regarding proportionality
    and consistency” of the decision to terminate. This argument
    thus focuses not so much on the substance of whether his
    termination was proportional and consistent but rather on
    whether the CSRO made adequate findings to support that
    conclusion. He contends that the CSRO merely “asserted that
    five [proportionality] factors weighed against [him] but did not
    explain why or how.”
    ¶45 “An administrative agency must make findings of fact
    and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to
    permit meaningful [judicial] review.” Bailey v. Retirement Board,
    
    2012 UT App 365
    , ¶ 15, 
    294 P.3d 577
     (cleaned up). “For [courts]
    to meaningfully review an agency’s findings, the findings must
    be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
    factual issue was reached.” 
    Id.
     (cleaned up).
    ¶46 Here, the CSRO listed the Harmon factors and stated that
    “[b]ased upon the testimony and documents in the record, . . .
    [DPS’s] decision to dismiss [Macfarlane] was not
    disproportionate to his conduct.” See generally Ogden City Corp. v.
    Harmon, 
    2005 UT App 274
    , 
    116 P.3d 973
    . It then found that five
    of the Harmon factors, which are used to judge proportionality,
    “weigh[ed] against [Macfarlane], and support[ed DPS’s] decision
    to dismiss his employment.” Specifically, the CSRO found
    (1) that Macfarlane was “dishonest,” (2) that his violations were
    “directly related to [his] official duties,” (3) that his actions
    “adversely affect[ed] the public confidence,” (4) that he
    “undermine[d] the morale and effectiveness of the department,”
    and (5) that his offenses were “committed willfully or
    knowingly.” (Quoting Burgess v. Department of Corr., 
    2017 UT App 186
    , ¶ 38, 
    405 P.3d 937
    .)
    ¶47 We have no difficulty in reviewing these findings. With
    respect to dishonesty (finding 1), the CSRO found, and we have
    already concluded substantial evidence supports, that
    Macfarlane was dishonest with Director in the 2015 Interview.
    Supra ¶¶ 35–36. With respect to whether Macfarlane’s violation
    related to his official duties (finding 2), the CSRO’s findings
    establish that Macfarlane obstructed the Draper Investigation
    due to a conflict of interest arising from his extramarital affair
    with Amy. With respect to whether Macfarlane’s actions
    adversely affected public confidence (finding 3), the CSRO
    explained that “POST employees need[] to hold themselves to a
    higher standard and be above reproach” and that Macfarlane
    “harmed (or potentially harmed) the credibility and reputation
    of [a] Division which needs to operate at the highest standards if
    it is have any credibility at all.” With respect to whether
    Macfarlane undermined the morale and effectiveness of POST
    (finding 4), the CSRO noted that Director was “worried about
    [Macfarlane] working closely with young recruits” and could
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    Macfarlane v. CSRO
    not use Macfarlane as either an investigator or a trainer. Finally,
    with respect to whether Macfarlane’s offenses were willful or
    knowing (finding 5), the CSRO noted that Macfarlane and his
    wife “had already agreed to lie about [his affairs] if the situation
    arose.” Thus, the CSRO’s findings are adequate to permit
    meaningful judicial review, and we need not instruct the CSRO
    to revisit its findings. See Bailey, 
    2012 UT App 365
    , ¶¶ 15–16.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶48 There is substantial evidence that Macfarlane was
    dishonest with Director in the 2015 Interview and failed to
    cooperate with another agency’s investigation due to a conflict of
    interest. Next, Macfarlane has not demonstrated that POST
    violated its prior practice when it terminated him. And even if
    POST did treat Macfarlane differently from other similarly
    situated employees, Macfarlane has not shown any harm from
    any inconsistent treatment. Lastly, the CSRO’s findings are
    adequate to permit meaningful judicial review. We therefore
    decline to disturb the CSRO’s decision upholding the
    termination of Macfarlane’s employment.
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